72 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Declared as their Opinion, and one of them to Coll Dunbar on the
Retreat, for which he Severely Reprimanded him.
3d: The Want of Indians or other irregulars to give timely Notice of
the Enemy's Approach, having only three or four guides for out
Scouts. Lastly the Novelty of an invisible enemy and the Nature of the
Country, which was entirely a Forest.12
  The statement that the troops were taxed beyond their
powers is too vague to analyze, although it may refer to the
hardships of the march. Dealing with a more specific point, it
may well be true that the men were short of provisions.
Cholmley's Batman mentions that when, on the morning of
battle, the troops halted for breakfast, few of them had any-
thing to eat.13 And certainly the march had been exhausting,
especially for those without previous experience in the wilder-
ness. But neither hunger nor fatigue is an adequate explana-
tion for the mass panic, especially since these same men were
apparently in high spirits just before confronting the enemy.14
  Next we arrive at the question of what role the provincials may
have played. Generally historians have had nothing but praise
for the Americans who fought under Braddock, and in truth it
seems fair to say that during the action they behaved much
better on the whole than did the regulars. But it is also entirely
possible that they played a large role in bringing about the panic
that destroyed Braddock's army. We have already heard the
testimony of Cholmley's Batman that the men fought on dog-
gedly, knowing that if they were captured they would be submit-
ted to "Barbarous Usage" by the enemy. Evidently by this he
means torture, and who but the provincials, particularly the
backwoodsmen, would have filled the men with such a fear?
Quite likely their horrific tales so sensitized the regulars that
when they were suddenly confronted by Beaujeu's Indian force
they were reduced to the level of instinct-the instinct for self-
preservation. British A makes this point emphatically: "The men
from what storys they had heard of the Indians, in regard to
their scalping; and mohawking, were so panick Struck, that their
officers had little or no Command over them."15





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 73


  The fact of the moment would not compromise with fiction.
The Americans' stories were coming true. All around the
troops, in every direction, was the savage enemy. Perhaps if the
men had faced only a French army, even in this situation, they
would have held firm. Perhaps. What can be said with certainty
is that it was specifically the Indian presence that spread terror.
The men knew they were out there, unseen but seeing them all
too clearly, planning their destruction. Their scalps would be
trophies, their torture, sport. Even in the first moments of
battle, an occasional Indian might be seen as he darted from
behind a tree, scalped a dead or wounded soldier who lay off to
the side, and disappeared again into his hiding place. And the
war cries, the incessant, infernal din! There could be no mercy
here. This was indeed an inhuman enemy, implacable, de-
monic. The men shuddered at the sound. Leslie would later
write that "the yell of the Indians is fresh on my ear, and the
terrific sound will haunt me until the hour of my dissolution."16
  The Americans, with their tales of terror, had done much to
bring on the panic. But presumably they had not intended only
to frighten the men. They had rather wished to counsel them
in the "ways of the Indian." They were as contemptuous of
Braddock's regular tactics as he was of theirs. They could not
persuade him or the British officers under his command that
the Indian must be fought in his own way. But they might be
able to convince their comrades "that if they engaged the Indi-
ans in their European Manner of fighting, they would be Beat."
If they could do this, the men might listen to their advice on
how to fight.
  The battle was on now. There was no time to educate. Per-
haps all that remained from the backwoodsmen's stories was a
residue of fear. But still they worked to save the situation-and
in so doing spread further panic. British A notes that with the
first firing "the American Troops tho' without any orders ran
up immediately, some behind Trees, and others into the Ranks,
and put the whole into confusion."17 That some Americans
moved behind trees is beyond dispute, as we shall see. But why





74 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


might others have disrupted the force, apparently on purpose?
Probably to tell the men to take cover. If so-and British A's
claim that some Americans ran through the ranks is quite
plausible-they may have done more harm than good. The
men were geared not only to regular tactics, but more generally
to obedience. Of course, one can scarcely claim that they were
behaving as they were supposed to. But they could still hear the
commands of their superiors, who were ordering them to stay
in line. Then, too, while the trees might mean safety, they
could also mean danger, for that was where the Indians were.
There was a temptation to follow the Americans, however, and
although few of the regulars did, their contrasting emotions
and instincts quite possibly increased their confusion.
  There were undoubtedly many factors involved in the panic,
and of course not all of the troops were affected for identical
reasons. Possibly there is something to the claim that "the Want
of Indians or other irregulars to give timely Notice of the
Enemy's Approach" was a factor in the frenzy. This suggests
that because the enemy was on them so suddenly, the troops
lacked time to prepare themselves mentally for combat. There
is some evidence to support such an argument. Certainly the
men appear to have been in high spirits as they marched north
from the river, largely because of their apparent confidence
that they would not be attacked, the enemy having failed to
contest their crossing. Perhaps the shock of confrontation did
indeed unnerve them.
  The telescoping may also have played some part. As the
detachments crushed together, Braddock's troops became sepa-
rated from their immediate superiors, and also lost their places
in the order of march. The typical British private was a pro-
duct of a system of discipline aimed at developing in him a new
set of instincts. His reaction to orders was to be not reasoned,
but involuntary. For his company to function as a unit, he had
to know his place, and this meant knowing who belonged on
his right and who on his left. Suddenly, with the collision of
forces, the troops became separated from their officers and





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 75


their comrades. They were now lost, although surrounded by
humanity. And one may well imagine that such men, inexperi-
enced and confused, would have panicked when deprived of
the steadying leadership of those in command.18
  Of course, it was not only the telescoping that separated
officers and men. Even during the first few minutes of fighting,
a significant proportion of the former were killed or incapaci-
tated. Their distinctive uniforms singled them out to the en-
emy. Those who were mounted were in particular danger, as
one may gather from Stewart's testimony that of the twenty-
nine in his unit of light horse, all but four were killed during
the battle. Finally, it is possible that many of the officers reck-
lessly-as well as heroically--exposed themselves before the
enemy in a vain attempt to rally their forces. According to
Dunbar, the officers, hoping to draw the troops out of the
disordered mass that had resulted from collision and panic,
"advanced into the front, & soon became the mark of the
Enemy, who scarce left one, that was not killed or wounded."
An army like Braddock's, geared to discipline and frankly
opposed to individual initiative on the part of common soldiers,
had to suffer considerable loss of order when the influence of a
large number of officers was removed in such a brief span of
time. It is noteworthy that the advance party, whose retreat
marked the real beginning of disaster, was particularly hard-hit
during the first few minutes. As we have seen, Gates himself
claims that fifteen of eighteen officers in that detachment were
dead or wounded before reinforcements arrived. We can well
imagine the confusion and terror of the men as their superiors
fell one by one. In the working party, St. Clair himself was
among the first wounded, and, by his own testimony, he was
unconscious for most of the battle.19 Perhaps this played its
part in the retreat of his detachment.
  As we can see, the eyewitnesses themselves suggest various
reasons for the mass panic, and common sense provides others.
But time and again our reporters return to the point that the
troops were shocked by the nature of the enemy. Judging from





         76 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the evidence, it seems most of all to have been fear of an
inhuman and unseen foe that within a few minutes destroyed
the discipline Braddock had worked so hard to engender, and
drove his men to huddle like sheep.20
  What had minutes before been a proud army was now a
frightened mass. Several factors-the loss of many officers, the
telescoping, and panic-had brought the troops to this sorry
situation. But their terror alone precluded a reordering. "Such
was the confusion, that the men were sometimes 20 or 30 deep,
and he thought himself securest, who was in the Center." So
says British A, with both the implicit consensus of eyewitnesses
and common sense to support him.21 Enough officers re-
mained active to coordinate a rally, were the men willing to be
rallied. And now Braddock himself took the lead.
  Seeing his forces on the point of total disintegration, the
general rode ahead. According to Orme, after Braddock sent
Burton's detachment forward, he ordered an aide-de-camp to
ride to the front "to bring him an account of the nature of
attack, but the fire continuing, he moved forward himself,
leaving Sr Peter Halket with the command of the baggage."
Orme's account is reasonable, and he was in a good position to
observe what he relates. It also helps to explain why a few
eyewitnesses in the vanguard mistakenly claim that the general
himself, rather than Burton, led reinforcements to the front.
On the basis of Orme's testimony, it is even possible to conjec-
ture that Braddock was already on the scene at the time of the
collision, though more probably he arrived shortly thereafter,
likely followed by remnants of the main body.
  The courage he was to show in the heat of battle would win
the praise not only of his admirers, but of his critics as well. He
would have been easy enough for the enemy to single out, in
his gaudy uniform, on horseback, racing wildly back and forth
to the perimeters of action. Bullets whistled past him. Horse
after horse was shot out from under him-some eyewitnesses
say four, others five.22 Always he remounted, always he rode
on, desperately trying to rally his troops. He failed in his






             "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 77
efforts, but enough sources report that one may judge how he
hoped to stem the chaos. Orme gives the clearest account: "The
whole were now got together in great confusion. The colours
were advanced in different places, to separate the men of the
two regiments. The General ordered the officers to endeavour
to form the men, and to tell them off into small divisions and to
advance with them; but neither entreaties nor threats could
prevail." The statement that officers advanced the colours in an
attempt to help the troops sort themselves out is Orme's alone,
but no one contradicts it, and it is entirely plausible. His claim
that Braddock ordered the men divided into small parties-or,
as some would have it, platoons-is supported by Stephen and
by British A. In all probability, the general hoped to divide and
redivide his men, in two or more stages, first by regiment,
finally by platoon.
  In his attempts to rally the forces, Braddock was well served
by the officers under his command. It is scarcely surprising that
the eyewitnesses who report generally have nothing but praise
for the officers as a whole, considering that with few exceptions
they themselves are spokesmen for that class. Some of them, like
Gage, are clearly self-serving, and try to leave no doubt as to
their own coolness under fire. Others, however, seem to have
less to gain through their praise. They commend particular
officers with no apparent motive other than to recognize cour-
age. Thus we see Gordon singling out Burton as one who be-
haved with exceptional valor.23 But probably more convincing is
the fact that the army did stand its ground for more than two
hours, despite the evident terror of the troops. Had the officers
themselves panicked, their men, Braddock notwithstanding,
would probably have followed them in headlong retreat.
  As it was, the heroism of Braddock and his subordinates
accomplished little. This was due primarily to the panic of the
regulars and the unwillingness of the troops in general to take
the offensive. If the men did not retreat, neither would they
advance.
  Some few do appear to have attacked-in their own way.





          78 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
Early in the battle, a high proportion of the Americans had
scrambled behind trees, intent on fighting Indian style. Their
number included almost the whole of the rear guard. Our only
indication of how the rear guard behaved during the battle
comes from Mackellar, who in his second map reveals the men
of that detachment "divided (round the rear of the Convoy,
now closed up) behind Trees having been attacked by a few
Indians." Mackellar would probably not have been in a position
to know this from personal observation, but he would have
received the testimony of Stephen and other officers at the
scene. Although there is no way of being certain, it is probable
that the rear guard, when first attacked, fought in a conven-
tional manner, under the command of Halket. But when the
colonel was killed, within minutes of his meeting with Brad-
dock, his men reverted to the style of fighting they knew best,
which they considered perfectly suited to the situation.24
  We have seen that the majority of those Americans who had
joined Braddock at Fort Cumberland were riffraff, specifically
eastern-shore riffraff, not the sort who would have been famil-
iar with forest fighting technique. Yet, those who were now
fighting the Indians on their own terms appear to have known
what they were doing and, in fact, seem to have been fairly
successful. Of course, many, particularly those recruited by the
regiments, undoubtedly panicked with their British brethren.
But the proportion of Americans who not only fought Indian
style but did so with apparent expertise is impressive. Perhaps
Braddock had left the weaker provincial units with Colonel
Dunbar and had kept the better fighters, unaware that they
would use irregular tactics in a situation such as this.
  The general fought their inclination. He was not about to
allow the Americans, or his regulars, to vanish into the forest.
Perhaps he feared particularly that the provincials would set a
bad example for the rest of the men. Be that as it may, he
strove mightily to get them back into line. Among our twenty-
two basic eyewitnesses, only Cholmley's Batman refers to his
attempts, and even he is not as specific as we might wish. Our






             "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 79
main source in this regard is James Burd, who wrote a letter to
Governor Morris in which he related an account of the action,
given him by Colonel Dunbar. According to Dunbar, after the
early attempts to dislodge the enemy had proven fruitless, "the
Soldiers... insisted much to be allowed to take to the Trees,
which the General denied and stormed much, calling them
Cowards, and even went so far as to strike them with his own
Sword for attempting the Trees." Despite the fact that this is a
thirdhand account, and that Dunbar may have wanted to put
Braddock in a bad light, the statement seems to be for the most
part accurate.25 The general would certainly have "stormed
much" at those who took to the trees. Whether he called them
cowards or struck them is less certain, but not at all improbable.
He was never known to be even-tempered.
  All elements in the scenario of battle were now present. The
regulars were crammed into a small area and were desperately
striving for the sanctuary of the center.26 Their officers, and
most of all their general, were hoping against hope to rally
them. It had taken the army only about one-half hour to get
itself into this sorry state. For the next two hours, the situation
would remain almost static. What few developments were to
come during this time would favor the enemy. And all the
while, Braddock's men would be dying.
  When the vanguard had retreated in confusion, it had aban-
doned the two six-pounders that Gage had earlier left with St.
Clair on the assumption that they would not be needed. As one
might expect,, the French soon moved out of their hiding places
at the front, seized the small cannon, retreated to a point of
sanctuary, and turned them against their erstwhile owners.
There is no way of knowing precisely when this occurred, but it
was probably not long after the British had collapsed into
chaos.27
  This seizure of the British artillery added a new dimension to
the adversary's power to kill. Historical tradition to the con-
trary, it is possible that Braddock, seeing his troops helpless
before the enemy barrage, ordered a retreat. According to





80 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Orme, "When the General found it impossible to persuade
them to advance, and no enemy appeared in view; and nev-
ertheless a vast number of officers were killed, by exposing
themselves before the men; he endeavored to retreat them in
good order; but the panic was so great that he could not
succeed." British A claims, more cryptically, that "within about
two hours and a half, the men were obliged to (at least did)
retreat 3 or 4 times, and were as often rallied." Perhaps it was
Braddock who ordered these retreats, in the hope that once
clear of the worst of the enemy fire the men might regroup for
a counterattack. But the panic did not abate.
  Even if there was no attempted retreat, there was action. In
his second map, Mackellar attempts to portray the British, with
the exception of the rear guard, "joined, with little or no order,
but endeavouring to make Fronts towards the Enemys Fire."
Soldiers do not "make Fronts" of their own volition, though
they may shoot wildly. To make a front requires coordination
to a degree that can be produced only by order. Therefore,
what Mackellar probably means is that at least some of the men
responded when their superiors ordered them to form. Such a
statement would accord very well with our other reports, for it
would imply not only that the officers were ordering counter-
measures, but that the men were to some extent responding.
Indeed, Mackellar goes on to claim that the British sought "to
recover the Guns and to gain the Hill to no purpose." In the
context of other accounts, this may be taken to mean that they
tried but failed. Still, even if they only tried, it shows some
willingness on the part of the men to take offensive action.
  Why did they fail? Gage provides a clue, and in this case his
testimony is entirely credible.
General Braddock tried all methods to draw the men out of this con-
fusion, made several efforts to recover the cannon, as also to drive the
enemy from our flanks, as likewise to gain possession of the hill al-
ready mentioned. Some few men were at times prevailed on to draw
out for this purpose, but before they had marched twenty yards,
would fall back into a line of march by files, and proceed to attack in





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 81


this manner, till an officer, or perhaps a man or two, should be struck
down, and then the rest immediately gave way; the men would never
make one bold attack, though encouraged to it by the enemy always
giving way, whenever they advanced even on the most faint attack.
What Gage is saying essentially is that only a few men were
willing to leave the comparative safety of their huddle in order
to move against the terrifying enemy, that even they were gen-
erally not willing to follow orders to form, thinking first in
terms of their own well-being, and that the slightest reverse
would send them hurtling back to the security of the mass.
There is considerable evidence to support his assessment, and
we shall soon encounter one vivid case of the kind he
describes.28
  While the British army disintegrated, enemy ambitions rose.
That morning, the French appear to have hoped only to repel
the invaders. Now they seemed intent on annihilating them. Or
perhaps it was not they at all who were determining the flow of
battle. Perhaps the Indians were in control. For all of Dumas's
trumpeting, it is quite possible that his orders were of little
importance, and that the warriors raced down the British
flanks of their own accord. Such a tactic was typical. As Dr.
Thomas Smith wrote a decade later, the Indians always fought
"scattered, and never in a compact body." Smith, himself not a
military man but one with strong army contacts, also asserted
that "their general maxim is to surround their enemy." Here
we recognize a possible blueprint for the strategy that engulfed
Braddock's army.
  Our French informants unfortunately have little to say of
tactics. This oversight leaves us with British testimony and the
obvious drawback that we are dealing with men who did not
know what the enemy was thinking. Furthermore, the clearest
source, Cholmley's Batman, is not the most desirable, for he
was by no means an experienced battlefield reporter. But he
could at least relate his impression that the Indians in particu-
lar were seeking to surround the British.
  According to him, during the first moments of battle the











                   Illustrations


Major-General Edward Braddock                  FRONTISPIECE
    Mezzotint engraving by William Sartain, 1899.
    Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Sir John St. Clair                                       11
    From a miniature by John Singleton Copley.
    Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylva-
    nia.
Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Linard de Beaujeu     23
    Portrait by Henri Beau. Courtesy of the Public
    Archives of Canada.
Thomas Gage                                              34
    Portrait by John Singleton Copley, ca. 1769. Mas-
    sachusetts State House, Boston.
Robert Orme                                              41
    Portrait by Sir Joshua Reynolds, ca. 1756. Repro-
    duced by courtesy of the Trustees, The National
    Gallery, London.
George Washington                                        43
    Portrait by Charles Willson Peale. Washington-
    Curtis-Lee Collection, Washington and Lee Uni-
    versity, Virginia.
Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas                                53
    Portrait by an unidentified artist.


ix





82 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


advance party faced extermination: "Immediately they began
to Ingage us in a half Moon and still Continued Surrounding
us more and more. Before the whole of the Army got up we
had about two thirds of our men Cut of [f] that Ingaged at the
First." This tactic he mentions again in discussing a later aspect
of the battle: "They begin to Inclose us more and more till they
had Nigh Inclosed us in." Finally, viewing the last moments of
action, he notes that he "expected Nothing but death for Every
Oone of us, for they had us surround[ed] all but a little in the
Rear, which they strove for with all their Force." Likewise,
Gordon comments that at the onset of fighting the Indians "fell
upon the flank partys, which only consisted of an officer & 20
men, who were very soon Cut off." This corroborates the
testimony of Cholmley's Batman to some extent-apparently
the Indians from the start followed a policy of divide and
massacre. Common sense also suggests that the enemy sought
to surround the British. After all, once the telescoping had
taken place, almost the whole of Braddock's army was wedged
into an area perhaps two hundred yards in length. The rear
guard, although separate, was small and about half a mile
behind-hardly in a position to break a cordon. To surround
the beleaguered British was an obvious maneuver that the
enemy forces apparently sought to effect. Their failure may
have been due primarily to the artillery that the British yet
retained.29 So passed two hours, the officers attempting to rally
their men, the French and Indians seeking to surround their
enemy in order to administer the coup de grace, chaos the rule.
  On every side Braddock's troops fell, victims of the folly of
frightened men. Certainly the French and Indians were re-
sponsible for many deaths, but the evidence is overwhelming
that more British soldiers were killed by their comrades than by
the enemy. British D goes so far as to claim that some of those
who fired at their officers did so not in confusion, but out of
malice: "In Spight of what the Officers and bravest Men could
do, Numbers ran away, nay fired on us, that would have forced
them to rally."30 Generally, however, the eyewitnesses suggest






             "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 83
that the men in their panic fired wildly. British A presents
perhaps the most vivid picture:
If any got a shot at [an Indian], the fire immediately ran through the
whole Line, tho' they saw nothing but Trees; The whole Detachment
was frequently divided into several parties, and then they were sure to
fire on one another. the greatest part of the men who were behind
trees, were either kill'd or wounded by our own People, even one or
two officers were killed by their own Platoon.
His testimony is corroborated by such disparate sources as Wash-
ington, Croghan, Gage, and Dunbar. And possibly the most
impressive support of all comes from British B, who is on so
many other points a maverick:
The Confusion and destruction was so great, that the men fired ir-
regularly, one behind another, and by this way of proceeding many
more of our men were killed by their own party than by the Enimy, as
appeared afterwards by the bullets that the surgeons extracted from
the wounded, they being distinguished from the french and Indian
bullets by their size.... Among the wounded men, there were two for
one of these bullets extracted by the Surgeons, and the wounds were
chiefly in the back parts of the body, so it must also been among the
kill'd.31
  Perhaps one incident points up more clearly than any other
the extent of panic. British C relates that "Capt. Waggoner,
with 170 Virginians, went up to where the Enemy was hid and
routed them: But O unhappy! our Infatuateds seeing a Smoke,
fired and killed him with several of his Men." He is wrong in
claiming that the unfortunate captain was Thomas Waggoner,
who in fact escaped from the battle unscathed. He may mean
Lieutenant Edmund Waggoner, who was killed in some way, or
perhaps Captain William de Peyronie, who apparently died in
the tragic fashion described here. British C's account is other-
wise quite plausible. Panic-stricken men, desperate to see the
barest sign of an enemy that seemed invisible, would likely have
shot in the direction of any puff of smoke. The Americans,
concealed behind trees, were obvious targets. Such was the
price of courage.





84 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


  After two hours of hopeless confusion and death, the British
made a final attempt to seize the strategic rising ground. Gor-
don provides the fullest description:
The General Order'd the officers to Endeavor to tell off 150 men, &
Advance up the hill to Dispossess the Enemy, & another party to
Advance on -the Left to support the two 12 pounders & Artillery
people, who were in great Danger of Being Drove away By the En-
emy, at that time in possession of the 2 field pieces of the Advanc'd
party. This was the Generals Last Order.... All the Officers us'd their
Utmost Endeavors to Get the men to Advance up the hill, & to Ad-
vance on the left to support the Cannon. But the Enemy's fire at the
time very much Encreasing, & a Number of officers who were Rush-
ing on in the front to Encourage the men Being killed & wounded,
there was Nothing to Be seen But the Utmost panick & Confusion
amongst the Men.
British A and Orme present material that elaborates on Gor-
don's version. It was undoubtedly Burton who led the forces
that attempted to seize the rising ground. When he was
wounded, along with several others, his troops broke and ran.
If we accept Gage's account, noted earlier, it appears that this
was just one of several such attacks, all of which were stymied
in similar fashion.
  It was by now shortly after four o'clock.32 The battle had
raged for more than three hours. Many soldiers had already
fled. These included the wagoners, who, according to several
eyewitnesses, had unharnessed the horses and ridden off on
them, dampening any remaining hope the British had of ad-
vancing, should they somehow break through the enemy
lines.33
  Suddenly, Braddock's army was in retreat, in a rout! Sud-
denly, after these long hours of chaos and death, the troops,
willing to stand no more, were striving madly for the sanctuary
of the river!
  Why had they suddenly broken, after having for so long held
their ground? The most obvious reason is that Braddock him-
self had fallen wounded. No fewer than eight sources note that





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 85


the rout began only moments after he was shot. It would be
difficult not to see some link between the two.
  Mackellar gives us two other incidents that may have played
a part in causing the retreat. According to him, "the British
were at length beat from the Guns. The General was wounded
soon after. They were lastly beat back across the Hollow way
and made no farther Stand." The guns referred to are three
twelve-pounders originally held by the main body. None of the
evidence would suggest that the French actually turned these
cannon against their former owners, as they had the six-
pounders in the front, but perhaps they did; in any case, the
frightening potential was there. Mackellar's reference to the
"Hollow way" is to a furrow that had bisected the army at the
start of battle, and over which Burton's detachment had
marched in its attempt to relieve the vanguard. In his state-
ment that the army was beaten back beyond the hollow way,
Mackellar may have misunderstood what was going on. Rather
than marking the onset of rout, this withdrawal appears to
have been a strategic move to protect the baggage until an
orderly retreat could be effected. Gage relates that

many of the men began to go off, and the General was wounded; what
remained, was to endeavour to cover the retreat of the ammunition
and provisions, but those that drove the horses went off with them.
The men that covered the wagons went off by tens and twenties, till
reduced to a very small body, which, receiving a fire from the enemy,
went to the right-about, and the whole were put to flight.

  Gordon provides still a third account. To his memory, after
Burton had been wounded and his attempt to seize the rising
ground had failed,

those officers who had Been wounded having Return'd, and those that
were not Wounded, By Exhorting & threatning had influence to keep
a Body about 200 an hour longer in the field, but cou'd not perswade
them Either to attempt the hill again, or Advance far Enough to
support the Cannon, whose officers & men were Mostly kill'd and
wounded. The Cannon silenc'd, & the Indians shouts upon the Right





86 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Advancing, the whole Body gave way, & Crossed the Monongahela
where we had pass'd in the Morning.

The engineer's version is not so unique as it may seem. Like
Gage, he substantially claims that many men had already fled
the scene by this late hour. Gordon, in fact, suggests that a
preponderant majority of those who were able had taken flight.
Like Gage also, he implies that the men were in essence
ordered to retreat,34 that they might cover the guns. Gordon
says "advance," but this would depend on perspective. The
cannon in question were, presumably, the three twelve-
pounders that Mackellar suggests had been lost before Brad-
dock was wounded. Perhaps Gordon is mistaken in suggesting
that they were still in British hands, but it is more probable that
Mackellar is confused in his ordering of events, since sequence
is such a common source of error.
  On the question of time, it appears that Gordon is exaggerat-
ing. Virtually all other sources suggest that once the retreat
began in earnest, it quickly developed into a rout. We would
expect the officers to present a picture of precipitate flight, but
not even Cholmley's Batman refutes them. On the contrary, he
reports that the Indians "prosued us Better than a mile and
Cut many of [f] in going through the River. All the wounded
that Could not walk fell in the Enemyis hands but was given no
Quarters." All of the reporters who refer to the retreat do so in
like fashion, to the point where we can almost sense the terror
of the troops as they fled, Indians at their heels, desperate
hope for mere survival governing their actions. Perhaps British
A gives the most vivid account. In his recollection, the men
"made a most precipitate Retreat, every one trying who should
be the first. the Enemy pursued us, butchering as they came, as
far as the other side of the River; in crossing it they shot many
in the water, both men and women, scalping and cutting them
in a most Barbarous manner."
  Even as the battered army fled, a few whose sense of human-
ity was still master to their instinct for survival stopped to aid





            "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 87
wounded comrades. Among the fallen was Braddock-alive,
but beyond consolation. If we accept a popular rumor that
circulated in the wake of battle, he asked Croghan to lend him
his pistols, so that he might "die as an old Roman." Croghan
refused, and he, Washington, Stewart, and a few others, man-
aged to carry the general from the scene. Orme apparently
later claimed that he had tried to bribe the fleeing regulars to
aid their commander, all to no avail.35
  That the enemy pursued the fleeing forces no farther than
the river was the best of what little luck Braddock's army had
that day. Had it followed, Dunbar claims, a force of one hun-
dred could have annihilated the remaining troops. British A
states that the retreat could have been cut off by a mere
half-dozen. The latter at least is exaggerating, perhaps for
effect, but the disorder of the troops was such that Dunbar's
opinion cannot be dismissed out of hand. Orme in fact states
that the enemy force that did pursue, inflicting great losses,
numbered no more than fifty.
  Why was there no massive pursuit? The French reporters give
three possible reasons. According to Pouchot, Dumas's army
soon gave up the chase, "because the Indians could not wait to
plunder and drink." His testimony is to some extent confirmed
by Cameron, whose vantage point, though poor, allowed him to
observe that "the whole Army of the Enemy fell to plundering,
&c.... Among the Plunder they found near Two Hogshead of
Rum, and the Indians, as likewise the French Soldiers, fell to
drinking, and soon got themselves pretty drunk, and went off."
Contrecoeur claims that Dumas could not pursue because so
many Canadians had fled at the start of battle that the captain
now retained only about twenty French troops. The implication
here is that the Indians needed supervision that Dumas, under
the circumstances, could not provide. Finally, French C relates
that "our forces pursued them for some time, but sieur Dumas,
having learned that General Braddock had left some leagues to
the rear a corps of seven hundred men under the orders of
Colonel Dunbar, ordered a halt."





88 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


  Pouchot's account stands up a bit better than the other two,
but this is not to say that it is correct. Contrecoeur slips on his
statement that Dumas had only a score of Frenchmen still
with him. We have seen that over one hundred French
officers and men had joined the march that morning, in addi-
tion to 146 Canadians. Even if we take Dumas at his word,
only one hundred-"one-half of our French forces"-fled at
the start of battle, and these mostly militiamen. Furthermore,
French casualties were light, as were those of the Canadians
and Indians. According to Contrecoeur's own reckoning, only
eight Frenchmen and Canadians were killed, of a total of
twenty-three who died fighting the British. Furthermore, he
sets the number of wounded at only sixteen, twelve of them
Indians. It is fair to judge, therefore, that Dumas retained
somewhere between fifty and sixty Frenchmen under his com-
mand, in addition to whatever number of Canadians had held
their ground. For that matter, I have already suggested that
Dumas's account of precipitate flight probably represents a
considerable exaggeration, although it was one Contrecoeur
chose to swallow. French C's statement that the French and
Indians pursued the British for "some time" does not hold up,
though his opinion that they halted because they feared Dun-
bar's detachment is reasonable. Of course, Dunbar was in real-
ity about sixty miles to the rear, but the French did not know
this, as Contrecoeur confirms, and they likely believed that he
was much closer. It is quite possible, therefore, that Dumas
feared the consequences if his forces, in headlong and disor-
derly pursuit, ran into a well-armed detachment of seven hun-
dred. Besides, he apparently anticipated a counterattack, and
to this end concentrated on securing the munitions and other
materiel the British had left on the field. Those Indians who
had pursued the fleeing British soon returned, apparently
fearful that they would be deprived of their fair share of
plunder. And the Indians could have guessed with reason that
somewhere in the wagons was liquor. Pouchot's assertion is
therefore most plausible, but the errors noted in the cases of






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 89


Contrecoeur and French C are not great enough to invalidate
their claims. The three reasons given are in any case not mu-
tually exclusive.
  Dumas need not have feared a counterattack. On the western
bank of the Monongahela, the scene was one of mindless ter-
ror, as men rushed to retrace the steps they had taken that
morning. Perhaps even a few officers joined in the panic.
Croghan says as much: "When the men were going off, many
of the officers called out Halt, Halt, which the men mostly did,
but the Officers continued on and got the heels of them."
Taken literally, this statement is implausible. Why would the
officers first call on their men to halt, and moments later
themselves lead a disorderly flight? The most likely explanation
is that Croghan is simply being vague in his usage. Some officers
tried to stop the mad retreat, while others led it. If this is what
Croghan means, it makes sense, but we should not be surprised
that most of the accounts, being the work of officers, tend to
note only the heroic aspect. First, there is Washington's famous
description of the retreat, to and from the river, led through-
out by the cowardly regulars:

At length, in despight of every effort to the contrary, [they] broke and
run as Sheep before the Hounds, leav'g the Artillery, Ammunition,
Provisions, and, every individual thing we had with us a prey to the
Enemy; and when we endeavour'd to rally them in hopes of regaining
our invaluable loss, it was with as much success as if we had attempted
to have stop'd the wild Bears of the Mountains.

  Most of the officers who have left detailed accounts concen-
trate on what happened after the army had recrossed the Mo-
nongahela, but otherwise their comments support Washington.
Dunbar, Orme, British A, and Gordon all claim that once
across the river the officers vainly attempted to rally their men.
The last in particular gives a vivid account, in which we see
once more the heroism of Burton: "Coll: Burton tho' very
much Wounded attempted to Rally on the Other Side, & made
a Speach to the Men to Beg them to get into some Order, But





         90 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
Nothing would Do, & we found that Every man wou'd Desert
us; therefore we were oblig'd to go along."
  Perhaps it was just as well that the men refused to take a
stand. Considering their losses, the British were by now
actually outnumbered. Furthermore, the French were in pos-
session of the cannon and a great deal of ammunition.
Dumas's vigilance limited the likelihood that a counterattack
would succeed. Only if the victors were indeed very drunk
would the British have had a chance. Perhaps, as Cameron
states, the British could have returned that night, after the
French and Indians had left the field, and destroyed some of
their remaining supplies, but this was all. Their defeat was
itself irreversible.
  So began the ignominious retreat that was to end only in
Philadelphia.

  Back on the field lay the wealth of Braddock's army. There
was, first and foremost, the vast store of munitions, although
indeed it was less impressive than that which Colonel Dunbar,
at Braddock's command, would destroy before beginning his
own retreat. There were also well over five hundred cattle and
horses-many of which were slaughtered on the field itself-as
well as provisions and valuable equipment. The wagons left
behind presumably included almost all of the thirty-odd that
Braddock had taken from the Little Meadows. In one of them,
the French discovered the general's war chest, containing sev-
eral thousand pounds. Another find was of perhaps even
greater consequence. This was a collection of Braddock's pri-
vate papers, including instructions to him from George II and
Cumberland, and copies of his own letters. The documents
enabled the French to piece together a history of his expedition
and provided them with invaluable information on the respec-
tive campaigns of Shirley and Johnson. Finally, they gave them
a great propaganda weapon, for now France could prove to the
world that the English, while proclaiming peaceful intentions,
had been preparing for war.36





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 91


  But the greatest British losses were not inanimate. On the
battlefield the fallen hosts of Braddock's army lay, soon to be
joined in death by the general himself. Counting those who
would die of their wounds, the British lost perhaps five hun-
dred men." Here at the scene of ignominy lay most of them,
symbols of the bloodiest defeat Britain had ever suffered on
the North American continent.
   Those who had died on the battlefield at least did not have to
endure the agonies of the wounded. Years later, Washington
recalled the horrors he and the men experienced on their
retreat to Dunbar's camp: "The shocking Scenes which pre-
sented themselves in this Nights March are not to be described.
The dead, the dying, the groans, lamentation, and crys along
the Road of the wounded for help ... were enough to pierce a
heart of adamant.""38
   At the site of their humiliation, those of the vanquished who
 could not flee were treated with a common callousness, the
 living as the dead. According to Cameron, some French
 officers tried-with considerable success, he implies-to stop
 the Indians from scalping enemy soldiers who were yet alive.
 His poor vantage point and the fact that he probably could not
 understand the French orders make him a questionable source.
 He may merely have noted a rumor that circulated in the wake
 of the battle, but if so he did it with the feeling that it was likely
 true, for he had no reason to be biased in favor of the French.
   It is certain that the Indians kept some of their prisoners.39
 Others, however, were not so lucky. There is no way of know-
 ing how or why they were singled out, but it is all too clear what
 happened to them. In the black of that night was played out
 the ghastly ritual that Braddock's men had feared throughout
 the afternoon. Some forty-four years later, Colonel James
 Smith recalled the horrors he had witnessed as a young pris-
 oner at Fort Duquesne:

 About sundown I beheld a small party coming in with about a dozen
 prisoners, stripped naked, with their hands tied behind their backs,






92 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


and their faces and parts of their bodies blacked; these prisoners they
burned to death on the bank of the Allegheny river, opposite to the
fort. I stood on the fort wall until I beheld them begin to burn one of
these men; they had tied him to a stake, and kept touching him with
firebrands, red-hot irons, &c., and he screamed... .; the Indians, in
the mean-time, yelling like infernal spirits.40

  Five years passed. Fort Duquesne fell, to be replaced by Fort
Pitt. Throughout the Ohio Valley and on into Canada, the
British turned defeat into glorious victory. Then, one day in
early September 1760, Colonel Jehu Eyre went riding with a
friend:
Monday... we set off through the woods to go to Braddock's field,
and on our journey we met with several Indian huts which the Indians
had left; and when we came to the place where they crossed of the
river Monongahela, we saw a great many men's bones along the shore.
We kept along the road about 11/2 miles, where the first engagement
begun, where there are men's bones lying about as thick as the leaves
do on the ground; for they are so thick that one lies on top of another
for about a half a mile in length, and about one hundred yards in
breadth.41







t0  FIVE t


                     Retrospect


EVEN AS DARKNESS covered the battlefield dead, even as the
battered army retreated in agony, controversy billowed. Within
days of Braddock's death, on July 13, those in the countryside
surrounding had heard of the disaster, and they were as quick
to draw conclusions as they were to load their muskets in
anticipation of an Indian onslaught. As Dunbar led his pitiful
troops into winter quarters-at the peak of summer-
accusations followed thick and fast. With their advantages in
manpower and munitions, how could the British have failed?
How could they have been defeated-not defeated, but
crushed? Now, with thousands of lives at risk, with the future of
the colonies at stake, angry men sought answers.
  "It is impossible to relate the different accounts that was
given of our late unhappy engagement; but all tended greatly
to the disadvantage of the poor deceased General, who is cen-
sured on all hands." So wrote Washington on July 28, without
exaggeration.1 The reports of eyewitnesses were bad enough.
Rumors, perhaps wholly imaginary to begin with, or else wildly
distorted as they passed from hand to hand, were etched sharp-
ly into the minds of a public which at first sought not to believe,
hoping against hope that Braddock had not been defeated, and
then, when overwhelmed by the evidence, believed all too
freely.
  With each account or rumor, recriminations spread. At the
time, they were hurled at many targets. The British officers
blamed the regulars, the regulars the Americans.2 Cumberland
drew censure for having chosen the route he had, the strategy
he had, and, at least by implication, the general he had.3 Dunbar
was excoriated for having destroyed the ammunition remaining
                             93





94 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


with him, thus precluding a second offensive, and above all for
having led a retreat that left western Pennsylvania stripped of
defenses.4 But, as Washington suggests, the loudest denuncia-
tions of all were reserved for Braddock. Likewise today. Histori-
ans have developed those charges which contemporaries hurled
at the general, and have created some new ones as well.5 This
chapter is devoted to assessing their criticism.
  Before discussing what Braddock has been accused of, let us
see what he has not been. His contemporaries, admirers and
detractors, as well as historians, have tended to ascribe to him
the same virtues. Their testimony sets these forth clearly.
  First, his critics. William Shirley, son of the governor of
Massachusetts and secretary to Braddock, wrote an angry letter
to Morris on May 23. At the time, the young man had less than
seven weeks to live:

We have a G- most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the
Service he is employed in, in almost every respect; he may be brave for
ought I know, and he is honest in pecuniary Matters. But... It is a
Joke to suppose that Secondary Officers can make Amends for the
Defects of the First.

An anonymous writer, who had been behind with Dunbar at
the time of the battle, shortly thereafter let his feelings be
known in a letter to one of his superiors: "In the time of the
Action, The General behaved with a great deal of Personal
Courage, which every body must allow-but thats all that Can
be said-he was a Man of Sense and good natur'd too tho'
Warm and a little uncooth in his manner-and Peevish-with
all very indolent." Finally, Franklin, writing more than thirty
years after Braddock's Defeat, declared: "This general was, I
think, a brave man and might probably have made a figure as a
good officer in some European war. But he had too much
self-confidence, too high an opinion of the validity of regular
troops, and too mean a one of both Americans and Indians."6
  Now we come to the remarks of two who remembered Brad-
dock fondly. The first is Charles Lee, a major general in his






RETROSPECT 95


own right and second-in-command during the Revolution. Like
Stephen, he was British by birth, and like him, he eventually
saw his career come to ruin. But though a volatile man, he
admired Braddock, for whom he fought at the Monongahela:
"There will come a day (I hope) when justice will be done to
this man's memory, who has left few behind him that are his
Equals, in Courage, honesty and Zeal for the Publick, his death
was a cruel stroke to us in particular, and a very unhappy
stroke for the Nation in general." Finally, Washington, speak-
ing through William Findley, reminisced about his deceased
commander years later, during his presidency:
True, true he was unfortunate, but his character was much too se-
verely treated; ... he was one of the honestest and best men of any
British officer with whom he had been acquainted; even in the man-
ner of fighting he was not more to blame than others,-that of all that
were consulted, only one person objected to it.7

There appears to be a consensus that Braddock may be con-
ceded at least two virtues, courage and honesty. His anonymous
critic aside, most have also seen him as dedicated. Unfortu-
nately, these favorable qualities, although they speak well of
him as a man, tend not to be of much importance when he is
viewed as a commander. That he was honest availed him little
at the Monongahela. Even his courage appears to have been
valueless when weighed against the panic of his troops. Let us
see, then, how he may be judged as a general.
  In discussing Braddock's role in the battle, it is worthwhile to
divide his critics into two camps, "traditional" and "modern."
The nature of their differences and the usefulness of this
division will, I hope, become apparent during the course of this
chapter.
  Franklin's statement that Braddock "had too much self-
confidence, too high an opinion of the validity of regular
troops, and too mean a one of both Americans and Indians"
epitomizes the traditionalist view.8 His camp sees the general as
having been an arrogant, stubborn man, too confident not only






96 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


of his own powers, but of the superiority of the method of
warfare with which he had become familiar back in Britain.
Here we have a martinet by design, living by the book, un-
willing even in the heat of battle to allow his experienced
Virginians to fight the Indians in their own way. And for the
Indians themselves, Braddock, according to the traditionalist
view, had nothing but contempt. Of course, part and parcel of
this position is the belief that the Indian method of fighting,
the same one advocated by the Americans under Braddock's
command, would have served him much better in battle than
did his own Continental tactics.
  That Braddock believed in the traditional mode of fighting is
true enough, and he was certainly a disciplinarian. But to call
him a martinet, as some have, is grossly unfair. The discipline
enforced before and during the march was probably no more
rigorous than was normal. Indeed, the British army was geared
to discipline as a means of creating some semblance of a
fighting machine from the riffraff who generally composed the
troops-"the scum of the earth," as Wellington would call
them. The rules laid down by Braddock were not exceptionally
strict, nor did he enforce them with rigor. Apparently not one
soldier under his command was executed, though several were
caught stealing or attempting to desert. On May 14, while the
troops were still in camp at Fort Cumberland, a court-martial
sentenced one Luke Woodward to death for desertion, but
Braddock pardoned him. The same day, he reduced the num-
ber of lashes which, by order of the court-martial, three con-
victed pilferers were to receive.9
  Of course, one might argue, with justice, that even if Brad-
dock did not enforce a discipline which was particularly harsh
by the standards of his day, the soldiers who lived under it may
still have been resentful. This would likely have been the case
among new recruits, particularly Americans, who were not
used to the rigor of the British army. They may well have
considered him a martinet, and if so their opinion has since
come to be accepted as fact by all but a few.






RETROSPECT 97


  But to criticize him as a harsh disciplinarian brings up the
same question raised before in relation to his supposed virtues,
such as honesty. What has this to do with assessing his role in
the Defeat? One anonymous contemporary suggests a link:
The flight of the men was occasioned by the great disgust they had to
their officers. The soldiers from their first arrival, had showed much
discontent, and the officers resolved to get the better and punished
them frequently, but the more the punishments, the more the discon-
tents increased. They say the troops were shot at from behind trees,
and could not see their enemies, on which they ran away, the officers
would have forced them to stand, and killed some of the men for not
standing, so it became a fight between the men and officers, for the
men fired on the officers that struck them, and ran quite away.
Although this is possibly only a thirdhand account, and it is
garbled on some points, we can recognize in it elements of
truth. We have seen that during the battle the officers sought
desperately to keep their men in the field. Indeed, they them-
selves boasted of this. Braddock led them in their herding, and
he may well have struck with his sword those who took shelter
in the forest. He may also have been shot by one of his own
men; and, if we take the word of British D, he was not the only
officer to suffer so.1o
   Our unknown letter writer implies that because discipline
was so harsh during the campaign, the men became totally
alienated from their officers, including Braddock, to the point
where they were more willing to fight against them than for
them. This is possible, but not likely. In regard to the American
soldiers, one cannot have it both ways. Either persistent regi-
mentation and punishment had alienated them, causing them
to behave badly in battle, or they performed well, in which case
the question of discipline, harsh or otherwise, is irrelevant. As
we shall see, and to some extent have seen, most sources sug-
gest that the provincials performed much better than did most
of their British counterparts. It is difficult, therefore, to argue
that discipline had a negative effect on them, although they
may well have resented it. As for the British regulars, the





         98 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
evidence is more tenuous. Cameron explicitly states his admira-
tion for Braddock, and it is doubtful that he does this merely
for effect, but one cannot assume that his attitude was typical.
There is even less to go on when attempting to judge how the
men felt about their officers as a whole. However, the battle
appears to -have been lost primarily as the result of panic, and
this in turn resulted from factors other than alienation. There-
fore, the question of discipline seems not to have much bearing
in their case either, and the whole issue of whether Braddock
was a martinet becomes only marginally relevant in analyzing
the engagement. But the broader question, whether the mili-
tary regimen that Braddock attempted to bring to the colonies
was unsuited to the American situation, is both relevant and
provocative.
  Taking next the oft-repeated claim that Braddock was con-
temptuous of Indians, we find that this is probably the most
complex accusation hurled against him. It has been taken two
ways. First, the simpler charge, that Braddock's contempt for
the Indian caused him to treat with disdain the possibility of
ambush. Franklin claims that he warned the general of exactly
the sort of attack which eventuated, only to be told that "these
savages may, indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw
American militia but upon the king's regular and disciplin'd
troops, sir, it is impossible they should make any impression."
Even assuming that Braddock did make such a statement, his
actions appear to have belied the confidence of his words, for
during his march he constantly took precautions to thwart any
ambush that the French and their Indian allies might mount.'1
Furthermore, in his recruitment of Indians there is evidence
that, at the very least, he respected them as fighters. If he had
wanted them only to reconnoiter, he would have needed no
more than fifty. But he happily anticipated the possibility that
several hundred would join his march. He must therefore have
looked on them largely as auxiliaries.
  The reference to recruitment leads us to the second, more
complex, charge that Braddock was unwise in his Indian policy.






                       RETROSPECT     99
Once again, we may start off with a quotation, this time from
Monakatooka:
He [Braddock] is now dead, but he was a bad man when he was alive;
he looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything that was
said to him. We often endeavoured to advise him and to tell him of
the danger he was in with his soldiers; but he never appeared pleased
with us; and that was the reason that a great many of our warriors left
him and would not be under his command.12
Here we have two main criticisms: that Braddock ignored the
advice of his Indians, and that he alienated them, causing many
to desert him. There is a corollary here, stated explicitly by
many others, that the general was at best halfhearted in his
attempts to recruit Indians. Let us deal with this corollary first,
coupling it with the charge that he treated the Indians who did
join him so badly that many of them left.
   Almost from the moment he arrived in America, Braddock
was involved in Indian affairs. He seems to have been particu-
larly concerned that the British alliance with the Iroquois be
maintained and strengthened, this attitude perhaps reflecting
the influence of Shirley and Johnson. To the latter he wrote
that he had "engag'd in the Indian affairs from the advantage
they seem to be to his Majesty's Colonies."13 There is certainly
no heartwarming assertion of the brotherhood of man to be
found in this statement, but there is a recognition that it was
useful to have the Indians as allies.
   On April 15, Braddock initiated his own attempt to recruit
Indians, when he wrote to Morris:
As I am inform'd there are a Number of Indians in your Province that
formerly liv'd near the River Ohio, & were driven from thence by the
French, I must desire You would acquaint them that I am now on my
March with a Body of the King's Troops, to remove the French from
their Incroachments upon that River, & to restore that Country to our
Allies, the Indians, & to protect them in the Enjoyment of it. And as
those Indians must be very well acquainted wth that Country, & may
be very usefull to me in the Course of this Expedition, I must desire
You will prevail wth the able Men of 'em to join me at Wills's Creek,





100 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


where they shall be kindly receiv'd, & in the Course of the Service
furnish'd with Necessaries.
  You will advise me of what You do in relation to this Affair, & of
the Number of Indians that are to join me from your Province, & I
doubt not your Assembly will take care of the Women & Children 'till
the Return of the men, as they will be very troublesome in the Camp.
The rest of this particular story is well known. Morris for-
warded the order to Croghan, who was able to recruit fifty
warriors. These he led to Fort Cumberland. Braddock was dis-
appointed in the number, but even more so in the fact that
they were accompanied by their womenfolk. Actually, Croghan
had been more realistic than the general, and had assumed that
the Assembly would not allocate funds to support the Indian
families. It was for this reason that he had brought them along.
As Braddock had feared, the women soon did become "trou-
blesome," though not for any reasons his troops would have
resented. Prodigal with their favors, they soon had the men, as
well as some officers, stealing provisions for them. Perhaps ow-
ing to their influence, the drinking problem in camp now in-
creased. Finally, in order to maintain discipline, Braddock felt
compelled to send them home with their men, leaving behind
only Monakatooka and his small band. Croghan later lamented
that "had we had fifty Indians instead of eight, that we might in
a great measure have prevented the surprise, that day of our
unhappy defeat." It is difficult to judge Braddock's decision
without knowing how great a threat the women actually posed
to camp discipline. What can be said with fair assurance is that
he was not the only one who feared their influence. In fact, one
of Morris's agents, Richard Peters, later claimed that he had
persuaded the general to order them out of camp, for the sake
of the expedition.14
  Early in June, Braddock decided that he had too few Indian
allies and asked Croghan to help him recruit some Delawares.
The agent complied by setting up a conference between his
commander and several chieftains, including the well-known
Shingas, who later reported on the proceedings:






RETROSPECT 101


He and 5 other Cheifs of the Delaware Shawnee & Mingo Nations
(Being 2 from Each Nation) had applied to Genl Braddock and En-
quired what he intended to do with the Land if he Coud drive the
French and their Indians away To wch Genl Braddock replied that the
English Shoud Inhabit & Inherit the Land, on wch Shingas askd Genl
Braddock whether the Indians that were Friends to the English might
not be Permitted to Live and Trade Among the English and have Hunt-
ing Ground sufficient To Support themselves and Familys as they had
no where to Flee Too But into the Hands of the French and their
Indians who were their Enemies (that is Shingas' Enemies). On wch
Genl Braddock said that No Savage Should Inherit the Land.... Next
Morning [they] Returned to Genl Braddock again in hopes he might
have Changed his Sentiments and then repeated their Former Ques-
tions to Genl Braddock again and Genl Braddock made the same reply
as Formerly, On wch Shingas and the other Chiefs answered That if
they might not have Liberty to Live on the Land they woud not Fight
for it To wch Genl Braddock answered that he did not need their Help
and had No doubt of driveing the French and their Indians away.
A crushing condemnation? If we accept it as reasonable, yes.
But there is much to be said against such acceptance. First,
there is Croghan's version of the conference:
I sent a messenger to Ohio who returned in eight days and brought
with him three chiefs of the Delawares. The General had a conference
with these chiefs... , and made them a handsome present, and be-
haved as kindly to them as he possibly could during their stay, order-
ing me to let them want for nothing. The Delawares promised in
Council to meet the General on the road, as he marched out, but
whether the former breaches of faith on the side of the English pre-
vented them, or that they had before engaged to assist the French, I
cannot tell; but they disappointed the General and did not meet him.
Here we have the testimony of one who respected the Indians,
although we should be wary, in view of the fact that he was also
sympathetic to the general.15 On certain differences, such as
the number of chiefs involved and their respective tribes, there
is no way of choosing between the two accounts. On overall
thrust, however, I would say that Croghan definitely has an
edge, even though his report is less detailed.










                       Preface


ON JULY 9, 1755, even as the invading Anglo-American
army approached its destination, Fort Duquesne, it was at-
tacked and thoroughly routed by a much smaller force of
French and Indians. One-third of the vanquished were mor-
tally wounded, including their commander, Major General Ed-
ward Braddock. A young George Washington achieved lasting
fame for the valor he displayed in the heat of battle. Braddock,
on the other hand, was marked out for ignominy. So began the
French and Indian War. This, every schoolboy knows.
  But ... does any schoolboy care? Clearly. For better or worse,
Braddock's Defeat remains one of the most famous battles of
our colonial period. Tens of thousands of pages have poured
from the presses, detailing every aspect of the encounter, from
the number of horses Washington had shot out from under him
to the ultimate fate of Braddock's sash. Along the way, some of
the finest American historians have contributed work that ranks
with their best. Only the continuing interest of generations of
schoolboys, and former schoolboys, could justify such coverage.
  Should any schoolboy care? I believe so. To begin with, inter-
est is its own justification. The study of history for no higher
end than enjoyment is scarcely insidious. But the historian-or,
at least, this historian-has reason to hope that an examination
of Braddock's Defeat may do more than merely entertain. In
its own day, after all, the battle held great significance. As a
result of this one action, the British drive to break the power of
France in North America was stymied. Thousands of Indians
who had been straddling the fence to see which way the im-
pending war would turn now allied themselves with the
French. Recriminations rent the colonies.
                             xi





         102 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
  Croghan's claim that Braddock had him distribute presents
to the Indian delegates is very reasonable. Even during his
short stay in America, the general had come to know the
importance of gifts. When he left Dunbar behind at the Little
Meadows, he entrusted to him most of the baggage, but, ac-
cording to Orme, he took along "one waggon of Indian pres-
ents." Was this the sort of man who would have behaved
toward the chieftains with an almost insane haughtiness? Per-
haps they asked more than he felt he could grant. We have
seen that in his letter of April 15, Braddock had instructed
Morris to tell the Indians that the Ohio Valley would become
theirs if it were reclaimed. But it is possible that he and the
Indian delegates whom he met in early June had different
notions of what this pledge meant. Did Shingas and his fellows
demand a recognition of their hegemony in the valley? If so,
Braddock was in no position to grant their wish, for the Iro-
quois claimed that the Ohio region was theirs by conquest. And
as suggested earlier, the general seems first and foremost to
have been interesting in maintaining the alliance with the Six
Nations. He would likely, however, have offered the delegates
more in terms of territorial influence than Shingas suggests.
  These points aside, there is again the common-sense angle.
Would Braddock, after having invited the chieftains to camp,
have been so stupid in his treatment of them? He may not have
been much of a diplomat-this question will be considered
shortly. Certainly he was volatile and fully capable of an emo-
tional outburst. But if we accept Shingas's word that he re-
peated his uncompromising rejection of Indian claims to the
Ohio on two successive days, it appears that he did not do so in
a moment of pique. We have seen that he valued the Indian
alliance, if only for pragmatic reasons. No matter how we look
at it, there is virtually nothing to be said for the wilder accusa-
tions contained in Shingas's account, and much to be said
against our crediting them.16
  This leaves the third and most important attempt to recruit
Indians for the campaign. Ironically, Braddock's involvement





RETROSPECT 103


in it was minimal. Before the troops marched from Fort Cum-
berland, Dinwiddie promised the general that he would pro-
vide him with four hundred Cherokees and Catawbas. What he
did not tell him was that he was feuding with Governor James
Glen of South Carolina, and that both sought control of these
very tribes. At length, Glen and a Virginian trader who was
acting on his own selfish motives managed to intercept the
several hundred Indian recruits who were intent on joining
Braddock, and dissuaded them from heading north. This
strange sequence of events was doubly tragic. A contingent of
Iroquois might have been willing to join the expedition, but
upon hearing that Braddock was to be accompanied by south-
ern Indians, whom they regarded as enemies, the Six Nations
decided to withhold aid, rather than risk a confrontation.
There is no reason to blame Braddock for either of these
misfortunes. But if he had not been the victim of circumstance,
if he had indeed been accompanied by a sizable number of
Iroquois or by the Cherokees and Catawbas, it is likely that he
would have carried the day at the Monongahela, and entirely
possible that the enemy would not even have attempted to
contest his way.17
  The evidence therefore suggests that Braddock actively
sought Indian aid, rather than shunned it, as his critics have
charged. Possibly he did make a mistake in sending away most
of the Indians who had accompanied Croghan. As noted ear-
lier, we lack the evidence to judge how great a threat to disci-
pline the women actually were. But even if he blundered in his
recruitment, others did so more decisively than he.
  On the other hand, I am not claiming that he was wise in his
treatment of the Indians. Perhaps he did not show them the
respect they felt they merited. But Indian diplomacy was a very
tricky business, and there were few successes at it. On this
point, it is worth noting the comments the Half King, a great
ally of the British, had made earlier concerning one of Brad-
dock's chief subordinates: "The Colonel was a good-natured
man, but had no experience; he took upon him to command





         104 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the Indians as his slaves, and would have them every day upon
the scout, and to attack the enemy by themselves, but would by
no means take advice from the Indians." "The Colonel" was
Washington.18
  Finally, there is Monakatooka's charge that Braddock paid
no heed to his Indian scouts.'9 It is probably simplest to discuss
this in the context of a related issue. In the wake of the battle,
Braddock was often accused of having ignored the advice of his
subordinates, both before and during the engagement. British
B in particular throws out this accusation with abandon. Re-
garding Monakatooka, whom he admires, he claims that the
sachem had suggested that Braddock halt, presumably to wait
for Dunbar before marching the last miles. British B also states
that prior to the attack, when the general had ordered the
troops, who were in a line of battle, to fall into a line of march,
both St. Clair and Halket had opposed the move; and that early
in the battle Sir John had requested of Braddock-in Italian,
no less-that he retreat. St. Clair in his own account says that
twice during the march he had urged that Braddock halt and
wait for Dunbar's detachment. Washington and Stephen both
claim that during the march they had often advised the British
officers to train their men in the use of irregular tactics, and
although they do not mention Braddock by name, they must
have known that their arguments could not be effective without
the general's support. For his part, Washington further main-
tains that during the battle he had begged Braddock to allow
him to lead a detachment of experienced forest fighters against
the enemy, only to be refused.20
  It is doubtful that the general received all of this advice, at
least as stated. In particular, British B's assertions appear to be
inaccurate. For one thing, while he refers to several supposed
encounters between Braddock and St. Clair, it appears from
the latter's own account that on the day of battle they met only
after Sir John was wounded, and that he gave no advice except
to order an attack on the rising ground. St. Clair's version is by
far the more plausible of the two. Furthermore, if Sir John had





                     RETROSPECT     105
indeed advised a retreat, he would have mentioned in his
report what in retrospect seemed a wise suggestion, for as we
have seen he was never one to hide his light under a bushel.
  But let us for the moment accept that Braddock did in fact
receive all of the advice noted. Should he have accepted it?
  The suggestion that the troops should have remained in a
line of battle may indeed have merit. We have seen that they
were drawn up in battle either just prior to crossing the river or
on the east bank, and that this was probably done at the
general's order. Such a maneuver was manageable on an open
bank and was clearly called for in view of the present danger,
since it was thought that the enemy might contest the crossing.
For the march from the river to the battlefield, we lose our
consensus. British B alone claims that Braddock ordered the
return to a line of march, and only Gates claims that Burton's
detachment moved up in this formation. Of course, it must be
added that no one contradicts either. One problem in judging
any reference to formation is that our eyewitnesses may not be
consistent in their usage. A battle line was in the eighteenth
century typically thought of as extending across a broad front-
"the drawing up of an Army for Battle, extending its Front as
far as the Ground will allow," as one writer defined it. Such a
formation was clearly impossible in the forest, no matter how
great the danger or sparse the trees. What British B and Gates
therefore desired was some battle formation, the exact nature
of which is unclear. Perhaps Braddock should have marched in
different order-this will be dealt with shortly. But despite
British B and Gates-and, more important, Mackellar-there is
much about the general's formations, before and during the
battle, that we do not know.21
  If Sir John or anyone else told Braddock early on that he
had lost the day and must retreat, this was, in retrospect, good
advice; but it may not have been so at the time. Perhaps
Braddock did attempt for too long to hold the field. This issue
brings in another: At what point should he have acknowledged
defeat and withdrawn? The historical consensus, with which I





         106 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
agree strongly, maintains that if during the early stages of
battle he had been able to rally his men, he would probably
have routed the enemy. Of course, his position deteriorated
steadily, as officers and men fell. Quite possibly he held on
when a more perceptive commander would have realized that
the panic of his troops was such that only retreat could save
them from annihilation. But there was no reason for Braddock
to concede this during the early stages of battle-at least the
first hour of action. So St. Clair's advice, assuming he gave it,
was premature, even if prophetic.22
  Moving on to Sir John's own statement-that he had twice
advised that the general halt and allow Dunbar's detachment to
catch up-it is difficult to credit him with anything but foolish-
ness, and the same may be said for Monakatooka if he made a
like suggestion. On July 3, when St. Clair made his proposal to
Braddock, the general, according to Orme, called a council of
war to deal with the issue. The council unanimously rejected St.
Clair's suggestion, citing three main problems: Dunbar's de-
tachment was at least eleven days' march to the rear; the addi-
tion of his forces would be of little use, since the whole could
not advance together; Fort Duquesne might be reinforced
while Braddock waited. Even if the council did not proceed
exactly as claimed by Orme-and there is no evidence to this
effect-the arguments he ascribes to it are reasonable. In fact,
by the time of the battle Dunbar was considerably more than
eleven days' march behind. He was at least fifty miles to the
rear, and estimates range upward to about seventy. This was
not entirely his fault, since Braddock had left him only the
poorest horses, as well as most of the wagons. But even if the
general had sent back some of his own horses-which were
none too strong themselves-he could not have brought his
second division up for at least two weeks, and probably closer
to three. Furthermore, one doubts that it was worth bringing
up. The men whom Braddock had left behind at the Little
Meadows were for the most part the dregs of his army. Perhaps
we can get some insight into their quality by noting the follow-





                     RETROSPECT     107
ing anecdote, which is well substantiated. On the morning of
July 10, the wagoners who had fled from the battlefield
brought news of the shocking defeat to Dunbar's men. Accord-
ing to an eyewitness, "about Noon of the same Day they beat to
Arms in Coll. Dunbar's Camp, upon which the Waggoners as
well as many common Soldiers took to flight in spite of the
Opposition made by the Centrys." It is difficult to believe that
men who could be terrified so easily would have behaved well
in the heat of the battle. More than likely, if Braddock had
waited for Dunbar, the only result would have been still heavier
losses. Indeed, it is possible that his second division served the
general best by remaining behind, for we have noted testimony
that one reason the enemy did not pursue the retreating Brit-
ish was their fear of encountering Dunbar.23
   One last major line of advice that Braddock supposedly re-
ceived also introduces the most common "traditional" charge
against him. Should he have allowed the Americans to use
irregular tactics during the battle? We may judge this with or
without reference to Washington's claim that he offered to lead
his fellow provincials in an Indian-style attack.
   That the Americans fought better than their British counter-
 parts at the Battle of the Monongahela is almost beyond dis-
 pute. In defending their role, we can cite not only legend but
 eyewitness accounts as well. Washington and Stephen both
 argue that the provincials behaved much better than the pan-
 icky regulars. So does Cholmley's Batman, himself not an
 American, and thus free of obvious bias in this regard. Indeed,
 the young servant alone among our firsthand reporters insinu-
 ates that Braddock was unwise in his decision not to allow the
 Americans to fight Indian style: "He always strove to keep the
 men together but I belive their might be two hundred of the
 American Soldiers that fought behind Trees and I belive they
 did the moast Execution of Any." When we add this testimony
 to that concerning the heroism of the various provincial units
 that sought to dislodge the enemy from its strategic strong-
 holds, we can see the justice of Washington's famous judgment





108 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


that "the Virginian Companies behav'd like Men and died like
Soldiers."24
  Braddock himself may in his last hours have come to feel
that he had undervalued the Americans. He may also, as
claimed by an anonymous writer, have "cursed his own Men,
constantly for Cowardice, and applauded the Virginians." Per-
haps, as he lay dying, he even came to credit American tactics.
According to Washington's adoptive son, the wounded general
lamented to his young aide-de-camp, "Oh, my dear colonel,
had I been governed by your advice, we never should have
come to this."25
  Still, even if we accept as fact the claim that Braddock had a
change of heart, we are not obligated to concede that he
achieved any higher wisdom in retrospect. His judgment dur-
ing battle may have been superior, and indeed the evidence
tends toward that conclusion.
  Elsewhere in this analysis it has been necessary to return to
the fact that during the battle, the regulars for the most part
panicked. This is another such point. Their panic made them
entirely incapable of fighting Indian style. One might argue
that they would possibly have behaved better if their training
had been geared to irregular tactics, as it appears Washington
and others had suggested. But actually, considering their in-
sane fear of Indians and the fact that they panicked almost
immediately, before a disposition of any kind could be made, it
seems doubtful that they would have made better irregular
troops than they did regular.
  The issue is now more limited. Should Braddock have allowed
those Americans who were experienced forest fighters to use
their native tactics during the battle? Again, the question is best
answered in terms of the behavior of the regulars. As we have
seen, the terrified troops tended to fire at anything that moved,
at any puff of smoke signifying a discharge. It was due to their
frenzy that they fired on and killed Peyronie and his men, as well
as other Americans and perhaps Britons who tried to move
against the enemy. Had they themselves gone behind trees, they





RETROSPECT 109


would simply have fired on each other. As it was, they were
almost undoubtedly responsible for most of the casualties suf-
fered by the Americans who secreted themselves. If Braddock
recognized the risk the provincials ran, this was a fine rationale
for his attempts to force them back into formation, for they
could not be in greater danger than they were in the woods.
Even if he did not have this in mind, it justifies his decision.26
  There is also the issue of desertion. In Braddock's day, troops
deserted with incredible alacrity. Indeed, military theorists did
not think that the primary function of a rear guard was to guard
the army's rear, its name to the contrary. Rather, it was intended
mainly to pick up and detain those from other detachments who
dropped out of formation in order to desert. Seeing his troops
panic under fire, Braddock may well have feared that if he al-
lowed them to seek shelter behind the trees, they would in time
desert the field altogether. Even if at first only the Americans
looked to the forest for safety, it was quite possible that many
regulars would follow their example. According to Washington,
during the first moments of battle, "some of the Irregulars (as
they were called) without direcns. advanced to the right, in loose
order, to attack; but this, unhappily from the unusual appearance
of the movement being mistaken for cowardice,... a running
away was discountenanced." Considering the high proportion of
men who actually deserted, it appears that Braddock was jus-
tified if he was among those who feared that these men were
"running away." Indeed, the tendency to desert was such that it
is difficult to blame the general for his apparent concern that, if
he allowed his troops to melt into the forest, he might soon be
without an army.27
   Braddock may indeed have acted as he did regarding irregu-
lar tactics because he feared that they might bring about higher
casualties and encourage desertion. He may well also have felt
that to allow his troops to fight Indian style would lessen his
chances of making the one mighty thrust that would put the
enemy to flight. This last suggestion brings us back to the point
that Braddock was very much a traditionalist. At the age of





110 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


sixty, he was too old to change his concept of warfare. To his
mind, and the mind of his era, battles were won by disciplined
maneuver, not individual initiative. The great irony of Brad-
dock's Defeat is that it was decided by a breakdown in that
discipline which he had tried so hard to engender in his men.
Perhaps if they had behaved better there would be less
justification for his resolve not to allow the provincials to forest
fight. But as it was, with the regulars firing blindly into the
woods and running off in increasing numbers as the battle
wore on, it appears that his decision actually saved lives, and it
is justified in retrospect, even if at the time he thought only in
terms of "the book."
  Again on the question of taking advice from his subordi-
nates, standard practice of the time seems to clear Braddock of
the charges against him. As we have seen, during the march he
actually appears to have sought counsel, for example, on the
key question of whether to divide his forces. But while the
battle raged he may well have felt that he himself must direct
the action. Tradition would have justified such a belief, and
might even have dictated it. During an engagement, the chief
officer was not only to be in command, but was to be seen to be
so.28 Even if we ignore this line of justification, we still may
exculpate Braddock on the grounds that most of the advice he
has been accused of rejecting was not itself well thought-out,
and that some of it, like St. Clair's suggestion that the general
wait for Dunbar, was positively inane.
   Thus far in this chapter I have dealt with the more common
charges made against Braddock by the traditionalists. The
modern school finds its chief advocate in its founder, Stanley
Pargellis. According to Pargellis and several other historians
who have written about Braddock's Defeat during the past four
decades, the general is not to be blamed for his unwillingness
to employ irregular tactics. On the other hand, they claim that
he is nonetheless culpable, because he failed to use the tactics
called for by Continental standards.
   Pargellis himself is quite specific in his charges. According to





                      RETROSPECT     111
him, Braddock deserves criticism because he compressed his
line of march to a dangerous degree after the men had re-
crossed the Monongahela; failed to provide any clear instruc-
tions before ordering the main body to reinforce the vanguard;
rode to the front at the first firing, rather than holding back
long enough to judge the situation; and did not during the
battle pay sufficient heed to his subordinates. The sum total of
these arguments is that while the troops may have panicked,
Braddock's blunders had put them into such a fix that their
behavior was to be expected.29
   Generally, I have already dealt with such charges. This obvi-
ously applies to the point of whether he was justified in ignor-
ing the advice of his subordinates. In chapter 4, I noted points
in passing which call into question several of Pargellis's key
assumptions. Thus, we have already seen evidence that the
main body was probably about one-quarter mile behind the
rear of the vanguard--certainly not close-order. On the still
more central question of how Braddock behaved during the
first moments of battle, I have suggested that he himself did
not ride up, instead sending Burton, and that he seems to have
given definite orders, although one may assume that the lieu-
tenant colonel was allowed some discretion on how to carry
them out.30
  But let us deal with the broader issue of whether the general
failed to employ the tactics British tradition deemed proper.
Pargellis, in support of his view that Braddock did so fail, cites
Humphrey Bland's Treatise of Military Discipline. On one
ground, the choice is well taken. Bland was the standard trea-
tise on drill procedure and field tactics, not only at the time of
Braddock's Defeat, but for almost two generations after it was
first published in 1727. It was considered definitive not only in
England, but throughout the English-speaking world, includ-
ing America, and Braddock himself would probably have
known it by heart.
  There are, however, two basic problems in attempting to
judge Braddock on the basis of Bland. First, the latter knew





xii PREFACE


  Moreover, the battle had implications that were to affect
profoundly the last years of our pre-Revolutionary era. On the
banks of the Monongahela were born myths that would mature
with the idea of independence. As Braddock's forces prepared
for the expedition, as they marched off toward the fort in
impressive order, Americans by and large looked to them, to
this British presence, as their first line of defense. As the
shattered remnants of the army retreated, these same men and
women began to see local forces as their strength. They saw
too, or thought they saw, that the tactics which had evolved in
the colonies were better suited to the American situation than
were those of the British. After all, had not Braddock during
the battle tried to force his troops to fight in the Continental
manner, only to see them massacred by an enemy force using
the irregular forest fighting tactics of the American backwoods?
Indeed, as rumor-and soon legend-had it, the provincials in
Braddock's force had distinguished themselves by bravery and
effectiveness during the battle. If only he had let them fight in
their own way, surely the enemy would have been routed! So
thought the Americans. England, to which they had earlier
looked for leadership, now seemed a burden. They would
hereafter turn to themselves for salvation, and particularly to
compatriots like the heroic Washington.
  Certainly Braddock's Defeat had significance in its own time,
and far beyond. But to note the importance of this event is not
to justify another study of it. Almost forty years ago, Stanley
Pargellis, in introducing his brief discussion of the battle, com-
mented that "there would be no point in adding another article
to the scores which have been written on Braddock's defeat if a
recent discovery of new documents ... had not made possible a
revaluation of the traditional interpretation."' One who writes
an entire monograph on the Battle of the Monongahela
should, I believe, provide even greater justification than does
Pargellis. Along the lines of his own rationale, I might mention
that I shall introduce several previously unpublished accounts
of the engagement and also make use of various eyewitness





112 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


nothing about Indian methods of warfare and had little to say
on the question of how an army should react when faced with a
situation like Braddock's. Second, in his treatise Bland empha-
sizes drill, rather than battlefield maneuver. He is by no means
silent on tactics, but he is seldom precise. Instead of hard
advice, he provides the reader with platitudes, perhaps epito-
mized by his comment that when the commanding officer finds
his troops under attack, "his own judgment and experience
must direct him in taking proper measures; for without he has
both, those who are under his command, at such a juncture,
are much to be pitied, let his courage be ever so great.""'
Bland, like Braddock, symbolizes the state of the British army
on the eve of the Seven Years' War. Both believed that in
battle, discipline would carry the day, and this is the primary
reason why they stressed drill. Likewise, both were ignorant of
the exigencies of forest fighting as it was known in America.
But only Braddock has borne the blame for failings common to
a generation of officers.
  Despite the reservations noted, two sections in Bland's work
seem relevant to the problems that Braddock faced. The first is
his portrayal of "street-firing," a formation to be used on a
narrow road. This he describes only in the form of a drill,
wherein the battalion is to fire while advancing, and those who
have discharged their muskets are to face left or right and
march to the rear. In a lengthier portion of text, he discusses
which tactics are proper for an army that is marching through
brushland or forest and anticipates attack. Given this situation,
Bland directs that the men should march in platoons. The
vanguard is to be no more than two hundred yards in front of
the main body, and is expected to reconnoiter all strategic
points, although in heavily wooded areas its activities in this
regard are to be supplemented by small parties. Should it be
attacked, the officer in charge of the main body is to detach his
grenadiers, or a few platoons, to rescue those under fire. If the
reinforcements become engaged, he may find himself forced to
commit his entire army to action.





RETROSPECT 113


  Judging Braddock strictly on the basis of Bland, it appears
that first of all the latter would have criticized the disposition of
his forces, for they did not march by platoon. We have seen
that Braddock apparently attempted during the battle to divide
his men into platoons, but that he was unsuccessful, as a result
of the mass panic. However, the point is not particularly cru-
cial. As a matter of fact, several eyewitnesses remark scornfully
that platoon firing could not have been successful against a
well-concealed enemy, and the point seems well taken. Bland
might also argue that Braddock should not have committed as
large a detachment as he did under Burton, at least until he
had received some intelligence from the front. But even if this
was a mistake on his part, one may ask whether the battle
would have turned out differently, had he not sent Burton
forward. Probably not. The vanguard appears already to have
been in panic when the detachment was ordered out. It was
certainly in a rapid and somewhat disorderly retreat. There
would almost surely have been a collision in any case, and the
same degree of disorder. Finally, Bland might claim that Brad-
dock had the main body of his army too far to the rear of the
vanguard. This is ironic for, as we have noted, Pargellis feels
that the two were too close. But in judging this point we should
remember that Braddock was burdened with a sizable wagon
train, despite the fact that he had left the bulk of his materiel
with Dunbar. A line of wagons separated the working party
from the main body and divided the main body itself. Since the
wagons contained tools as well as ammunition, it was vitally
important to the working party in particular that they be close
by. This sort of situation does not seem to have occurred to
Bland. Again, he seems to have thought in terms of the Conti-
nental situation. In his idealized scheme, supply lines were
always reasonable, since civilization was never too far off. The
notion that an army might be isolated to the extent that Brad-
dock's was appears not to have crossed his mind.32
  Through the years, countless historians, professional and
amateur, have pondered the question of what tactics Braddock





         114 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
should have used during the battle. It has been argued that he
was culpable for not having attempted to seize the rising
ground earlier; that he should have ordered a bayonet charge;
that his proper maneuver was a feigned retreat to lure the
enemy from its hiding place, preparatory to a crushing coun-
terattack. The tactics suggested are all reasonable enough, and
indeed Braddock may himself have attempted to use them.33
But all of these require a sizable body of men to succeed, and
after the panic set in he did not have such a force at his
disposal.
  So far this discussion has keyed on the charges against Brad-
dock himself, but some of his subordinate officers have been
attacked as well.34 Only one of them, however, has drawn
consistent criticism. This is Gage, and while it appears that the
general has been dealt with too harshly, it is difficult to say the
same regarding the commander of his advance party.
  Some have accused Gage of having, like the Duke of Plaza-
Toro, led his embattled troops in a charge to the rear. While
president, Washington one evening recalled that during the
retreat from the Monongahela "he overtook col. Gage three
miles a head of the place in which he had halted the retreating
army, and to which he sent Gage back."35 However, Orme puts
the incident in a different light: "After we had passed the
Monongahela the second time, we were joined by Lieutenant
Colonel Gage, who had rallied near 80 men." One might also
question the point implicit in Washington's recollection, that he
ordered Gage to rejoin the army. How could an aide-de-camp
order a lieutenant colonel to do anything? On this particular
issue, the case against Gage is tenuous.
  On other points, however, the evidence is overwhelming.
Gage made four major blunders on the day of the battle. First,
there was his decision not to drag along the two six-pounders
after his troops had recrossed the Monongahela. Had they
been in front with him, ready to wheel quickly into action, his
opening barrage probably would have been more deadly, and
possibly the enemy would have been thrown into chaos. As it






                     RETROSPECT     115
was, with the field pieces remaining behind with St. Clair, it
took some time to get them firing, and by then the enemy had
dispersed into the forest. A second charge involving his actions,
or lack of them, prior to the battle, is that he failed to occupy
the hillock to his right as he passed it. As we have seen, this
"rising ground" soon fell into the hands of the enemy, and its
tremendous strategic value is reflected in the number of at-
tempts made by Braddock's forces to capture it. That it was
primarily the responsibility of the advance party to occupy such
potentially strategic points reflects not only Bland's dictum, but
common sense. Gage's oversight in failing to secure the knoll,
coupled with his decision to leave the six-pounders with St.
Clair, suggests that he was supremely confident the enemy
would not attack.36 This explains his negligence; it does not
excuse it.
  "When the van-guard discovers any body of men, it is to halt,
and the Officer is to send back immediately and acquaint the
Commanding Officer with it, and to know what particular
commands he has for him." So writes Bland, and again by
implication he stands as Gage's accuser. Braddock has been
criticized, by Pargellis among others, for not having sent ahead
to gather intelligence before acting further." But we may recall
in his defense that Orme at least claims the general ordered an
aide-de-camp "to bring him an account of the nature of attack,"
although apparently because the subordinate did not return,
he rode forward himself. On the other hand, there is no sug-
gestion from either Orme or Gage himself that the commander
of the advance party sent a messenger back to Braddock when
he first encountered Beaujeu's party. He should have done this
as soon as possible. But in fact Orme's account, which conveys
the impression that Braddock remained in the dark about what
was going on ahead until he himself rode forward, likewise
suggests that Gage dispatched no one at all.
   Seventeen years after the battle was fought, it was discussed
at some length by Thomas Mante, during the course of his
history of the French and Indian War. Mante's testimony is of





116 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


particular interest, since he appears to have himself served as a
commissioned officer during the conflict and may therefore be
regarded as an authority on the standard tactics of his time. It
is noteworthy, then, that he works to vindicate Braddock, even
as he acknowledges his distance from the consensus: "Few
generals perhaps have been so severely censured for any de-
feat, as General Braddock for this." While defending the gen-
eral, he is not so kind to Gage, although his criticism is merely
implied. According to Mante, during the first moments of
battle, the
flanking parties were driven in by the enemy, and no detachments
were made from the advanced guard to repel the attack on its flanks.
Had such detachments been made in proper time, they most certainly
would have beaten off the enemy. This was by no means the General's
fault; for the advanced guard fell into confusion before it was possible
that the General could send his orders to put into execution what
ought to have been done without any orders from him.
Mante's obvious implication is that the appropriate orders
should have come from Gage."3 Perhaps surprisingly, the latter
gives tacit support to the charge. His account may not be accu-
rate throughout, but it is detailed, particularly on the first mo-
ments of battle. Yet he does not suggest that he attempted to
reinforce the flanking parties and, in fact, reports the orders
given to his detachment in such detail as to suggest that he did
not do so.
  However, with Gage as with Braddock, we should not carry
the charges too far. The two examples of negligence cited in
the case of Gage, relevant to the period just prior to the battle,
may possibly have had some impact on the outcome, but it is
doubtful. As for his two mistakes once the engagement was
under way, they were probably of little import, regardless of
what they may suggest about his competence as a commander.
This is because in the final analysis the day was lost, not be-
cause one or more officers blundered, but because the regulars
panicked. It was they who threw away the great advantages
held by the British.





RETROSPECT 117


  However, before rushing headlong toward judgment, let us
for a moment examine the question of responsibility in terms
of the issue at hand. The very thought of calling the past to
account frightens some and angers others. But history is,
among other things, a thought process, with conclusions the
capstone. The assessment of responsibility is merely the most
natural area of conclusion in a study dealing with disaster.
Closely related to those who refuse to take a stand are those
who with a flourish throw up their hands and shout, "Who can
say?" If, after having immersed themselves in a given subject,
they cannot say, or even suggest, chances are that they have
failed to define the issues, or that the question is too complex
and needs to be broken down further. On the other hand,
there are the historians who delve so deeply into causation that
every incident is somehow tied to Adam's fall. Having noted
the extremes of the spectrum, let us aim for the center. Let us
also remember that Clio, while she does not shy from reaching
a verdict, is not a hanging judge.
  Relative to the case in point, we must take into account one
major distinction. Are we discussing Braddock's Defeat-that is,
the battle-or Braddock's defeat-generally, the frustration of
his aims? The latter is more complex and will be dealt with first.
  We have seen that prior to early July, in fact just a few days
before Braddock arrived on the scene, the garrison at Fort
Duquesne was so weak that it could have offered no meaning-
ful resistance. Therefore, one may conclude that whatever or
whoever was responsible for delaying the march -was responsi-
ble for Braddock's Defeat and, probably, for the fact that there
was any battle at all. The general himself apparently erred in
taking such a large wagon train from Fort Cumberland, though
in his defense he was preparing for an extensive campaign, not
one that would be turned back at the forks of the Ohio. Other
causes of delay during the march, such as accident and illness,
fall under the heading of happenstance.
  The most serious hindrances faced by Braddock and his army
were really those they faced before their departure from Wills





118 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Creek. Chief among these-at least, if we concentrate on prob-
lems that could have been avoided-was the shortage of provi-
sions and wagons. That the general was misled and cheated by
colonial contractors is beyond question. Certainly the system of
providing for an army by using the services of private and vir-
tually unsupervised agents was a natural source of abuse, but it
could not have been reformed quickly enough to help Brad-
dock. What could have helped and, in fact, could have guar-
anteed the success of the expedition, was honesty. Beside the
problem of supplies, those concerning Braddock's relationship
with the colonies pale into insignificance. He was not detained
for want of funds, but rather for want of provisions.39
   Straddling our dividing line is the issue of Indian auxiliaries.
 Had Braddock been accompanied by a large contingent of
 Indian auxiliaries, the French and Langlade's followers might
 have considered the cause hopeless and not attacked. Even had
 they ambushed Braddock's forces, they probably would have
 been driven off. Therefore, those who thwarted the general's
'attempts to recruit large numbers of Indians bear a heavy
burden of responsibility for his defeat.
   Moving on to the battle itself, and assuming that it would be
 fought under more or less the same circumstances, the ques-
 tion of responsibility becomes fairly simple. Some historians,
 notably Pargellis, have criticized Braddock's disposition of
 forces, and have suggested that he led his men into a situation
 that was untenable and conducive to panic. But whatever er-
 rors he may have made, they do not appear to have been
 particularly egregious, and, as we have seen, most of his deci-
 sions were probably justified. As for the collapse of his troops,
 this chain reaction started in the front, while he remained with
 the main body.
   Is Gage then to blame? It was, of course, his detachment that
 broke first and began what developed into a chaotic retreat.
 But there is little reason to hold him responsible for the dis-
 order. He may well have been a poor leader, as uninspiring as
 he was incompetent. However, his detachment, like the army in





                     RETROSPECT     119
general, disintegrated as a result of factors that were quite
irrelevant to his ability. Briefly, it seems that the panic was
caused primarily by the troops' almost insane fear of the un-
seen and alien enemy. There was also the problem of casualties
among the officers, which left the men leaderless. The advance
party seems to have been hit particularly hard, and early, in
this respect. In view of the odds against him, Gage could not be
expected to keep his detachment viable.
  Braddock and his subordinates by no means put the men in an
"impossible" position. Had the troops followed orders, the en-
emy would probably have been defeated. One must say "prob-
ably" here. Ambush was not an all-or-nothing strategy. Those
who used it tended to give ground willingly in the face of a
concerted counterattack. Had Braddock's men followed him in a
bayonet charge they would probably have dislodged the enemy,
but this is not to say that the road to Fort Duquesne would then
have been open to them. They still faced difficult terrain, the
sort that afforded ample opportunity for ambush. And if one
maxim of Indian warfare was that they would retreat in the face
of a determined counterthrust, another was that they would
soon return to the attack.40 An active pursuit might have dis-
persed them, but this would have been a risky maneuver, and
one doubts that Braddock would have allowed it.
  The point is not that the British still faced heavy going even
if they repulsed the first attack. It is that in all probability they
could have broken through with ease, for the enemy, in the
face of a counterthrust, would not have stood and fought.
Presumably, this pattern would have applied to any further
possible action as well. It would not have been easy for Brad-
dock's men, but they would probably have made it to the
fort-if they had kept their heads.
  The collapse of the general's army disappointed many of his
peers, but surprised few. At several points in this study it has
been suggested that the British officer class commonly be-
lieved that in battle the more disciplined force would usually
carry the day. Their conviction was born of experience. Many





120 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


an eighteenth-century battle was decided in its first moments,
when some contesting army collapsed in panic and either fled
the field or was surrounded and butchered. The more fear-
some or alien the enemy, the greater the likelihood of col-
lapse. During the Forty-Five, British troops were on several
occasions thrown into panic by the war cries of the "wild"
Scottish clansmen.41 And few in the past had faced an enemy
as frightening as that encountered by Braddock's men.
  While recognizing the tendency of troops to panic, some
seasoned observers chose to be fatalistic. Army recruits were
generally the dregs of society, they reasoned. Such men fought,
not for God, king, or country, but for a livelihood. It would, of
course, be desirable for the army to get better men, but in
reality this was impossible. Instead, the officers must enforce a
discipline sufficiently harsh to serve as a crucible and re-form
the motley recruits into a fighting machine. Sometimes they
would fail, as did Braddock. But in his case, time was against
him. His troops, British as well as American, were for the most
part green. It would have taken an almost superhuman effort
on his part to prepare them to meet any adversary, much less
the sort they faced. So would the more tolerant have spoken.
  Some, however, could not excuse what they saw as cowardice.
Among them was James Wolfe, whose last hours would be as
glorious as Braddock's were ignominious. On hearing of the
debacle, he wrote:

I have but a very mean opinion of the infantry in courage. I know
their discipline to be bad, and their valour precarious. They are easily
put into disorder, and hard to recover out of it. They frequently kill
their officers through fear, and murder one another in their confu-
sion. Their shameful behaviour in Scotland, at Pont L'Orient, at Melle,
and upon many less important occasions, clearly denoted.., .the dis-
obedient and dastardly spirit of the men.42

In the end, we are faced with a choice of connotations. Were
the men to "blame" for Braddock's Defeat, in the sense that we,
like Wolfe, believe that they should have performed more






                    RETROSPECT     121
bravely than they did? Or were they merely "responsible"?
Either way, the weight of evidence places the onus on them,
rather than on Braddock or other officers. It was they who
would not carry out orders, who huddled together when their
superiors commanded that they re-form and attack. But should
we expect such culls, green in battle, fighting a fearsome and
unseen enemy, to act with courage? This, the question of "re-
sponsibility" or "blame," each reader must decide for himself.





PREFACE xiii


reports which, although in print, have apparently never been
incorporated into an examination of it.
  More important, at least to my mind, I shall attempt to apply
the various accounts in a more critical way than have earlier
writers. To date, the known testimony has been used primarily
for stylistic impact, to provide the appropriate quotation. A few
historians, notably Pargellis, have shown the way in their care-
ful handling of the available material, but they have generally
been hampered by a lack of sources. By comparing the various
eyewitness reports of Braddock's Defeat-British, American,
and French--I hope to produce a more accurate account of the
battle than any currently in print. On that foundation, I plan to
evaluate the tactics Braddock used, in an attempt to determine
the extent to which he was responsible for the fiasco.
  I aim at no "root-and-branch" revision of the traditional
account of the affair, but at a more precise portrayal. Though
our "facts" even at best lack chemical purity, by employing data
with care we can approximate past events in such a way that
our conclusions will bear the scrutiny of future generations. On
the other hand, the insufficient accumulation of data, or the
sloppy handling of it, will certainly lead to faulty conclusions.
This, any schoolboy knows. But sometimes he tends to forget.







t   SIX tO


                    "So What?"


HERE ENDS another study of Braddock's Defeat. The list of
like works is long, and undoubtedly it will continue to grow.
But perhaps the time has come to ask of this affair the most
profound question in the historian's reserve-"So what?"
  Whether we admit it or not, all of us are to some extent
antiquarians. All of us have some interest in the past for its own
sake. There are, of course, those who attempt to prove that
every historical splinter has significance. Perhaps, indeed, the
polar ice caps would have melted had Anne Boleyn not been
born with six fingers on her left hand. But most of us are
willing to admit that interest alone causes us to remember that
Attila the Hun died of nosebleed. For the delectation of the
unabashed trivialist, I shall attempt in Appendix A to answer
certain provocative questions relative to the Battle of the Mo-
nongahela, such as "What happened to Braddock's sash?"
  Trivia, however, can justify only so much printer's ink. Even-
tually we should all be willing to ask ourselves whether a par-
ticular topic merits the attention we have given it. So let it be
with the one at hand. It is surprising indeed that for all that has
been written about Braddock's Defeat, apparently no one has
ever discussed in print why it is worthy of attention.1 In this
concluding chapter I hope to fill that gap, by dealing first with
short-term and then with long-term significance.
   First, it may be said that, with the battle over, the war began.
The French position in the New World was greatly enhanced
by the events of July 9, 1755. Of course, the victors gained
cash, arms, and provisions from the stores of the defeated
army. Likewise, they won a great, if temporary, strategic ad-
vantage in the struggle for the Ohio Valley. Finally, the docu-
                             122






"SO WHAT?" 123


ments captured by Beaujeu's men, proving as they did that the
British had planned a massive campaign on several fronts,
stoked war fever and Anglophobia in France.
  Meanwhile, the British drew their own sort of inspiration
from the battle. On both sides of the Atlantic, those loyal to
the Crown became obsessed with dreams of vengeance. Cer-
tainly any humiliation such as had been suffered at the Mo-
nongahela would have brought this about, especially since it
had come at the hands of an ancient enemy. But the nature of
the battle increased British rancor, for they claimed that their
enemy had triumphed through stealth, a sort of treachery that
mocked the very concept of civilization. Immediately after the
battle, Leslie declared, "We have lost gallant officers and gen-
erous friends, not in battle, for that we could bear, but by
murder, by savage butchery. The French dared not openly
meet us; our's is the loss, theirs the disgrace." A rationale for
defeat? Certainly, but that does not lessen its significance. The
point is that the British and Americans now commonly looked
upon France as a nation that advocated ambush rather than
open battle, and ambush was commonly regarded as the re-
course of cowards.2
  The call for vengeance had an enhanced meaning for those
who revered Braddock's memory. Some may be surprised that
there were such people, but in fact there were many, and they
seem particularly to have been Americans. We may appreciate
their number by noting the considerable output of ballads and
poems written in memory of the general. Such reverence soon
faded. Within a few years, those who looked for heroes had
new ones who were more successful, while those who remem-
bered Braddock tended to be his critics. But during 1755, and
for a year or two after, many saw each defeat of the French,
each massacre of the Indians, as fit retribution for the ambush
of Braddock's forces and the murder of the general. Late in
September 1755, Stephen Hopkins, the governor of Rhode
Island, wrote to Johnson to praise him for his victory at Lake
George. Hopkins seems to have been particularly pleased that






124 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


just prior to the engagement Johnson's men had driven off a
band of French Indians intent on ambush:
Those who from their past Experience might be led to think they had
Nothing more to do than to attack furiously, and yell hideously to
make them victorious, have been modestly shewn their Error, they
have been taught to turn their Backs, and leave their Brethren and
Commanders behind them; They who stole a Victory from Braddock,
and cheated that Hero out of his Life by Sculking, have been openly
arreasted by English Warrants, and sent to Settle their Accounts with
him, where Nothing will be gained by Ambuscades.3
It is, of course, impossible to measure the impact of vengeance.
Nor should we evaluate it in isolation. The circumstances of
Braddock's Defeat were such as to inspire not only vindictive-
ness, but terror. These twin tempers combined into a fierce ha-
tred of the French and their Indian allies. This appears to have
been particularly true in America, where the danger was great-
est. Americans had always hated the French and Indians, but
Braddock's Defeat hardened them still further. On the one
hand, they longed for the day of final victory, when their enemy
would know the bitter taste of retribution. On the other, there
was the terrifying possibility that they would be overrun by an
adversary that had dramatically demonstrated its inhumanity at
the Monongahela. A desire for vengeance, and the specter of a
horrible defeat, would spur the Americans to fight on.
   If they needed any further persuasion that the enemy was
 ruthless, they found it in the wake of Braddock's Defeat. As
 Dunbar led his ignominious flight to Philadelphia, he left the
 frontier exposed. The result was predictable. Immediately the
 French began to exploit their new strategic advantage by send-
 ing Indian allies to harry out those Americans who had settled
 west of the Alleghenies. Their strategy was brutally successful.
 Homes were burnt, hundreds butchered, many more carried
 off. The danger was so great that it caused a major population
 shift, as thousands of Pennsylvanians fled to the comparative
 safety of South Carolina.4
   These raids brought home to the Americans as never before a






"SO WHAT?" 125


fear and hatred of Indians. Furthermore, they seemed to show
clearly that the French and Indian threats were now one. The
popular belief in this newfound enemy solidarity was somewhat
simplistic. Only two months after the Battle of the Mononga-
hela, Johnson's supporters from the Six Nations played a key
role in his victory at Lake George. But it is true that Britain's
influence among the Indians eroded dramatically during 1755,
and in fact this was due largely, if not primarily, to Braddock's
Defeat. That the debacle had a great impact on the system of
tribal alliances surprised few knowledgeable contemporaries. As
we have seen, both the British and their French adversaries had
known that in the fate of Fort Duquesne lay that of their respec-
tive influence over the powerful tribes of the Ohio Valley. Both
had hoped to demonstrate that they had the power to protect
their Indian allies and to punish those tribes which remained
loyal to their enemy. The French had hoped further that a vic-
tory would provide the Indians who fought for them with
plunder sufficient to inspire other tribes to join their cause. In
the wake of Braddock's Defeat, the hopes of the French and the
fears of the British were realized to the letter. Several tribes,
including the powerful Delawares and the Indians of the Ohio
generally, now cleaved to France. Shingas himself was among
those who, before the year was out, openly espoused the French
cause, and he was not shy about stating that his decision was
linked to the events of July 9. According to him, while a few
Delawares had actually fought for Beaujeu, "the Greater Part
remained neuter till they saw How Things wou'd go Between
Braddock and the French in their Engagement."5
  Certainly the British were shocked by spiraling French
influence among the tribes, and by the Indians' role in Brad-
dock's Defeat and the subsequent massacres of settlers. But
mingled with their horror was a newfound respect for Indian
tactics. The provincials who had marched with Braddock had
failed to persuade the general or his chief British subordinates
that it would be desirable to train the regulars in forest fighting
techniques. As suggested in chapter 5, Braddock's stand was





         126 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
probably wise, and almost certainly it did not work against him.
His men were inexperienced, and he was well advised to con-
centrate on instilling in them a sense of discipline. But this did
not mean that, given time to prepare, the British should not
have altered their policy to make it accord better with the
exigencies of American warfare.
  Back in Britain, neither Braddock's Defeat nor other re-
verses seem to have made much of an impression. Military
experts continued to discuss warfare in terms of past glories,
particularly Marlborough's campaigns, and even Bland, in his
revised edition of 1759, had nothing new to say on countering
an ambush or fighting in closed country. Tactics did indeed
change in the wake of Braddock's Defeat, but only in America,
and only on the initiative of officers actually serving there.
  Washington later claimed that as a result of the Battle of the
Monongahela, "the folly and consequence of opposing compact
bodies to the sparse manner of Indian fighting, in woods,
which had in a manner been predicted, was now so clearly
verified that from hence forward another mode obtained in all
future operations." This new "mode" concentrated on combin-
ing irregular with regular tactics. The Royal Americans in
particular were geared to innovation, and in 1756 Lord Lou-
doun, commander-in-chief, directed that members of the regi-
ment, "in order to qualify them for the Service of the Woods,
... are to be taught to load and fire, lyeing on the Ground and
kneeling." New commands were also instituted, the most dra-
matic of them being "Tree all," the order given in case of
ambush, to disperse the men behind trees.6
  The inventive spirit also manifested itself in a new willing-
ness on the part of the British to make use of rangers. As we
have seen, Braddock apparently felt that only Indians should
be encouraged to fight "Indian style," while Americans were to
be trained in the Continental mode. He seems not to have had
much use for rangers, as fighters or scouts. How different the
attitude of General John Forbes, who on one occasion wrote a
brother officer that he had "been long in your opinion of






"SO WHAT?" 127


equiping Numbers of our men like the Saveges... I was
resolved upon getting some of the best people in every Corps
to go out a Scouting.... And I must confess in this country,
wee must comply and learn the Art of Warr, from Ennemy
Indians or anything else who have seen the Country and Warr
carried on in itt."7
  To this point, we have viewed those aspects of the signifi-
cance of Braddock's Defeat involving changes that seem logical.
But these were not the only effects. The colonies did not, as we
might expect, react to the increased danger with a newfound
spirit of cooperation. Some did increase their military expendi-
tures and raise new militia, but the effort was small-scale,
reflecting the age-old philosophy that each should have prima-
rily its own interests in view, and that Britain should be ex-
pected to supply the bulk of troops and funds necessary for
defense. Not even within the various colonies was there the
degree of cooperation that the crisis seemed to call for. Instead,
the peril arising in the wake of Braddock's Defeat proved
divisive, for it raised the specter of a fifth column, prepared to
capitalize on a French invasion or even to work for its success.
In Virginia, Dinwiddie suggested measures for quelling any
slave rebellion that might eventuate, this due to his fear of "the
Villany of the Negroes on any Emergency of Gov't." Horatio
Sharpe, the governor of Maryland, ordered the local justices to
inquire into rumors that blacks and Catholics were creating
disturbances. They reported in the negative, and the matter
was dropped. But in Philadelphia, the Catholics faced danger
from a different, less restrained quarter, in the wake of the
news that Braddock had been defeated:
The Mob here upon this occasion were very unruly, assembling in
great numbers, with an intention of demolishing the Mass House
belonging to the Roman Catholics, wherein they were underhand ex-
cited and encouraged by some People of Higher Rank. But the peace-
able Quakers insisting that the Catholics as well as Christians of other
denominations were settled upon the faith of the Constitution, or
William Penn's Charter, and that the Government were bound to pro-






         128 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
tect them so long at least, as they remained inoffensive and paid duti-
ful regard to the Establishment; the Magistrates met and with a good
deal of difficulty prevailed with the Mob to desist.8

Ironically, in view of their heroism on this occasion, Braddock's
Defeat was to have a greater negative impact on the Quakers of
Pennsylvania than on the Catholics and blacks of the colonies
generally. For some years the Quaker hegemony in Pennsylva-
nia politics had been widely questioned, by Morris among
others. Because of their pacifism, the proprietorship of the
Penns had no militia and generally lacked the means to defend
itself. This was bad enough in peacetime, for even then the
frontiers were never entirely safe. Now, following Braddock's
Defeat, the scope and savagery of Indian raids reached un-
precedented proportions, and an anguished populace looked
to its Assembly for aid. In late November, the municipality of
Philadelphia petitioned the legislature:
You were lately called together upon more urgent Business than ever
came before an Assembly of this Province, and while you have been
sitting scarce a day has passed wherein you have not heard of the
inhuman Slaughter of your Fellow Subjects, & been loudly called upon
for that protection, which, by the most sacred Ties you owe to the
People.... Nevertheless, while you have been deliberating, much in-
nocent Blood has been spilt, a great extent of our Country laid waste,
& the miserable Inhabitants scatter'd abroad before the Savage
Spoiler.

In the face of this outcry, as well as the obvious need, the
Assembly finally did pass a weak militia bill. But it was not
enough. When 1756 proved equally disastrous for British arms,
and Indian raids continued or even intensified, pressure began
to build for the passage of legislation to place Pennsylvania on
a war footing. The position of Quakers in the Assembly became
progressively more untenable, as both the governor and their
coreligionists at home and abroad called on them to resign
their places, the former on the assumption that their
nonpacifist successors would be willing to pass the necessary





                     "SO WHAT?" 129
legislation, the latter so that they would not have to violate their
beliefs by cooperating with the war effort. Finally, in November
1756, the pressure became unbearable, and the Quakers gave
in, declaring to the Assembly the wish that their seats might "be
filled by Members of other Denominations, in such manner as
to prepare, without any scruples, all such Laws as may be nec-
essary to be enacted for the Defence of the Province." So ended
an era in the political history of Colonial America. Braddock's
Defeat marked the beginning of the end.9
  Thus far, this discussion has focused on what might be con-
sidered the immediate consequences of Braddock's Defeat. In
some cases-the Quakers' withdrawal, the change in tactics-
the impact was to be of both short- and long-term significance.
On the other hand, the strategic advantages gained by the
French were to be swept away, and the Indians would emerge
from the war far weaker than they had entered it. But it seems
fair to say that those who suffered most from the short-term
effects of Braddock's Defeat were the Americans, particularly
those living on the frontier.
  In the long term, however, the colonies profited most, and it
is really in this sense that the battle was of greatest conse-
quence. During the decade following, British arms thrust back
the French and their Indian allies. Still, the Battle of the Mo-
nongahela was not forgotten. While details of the engagement
may have faded from men's minds, the residue that remained
was the stuff of which myths are made. And the legends that
enshrouded Braddock and his unfortunate army were to prove
of greater significance than even the Defeat itself.
  From the ashes of their misfortune, Americans were to draw
their greatest hero. Washington had not been unknown prior
to the battle, nor was it his first experience in the Ohio Valley.
But during the Fort Necessity campaign, he had himself been
in command, and although the odds against him had been
overwhelming, a losing commander is seldom lionized, no mat-
ter how gallant his behavior or inevitable his defeat. So was it in
this case. During Braddock's expedition, however, the young





130 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Virginian was a mere aide-de-camp. Therefore, he could in no
way be held responsible for the debacle. But he could be
singled out for his own acts of heroism, and this is precisely
what his countrymen did. The courage he displayed under fire
was the sort that could scarcely be exaggerated by legend, and
word of it soon spanned the Atlantic. In early 1756, Lord
Halifax asked an associate, "Who is Mr. Washington? I know
nothing of him but that they say he behaved in Braddock's
action as bravely as if he really loved the whistling of Bullets."
Such bravery would itself have impressed many, but more
significant still was the fact that, despite his willingness to ex-
pose himself to the greatest danger, he was one of the few
officers to escape unscathed. How was this possible? Only
through divine intervention! Washington himself suggested
this, when he wrote his brother that he had survived because of
"the miraciulous care of Providence that protected me beyond
all human expectation." His adversaries may have been likewise
impressed. According to his friend and phsyician, Dr. James
Craik, some years after the battle he and Washington met an
old chieftain, who told the future president that he and his
followers had fought for the French against Braddock, and had
in the beginning singled out Washington as a target, but that
he, seeing the young officer remain unharmed, had told his
warriors, "Fire at him no more; see ye not that the Great Spirit
protects that chief; he cannot die in battle." Apocryphal? Per-
haps, but still significant, for the Indian's tale suggests the aura
of semidivinity that enveloped Washington in the wake of his
miraculous escape from the Monongahela. This man must in-
deed have survived so that he might fulfill a divine mission! So
thought the Reverend Samuel Davies, who undoubtedly spoke
for many Americans when, during the course of a sermon
delivered some five weeks after the battle, he paused momen-
tarily to "point out to the public that heroic youth, Colonel
Washington, whom I cannot but hope Providence has hitherto
preserved in so signal a manner for some important service to
his country."10





                     "SO WHAT?" 131
  A legend that quickly became gospel was that during the
battle Washington had pleaded with the general to allow him to
lead the Americans in an Indian-style attack on the enemy, but
that Braddock had refused, the degree of his bluntness depen-
dent upon the reporter. As legends go, there is a great deal to
be said for this one. And in any case it was commonly believed;
that is the important point here. Washington came to epitomize
the new, pragmatic, American method of fighting, against the
blind, stodgy, Continental tradition represented by Braddock.
There was more at stake here than mere tactics. Washington
was seen to speak for freedom and individual initiative, Brad-
dock for regimentation. Washington, himself a volunteer, stood
for the tradition of the amateur warrior so dear to his country-
men. Braddock and his regulars were the professionals,
fighting for a livelihood, rather than for home and hearth.1
  In the wake of Braddock's Defeat, Americans by and large
were not grateful to Britain for its sacrifices. On the contrary,
the consensus seems to have been that the mother country had
gotten in the way. If only the British had been content to
supply them, they would then have driven off the enemy. As a
Carolinian merchant wrote to his friend, "Our Ministry would
do well to prosecute a War in America with Americans. Only
they are not frightened out of their wits at the sight of Indians
which by our Accounts was the case with your English Veter-
ans. We wish they had staid at home as the advantage the
Enemy have gain'd by their shamefull behaviour will put us to
ten times the inconveniency in this part of the World." The
provincials who had fought for Braddock were quickly lion-
ized, not only at home, but in Britain as well. Conversely, the
regulars who had failed so dismally were universally execrated,
along with their general.12 In the light of such stereotypes, it is
scarcely surprising that some Americans began to wonder
whether they might not be better off fighting on their own.
  The Battle of the Monongahela encouraged a self-reliant
spirit that would one day turn smoothly into a desire for inde-
pendence. We may best understand the link if we attempt to






         132 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
see the battle as Americans of the time by and large would
have. To them, it revealed that they could do more in their
own defense than Britain could do for them. If this were so,
why be bound to the mother country? There were sentimental
and in some cases fraternal ties, of course, but they were
already weakening by 1755. Security was a more basic motive.
As long as Britain would defend them, Americans saw value in
the relationship. But in Braddock's Defeat, the mother country
failed dismally. One might imagine that the numerous victories
achieved by British arms before the close of the decade would
have more than counterbalanced any bad impressions, and in
point of fact memories of the battle did fade. But they revived
as friction grew in the early 1770s. Indeed, Americans might
now feel that, with the French menace gone, only the Indians
were yet to be dealt with, and that it was they, not the British,
who knew how to handle them. This granted, what did the
British connection now mean? It meant expense, tribute to an
overlord who would not protect the colonies as well as they
might protect themselves. Was the tie worth retaining? The
answer came in 1776. But already more than two decades
earlier, the question was beginning to evolve. According to
Franklin, "this whole transaction gave us Americans the first
suspicion that our exalted ideas of the prowess of British regu-
lars had not been well founded."' The "transaction" was Brad-
dock's Defeat.















APPENDICES

   NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

    INDEX







APPENDIX A toh


                      Tangents


IN THE TEXT I have been intent on an in-depth discussion of
the Battle of the Monongahela itself-background, narrative,
analysis, and significance. My aim in this first appendix, how-
ever, is to travel somewhat off the beaten track, and to note
some of those interesting sidelights to the career of Braddock
which I felt did not belong in the text. For the most part, this
section is bibliographical, but since some of the sources I men-
tion here are not readily available, I have tried to provide some
insight into what their value may be.
  First, I must report that those who hope to gain some under-
standing of Braddock by tracing his life from the cradle are
due for a disappointment. Prior to 1754, he was just a shadow
figure. One can establish that he came from a military back-
ground and trace out his promotions easily enough. Lee
McCardell, his only biographer, has fixed his date of birth. But
almost nothing else is known of him during the long years
before Curpberland chose him to head the campaign in Amer-
ica. McCardell manfully tries to compensate for such a lack of
data by providing some insight into his milieu, but there is no
way of knowing how Braddock himself reacted to it. A few
anecdotes throw dim rays of light on his character, but it would
be unwise to infer too much from them. Some are drawn from
Walpole, who in 1754, on hearing of Braddock's appointment,
sought out and related tales about him, all suggesting that the
new major general was volatile and selfish, as well as de-
bauched. About the only favorable information he could find,
or at any rate was willing to pass on, was that Braddock had
been a popular acting governor at Gibraltar. On the other
hand, George Anne Bellamy, a popular actress of the day,
                             135





                      136 APPENDIX A
whom Braddock treated as a daughter, provides the reader
with a much more favorable impression of the unfortunate
general. The anecdotes she supplies, as well as Walpole's, are
treated at length by McCardell, and Winthrop Sargent recounts
them as well. The latter, although on the whole critical of
Braddock, gives the Bellamy testimony full play and appends
much of it. He does the same with Goldsmith's discussion of
the general's unfortunate sister Fanny, who in 1731 hanged
herself at Bath after having wasted her small patrimony on a
scoundrel. The claim that Braddock reacted with sarcasm to
the news of her death may simply be malicious and is related
only by Walpole, who tended to remember just the worst gos-
sip. Still, like everything else involving Braddock's behavior
prior to 1754, we cannot know for certain.
  On the background to the campaign and the expedition
itself, I recommend Winthrop Sargent, The History of an Expedi-
tion Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755, Lawrence Gipson, The Great
War for Empire, Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General, and, particu-
larly on the march, Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington: A
Biography. As regards Braddock's stormy relationship with the
colonies and the governors' equally stormy relationships with
their respective assemblies, it is worthwhile to check Arthur M.
Schlesinger's fine article on the impasse in Maryland, "Mary-
land's Share in the Last Colonial War." Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia politics during this period have been dealt with well and
often. Two works particularly worthy of note are Robert David-
son's War Comes to Quaker Pennsylvania 1682-1756, especially
chapter 8, and Louis K. Koontz, Robert Dinwiddie: His Career in
American Colonial Government and Westward Expansion. The latter
provides very worthwhile material, not only on Dinwiddie's
attempts to rally support for the expedition, but also on the
background to the French and Indian War, for the governor of
Virginia played a large role in bringing the conflict about.
  The individual interested in following Braddock's route from
Wills Creek will find ample material to guide him on his way.
The standard study of Braddock's Road has for years been and





                      TANGENTS 137
yet remains John K. Lacock, "Braddock Road." However, in
respect to the last days of the march, see also Paul Wallace's
"'Blunder Camp': A Note on the Braddock Road." Wallace
profits from the use of several sources not available to Lacock,
the most important of them being the two journals printed by
Charles Hamilton in Braddock's Defeat. Freeman likewise pro-
vides interesting information on the road, particularly regarding
topography; see George Washington: A Biography, vol. 2, p. 46.
  When I mentioned to a friend that I was writing an account
of the Battle of the Monongahela, he responded by asking, "Is
it true that Braddock took his mistress with him on the march?"
I have found it impossible to answer this question. It is true
that there is a legend to this effect, and to the effect that she
was one of those taken captive by the Indians (Walter O'Meara,
Guns at the Forks, p. 121). Moreover, if we take Walpole's word
for it, the general had been something of a rake in his youth.
Nevertheless, I have found no evidence whatever that Brad-
dock traveled in the company of a mistress, though presumably
it would take a peculiar kind of eyewitness to verify the fact in
any case. This question therefore cannot be answered with any
*confidence, but it does bring up a related point: Who were the
women who did accompany the march? O'Meara provides
some information on them (pp. 121-24). However, his sugges-
tion that many or perhaps most of the women were looked to
by the soldiers for services less creditable than washing and
nursing should not be too quickly accepted. The only woman
involved in Braddock's expedition about whom we know any-
thing, Charlotte Browne, certainly set a high standard of mo-
rality. Mrs. Browne, a widow, accompanied her brother on the
expedition, but went no farther than Fort Cumberland. Her
account is interesting nonetheless and provides insight into the
miserable conditions that the women, as well as the men, must
have endured on the march to Fort Duquesne. It is contained
in her diary, the relevant portions of which are published in
"With Braddock's Army," edited by Fairfax Harrison.
   Moving on to the battle itself, we encounter the most famous





                      138 APPENDIX A
of all legends involving Braddock: that he was shot by one of
his own men. Sargent claims that the story was never heard
until years after the event, and that this militates against its
veracity. He is wrong here, although he could not have known
it, owing to the limited source material at his disposal. On
August 13, 1755, John Bolling provided an account of the
battle in a letter to his son. In passing, he noted that Braddock
was "supos'd to have been killed by his own Men" (John A.
Schultz, ed., "A Private Report of General Braddock's Defeat").
Bolling's source of information on this point is uncertain,
though the rest of his account is very heavily influenced by
Washington.
  Several soldiers apparently claimed "credit" for having shot
their commander. One was Captain Robert Allison. According
to Allison, he was in the advance party on the fatal day. When
Braddock refused to order a retreat, despite the hopelessness
of the situation, Allison says he commanded his orderly ser-
geant to shoot the general, in order to save those who yet lived.
The subordinate tried to shoot Braddock, but was successful
only in killing several of the general's horses, thus forcing
Allison to commit the deed himself, successfully. This account,
which had become a family legend, is repeated in the Historical
Magazine, vol. 11 (1867), p. 141. There is no record of any
officer surnamed Allison having served on the expedition, but
since the nature of his purported service is unknown, it is
possible that he participated in some capacity.
  In 1826, John Fanning Watson, an antiquary, interviewed
Billy Brown, a nonogenarian who as a slave had served an
officer in Braddock's army. According to Brown, during the
battle "a soldier took aim and shot Indian. Braddock shot the
soldier the soldier's Brother shot Bk. he was on foot. the soldier
offered to give himself up." Brown identified the man in ques-
tion as one Pritchett. Seven years after this interview, Watson
conversed with another supposed survivor of the battle, Wil-
liam Butler. "I asked him particularly who killed Braddock, and
he answered promptly one Fawcett, brother of one whom Brad-





TANGENTS 139


dock had just killed in a passion; this last, who killed Braddock,
was in the ranks as a non-commissioned officer; the former was
a brave major or colonel." Watson accepted the stories, identi-
fying "Pritchett" with "Fawcett" (see entries for Brown and
Butler in Appendix E).
  Here we for the first time encounter the main "claimant"-
"Old Tom Faucett." Faucett, a backwoodsman, did indeed
serve in the battle. We know this because he was listed among
the deserters after the event. He certainly lived on for many
years, and in fact Butler claimed to have seen him in 1830,
though most evidence suggests that he had died somewhat
earlier than this. Be that as it may, he seems to have been alive
in 1812 to deliver the following diatribe to Braddock's skeleton,
which he had helped to unearth:
You tried to put shame on th' names o' brave men. We was cowards,
was we, because we koowed better than to fight Injuns like you red-
backed ijits across the ocean is used to fight; because we wouldn't
stand up rubbin' shoulders like a passel o' sheep and let the red-skins
made sieves outen us! ... And them boys-th' ole Virginny
Blues-you made git from behint th' trees and git kilt; and them
others you cussed,... and cut down with yer saber, my own pore
brother, Joe, amongst 'em!-Why, ef I hadn't stopped ye with a shot,
ye'd had us all massacred and scalped! (see Appendix E)
Even if Faucett did not deliver this particular speech, it seems
clear that on numerous occasions he claimed to have shot Brad-
dock. The problem is that on others he insisted he had not.
Drink appears to have loosened his tongue. Did it also loosen
his memory?
  Sargent devotes a great deal of space to analyzing Faucett's
story, and to tearing it apart (pp. 244-53). In particular, he
notes discrepancies in the various versions. So does John S.
Ritenour (Old Tom Fossit), who after surveying the evidence
puts his subject down as a drunken illiterate who told his tale
for the sake of notoriety (pp. 113-20).
  Others are not so sure. William Lowdermilk (History of Cum-
berland) claims that the discrepancies noted by Sargent could





140 APPENDIX A


be ascribed to the fact that Faucett tended to forget or con-
fuse certain details as he aged (pp. 187-88). He implies accep-
tance of Faucett's story, while others, such as James Hadden,
accept it with conviction (Washington's Expeditions [1753-1754]
and Braddock's Expedition [1755], pp. 114-15). Hadden's case is
particularly interesting, since apparently without realizing the
implications he notes that Tom Faucett's brother Joseph, the
man whom Braddock had supposedly killed, survived the
battle, married, and had children (p. 125).
  Needless to say, there is no way to prove that Braddock was
not killed by one of his own men. However, the fact that there
are so many different accounts, given by various individuals,
and that virtually every known version contains elements that
are implausible at best, militates against accepting the legend.
The popularity of this tradition should, however, serve as a
reminder of just how unpopular Braddock was for fully three
generations after his defeat: For one of his men to claim that
he had shot him might have been merely a boast.
  After his wounding, by whatever hand, Braddock was carried
from the field in his sash, which had been designed for this very
purpose. His fate we know. That of his sash is less certain. What
appears to have been the same item, stained with the general's
blood, was in 1846 presented to Zachary Taylor as a tribute to
his deeds during the Mexican War (Wills de Hass, History of the
Early Settlement and Indian Wars of Western Virginia, pp. 129-30).
In 1909, Miss Sarah Knox Wood, a descendent of President
Taylor's, allowed the Maryland Historical Society to exhibit the
sash, which was then in her keeping (Maryland Historical Maga-
zine, 5 [1910], pp. 73-74). It is now on display at Mount Vernon
(Elswyth Thane, Mount Vernon: The Legacy, p. 92).
  And what of Braddock's cannon, some of which, thanks to
Gage's blunder, had from the very start of battle been turned
against the British? Montcalm used them in August 1756, dur-
ing his successful attack on Fort Oswego. This has been fre-
quently noted. Not so well known is the fact that two years later
the British regained them, when they took Fort Frontenac






                      TANGENTS      141
(E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History
of the State of New York, vol. 10, pp. 484, 821, 829). In a small
way, this restoration symbolized the turning of the tide. With
Forbes's conquest of Fort Duquesne later that year, the wheel
came full circle.











              Acknowledgments


IT IS ONLY FITTING that before proceeding with this book I
give thanks to those who played a part in its creation. Since the
work that follows is heavily reliant on eyewitness accounts of
Braddock's Defeat, published and unpublished, I first of all
thank those who have granted permission to excerpt and ap-
pend these invaluable sources: the British Library Board, the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Historical Society of
Western Pennsylvania, the Maryland Historical Society, Mrs.
Stanley Pargellis, the Public Record Office, London, the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press, and the U.S. Superintendent of
Documents.
  I wish to express my gratitude also to those who have gener-
ously granted me permission to reproduce portraits and maps:
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Library, the Histori-
cal Society of Pennsylvania, the Library of Congress, the
National Gallery, London, the Public Archives of Canada, the
Royal Library at Windsor Castle, and Washington and Lee
University.
  Finally, there are those whose advice has helped to make this
book better than it would otherwise have been. Two scholars,
separated by thousands of miles but linked by their mutual
interest in military history, have been particularly welcome
readers and critics: Dr. George Raudzens, Macquarie Univer-
sity, Sydney, Australia, and Nancy Jo Padgett, University of
Illinois, Urbana. I would also like to thank the following for
their encouragement and advice: Dr. Henry Collins, of Mac-
quarie University, Gary Steller, Robert Frye, Lt. Col. Franklin
T. Nichols, Bernard P. Chamberlain, R. Bruce Wood, and
Dennis Walle. The arduous task of proofreading was lightened


XV







0 APPENDIX B %o4


          Bibliographical Survey


BERNARD OF CHARTRES, an eleventh-century philosopher,
once compared scholars living in his own time with the ancients
by describing the former as "dwarfs, mounted on the shoulders
of giants." Modest? Certainly. Self-abasing? No, not really. For
he went on to say that, being so positioned, "we can see more
and further than they."
  Those who have studied intensively Braddock's campaign
and defeat include several of the greatest historians this nation
has yet produced-George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and
Lawrence Henry Gipson. It is primarily on the basis of their
research, and that of others approaching them in stature, that I
have completed my own study of the battle. My hope is that,
like Bernard, I enjoy a vantage point that permits me to see a
bit further than my predecessors. In this appendix, I shall
attempt to show how Braddock historiography has evolved,
and how far earlier historians were able to see.
  Some may consider Braddock's Defeat to be too limited a
topic to merit an essay such as this. Such might be the case if
we were to see it merely as a battle, and at that as one which
by no means decided a war. But historians have seldom done
this. Rather, most have seen it as something of a morality
play, whose protagonists were not Beaujeu and Braddock, but
Washington and Braddock, each personifying a nation and a
system. As Pargellis writes, "To almost everyone... this epi-
sode stands as a conflict between Old World and New World
ways, with the outcome justifying the New."' Let us therefore
proceed, but likewise recall that we view scholarship through
but a narrow aperture.
  The symbolic aspect of the battle was most clearly drawn
                            142






              BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY      143
during the nineteenth. century, when narrative achieved its
highest expression. While Bancroft and Parkman were penning
their epics, across the Atlantic, James Anthony Froude was
proclaiming Shakespeare the greatest of all English historians.
But this was not only an age of stylistic excellence. It saw also a
rapid advance in historical scholarship. In both the method and
the basis of telling, the study of Braddock's Defeat developed
in a microcosmic relationship to the whole.
  Very nearly a century passed between the battle and the first
treatment of it scholarly enough to merit the term "history."
This does not mean, however, that it was seldom written of
during the interim. Shortly after the campaign had come to its
disastrous end, interested individuals began to sift through the
published accounts, embellished them with rumor, and pub-
lished reports of the action. A few of them, like Thomas Mante
and John Entick, worked with care. But even though contem-
porary to the event, none of them really had much to go on,
for the printed versions were few. Furthermore, most writers
were quite credulous and were thoroughly willing to accept
fiction as fact, particularly if it tended toward the glorification
of Washington or the detriment of Braddock. This tendency
grew with the years. As memories became more clouded, gulli-
bility increased, and history gave way almost entirely to legend.
Some of the myths involving the Battle of the Monongahela
remain with us today, the notion that Braddock was ambushed
being perhaps the most common.
  In 1839, Jared Sparks completed The Life of George Washing-
ton, which included the first nineteenth-century analysis of the
battle worthy of special notice. Of the general's character, he
gave a mixed, but on the whole a negative, review:
General Braddock was a brave man and an experienced officer; but,
arrogant and obstinate, he had the weakness, at all times a folly and in
his case an infatuation, to despise his enemy. Ignorant of the country,
of the mode of warfare in which he was engaged, and of the force
opposed to him, he refused counsel, neglected precautions, and thus
lost his life.





144 APPENDIX B


Sparks was no mean scholar, though his contempories over-
rated him in this respett. He himself visited Braddock's Field
and examined every inch of the terrain. On his tour, he dis-
covered several "deep ravines" in the area and concluded that
the French and Indians had concealed themselves within
them-not a foolish inference, although I have suggested it to
be on the whole incorrect. More surprising is his statement
that Braddock was, indeed, ambushed. Sparks had access to
the comments of only two of our twenty-two basic British eye-
witnesses, Orme and Washington, and neither provides much
insight into the first moments of battle, which involved primar-
ily the advance party. On the other hand, Sparks also had at
his disposal three French accounts, that he had discovered in
the archives of Paris. Although he does not give details, one
was certainly by the anonymous writer whom I have desig-
nated "French B," and it is in fact Sparks who first related
Beaujeu's famous speech to the Indians. But it cannot be said
that he otherwise made very good use of his find. Though the
French reports clearly show that Braddock was not ambushed,
Sparks chose to cling to tradition. His tendency to be credu-
lous is likewise manifest in the fact that, like John Fanning
Watson, he interviewed William Butler, a centenarian who
claimed to have fought under Braddock, and furthermore
blithely accepted the old man's damaging testimony that the
general had positively refused to allow an Indian band to join
his march.2
  Despite the tenuous nature of his sources, Sparks set a pat-
tern that was to endure for the remainder of the century.
Virtually all writers would echo his "compromise" portrayal of
Braddock as a brave man who would perhaps have been a
competent tactician had he been fighting in Flanders rather
than in America. They would see the general as a martinet, a
bigot in his attitude toward provincials, and, most damaging of
all, a pigheaded person who refused to take the advice of those
wiser than he, most notably Washington. Younger historians
would mirror Sparks in other ways as well. As noted in chapter






              BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY 145
3, throughout the nineteenth century and into our own, most
writers took it for granted that the enemy had fired on Brad-
dock's troops from the security of trenches. Although this was
an old tradition, it received its main impetus from Sparks. It
fitted in well with an overall negative assessment of Braddock,
because historians could claim that if only the general had
ordered sufficient reconnaissance, he would have known of the
trenches and could have planned accordingly. And why had he
not? They would answer, because he was overconfident, con-
temptuous of the enemy, and so mindless of the value of
Indian scouts that he turned many away, while ignoring those
who did accompany him.3
  With the publication in 1852 of the fourth volume of Ban-
croft's History of the United States, we move into a higher sphere.
It has become fashionable to criticize Bancroft as one who
allowed his political leanings and patriotism to get the better of
his scholarship. Biased he was, but he was also a scholar of the
first order. His years of research in British, French, and Ameri-
can archives are everywhere reflected in his great History, and
in no area more than in his study of Braddock's expedition.
Through him, our attention is for the first time drawn to
several of the most important sources on the campaign and
battle. Sparks had known of Orme's letter to Morris, but it is
Bancroft who first refers to the captain's journal, including his
maps, and in fact his account of the battle draws most heavily
on this source. He also notes Gage's letter, which had recently
been published-a source that only he and Parkman, among
major historians of the century, used. Furthermore, he cites
three French accounts, which he had probably heard of
through Sparks and which would be published later in the
decade. He makes far better use of these than had Washing-
ton's famed biographer. Bancroft's list of second- and third-
hand reports is likewise impressive, and more so because he
looks at them with a critical eye. Perhaps he is a bit free in
accepting anecdotes favorable to Washington, but on the other
hand there is nothing here of Butler's dubious reports. His





146 APPENDIX B


research was mature enough that he could afford to dispense
with such material.
  Bancroft's learning is admirable. So is his account of the
battle, which is the most original of his century. Although no
admirer of Braddock's he does not see the general as totally, or
even primarily, to blame for the debacle. Among the officers,
he singles out Gage as a blunderer. But the central cause of
defeat was in his opinion the panic of the troops: "Had the
regulars shown courage, the issue would not have been doubt-
ful." The implications of this statement are significant. There is
nothing here of the popular concept that Braddock's real mis-
take lay in not using irregular tactics. In fact, Bancroft has very
little to say about the American troops. He says that the British
would have carried the day using standard Continental tactics,
if only the regulars had kept their heads. Nor does he claim
that Braddock stumbled into an ambush. Rather, he accepts the
consensus view implicit in the French accounts he had exam-
ined, to the effect that both sides were surprised by their
sudden confrontation. He also takes French B's suggestion that
Beaujeu's troops fought from behind trees. Bancroft makes no
reference to trenches, and indeed he appears to have con-
sidered the entire question of reconnaissance immaterial. One
last conclusion he draws from his French accounts-that Beau-
jeu was truly heroic. Although Sparks had touched briefly on
the French captain, it is Bancroft who first glorifies him, Dumas
receiving some lesser praise.4
   Bancroft's account might have exerted more influence than it
did if not for the fact that only three years after it appeared in
print Winthrop Sargent produced his monograph on the Brad-
dock expedition. The book won great acclaim on both sides of
the Atlantic and was quite popular, appearing as it did in the
centenary of the battle. Sargent was only in his thirtieth year
when his finest work appeared. He was to die young and is
today remembered primarily for this one study, which is still
generally considered definitive in its field.
   Sargent does not appear to have been familiar with much






             BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY 147
material on the battle that Bancroft had not known of, the one
major exception being the "Seaman's Journal," a version of
which had been published in London the year before. Sargent
appended that version, as well as long excerpts from a second.
More important, he published Orme's journal and also the
three French accounts referred to by Bancroft, those of French
A, French B, and Lotbiniere. He also became familiar with the
reports by Pouchot, Croghan, Leslie, and British D, but he did
not make much use of any of them and indeed appears to have
examined the last only after his study had gone to press.
  In his portrayal of Braddock, Sargent evinces some am-
bivalence. Like Sparks, he considers the general to have been
volatile and stubborn, though courageous. But unlike his pre-
decessor he defends Braddock for having been critical of
Americans. To Sargent's mind this bias had developed in re-
sponse to the apathy that provincials had commonly displayed
toward his mission.
  Sargent's account of the battle is taken from two sets of
sources. His version of the initial clash between Beaujeu's de-
tachment and the advance party is drawn primarily from the
"Seaman's Journal," with additional material coming from the
French accounts. Otherwise, his main source is Orme. Al-
though Bancroft had made use of Orme's journal, it is with
Sargent that Braddock's aide-de-camp becomes clearly estab-
lished as the most important informant of all, as regards Brad-
dock's campaign in general and the Battle of the Monongahela
in particular. Sargent's account of the telescoping and resultant
panic derives directly from Orme and helps to exculpate Brad-
dock, since it focuses blame on the regulars. But Sargent does
not take this point to its logical conclusion. Having described
the panic in detail, he then turns around and suggests an
involved feint that he felt Braddock should have used to draw
out the enemy. Regarding the general's role in the Defeat, he
seems on the whole to be a witness for the defense. On the
basis of his own observations, he repeats Spark's claim that the
enemy fired from trenches. However, while claiming that Brad-





                      148 APPENDIX B
dock had not treated his Indians well, he suggests too that
those who did accompany the march were recalcitrant and
usually unwilling to reconnoiter, so that their commander
could scarcely be blamed for not knowing of the ditches that
lay across his route. On the key question of whether Braddock
should have listened to Washington's plea that the men be
allowed to fight Indian style on the fateful day, Sargent does
not take a clear stand. Indeed, he has surprisingly little to say
about the behavior of the provincial troops. This may again
derive from his reliance on Orme, who says nothing whatever
about them.
  During the eighty years after Sargent produced his great
work, only one historian made a significant contribution to the
study of Braddock's campaign or defeat. This was Parkman,
one of the few products of his century to rival Bancroft in
stature. In his classic Montcalm and Wolfe, first published in
1884, Parkman included some fifty pages on the Braddock
expedition, about twenty of which may be said to revolve
around the battle itself. Clearly this is a topic that interested
him, and his account of the engagement is vividly drawn.
  Parkman refers to the traditional British sources, first- and
secondhand, and stands as the apparent discoverer of Mackel-
lar's maps. Moreover, he makes use of a small volume of
French reports, published by John D. G. Shea in 1860, and on
this basis becomes the first major historian to refer to the
accounts of Godefroy and French C. More important, he intro-
duces two documents discovered in the course of his archival
research-the reports by Dumas and Contrecoeur. One should
not overestimate the significance of his contributions. French A
in particular had followed the accounts of the two captains so
closely that the information itself was not new. But Dumas's
stirring account of the first moments of battle-and especially
of his own heroism-is the stuff of theater, and Parkman uses
its dramatic potential to the full. For the first time, Dumas
emerges as Beaujeu's equal in greatness.
  Parkman made use of more accounts of the battle than did






              BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY 149
any other nineteenth-century historian, but it cannot be said
that he used them better. His narrative of the action is famous,
but somewhat tarnished by his tendency to go beyond the
sources for dramatic effect. This is not to say that he misrepre-
sents his material, but rather that he embellishes it. So had
countless historians before, so have countless since. But it
seems that both Bancroft and Sargent "stick to the facts" some-
what better than does Parkman.
  Parkman's narrative ability tends to reach its summit when
propelled by soaring patriotism. So it is with his description of
the battle. Leaving most of his sources behind, he draws on
Washington, Burd, and legend in glorifying the heroism of the
provincials in the wake of the regulars' collapse:
The men of the two regiments became mixed together.... Both men
and officers were new to this blind and frightful warfare of the savage
in his native woods.... The Virginians alone were equal to the emer-
gency. Fighting behind trees like the Indians themselves, they might
have held the enemy in check till order could be restored, had not
Braddock, furious at a proceeding that shocked all his ideas of cour-
age and discipline, ordered them, with oaths, to form into line.
However, if Parkman implicitly condemns Braddock for hav-
ing refused to allow the Americans to fight Indian style, he
supports him on other fronts. Like Sargent, and even more
pointedly, he sees Braddock's problems in reconnaissance as
deriving not from his mishandling of the Indians, but from
their own recalcitrance. In any case, he does not see the scout-
ing problem as decisive. He agrees with Sparks and Sargent
that the enemy used natural trenches as hiding places, but
suggests that many, if not most of them fought from behind
trees. The thrust of his account is that Braddock lost, not
because he was fighting in an area of which he should have
received intelligence and had not, but rather because his
troops panicked.
   Parkman's portrayal of Braddock is among the more sympa-
thetic of the century. He suggests the usual flaws in the gen-
eral's character-stubbornness, surliness-and, like most of his





150 APPENDIX B


contemporaries, he judges Braddock unfit to have led a cam-
paign in the American wilderness, owing to his ignorance of
Indian tactics. But he notes that "whatever were his failings, he
feared nothing, and his fidelity and honor in the discharge of
public trusts were never questioned." Such praise for his cour-
age and honesty is not new. Neither is the historian's claim that
Braddock for the most part conducted his march well, taking
all due precautions. It is rather Parkman's emphasis of these
positive points that leaves the impression that he is on the
whole more sympathetic to the general than Sparks, Bancroft,
or Sargent had been. Perhaps this is again the result of Orme's
influence, and it is noteworthy that Parkman puts the captain
himself in a very favorable light.5
  More than fifty years passed between the publication of
Montcalm and Wolfe and that of the next major work involving
Braddock's Defeat. In the realm of our subject, this long inter-
val was a time of mighty narrative and weak scholarship. At
best, the writers by and large rehashed Sargent, and even then
they liberally sprinkled his account with folk legend. This
shoddy workmanship did not derive from any diminution of
interest in the battle, but rather from the desire to press it into
a chauvinistic context. Braddock was now generally cast as a
total fool-perhaps a brave one-who, after blundering into an
ambush, was too pigheaded to allow the Americans under his
command to save the day by using Indian-style tactics against
the enemy. Thus did the haughty, regimented, traditionalist
Old World come into conflict with the individualistic, innova-
tive New, to the disgrace of the former.6
  But the torrent of rancor finally abated. In 1936, Stanley
Pargellis produced two works that have strongly influenced
subsequent research on Braddock's Defeat. During the course
of his research among the Cumberland Papers at Windsor
Castle he discovered a number of documents relevant to the
battle, which he published in Military Affairs in North America
1748-1765. Now for the first time the public came to know of
the eyewitness accounts by Gordon and St. Clair. And in his






              BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY 151
article, "Braddock's Defeat," Pargellis became the first to make
reference, albeit brief, to the report by Gates, and the first to
incorporate Stephen's account, then little known, into a discus-
sion of the battle.7
  Pargellis leaned rather too heavily on weak sources, and this
led to questionable conclusions. His arguments are dealt with in
chapter 5, and again in Appendix C. It is nevertheless true that
he made an invaluable contribution, not only by adding consid-
erably to the store of material on Braddock's Defeat, but in his
approach to the various accounts bequeathed to or discovered
by him. Earlier writers on the battle had seldom dealt critically
with their sources. Perhaps at most they had judged a particu-
lar version to be untrustworthy, and in such cases they had
made little if any attempt to determine whether certain aspects
might nonetheless be worthy of acceptance. They had also
tended to credit everything contained in accounts they liked,
particularly when the text was quotable. There are few in-
stances in the earlier narratives where we can see evidence that
A given historian is noting contradictions among his various
sources and choosing one viewpoint as most plausible. Admit-
tedly, there are several reasons for this. One of the most impor-
tant is that throughout the nineteenth century writers had
comparatively few eyewitness accounts to work with. But the
main consideration was probably stylistic. If one were to
compare versions, it would be necessary either to disrupt the
narrative-which, in the age of Parkman, would have been
considered gauche, to say the least-or else to argue out in a
footnote each disputed point, and thereby produce a book that
was only one-quarter text. Pargellis was the first willing to
sacrifice the fluidity of his narrative for the sake of accuracy.
He was not always consistent in the means by which he judged
credibility, and in the scope of an article he could not discuss
each eyewitness to the extent desirable, but there is no question
that he, more than any other historian, pointed the way toward
more careful handling of source material. Unfortunately, only
a few have followed his lead.





                xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
greatly by the efforts of Endre Ag6cs and Larry Leveque.
Finally-symbolically, since she had the last word on every-
thing, and always used it well-I would like to express my
deepest gratitude to Beth Luey, who edited my book for the
University of Pittsburgh Press.





152 APPENDIX B


   Pargellis's thesis has experienced the same mixed success as
his methodology. Briefly, in his article he argues that Braddock
was justified in his resolve to fight the battle entirely on the
basis of Continental tactics, but that he misapplied them and
was therefore to blame for the disaster. Most historians have
accepted the first point, but not the second. That is, they tend
to feel, for one reason or another, that the general could not
have won by allowing his troops to fight Indian style, but they
also insist that the regular tactics he advocated were sound. As
one might suspect, they for the most part place blame for the
Defeat not on Braddock, but rather on incompetent subordi-
nates, or, more often, on panicky troops. On the strength of
this conviction, the pendulum has swung dramatically. Brad-
dock, long maligned, has been portrayed in an increasingly
favorable light, perhaps too much so.8
   Among major historians, probably the staunchest defender
of the general has been Gipson, who in 1946 produced The
Great War for Empire: The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757, the sixth
volume of his magnificent series, The British Empire Before the
American Revolution. As one might expect in a book whose
theme is defeat, there is a good deal here about Braddock. The
thrust of Gipson's argument is that the disaster at the Monon-
gahela resulted primarily from several key blunders by Gage,
of great importance being his decision not to occupy the hillock
on the right before encountering Beaujeu's troops, and then,
more disastrous still, prematurely ordering a retreat. He seems
justified on the first point, but not on the second, for while the
retreat of the advance party certainly had disastrous conse-
quences, it is by no means clear that Gage ordered it. On the
telescoping, and generally on the battle, Gipson relies primarily
on Orme, and indeed he makes no significant contribution to
our list of sources. But he does set the tone for a generation
that would admire Braddock. To his mind, the general was
vigorous and humane: "His military conceptions and his tacti-
cal arrangements were sound and most errors of judgment in
connection with the campaign were committed by others...;






BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY 153


yet his correspondence is remarkably free from any censure of
his fellow officers."9
  Only two years after Gipson's work appeared, Douglas
Southall Freeman came forth with the second volume of his life
of Washington. Freeman's interest in Braddock is evident in
the fact that he devotes fully one hundred pages to the expedi-
tion of 1755, including almost forty on the battle. But the
significance of his study certainly does not lie in the area of
quantity. Here length connotes thoroughness, not only in treat-
ment, but in research. Freeman uses all of the significant
sources on the battle known in his day. Moreover, he uses them
extremely well, and is also the first to refer to Roucher's ac-
count, although he does not work too much with it. Regarding
Braddock himself, Freeman is favorably inclined, but more
critical thari Gipson, perhaps reflecting Washington's own am-
bivalence. Still, when it comes to analyzing the general's role in
the battle and the march preceding it, he provides the most
admirable defense yet produced. This defense reflects the sys-
tematic nature of Freeman's scholarship. He lists the various
charges leveled against Braddock and answers them individu-
ally. A simple format indeed, and yet one that had never been
used previously, possibly because, again, it was inconsistent
with the dictates of style. Although just one section, albeit a
lengthy section, of a multivolume work, Freeman's study of
Braddock's expedition and defeat stands head and shoulders
above others written in this century. Here we have not only
narrative, indeed excellent narrative, but scholarship of the
first order, and a new concept of how to handle the issues
arising from the subject.10
  In 1958, more than two centuries after his death, Braddock
finally became the subject of a full-length biography. Lee
McCardell, who had made something of a hobby of studying
the rather mysterious officer, entered the historical lists with
Ill-Starred General: Braddock of the Coldstream Guards. McCardell's
research is admirable. He is the first writer in the field to have
ferreted out Cameron's memoir, and he makes use of virtually





                      154 APPENDIX B
all relevant sources in print at the time, primary and secondary.
Unfortunately, he is not particularly discriminating in his use
of them, seldom differentiating between a solid eyewitness ac-
count and even the wildest rumor. His study of the battle
hearkens back to the age of narrative. There is no real analysis
here or elsewhere. The action simply flows, and McCardell's
numerous sources provide a wealth of battlefield quotations. As
one might expect, the end result is very readable, but it does
not rank high in the realm of scholarship.
  The present work has served to introduce several new sources
and to draw attention to others which, though in print, have
hitherto been ignored by historians. But the stress, I hope, has
been on analysis. I have attempted-with what success the
reader may judge-to carry the handling of our materials fur-
ther down the road suggested by Pargellis. To encourage contin-
ued analysis, I have appended all eyewitness reports of the
battle. Others may use them to embellish my account or, if they
find cause, to alter it. Certainly the wealth of testimony provides
many more angles than could be handled in the text.
  In emphasizing critical method, I am by no means suggesting
that we should put the age of narrative behind us." I do feel,
however, that no matter how the historian finally tells his story,
he owes it to his audience to prepare it carefully, and this must
involve not only gathering sources, but analyzing them. I fur-
thermore believe that the "mass" audience is becoming progres-
sively more sophisticated, and that contrary to the suggestions
of some, it is no longer frightened by footnotes or by a frankly
critical approach to source material. For the sake of narrative,
the historian may well choose to do his analysis behind the
scenes. But it seems to me that the historian's craft has ad-
vanced to the point where, regardless of subject, the writer
cannot toss his materials around with abandon and yet win for
his product the accolade of "history." This, too, is a legacy of
the giants.







APPENDIX C o


               Orme's Reliability


FROM 1755 to the present, Robert Orme has remained our
chief source of information on Braddock's expedition and the
Battle of the Monongahela itself. Some four decades ago, how-
ever, Stanley Pargellis accused the captain of having misrepre-
sented the action in order to protect Braddock's reputation, as
well as his own. In this appendix, I discuss Orme's importance
as an eyewitness and judge his credibility.
  As soon as he had recovered sufficiently from the wounds he
had suffered in battle, Orme began to dispatch a series of
letters presenting his account of the affair. These letters fell
into two categories. First there were those intended for publica-
tion, in hopes that they might sway the public. These versions
were printed in no fewer than seven newspapers, on both sides
of the Atlantic, during the late summer of 1755.1 The second
category includes letters aimed at individuals, specifically supe-
riors and colonial governors. In this case, too, he was prolific,
and some of the addressees passed on copies or extracts of his
accounts.2
  According to the captain, he wrote at the behest of his late
commander. In his letter to Fox, he states that "the General the
Day before his Death Order'd Me as soon as I was Able to
transmitt to You, Sir, An Account of the Unhappy Action."
Quite likely the order did not involve Fox alone. Whether the
dying general looked for vindication, or merely a just account
of the battle, one cannot know. Orme himself certainly worked
toward the former end, and possibly the latter as well. In the
process, he may likewise have sought out his own vindication.
St. Clair might wash his hands of all responsibility for the fiasco
by claiming that during the last days of the campaign Braddock
                            155






                      156 APPENDIX C
had continually ignored his good advice. Orme could scarcely
get away with that. Everyone of any importance on the expedi-
tion knew that he had been Braddock's chief favorite and had
held tremendous sway with him. Only by vindicating the gen-
eral might he vindicate himself.
  We have seen the end product of his labors. Orme's narrative
boils down to a simple proposition: Braddock had served nobly
throughout the campaign and battle; the disastrous defeat was
entirely the fault of his panicky troops. Although heaping
praise on the officers, Orme implies that if any were at all to
blame, it was those of the vanguard, who had allowed their
men to retreat into Burton's detachment.
  From his day to ours, the captain's account has had tremen-
dous impact. The historiographical survey I appended previ-
ously gives some indication of his persistent influence.3 Yet, as
we also saw, the fact that historians have by and large accepted
his portrayal of the battle has not prevented them from criticiz-
ing Braddock. This is due to two aspects of the action that
Orme passes over. First, being himself in the main body at the
commencement of firing, he has nothing to say about the
fighting up front, and therefore does not contradict the legend
that the attack constituted an ambush. As I suggested in Ap-
pendix B, historians like Sparks who have assumed that Brad-
dock was indeed ambushed tend to be hard on the general for
what they see as his failures in reconnaissance. Orme likewise
has nothing to say about the behavior of American troops, and
this has left historians free to accept the legend that they
fought heroically and might well have routed the enemy had
not Braddock forced them from cover.
  Orme was himself a persuasive sort. This we may judge by
comparing two letters Morris wrote to Shirley. In the first,
undated but apparently written in late July, the governor of
Pennsylvania states:
The Defeat of our Troops appears to me to be owing to the want of
Care and Caution in the Leaders, who have been too secure, and held
in too great Contempt the Indian Manner of Fighting; even by Capt.






ORME'S RELIABILITY 157


Orme's Account they were not aware of the Attack. And there are
others that say the French & Indians lined the Way on each Side and
in the Front behind Intrenchments that we knew Nothing of till they
fired upon us.
Yet, by September 5, Morris had changed his tune: "My good
friend, Capt. Orme, is now with us.... Capn Orme is going to
England, and will put the affair of the Western Campaign in a
true light, and greatly different from what it has been repre-
sented to be."4
  This is not to say that everyone accepted his story. Daniel
Dulany, perhaps his most vocal critic, claimed in a newsletter of
1755:
As Orme is gone home, I take it for granted his account of the action
will be published there, and, perhaps, may give the public a different
impression of the conduct of the expedition than a disinterested and
candid narrative would do. He absolutely governed Mr. Braddock,
and his influence and insolence became so notorious that there is
hardly any one in the army who cannot give instances of them....
His influence all America has reason to deplore, his insolence to re-
sent, and his enmity to fear, if he has yet the power of hurting us by
his representations.5
If we accept Pargellis's opinion, Orme was disbelieved by indi-
viduals far more influential than Dulany. He claims that the
captain was refused a promotion in 1756 and that this resulted
from an unwillingness on the part of superiors to accept his
account. The first claim is true enough, and indeed Orme was
both surprised and disappointed by the rebuff. But in writing
to Washington of his misfortune, he implies not that he had
been discredited, but quite the opposite:
Letters from America had made the Generals Character as odious in
this Country as there but since my Arrival and my having writ a true
and impartial Narrative of the Affair the Opinions of Men are altered
and his Character will be rather revered than disapproved.... I
thought I should have returned but am not included in the American
Promotions[;] except the Pleasure of once more seeing my dear
George I am as well contented.





                      158 APPENDIX C
Even if his last statement suggests sour grapes, it is frankly
far-fetched to assume that he had failed to secure promotion
because his superiors disbelieved him. Orme was himself
involved in a serious scandal at the time. Despite the fact that
he was apparently already married, and a father, he had
wooed and won the daughter of Viscount Townshend. Later
that year they were to wed, and he was to retire to the com-
fortable life of a country gentleman. Townshend was not
amused by the affair, and he would have had sufficient in-
fluence to block any promotion Orme might otherwise have
received. It is possible that he did so, and possible also that
Orme himself overestimated his chances for advancement.
After all, Braddock's death had deprived him of his most
important patron. Perhaps, too, he failed of promotion be-
cause the army needed a scapegoat, and he was looked on as
an obvious choice. But presumably the powers that be would
have made more than they did of the rebuff if this had been a
major factor. In any case, if he were chosen as a scapegoat, it
would more likely have been because it was felt that he had
abused his influence over Braddock than that his account mis-
represented the action.6
  Next we come to a more direct accusation by Pargellis. Ac-
cording to him, Orme was the central figure in a conspiracy to
cover up the general's blunders which had brought about the
disaster:

Braddock's reputation he valiantly tried to save by throwing the blame
for the defeat elsewhere. He could not throw it on the officers, for
they, being literate men with powerful correspondents, would deny
the allegation. His solution was to praise to excess the "unparallelled
good Behaviour" of the officers, and to put the blame, unreservedly,
upon that poor dumb ox, the British private soldier. Gage, to excuse
his own negligence, reached the same answer. Gordon on the other
hand, who had listened to Orme's blandishments, ran to the cover of
Cumberland's protection.... St. Clair said just enough to make it
clear to Cumberland where he stood. Gates contented himself with
hinting that things were not what they seemed. Stephen knew nothing






                 ORME'S RELIABILITY 159
of these wheels within wheels.... No evidence shows that
[Washington] was consciously involved in a rather unscrupulous
scheme and that he covered up his complicity.7
Despite this neat listing, there is really no proof of a conspiracy.
Pargellis presents no evidence, and I know of none, to show
that Orme in any way sought to influence Gordon. Further-
more, the accounts by the reporters noted are quite individu-
alized, again militating against any "conspiracy" theory. This
applies as well to most of the reports that have surfaced during
the period since Pargellis wrote. Uniformly, the writers have
supported Orme's basic thesis. But this should not suggest a
cover-up. Among reporters favoring his essential view is Fur-
nis, who hated him and would not have followed his lead.
  Pargellis tends to see Washington as a yokel, who accepted
blindly whatever his friend Orme told him. It is true that the
Virginian was younger than his fellow aide-de-camp, and prob-
ably a less experienced observer. But while he might have left it
to the captain to provide a detailed account of the battle, he
could certainly have understood and judged the most basic
aspects of it, and it is primarily these which Pargellis discusses.
Washington undoubtedly knew how his friend was portraying
the engagement, and he seems to have agreed with him. Rec-
ognizing his support, Orme wrote boldly on August 25, reply-
ing to a letter in which Washington had noted unhappily that
criticism of Braddock was rife:
The Part of your Letter mentioning the Reflections upon the General
gives me much uneasiness tho' I feel a Contempt for the Detractors
which alleviates in some Degree my Concern[.] I know the ignorant
and rascally C D. is one promoter through Resentment and Malevo-
lence, and the thick head Baronet another intending to build his Char-
acter upon the Ruins of one much more amiable than he can be. For
my Part I judge it a Duty to vindicate the Memory of a Man whom I
greatly and deservedly esteemed and I think every Man whom he
regarded should be his Advocate keeping litterally to Facts which must
always improve the goodness of his Disposition. I am convinced the
Affection he bore you as well as your Integrity and good Nature will





160 APPENDIX C


make you assiduous in removing those abominable Prejudices the gen-
erality of People have imbibed and publish.8
Conspiratorial? Hardly. Rather, the comments of one man to
another whom he felt with confidence would think as he did.
Orme and Washington had seen the battle from the same per-
spective. They had both been present when Braddock ordered
Burton's detachment forward, they both had witnessed the col-
lision of troops, or had been on the scene within minutes. Most
important, both had seen their fill of panic, a panic that had
cost the general both victory and life, despite his heroic at-
tempts to counter it.
  Probably the best way to judge Pargellis's accusations against
the captain is simply to compare the latter's account of the
action to others written by eyewitnesses, as was done in chapter
4. It seems to me that such a comparison shows Orme to have
been both honest and accurate. The only points where he is
directly challenged involve the first moments of action:
whether Braddock himself rode up; whether Burton's detach-
ment was in disorder prior to the telescoping; whether it was in
motion at the moment of impact. As I have suggested, the
telescoping may well have taken place before he was on the
scene, in which case he was relating testimony he had heard,
most probably from his friend Burton. Even so, the evidence
against him is not particularly strong. Regarding Braddock's
actions, the reporters who claim that the general himself rode
forward were in the vanguard and therefore had a poor per-
spective. If we accept Peyton's testimony, the case for Orme's
statement that Braddock merely ordered Burton's detachment
ahead is overwhelming. I feel that this would be unwise, but
even if we reject Peyton we are left with Washington. He as
well as Orme knew of Braddock's initial orders. He would have
known if the captain were misrepresenting them in his ac-
counts. Again we may refer to Orme's letter. If Washington's
friend were a liar, would he have so brazenly attempted to
portray himself as a champion of integrity to one who knew the
truth as well as he?





ORME'S RELIABILITY 161


  Orme compares favorably with most other eyewitnesses, not
only in terms of the credibility of his narrative, but also in his
interpretation of the action. It is true that he associates the
onset of chaos with the telescoping more than do others, but
this is of limited importance. Orme's central thesis, that the
disaster of July 9 was caused by mass panic, and that the panic
of the troops could not be justified by reference to any
blunders on the part of the general, not only withstands the
scrutiny of the remaining eyewitnesses, but actually is strength-
ened by it.
  We may feel that Orme and his fellow officers protest too
much in blaming the men, and clearly their accounts reflect the
biases of their class. But one must present overwhelming evi-
dence if he hopes to discredit their testimony. Pargellis has not
done this, and I strongly doubt that anyone ever will. Further-
more, judging from the testimony discussed at length in
chapter 4, it appears that the reason such evidence is not
forthcoming is simple and does not hinge on the undoubted
fact that most of the troops were illiterate. Rather, it is this:
Even if they embroidered, in their central argument Orme and
his peers told the truth.











                   Introduction


EVERY PROJECT PRESENTS unique problems in methodology.
In analyzing Braddock's Defeat, the historian is confronted
with the basic question of what criteria to use in judging the
validity of the numerous battle reports. Since there are many
accounts, particularly on the British side, we can afford to be
demanding.
  To begin with, we are well advised to avoid wherever possible
secondhand versions of the affair. I say this for several reasons.
By sticking to eyewitnesses, we limit the likelihood of an indi-
vidual's corroborating his own testimony. A secondhand re-
porter, relying on eyewitnesses, may use information supplied
to him by one or many, and may or may not name his sources.
An eyewitness may therefore present his account of what hap-
pened directly through his own report, and indirectly through
the writings of those who have been impressed by his de-
scription. We can limit the likelihood of being misled by such
self-corroboration if we rely as much as possible on firsthand
reports. Of course, we can never eliminate the danger entirely.
Even those who were present at the Battle of the Monongahela
saw it from necessarily limited perspectives, and, in order to
enhance their accounts, some of them may well have sought
out the testimony of others. Fortunately, the reports are indi-
vidualized enough to suggest that no single eyewitness had an
undue influence on his fellows and that, in fact, most observers
seem to have concentrated on action they themselves saw.
  If we allow second- or thirdhand reports to affect our think-
ing, we also run the risk of not knowing how carefully our
informant has recorded the testimony that others had given
him. Unless he is obvious about it, we cannot be certain how
                            XVii






APPENDIX D %40


      British Eyewitness Accounts


                   A Note on Transcription
IN TRANSCRIBING the documents appended here, I have ob-
served the following rules: the letter thorn is rendered as th;
superscript letters are brought down to the line; letters consis-
tently capitalized are made lower-case, except where modern
usage calls for the capital. Aside from the last, these practices
are applied to printed, as well as manuscript sources. They are
used in the text and in all appendices.

                          British A
  [A fair copy of this report has already been transcribed and
published by Charles Hamilton (Braddock's Defeat [Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1959], pp. 40-58). However, the
following is drawn from my own transcript of an earlier draft,
Hardwicke no. 136, document no. 5, Manuscripts and Archives
Division, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden
Foundations. The Hardwicke draft is not as full as that printed
by Hamilton; it does not include the closing passages on the
retreat, or the list of officers to be found on pp. 53-58 of
Braddock's Defeat. The earlier portions of the respective drafts,
as well as the accounts of the battle itself are, however, almost
identical. There are only three noteworthy differences between
the reports of the engagement. First, the Hardwicke draft, un-
like Hamilton's, specifies that Gage marched with two compa-
nies of grenadiers. Second, the line which in the Hardwicke
version reads, "it was proposed to strenghten the flanks, but
rejected," in Braddock's Defeat concludes, "but this was unhap-
pily rejected." Finally, where Hardwicke reads, "tho' certainly a
                             162





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 163


very bad way as we were situated," Hamilton's fair copy has,
"which could not have answered all as the Enemy were situ-
ated." The portions of the Hardwicke draft quoted here corre-
spond to Braddock's Defeat, pp. 49-52.1

  Wednesday July the 9th. as we were to cross the Mononga-
hela that day, and so near the Fort as we were drawing, it was
found absolutely necessary to detach a Party to secure the
crossings. Accordingly Lt. Col: Gage with 300 Men, the two
Companies of grenadiers and two peices of Canon, marched
before daybreak, and before the Road was cleared. at Day
break the whole Detachment marched tho' slowly, having a
great deal of trouble with the Road; after about 5 miles we
came to the first crossing of the River which was extreamly fine,
having a view of at least four miles up a River, undoubtedly
pleasing, the breadth about 600 yards; near this first crossing,
our advanced party had scared some Indians from their holes;
finding many spears, and their fires newly burning; from this
crossing, to the other was near two miles, and much the finest
of the two: on the other side of the second crossing, the ad-
vanced Party had halted at Frazier's House, close to the Bank,
which was very steep, and took two hours to make it passable
for the Carriages. The general now thinking the dangerous
Passes were over, did not suffer the Advanced Party to proceed
any farther than just the Distance of a few yards from the main
body; it was proposed to strengthen the flanks, but rejected.
between 12 and one, after we had marched about 800 yards
from the River, our first flank upon the left was fired upon,
and every man killed or wounded. the Alarm soon became
general, and the fire was very brisk from Right to Left; the
Indians were every one of them planted behind Trees, and
fired with the utmost security; the ground from where the
Enemy fired, and were posted was rising and advantagious.
upon our right were a Couple of Immense large Trees, fallen
on each other, which the Indians were in possession of, and
annoyed us from very much; but an officer and a party of men





                     164 APPENDIX D
soon dislodged them, and by pretty brisk fire, kept our Right
tolerably easy; The Guns which were all rather to the Left,
fired both Round and grape shot, and with great Execution.
The Indians, whither ordered or not, I can't say, kept an
incessant fire on the guns, and kill'd the men very fast. The
Indians from their irregular method of fighting, by running
from one place to another, obliged us to wheel from right to
left, to quit the guns, and then heartily to return and cover
them. At the first of the firing the General who was at the head
of the detachment came to the front, and the American Troops
tho' without any orders ran up immediately, some behind
Trees, and others into the Ranks, and put the whole into
confusion. The men from what storys they had heard of the
Indians, in regard to their scalping; and mohawking [toma-
hawking], were so panick struck, that their officers had little or
no Command over them, and if any got a shot at one, the fire
immediately ran through the whole Line, tho' they saw nothing
but Trees; The whole Detachment was frequently divided into
several parties, and then they were sure to fire on one another.
the greatest part of the men who were behind trees, were
either kill'd or wounded by our People, even one or two
officers were killed by their own Platoon. such was the confu-
sion that the men were sometimes 20 or 30 deep, and he
thought himself securest, who was in the Center. during all this
time the Enemy kept continually firing, and every shot took
place. The general had given orders that they should fire in
Platoons, which was impossible to be Effected, tho' certainly a
very bad way as we were situated. within about two hours and a
half, the men were obliged to (at least did) retreat 3 or 4 times,
and were as often rallied, we found at last, that we should
never gain the day, unless we dislodged them from the Rising
ground, upon which Lt. Col: Burton with the grenadiers at-
tempted the hill; for some time we were in hopes of their
success, but some shot killing two or three of them, the rest
Retreated very fast, leaving their officers, entreating and com-
manding but without any Regard to what they did.





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 165
  The Indians were scalping at the beginning of the affair,
which we heard was a sign of their being dubious of success but
it is certain they never gave ground.
  General Braddock who was in the heat of the action the
whole time, was greatly exposed, he had 4 Horses shot under
him, and Balls through several parts of his cloaths: at the latter
end of the unlucky affair, a shot hit him in the Body, which
occasioned his death three or four days afterwards.
  Sir Peter Halkett was killed at the beginning, and many other
officers; after they had Retreated from the Hill, the men made
some stand, and the Canon kept a tolerable good fire, but very
soon for want of sufficient guard to it, the men were obliged to
desert them. during this time the Waggoners who imagined
things would turn out badly, had taken the gears from their
horses and galloped intirely away, so that if fortune had turned
in our favour, we had not one horse left to draw the train along.
however after about four hours incessant fire and two thirds of
our [men] killed or wounded, they as if by beat of Drum, turned
to the Right about, and made a most precipitate Retreat, every
one trying who should be the first. the Enemy pursued us,
butchering as they came, as far as the other side of the River; in
crossing it they shot many in the Water, both men and Women,
scalping and cutting them in a most Barbarous manner.
  On the other side of the River most of us halted to consider
what to doe, but the men being so terrified desired to go on,
nay indeed they would, melancholy situation! expecting every
moment to have our Retreat cut off (which half a Dozen men
would very easily have done) and a certainty of meeting no
Provisions for 60 miles.
  Retreated to Col. Dunbar, 12 miles beyond Gist's Plantation,
which Plantation is 50 miles from the Place of Action.
  Killed. 385.   Wounded. 328.   not Wounded. 523.

Commentary
  Aside from Cholmley's Batman, British A is the most impor-
tant of our anonymous reporters. His account is both full and





166 APPENDIX D


accurate. Although he is apparently in error in stating that
Braddock early on rode up to the front, this mistake seems to
derive from his faulty perspective. British A was probably to-
ward the front himself. His mention of wheeling right and left
seems to be in reference to the advance party, and his excep-
tionally detailed report on this point suggests that he was him-
self of that detachment. So does his reference to Croghan's
opinion (see his account) that the fact that the Indians were
scalping from the first showed them to be pessimistic. Croghan
would presumably have rejoined the advance party during the
first moments of fighting and might have given an optimistic
assessment then, but not for long.
  On the other hand, British A's inaccurate version of the early
moments of fighting, and particularly his claim that the enemy
first revealed itself when it fired on the flanks, rather than that
it appeared to the fore and soon ran down the flanks, indicates
that he was to the rear of the advance party. Despite a few
errors such as those noted, British A is generally reliable. He is
also honest. He does criticize the troops for their panic, but he
also notes that they made a stand after their retreat from the
rising ground. As for his attitude toward Braddock, he is
mildly critical, here and elsewhere in his journal. While show-
ing no great admiration for the Americans, he suggests that
Braddock's reliance on traditional platoon-firing tactics was un-
wise in vew of the circumstances.


                           British B
   [This is reprinted from "Braddock on July 9, 1755," ed.
Richard Walsh, Maryland Historical Magazine, 60 (1965), pp.
421-27. The original is on permanent exhibit at the Maryland
Historical Society and is ms. 2018 in the Colonial Collection. It
lacks the first and last pages, which explains its abrupt opening
and closing. The account here represents Walsh's complete
transcript.]





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 167


   ... affairs and the ordering of a march than such a young-
ster as he. The General, upon this said with some vehemence,
"Gentlemen, you are hot.["] Col. Dunbar told his excellency
that he left it to him to judge, who had most reason, that 'twas
true he was old, but he thought his age should rather protect
him, than expose him to the ridicule of that young man in his
excellencie's hearing.
  A little after this Scuffle and several others of less conse-
quence, too tedious and triffling to relate, the general marched
before with twelve pieces of artillery fifty five waggons with a
great part of the ammunition and baggage, twelve hundred men
of the choice of the army, and the artillery chest, and left Dun-
bar behind, with about 800 men and 72 waggons, to bring up the
heavy artillery, and the rest of the baggage and ammunition.
   Before he reached the Monongahela, our Indian friend, the
half king, with some of his tribe, had once or twice reconnoi-
tred the french fork and brought the general Intelligence,
that the Enimy were very strong there being, as he could
judge, about 2200 french Regulars and irregulars, with a
white flag, and about 3000 of their Indian friends and allies.
After this advice, which several of the scouts agreed in, not-
withstanding the repeated solicitations of the old officers, to
regulate the march and be more circumspect, the general let
them go on, in the same confused manner as before, and the
triumvirate still kept laying their wages of 100 guineas to five
shillings, and did not stick to charge those with cowardice,
who talked of watching the enimy, or guarding against their
designs.
   When they approached nigh the Monongahela, Dunbar with
his party, was by this time 50 miles behind (you will probably see
this called ten miles in some of the triumvirates letters published
in our newspapers) and Monacatucha the half king proferred
his advice, that they should proceed no further, but Incamp and
fortify the army on this side the Monongahela, alledging, that if
they proceeded towards the fort they must of a necessity be all





168 APPENDIX D


surrounded and cut off by superior numbers, having no safe
place of retreat, but this good advice was disregarded.
  Upon the 9th day of July the army crossed the Monongahela
twice about eleven o'clock in the morning, that river, which is a
branch of the Ohio, making a great bend or Circumflexure in
this place, which is about seven miles on this side of fort
duQuesne, as Sir John St. Clair, and Sir Peter Halket, were
apprehensive that the Enimy would attack them at the passing
of this river (which they really intended, but happened to come
a little too late) they with some difficulty persuaded the General
to form the army into battle order; in this order they marched
so, about a quarter of an hour after they had passed the river,
but soon was ordered again to resume the line of march, and
got into their wonted Confusion. Sir John at this appeared
uneasy, and solicited the General again to form the army into
the line of battle but to no purpose. Sir John alledged to the
General pointing to a valley with a small rising hill upon each
side, scarce half a mile distant from the front, that the enimy
would attack him there. The General asked him by what Intelli-
gence he knew that. He replied by the same Intelligence as his
Excellency had had of the Indian Sachem, which when the
General made slight of, Sir John assured him, that were he his
enimy and knew his numbers and disposition as well, as he was
assured the french knew it, he would himself undoubtedly
attack him in that very place, and he judged that the french
officer or officers would in common prudence pursue the same
scheme. The general still slighted this advice, and Sir John
begged that he would only suffer him with an advanced party
of two or three hundred men to go and reconnoitre the fort
and bring him proper Intelligences, which request was refused,
so on they marched in the same confused manner, with ar-
tillery and baggage, and in effect as Sir John had conjectured,
they were surprized with a very hot and heavy fire, both on
their front and flanks, from a party of french, concealed in a
parcell of high weeds and brush on the left hand, and a great
number of Indians from the rising of the hill on every hand.
This put them into a terrible confusion and the men dropt very





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 169


fast. Leutenant Coll. Gage led a party in the front, to cover Sir
John St. Clair, who followed him with his pioneers to clear the
woods. The remainder of the army were behind with the Gen-
eral in a confused disposition. In the front were 500 grenadiers
called Halket's grenadiers as choice men as could anywhere be
seen. These men bore the first brunt of the fire in the front, till
at last both Sir John St. Clair, and Coll. Gage's party were put
into the utmost confusion by the Irregularly tumultuous press-
ing on and crowding of the men behind, who as they were
hurried and pushed Irregularly forward, and commanded to
march, earnestly requested to be put into some kind of order
and instructed how to proceed. You'll perhaps see in some of
our newspapers a foolish account from some of the triumvi-
rate, that the foremost ranks falling back upon the rest of the
army as yet not formed, threw them into a pannic and Confu-
sion which neither the Intreaties nor threats of the officers
could divest them from or persuade them to stand their
ground, but this is as false and foolish a gloss as ever was
Invented. The affair was quite the reverse and therefore you'll
do well not to believe a word of it.
  While affairs were in this disorder Sir John St. Clair again
awaited the general, and told him that he was certainly being
defeated, if he did not speedily make as regular a retreat as
possible, and endeavor to save the Remainder of the army; this
was not regarded, and Sir John was ordered again to his post.
Sir Peter Halket, and Lieut. Coll. Gage came also to the gen-
eral. Sir Peter proposed, that he should be allowed 200 men, to
take possession of an advantageous post which he perceived the
enimy had just left. The general called him fool, and old
woman, telling him that he was fitter to be led than to lead,
ordered him to go to his station, and give his advice when it
was asked. Sir Peter (that good and worthy man) modestly
replied, that he valued not his own life, if the giving of it up
would better the cause, and he was grieved to have the bad
prospect before his eyes, of the certain destruction of so many
brave men who deserved a better fate, and returning to his
Station was in a few minutes afterwards shot dead. Coll. Gage





170 APPENDIX D


asked his excellency what he was to do; the reply was to go and
mind his business. The Coll. obeyed saying as he went away,
that he could but die at the head of his men, for it was out of
his power to do any service. Soon after the Confusion and
destruction was so great, that the men fired irregularly, one
behind another, and by this way of proceeding many more of
our men were killed by their own party than by the Enimy, as
appeared afterwards by the bullets that the surgeons extracted
from the wounded, they being distinguished from the french
and Indian bullets by their size, as they were considerably
larger for the bore of the Enimis' muskets of which many were
picked up was very small. Among the wounded men, there
were two for one of these bullets extracted by the Surgeons,
and the wounds were chiefly on the back parts of the body, so it
must have been among the kill'd. Captn. Mercer marching with
his company to take possession of an advantageous post, was
fired upon by our men from behind, and ten of his men dropt
at once. Capt. Polson lost many of his men by irregular pla-
tooning behind him, on which he faced about, and intreated
the Soldiers not to fire and destroy his men. They replied they
could not help it, they must obey orders, and upon one or two
more fires of this sort, Capt. Polson himself lost his life, being
shot directly threw the heart. He jumped at one Spring a great
distance from the ground and then fell. In fine, between the
two fires of friends and enimies, that whole company was
destroyed but five; the Hundred Grenadiers were also by this
time all killed but Eleven, three of whom were mortally
wounded. A party of these fellows had got behind a large tree
which had fell down, and making use of it for a Breast work,
made considerable havock among the Indians. These fellows
the Generall ordered to be called off, by his aid de Camp
Washington who obeyed the order with reluctance. Sir John St.
Clair had now received a desperate wound from a musket ball
that went thro' his shoulder, followed with a large profusion of
blood. He immediately rode up to the general and Speaking to
him in Italian, told him that he was defeated, and all was





           BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 171
ruined, to whom, when the general made some scornful reply,
Sir John told him, that by the fresh bleeding of his wound, he
did not expect to survive many minutes, and therefore could
have no Interest in dissembling, or saying what he really did
not think. Sir John was immediately carried off by his Servant,
he having tied him on the horses back, as he was thro loss of
blood unable to keep the saddle. The general by this time had
had five horses killed under him, and his aid de Camp Wash-
ington, two, whose upper coat was intirely shot to tatters with
musket bullets, and yet he not hurt. Soon after this the general
was wounded with a musket ball, which went thro his right
arm, his side and lodged in his lungs, and Washington applying
to the Soldiers to carry him off the field; the[y] absolutely
refused. At last some good natured waggoners and other
people carried him off in a sort of bier or litter upon their
shoulders, he being a gross heavy man was not able to bear the
jogging of a waggon or motion of a horse. Six hundred private
soldiers and upwards now lay dead and disabled on the field,
besides officers. The men had now fired away all their stock of
ammunition, and many of them took the cartridges of powder
and shot from the dead and wounded, and used that also.
There was no other shift now, but a speedy flight; great num-
bers of the officers were killed; all those of the artillery were
killed or wounded but one. The artillery baggage, ammunition,
military chest, with all the general's plate, of which he had a
complete service, money letters from the Governors, papers of
Instructions, fell into the hands of the enimy, amounting, as is
thought to 500000 Lb Sterling. The flight was precipitated and
confused, many were killed and scalped by the Indians in
repassing the Monongahela; almost all the poor women belong-
ing to the Camp were slaughtered by these savages; multitudes
of the wounded men dropt down on the Roads, and many died
that were not wounded, thro hunger faintness and weariness,
the men on that day the battle was fought, having eat little or
nothing for two days, and drank only water, under an excessive
hot sun. In short, the poor remainder of them, that reached





Braddock at the
Monongahela

Paul E. Kopperman






"An original and important work. The
scholarship is of a high order, and the
writing has both clarity and style. It is the
best analysis yet of the source material on
Braddock's Defeat. It gathers together for
the first time all the known eyewitness
accounts of the Defeat, including several
that were previously unpublished or
untranslated."        -Robert C. Alberts

On July 9, 1755, an army of British and
American soldiers commanded by Major
General Edward Braddock marched toward
Fort Duquesne, a major western outpost held
by the French. They were confident of an
easy victory. But before they reached the fort
they were attacked by a much smaller force
of French and Indians. Braddock's army was
destroyed, its commander fatally wounded,
and its cannon, supplies, money, and secret
papers lost to the enemy. One of the few to
escape unharmed was a young aide-de-camp,
George Washington.
  Within days, accounts of the catastrophe
began to appear in colonial newspapers and
in official and personal correspondence. How
the battle could have been lost became a topic


        (continued on back flap)


*i l~ ~:





xviii INTRODUCTION


much he is interpreting or interpolating, or generally how his
biases may be coloring the account. In any case, we must try to
minimize the number of memories at work and, thus, the
refraction of actuality. Even the most careful eyewitness re-
members primarily what seems important to him at the time he
observes a given event, and he then tends to discard what does
not fit into his overall conception of what occurred. Someone
reporting his testimony may remember only what strikes him as
probable and significant, and in this way may remove us still
further from the truth.
  Among secondhand versions of Braddock's Defeat, the most
famous is the so-called Seaman's Journal. There are in addition
four or five others particularly worthy of note. I shall discuss
these accounts individually in Appendix E.
  A second criterion for judging the accounts of the battle is
their immediacy to the event. How soon after it were they
written? As time passes, removing a reporter from the incident
he has witnessed, his memory becomes at once more clouded
and more selective. Some trivial but vivid events are remem-
bered, while others of far greater significance are forgotten.
Even more important, rumor and the reminiscences of others
become entirely interwoven in what originally may have been
an accurate and personalized account.
  Fortunately, the wealth of material again allows us to be
highly selective. Most extant eyewitness accounts by those who
marched with Braddock were written within weeks of the
battle. As a result, we can afford the luxury of restricting
ourselves primarily to versions written before the close of 1756.
This limits the importance of such reporters as Dr. Thomas
Walker, Billy Brown, Tom Faucett, and William Butler. The
autobiographical notes that George Washington prepared in
1783 are likewise deemphasized, though since we possess sev-
eral accounts written by him at the time of the battle, we do not
thereby lose him as an eyewitness. The four lesser figures
mentioned here would be of limited value in any case, since
their testimony was transmitted by others. Like the major sec-





                     172 APPENDIX D
Coll. Dunbar's camp, appeared like spirits more than men, and
their wounds alive with maggots. The General died on the
Road on the 13th of the month, more out of vexation and
grief, as is said, than of his wound, which his surgeon believed
were not mortal. He held one Council of war before his death,
in which it was determined, and orders given accordingly to
Coll. Dunbar, to destroy all the Remainder of the artillery
baggage and ammunition, and this ridiculous order was soon
put in execution. The General was buried in a coffin made of
Bark, with little or no Ceremony, a little on the other side of
the Great Meadows. About an hour before his death he
resigned his command to Coll. Dunbar, who marched Immedi-
ately with the broken Remains of the forces, back to fort Cum-
berland on wills' creek, where the wounded officers and men
were left, and in a few days from thence took his rout towards
Pensylvania, where he is now arrived. Soon after this defeat,
the Indians began to perpetrate their Butcheries on the Back
of Virginia and Maryland, and still continue to do so, cutting
off numbers of families. The french are now fortifying at the
great meadows, and our Countrys here, are in a most deplor-
able situation.
  Before I make any remarks upon this unaccountable transac-
tion, I shall give you the particulars of Sir Peter Halkets death.
Just after he had left the general, as I have above related, he
rode to the head of his men and riding about to give necessary
orders, he was observed by an Indian fellow, who sat disabled
in the field by a shot in his knee; this savage levelled his piece at
Sir Peter as he rode about, which one Capt. Ghist, a capt. of the
Militia and huntsman perceiving who had just discharged his
musket, he made haste to reload, in order to prevent the
danger with which Sir Peter was threatened, but could not
make such dispatch but that the Indian had shot Sir Peter
down, before he was in readiness to oppose him. Ghist however
immediately step'd up and blew out the miscreant's brains; Sir
Peter's Servant went up to his master's body to see if he was not
mortally wounded, or if dead, to take proper care that the body





           BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS         173
was decently disposed of, but the poor fellow, in that Instant
was shot, and fell upon his master, a worthy example of duty
and fidelity. Thus fell Sir Peter Halket, in the Service of his
king and country, a gentleman much lamented by all that knew
him here, of a sweet affable conversation, and ...

Commentary
  It is unfortunate that the lengthiest and in some respects the
fullest account of Braddock's Defeat is also easily the least reli-
able. British B cannot be placed on the scene of battle; he reports
with equal inaccuracy events that took place all over the field. In
the text and notes of this study we have already seen some of his
grosser inaccuracies. To mention all of his minor mistakes, such
as the fact that it was Halket's son, rather than his servant, who
died with him, would cause us to spend far too much time on a
document that is actually worth comparatively little.
  The errors are in fact so numerous and in many cases so
great that I wonder if British B actually was an eyewitness. I
agree with Walsh that he was almost certainly an American;
from his references to "our Countrys here" and the like, he
may furthermore have lived on the frontier. However, he does
not appear to have been addicted to Indian-style fighting. He
does mention Washington, Polson, and Mercer in favorable
contexts, but his real heroes appear to have been St. Clair,
Gage, and, obviously, Halket, three who were not only British,
but traditional in their tactics. Due to his acquaintance with
them, and his clearly partisan attitude, I would guess that he
was at least a member of the expedition. It is possible, however,
that he was one of those left behind with Dunbar. Note that in
his-admittedly truncated-letter he does not claim to have
been present at the battle. He does, of course, relate events
from the field, but on whole so inaccurately that he may merely
have been reporting wild rumors, especially those which
tended to the disadvantage of Braddock and his favorites. Still,
there is no hard evidence to disqualify British B as an eye-
witness, and anyway he has little impact on our overall concept





174 APPENDIX D


of the battle, for his wild claims are in most cases overwhelmed
by the evidence presented by more reliable reporters.


                         British C
  [The following is an "Extract of a Letter from an Officer
about the late Battle in America," originally printed in the
Whitehall Evening Post of October 9-11, 1755. I am using the
reprint in N. Darnell Davis, "British Newspaper Accounts of
Braddock's Defeat," PMHB, 23 (1899), p. 321.]

  In advancing towards the Enemy the Fire in Front was thick
and heavy; and two of our Parties, one of three hundred, the
other of two hundred Men, falling back, caused such Confu-
sion and Pannick that no military Expedient thought of had
any effect upon our Men; who, after firing away, in the most
irregular Manner, all their Ammunition, ran quite off, leaving
to the Enemy the Artillery and Baggage. The main Body was
with Col. D-    , or the whole Army would have been de-
stroyed: Loss of Horses and Want of Carriages for the
Wounded, made us destroy Ammunition and superfluous Pro-
vision. The whole Artillery is lost. The Troops are so weakened
by Deaths, Wounds, and Sickness, that it is judged impossible
to make any farther Attempt for the present. It is affirmed,
that the military Chest, with 925,000. to pay the Army, and all
the General's Papers, are lost. Capt. Waggoner, with 170 Vir-
ginians, went up to where the Enemy was hid and routed them:
But O unhappy! our Infatuateds seeing a Smoke, fired and
killed him with several of his Men.
  Capt. Polson, another brave Virginian, with his Company,
attacked the Enemy a little before the Retreat was beat, which
they hearing, surrounded these brave Fellows, and cut the
Captain and most of them to Pieces. It is with Regret I send
this sad Account.
  P.S. D-   's hasty Retreat seems still a great Mystery.






BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 175


Commentary
   This account is brief but meaty. Generally it is plausible,
though I have noted the error involving Waggoner. As is the
case with British B, I am somewhat concerned that the officer
who prepared this account did not really witness the battle.
The fact that he occasionally speaks of Braddock's forces in the
first-person plural should not confuse us. This would have
been conventional usage for one who supported the cause for
which the army was fighting. I am bothered by his haziness
over the causes of Dunbar's retreat and his mistaken belief that
the colonel's detachment had represented the "main Body" of
Braddock's army. If British C was indeed involved in the battle,
he was probably in the main body, and in Burton's detachment,
considering the perspective he gives on the collision. But he
could have picked up Orme's account of the telescoping from
any of several newspapers, and other material from random
sources. The fact that even in such a brief report he includes
details on the activities of two provincial captains and their
troops suggests that he was himself an American, with at least
some respect for irregular tactics. On the whole, his account is
worth noting. If he was indeed an eyewitness, his comments
help to boost Orme's credibility. If not, we have enough reli-
able sources to minimize the likelihood that we will accept his
point when he is mistaken.


                           British D

   [The excerpt that follows is taken from The Expedition of Ma-
jor-General Edward Braddock to Virginia, with the two Regiments of
Hacket and Dunbar. Being Extracts of Letters from an Officer in one
of those Regiments to his Friend in London (London, 1755). I am
using a reprint by Archer B. Hulbert, in Braddock's Road and
Three Relative Papers, Historic Highways of America, 4 (Cleve-
land: A. H. Clark Co., 1903), pp. 163-65.]





176 APPENDIX D


  The General seems very anxious about marching through
the Woods, and gave very particular Orders; Powder and
Bullet were given out, and every Thing fit for Action; two
Lieutenant-Colonels were ordered to command the advanced
Party. The General followed with the Gross of the two Regi-
ments from Europe, the Americans followed, and the Rear was
brought up by Captain Dumary's, and another Independent
Company. We marched on in this Manner without being dis-
turbed, and thought we had got over our greatest Difficulties,
for we look'd upon our March through the Woods to be such:
We were sure we should be much above a Match for the
French, if once we got into the open Ground near the Forts,
where we could use our Arms. We had a Train, and a gallant
Party of Sailors for working our Guns, full sufficient to master
better works than those of the French Forts, according to the
Intelligence we had of them. Then we march'd on, and when
within about ten Miles of Fort Du Quesne, we were, on a sud-
den, charged by Shot from the Woods. Every Man was alert,
did all we could, but the Men dropped like Leaves in Autumn,
all was Confusion, and in Spight of what the Officers and
bravest Men could do, Numbers ran away, nay fired on us,
that would have forced them to rally. I was wounded in one
Leg, and in the other Heel, so could not go, but sat down at
the Foot of a Tree, praying of every one that run by, that
they would help me off; an American Virginian turned to me,
Yes, Countryman, says he, I will put you out of your Misery,
these Dogs shall not burn you; he then levelled his Piece at
my Head, I cried out and dodged him behind the Tree, the
Piece went off and missed me, and he run on; Soon after
Lieutenant Grey, with a Party of Dumary's Company came by,
who brought up the Rear; the Firing was now Quite ceased,
he told me the General was wounded, and got me carried off.
When we arrived at the Meadows, we found Colonel Dunbar
did not think it expedient to wait for the French there, but
retired, and carried us, the wounded, with him to Will's Creek.
I have writ till I am faint.





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 177
Commentary
  In The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755:
Under Major-General Edward Braddock, Pennsylvania Historical
Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadelphia, 1855), Winthrop Sargent
suggests that the author of this account may have been an
"ignorant camp-follower" (p. xii). Ignorant British D may have
been, but he was no camp follower. The strong anti-American
bias evinced in his various letters indicates that he was British,
and men do not venture across the Atlantic in order to become
camp followers. That he was literate suggests that he was not a
common soldier, although as we have seen a few privates like
Duncan Cameron could read and write. British D was in all
probability what he claims to have been, a British officer. His
account is highly personal and not very detailed, but in no
respect implausible. Indeed, on points that he alone makes he
deserves the benefit of the doubt.


                      Duncan Cameron

  [Cameron's account is extracted from his autobiographical
sketch, The Life, Adventures and Surprising Deliverances of Duncan
Cameron, 3d ed. (Philadelphia, 1756), pp. 10-12.]

  We march'd from Wills-Creek under the Command of Gen-
eral Braddock, a brave old experienced Officer, in whom we had
a great deal of Confidence, and his Dependance was chiefly
upon us Regulars that he brought from Ireland, being 1000
Men compleat, which with above 1200 of New-rais'd, and
Three Independent Companies, made in the whole upwards of
2500 Men, besides Officers; we had 200 Baggage Waggons,
about 1500 Pack Horses, and a fine Train of Artillery. The
Way was very rugged till we got over the Alleghany Hills, when
gradually it grew better as we proceeded. At the Place call'd the
Little Meadows, our General ordered about 1200 Men to be
pick'd out for a hasty March to the French Fort Du Quesne on





178 APPENDIX D


the Fork of the Ohio; I happen'd to be one of 800 old Regulars
pick'd out for that Purpose; we march'd forward with hasty
Marches, having about 80 Waggons, the chief Part of the Ar-
tillery, with necessary Ammunition with us; leaving Col. Dunbar
to bring up the Remains of the Army, &c. On the 9th ofJuly we
cross'd the Mononghale (a Branch of Ohio) in two Places, and
soon after the second Crossing, when our advanc'd Guard had
got about one Mile from the River, a Firing began in the Front:
The Enemy were advantagiously posted on two Hills, one on
each Side of our Way, which Hills joined in our Front: The
Firing as a Signal began in the Front, and immediately was
follow'd from behind the Hills and Trees all-along each Flank:
Our Troops keeping in regular close Order, not a Shot of
theirs, posted to such Advantage, could be well shot amiss; and
yet they shot too high: Our Officers as well as Men generally
behaved well; and all the Blame that can be properly laid, is in
not having proper Scouts out to have prevented our falling into
such an Ambush; however, our Army was defeated by a Num-
ber equal if not superior, posted as well as their Hearts could
wish. Near 400 of our Men were left dead on the Spot, between
2 and 300 wounded got off, about 100 were left wounded not
able to get off. Among the Kill'd to our very great Grief, was
our brave Colonel Sir Peter Halket, and his Son. As soon as the
Remains of our Army had recross'd the River, and got out of
Gun-shot, the Indians, a merciless Crew that compos'd Part of
the French Army, began immediately to scalp the Dead and
Wounded; this I heard and saw, though escap'd being seen by
them; for I being one of the first that was wounded, and was
for a while pretty much stunn'd, was left among the Dead of
the advanc'd Guard of our Army; when our Army retreated,
the Enemy follow'd close, by which Means the Ground where
the Battle began in the Front was deserted for a Time both by
Friends and Enemies, and in that Time I made shift to get
away and hide myself at some small Distance in a hollow Tree;
and I had not been long there before these ravenous Hell-
hounds came yelping and screaming like so many Devils, and





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS      179
fell to work as before-mentioned: About a Foot above the
Entrance into the Tree I was in there was good Foot-hold for
me to stand on, upon which I stood, and against my Face there
was a small Knot-hole facing the Field of Battle, by Means of
which I had a fair Prospect of their Cruelty: But Oh! what a
Pannic was I in, when I saw one of those Savages look directly
at the Knot-hole, as I aprehended, gave a Scream, and came
directly up to the Tree? But what Inducement he had for
doing it I cannot tell, for he went off again without shewing
any Signs of his discovering me. The whole Army of the En-
emy fell to plundering, &c. Though I must do the French
Commandant this Justice, that as soon as possible he could, he
put a stop to the Indians scalping those that were not yet quite
dead, and ordered those Wounded to be taken Care of. Among
the Plunder they found near Two Hogsheads of Rum, and the
Indians, as likewise the French Soldiers, fell to drinking, and
soon got themselves pretty drunk, and went off, as I apre-
hended, at Night to the French Fort, without carrying off,
much of their Plunder, neither could they do it by reason of
their Intoxication: They did not leave so much as a Guard on
the Field of Battle; neither did they pursue our Army farther
than the River; so that if our People had halted but Half a Mile
from the Field of Battle, they might have returned at Night,
and destroyed most of the Baggage. At Night when the Coast
was clear, I got me out of my Hiding-place.

Commentary
  Even more than British D's account, Cameron's is personal-
ized and anecdotal. The reporter himself is honest enough, but
during most of the battle his perspective for viewing the action
was, to say the least, poor. His usefulness is limited to discuss-
ing the first moments of battle and some of the background to
it. His admiration for Braddock as well as Halket seems to have
been genuine, but we cannot say whether this attitude was
typical of the regulars. His assessment of the strength of the
army before and after it was divided is fairly accurate, but





180 APPENDIX D


several other reporters, notably Orme, were in a better position
to know and give more precise figures.

                       John Campbell
  [This very brief account represents the bulk of a letter from
Campbell to Morris, July 17, 1755. My source is Minutes of the
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, 6 (1851), p. 481.]

  I thought it proper to let you know that I was in the Battle
where We were defeated, And we had about Eleven Hundred
and Fifty private Men besides Officers and others, And we was
attack'd the 9th Day about Twelve o'Clock and held till about
Three in the Afternoon and then we were forced to retreat,
when I suppose we might bring about 300 whole Men besides a
vast many wounded; Most of our Officers were either wounded
or killed; General Braddock is wounded but I hope not mortal,
and Sr. John St. Claire and many others, but I hope not mortal.
All the Train is cut off in a manner.

Commentary
  I have included this account primarily because there is no
valid criterion for not doing so, "worth" being too subjective a
quality to use as a yardstick. Besides being brief, the report is
not very accurate. The most that can be said in rating it is that
it may indicate that immediately after the battle, when Camp-
bell was sent off with his message, there was some hope that
Braddock might recover. If the general did not indeed seem to
be a dying man, this would in part justify Dunbar's acceptance
of his order to destroy the ammunition. British B also suggests
that Braddock's wounds may not at first have seemed mortal.

                     Cholmley's Batman
  [The following key account is extracted from a transcript on
pp. 27-32 of Braddock's Defeat, edited by Charles Hamilton.
Copyright 1959 by the University of Oklahoma Press.]






          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 181
  Wedensday July the 9th. The Advance Party Marched at
two in the Morning, Consisting of two grannadier Companies
and a hundred Patallion. My Master Commanded the Pattal-
lion. We marched to take Possession of a Pass Over the River
which is Called Muningahele River, we haveing all the morn-
ing two pieces of Cannon which was very troublesome to get
forward before any Road was Cut which there was not at that
time for the working party being b'hind at that time. A Bout
Eight in the Morning we Came to the River after Marching
Near Seven Miles. When we Came Close to the River some of
our men saide they saw great many of the French Indiens on
the Other side of the River. Some saide their was not Any but
to be Shure Colonel Gage who Commanded the Party Or-
dered the Cannon to be taken of the Carriges and to be
drawn Over by the men, Ready to Ingage if accation. The
men all marched Over in line of Battle with the Cannon till
they Came to the Other side of the River where we had a
Bank to Rise Eight yards parpendiquler that we was Oblig'd to
Sloape before we Could Rise the hill. The River is betwixt two
and three hundred yards Over and not much more than knee
deep. After we had Rose the Bank we had not a Bove two
hundred yards to Frayzors Plantation where we marched and
our Command went no further at that time. So as soon as we
arived their, the Sentryes was posted and Every thing made
secure. The men that had any thing to Eate they Eate it for
their Breckfast, it being then about half an hour after Nine,
but I believe where there was one that had any thing to Eat
their was twenty that had Nothing. Some men had Nothing
most of the day Before. My Master Eat a little Ham that I had
and a Bit of gloster Shire Cheese and I milked the Cow and
made him a little milk Punch which he drank a little. About
half an hour after ten the working party Came Over the River
and a Bout a[t] Eleven the grand Army begins to Come Over.
As soon as they Came to the River we Rec'd Orders to march
on again. Sir John Sincklare asked Colonel Gage if he would
take the two piece of cannon with us again. Colonel Gage





                    INTRODUCTION xix
ondhand reports, those whose value may be questioned be-
cause they were prepared long after the event will be discussed
at length in Appendix E.
  When I note that I intend to deemphasize a given account,
this does not mean that it will be ignored entirely. Besides the
appended discussion, I plan to use such versions to corroborate
evidence found in reports that I consider more reliable. For the
most part, this corroboration will be pointed out in notes. In a
very few cases, references to these lesser accounts will appear in
the text itself, when one of them contains important informa-
tion that is not found in a better source, but that seems accu-
rate on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
  Similar reservations apply to another version by a purported
eyewitness. The writer involved is Francis Peyton, and my fear
in this case is that the account ostensibly prepared by him is
partly or entirely fabricated. If so, the blame rests not with him,
but rather with his descendant, John Lewis Peyton, who pub-
lished the alleged account. I dislike having to make such an
accusation and hope that my suspicions are unfounded, for the
manufacture of source material is the historian's equivalent of
high treason. However, for safety's sake I must treat Francis
Peyton as an unreliable source. I hope to justify this position in
Appendix D, where I reprint the pertinent section of his
lengthy account and comment further on it. In chapter 4, my
central discussion of the battle, his testimony is relegated to
notes.
  Having stated my primary reservations, I shall mention one
account that stands in a category of its own. Among those
firsthand reports prepared within an acceptable period after
the battle, almost all are in the hand of the witness. The lone
exception is that of George Croghan. This famed Indian agent
was an important member of Braddock's army, and one whose
testimony is worth having. Unfortunately, his version is avail-
able only in paraphrase, in a letter written by his friend Charles
Swaine. Although technically Swaine's is a secondhand account,
it differs from others in this category in that it clearly involves





                     182 APPENDIX D
Answered, no Sir I think not, for I do not think we Shall have
much Occation for them and they being troubolsome to get
forwards before the Roads are Cut. So we began our March
again, Beating the grannadiers March all the way, Never Seas-
ing. There Never was an Army in the World in more spirits
than we where, thinking of Reaching Fort de Cain the day
following as we was then only five miles from it. But we had not
got above a mile and a half before three of our guides in the
froont of me above ten yards spyed the Indiens lay'd down
Before us. He Immediately discharged his piece, turned Round
his horse [and] Cried, the Indiens was upon us. My Master
Called me to give me his horse which I took from him and the
Ingagement began. Immediately they began to Ingage us in a
half Moon and still Continued Surrounding us more and
more[.] Before the whole of the Army got up we had about two
thirds of our men Cut of that Ingaged at the First. My Master
died before we was ten Minuits Ingaged. They Continualy
made us Retreat, they haveing always a large marke to shoute
at and we having only to shoute at them behind trees or laid on
their Bellies. We was drawn up in large Bodies together, a
ready mark. They need not have taken sight at us for they
Always had a large Mark, but if we saw of them five or six at
one time [it] was a great sight and they Either on their Bellies
or Behind trees or Runing from one tree to another almost by
the ground. The genll had five horses Shot under him. He
always strove to keep the men together but I believe their
might be two hundred of the American Soldiers that fought
behind Trees and I belive they did the moast Execution of
Any. Our Indiens behaved very well for the Small Quantity of
them. Their was a man and his Son thought to have killed a
Bout sixteen men. The father, after [having] Spent all his Am-
munition, lay down his gun till he went to get a fresh Supply.
In the mean time one of our men found her and to hinder the
Enemy for having Any service from her he knocks her Round
a tree and bent her like a Bow. Soon after the man Comes and





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 183
finds his piece all Bent. He was seemingly very Angry. He
afterwards said he should do the same. He spyes a French
Indien that had shot several Shots from behind a tree. He
Immediately Called his Son to Shout at him, which he did and
shot him dead. They begin to Inclose us more and more till
they had Nigh Inclosed us in. If it was not for their Barbaras
Usage which we knew they would treat us, we should Never
have fought them as long as we did, but having only death
before us made the men fight Almost longer than they was
able. There was about three Quarters of an hour before we
Retreated. I expected Nothing but death for Every Oone of us,
for they had us surround all but a little in the Rear, which they
strove for with all their Force. But our men knowing the Conci-
quance of it preserved the pass till we Retreated. The generall
was wounded and a great many Officers was killed with about
five hundred private men, and about four hundred wounded
out of Better than twelve hundred. The Ingagement began
before one and Ended half an hour after four, when we Re-
treated. They prosued us Better than a mile and Cut many of
in going through the River. All the wounded that Could not
walk fell in the Enemyis hands but was given no Quarters. My
Masters horse Rec'd a Ball in the Shoulder and after that the
genll['s] horse was Shot and I mounted him of my Masters.
Near half an hour after their was Other horses Ready. I ad-
vised him to mount another As he was wounded. I was a fear'd
he should fail with him; but I did not leade him above half an
hour Before a Ball Struck him in the Rib and he died Immedi-
ately. I had seven horses in the field and one Cow and they was
all lost but two horses. When we Retreated we marched all
Night and the Next day without any thing to Eat or drink
Except water untill we Came to guests Plantation before we
halted, it being Better than Sixty Miles, and then we had Eight
miles to Colonel Dunbar Party but it being so late, then Eight O
Clock and the men so forteagud, not being a hundred Ariv'd at
that time made us halt their that Night.





184 APPENDIX D


Commentary
  Cholmley's Batman stands as our only first-rate source on the
battle writing from the point of view of the common soldier. In
surveying the day's activities prior to the attack, this report is
quite possibly the finest of all. On the engagement itself,
Cholmley's Batman is, however, a less informative reporter
than we might wish. First, he becomes too anecdotal. He is,
after all, not a practiced observer and is not likely to give a
broad view of the fighting. Instead, as we might expect, he
relates various vivid events he saw or heard of on the fateful
day. Second, he becomes less precise on matters involving large
bodies of men. For example, he mentions that "they Continualy
made us Retreat," but since his perception of time is hazy for
that portion of his account dealing with the battle, we cannot be
certain who is retreating here, the advance party, the van-
guard, or the entire army. Cholmley's Batman merits a high
rating for honesty, but not always for accuracy.

                       George Croghan
  [I am including here the bulk of a letter from Charles
Swaine to Richard Peters, written August 5, 1755. The letter
has been printed once before, in the Philadelphia Evening Bul-
letin, September 15, 1849, p. 1, col. 6. However, this is my
own transcription, from the Peters Papers, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania, Manuscript Dept., 4, pt. 1, p. 38.]

  Mr. Croghan came over on Saturday to Shippensberg, he
had a free sight of the Enemy as they approached, says they
were about three hundred the French in shirts, & the Indians
naked, that they were lead by three French officers with hats in
their hands and with which they gave a signal for the firing. He
was informed 400 Onandago Indians came to the Fort the day
before, that there were 100 Delawares, 60 Wiandots, 40
Puywas, 500 Pawwaws, the Shawnees who lived about Logtown,
and some of all other tribes, that some of the Wyandots now





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 185
going down to Philadelphia were in the action against us; but
says the attack was not made by above three hundred, but it
was intended to dispute every inch of Ground between the
river and the Fort, that the Indians had all the plunder and
next day went off-all the prisoners and wounded who could
not get off the Field were killed in cold blood and only one
man and three Women got into the Fort. The firing was over
excepting a few shot now & then a Quarter of an hour before
our people retreated, & the enemy had fired for some time at
such distance that the Bullets came in quite dead-that the
Indians never expected a [British] defeat, by reason they began
to scalp immediately but when the Grenadiers, (who gave the
fire at 200 yards distance, instead of receiving it) began to
retreat, than the Indians hollowed and began to act vigorously-
many of our people fired twenty-four rounds and never saw
the enemy, not above two hundred and Fifty were left dead on
the Ground, and it is supposed one hundred and Fifty were
killed by our own people & it appeares to me, that had there
been any officers to have rallied the men on retreating even at
last the Enemy would not have got the six cannon and mortars,
& perhaps they might have Advanced toward the Fort, for
when the men were going off, many of the officers called out
Halt, Halt, which the men mostly did, but the Officers contin-
ued on and got the heels of them. the unfortunate General
Braddock was intirely deserted in the waggons with only his
servants and a person or two more, & it was some time before
they got a party of men to Guard him. There is an anecdote
which possibly you have heard as to the greatness of his despair
& his wanting to die as an old Roman, & endeavouring to lay
hold of Croghan's pistoles, this you may credit, as I privately
inquired of Croghan as to the Truth of it.

Commentary
  Croghan is a source well worth listening to. Of our eye-
witness reporters, he is easily the most competent judge of
the sort of battle he is describing here. It is unfortunate that





                     186 APPENDIX D
his account of the battle itself is so brief. However, what he
does present is important and apparently reliable. Most
points he makes are corroborated by others, and the only
one which is implicitly disputed by the consensus-that the
officers in the end panicked-has been discussed in the text.
Because of his experience and the fact that he has less of an
ax to grind than have most eyewitnesses, Croghan is the sort
whose word may generally be allowed to stand, even when
uncorroborated. An exception should naturally be made
when he is citing rumor. Roucher remains a far superior
source on the composition of the Indian forces that joined
the French, partly because Croghan's estimate of their num-
bers is too high, mainly because the Frenchman was in a
better position to know. Another point inviting caution is
that Swaine may in some cases be giving his own opinions.
The most obvious case of Swaine's intervention is his han-
dling of the retreat: "It appeares to me, that had there been
any officers to have rallied the men. ... " Perhaps Croghan
himself was not as critical of the officers. For the most part,
however, it appears that Swaine has reported faithfully the
observations of his friend.


                      William Dunbar
  [This account has never been in print, nor have I ever seen a
reference to it. The manuscript of which the following is a
transcript is Hardwicke 136, document no. 6, Manuscripts and
Archives Division, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and
Tilden Foundations. As the reader may note, Dunbar's account
follows the one by British A in the Hardwicke Papers. The two
reports are in different hands, probably neither that of the
eyewitness himself. Both are rather rough. Ms. 6 is headed
"Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Dunbar-Wills Creek
20th July 1755."]

  On Wenesday the 9th Inst, We were advanced within 9





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 187


miles of Fort du Quesne, & in order to reach it were to pass
the Monongahela in 2 different places. by 2 in the Morning
Col: Gage with the 2 Companies of Grenadiers, to wch I be-
longed, with 150 Men besides was ordered with 2 six pound-
ers, to cross the River, & cover the March of the General wth
the Rest of the Army. This We executed witht any disturbance
from the Enemy, and when we had yet possession of the Bank
of the sd crossing, we were remained drawn up, till the gen-
eral came with the rest of the Army, & passed the River in a
Column. The Ground from thence to the French Fort, we
were told was pretty, good, & the woods open, but all upon
the ascent [.] Col: Gage was then ordered with his advanced
Party to march on, and was soon followed by the general. We
had not marched above 800 yards from the River, when we
were allarmed by the Indian Hollow, & in an instant, found
ourselves attacked on all sides. their methods, they immedi-
ately seise a Tree, & are certain of their Aim, so that before
the Genl came to our assistance, most of our advanced Party
were laid sprawling on the ground. our Men unaccustomed to
that way of fighting, were quite confounded, & behaved like
Poltrons, nor could the examples, nor the Intreaties of their
officers prevail with them, to do any one [what was ordered.]
This they denied them, when we begged of them not to throw
away their fire, but to follow us with fixed Bayonets, to drive
them from the hill & trees, they never minded us, but threw
their fire away in the most confused manner, some in the air,
others in the ground, & a great many destroyed their own
Men & officers. When the General came up to our assistance,
men were seized with the same Pannic, & went into as much
disorder, some Part of them being 20 deep. The officers in
order to remedy this, advanced into the front, & soon became
the mark of the Enemy, who scarce left one, that was not
killed or wounded; when we were first attacked, It was near
one o'Clock, & in this Confusion did we remain till near 5 in
the Evening, our Men having then thrown away their 24
Rounds in the manner above mentioned, & scarce an officer





                     188 APPENDIX D
left to head them, They then turned their backs, & left the
Enemy in possession of every Thing. What officers were left,
endeavoured to rally them at the first crossing of the River,
but all to no purpose, terrified at the notion of having no
Quarter & being scalped, they ran witht knowing where &
most of them threw their Arms from them[.] The French &
Indians not imagining our Pain & Consternation were so
great, as they really were, pursued us no further than the first
crossing otherwise 100 of them, might have cut the Re-
mainder of us to Peices. We marched all night in the utmost
horrour & distress, most of us wounded, without a bit of any
thing to eat & nothing to cover us. On Friday the 11th We
arrived at Col: Dunbars Camp 56 Miles from the Place of
Action. our Strength before the Engagement amounted to
1100 Men.
  Killed & wounded 823.

Commentary
  Although fairly brief, this is an exceptionally interesting ac-
count. As we have seen through various examples in the text,
Dunbar's report tallies extremely well with the others, and in
fact he is probably unexcelled in reliability. For this reason, I
tend to accept his uncorroborated statements, such as that
toward the start of battle the officers of the advance party
ordered a bayonet charge. Aside from the obvious fact that he
leaves out a great deal, his main weakness is that he, like
Cholmley's Batman, is sometimes lax in defining sequence.
Since he has nothing to say about the telescoping of troops, it is
hard to determine what he means when he refers to the troops
massing together: Was this the result of panic, or a collision?
Similarly, why should Braddock's appearance have caused still
more panic? Was it because he followed hard on the heels of
Burton's detachment, and came on the scene shortly after the
troops had crashed together? These and other questions of
importance Dunbar leaves unanswered. Where he is precise,
however, he is a first-rate source.






BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 189


                       James Furnis

  [The extract printed here is the bulk of a letter from Furnis
to the Board of Ordnance, written at Fort Cumberland on July
23, 1755. The whole has been transcribed from Furnis's letter
book in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan, by Edward G. Williams, and appears in his "Treasure
Hunt in the Forest," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 44
(1961), pp. 388-89.]

  On the 9th Instant the General at the Head of about 1200
Men--crossed the Manongahela near Fort DuQuesne. the rear
of the Army had scarce forded the River before the advanced
Party consisting of 250 Men Commanded by Lieut. Colo. Gage,
received a smart fire from behind the Trees which put them
into some disorder, upon which the General who was about a
quarter of a Mile Distant immediately advanced with the
Troops and drew up in an open place, when the Action became
general, but the Enemy had greatly the Advantage, by securing
themselves behind Trees-in such a manner, as they could not
be seen, while our people by keeping together in a Body were a
Butt for them to fire at, and only threw away their Ammuni-
tion the Action began about half an hour past One, and contin-
ued untill a Quarter past Four, when the Troops gave way, and
all methods taken to rally them prov'd ineffectual, so that we
were oblig'd to leave all our Artillery and Horses in the Field
and to cross the River in great Confusion, several of the Indi-
ans pursued us into the Water, and came up with and scalp'd
some of the straglers, but the main body keep'd the field in
order to secure the Artillery and Baggage expecting we might
rally which was very lucky, for the Soldiers were struck with
such a Pannick that a small body might have cutt off what
remained, we are at present uncertain of the number of the
french and Indians, but they are computed at about three or
four Hundred-and our loss kill'd and wounded about Eight
hundred. at this time Colo. Dunbar was in the Rear with the





                      190 APPENDIX D
rest of the Army, Horses and Provisions about 54 Miles distt.
not being able to proceed for want of Horses. -On the 1 1th in
the Evening the General with most of the wounded Arrived at
the Camp, and the next day gave orders to destroy the Stores
which were there, and a great Quantity of Provisions, least they
should fall into the hands of the Enemy, who we then expected
would pursue us, the greatest part of the Drivers having gone
off with their Horses, on the first Alarm of our defeat.

Commentary
  A meaty report, well worth our scrutiny. Furnis is obviously
not very precise in his description of the battle, and not every-
thing he says is correct, a point that has been noted in the
text. However, his position in the army lends credence to
other aspects of his testimony. He would certainly have been
in a better position than most to know why the ammunition
that Dunbar was holding was destroyed. On the other hand,
the reader benefits from the fact that Furnis was in many
ways the "odd man out." He presumably would have had close
contact with Thomas Ord, his immediate superior, but in view
of his probable civilian status, he would likely not have been
friendly with more than a few officers, and perhaps not with
any. In addition, considering his role in the army, the battle
he portrays was certainly not his to win or lose. No one would
have blamed him for the defeat, no matter how he described
it. Since he was not close to the officers, and was not himself
in a position where he might be considered culpable, he had
less reason to cover up his superiors' conduct than they had.
This raises his credibility rating. His errors seem to be due not
to dishonesty or a biased interpretation, but rather to faulty
perspective.


                        Thomas Gage
  [This lengthy and important account is the full text of a
letter Gage wrote to the Earl of Albemarle, dispatched from





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 191
Fort Cumberland on July 24, 1755. I am reproducing the letter
from the only version in print, Thomas Keppel, The Life of
Augustus Viscount Keppel (London, 1842), pp. 213-18. In his
transcription, Thomas Keppel has apparently modernized
spelling and punctuation.]

  We are arrived here with the remainder of our army, since
our unfortunate defeat on the 9th instant, within a few miles of
Fort Du Quesne. As I imagine you would be glad to have some
particulars of that action, I will give you the best account I can
draw from so confused an affair.
  General Braddock marched from this place with all his
forces, escorting the whole convoy of provisions, ammunition,
&c., to a place called the Little Meadows, about twenty-three
miles from hence; and finding he had made but very slow
progress, chose a detachment of 1200 men, and proceeded
towards the French fort as fast as possible, taking with him two
six-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four howitzers; the
remainder was left under the command of Colonel Dunbar, to
follow with all convenient speed.
  The night before the action, I received orders to march the
next morning by three o'clock, with two companies of Grena-
diers, and 150 men; to pass the Monongahela, -and to march
on the other side, till I should come opposite the place where
Frazer's house formerly stood, then repass the river, and post
myself on the most convenient spot I should find. These orders
were executed without any opposition from the enemy; and I
remained on the post we had taken till Sir John Sinclair, who
followed me with the working party, came up to me, and the
General with the main body was passing the last ford. I then
received orders to march on till three o'clock. We had scarcely
marched a quarter of a mile from the river, when the guides,
who were the only outscouts we had, brought word that the
French or Indians were coming. Upon which, the guard in our
van came to the right-about, but, by the activity of the officer
who commanded them, were stopped from running in, and





                   xx INTRODUCTION
the testimony of one person, whose identity can be established,
and who is not represented by any report in his own hand.
Furthermore, Swaine recorded Croghan's comments within
three days of having heard them. We would therefore do well
to include Croghan among our eyewitness communicants.
  Patrick Mackellar, like Croghan, is something of a special
case. Although he left behind brief remarks on Braddock's
Defeat, his chief service to the historian is that he prepared two
detailed maps of the battlefield, showing the disposition of both
forces before and during the engagement. I have reproduced
his maps and comments, as well as the other eyewitness ac-
counts, in Appendix D.
  Counting Croghan and Peyton, but not Walker, Faucett,
Brown, or Butler, we have twenty-two eyewitness reporters
who fought under Braddock. Those who can be identified
include, in alphabetical order, Duncan Cameron, John Camp-
bell, Croghan, William Dunbar, James Furnis, Thomas Gage,
Horatio Gates, Harry Gordon, Philip Hughes, Matthew Leslie,
Mackellar, Robert Orme, Peyton, Sir John St. Clair, Adam
Stephen, Robert Stewart, and Washington. The authors of five
accounts are unknown. The first four will be referred to as
"British A, B, C, and D," respectively, while the last, who
served as Captain Robert Cholmley's batman, or servant, will be
designated as "Cholmley's Batman."
  With twenty-two firsthand reporters, we can still afford to be
selective. How are we to judge the worth of their respective
accounts? Obviously some are fuller than others. The reports
by British A and Gordon are perhaps the most detailed, while
Hughes and Campbell provide only brief glimpses of the ac-
tion. But what can we say about the more important question
of credibility? It may be established by corroboration, provided
that we have no reason to suspect that one reporter is simply
repeating what another has told him. It is indeed reassuring to
note that most questions concerning the Battle of the Monon-
gahela may be answered by the simple expedient of noting
testimony and corroboration. But should a reporter stand





192 APPENDIX D


prevailed on to face again. The detachment was ordered to fix
their bayonets, and form in order of battle, with intention of
gaining a hill upon our right, which was partly already pos-
sessed by an officer's party that was scouring our right flank.
The first was obeyed in a good deal of hurry, but none of them
would stir to the posts assigned them. Though I had all the
assistance that could be expected from the officers, not one
platoon could be prevailed upon to stir from its line of march,
and a visible terror and confusion appeared amongst the men.
  By this time, some few shots were fired on the parties who
were on the right and left flanks, on which the whole detach-
ment made ready, and notwithstanding all the opposition made
by the officers, they threw away their fire, when, I am certain,
scarcely two of the men could be seen by them. This fire killed
several of our men on the flanking parties, who came running
in on the detachment, as did also the vanguard, which com-
pleted our confusion. The enemy took advantage of it by com-
ing round us covered by trees, behind which they fired with
such success, that most of the officers were in a short time
killed or wounded, as also many of the men, and the rest gave
way. We found Sir John Sinclair's working party in the same
confusion, as also the main body under General Braddock. The
same infatuation attended the whole; none would form a line
of battle, and the whole army was very soon mixed together,
twelve or fourteen deep, firing away at nothing but trees, and
killing many of our own men and officers. The cannon was
soon deserted by those that covered them. The artillery did
their duty perfectly well, but, from the nature of the country,
could do little execution.
  General Braddock tried all methods to draw the men out of
this confusion, made several efforts to recover the cannon, as
also to drive the enemy from our flanks, as likewise to gain
possession of the hill already mentioned. Some few men were
at times prevailed on to draw out for this purpose, but before
they had marched twenty yards, would fall back to a line of
march by files, and proceed to attack in this manner, till an






BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 193


officer, or perhaps a man or two, should be struck down, and
then the rest immediately gave way; the men would never
make one bold attack, though encouraged to it by the enemy
always giving way, whenever they advanced even on the most
faint attack.
  In this manner the affair continued about two hours and a
half, when many of the men began to go off, and the General
was wounded; what remained was to endeavour to cover the
retreat of the ammunition and provisions, but those that drove
the horses went off with them. The men that covered the
wagons went off by tens and twenties, till reduced to a very
small body, which, receiving a fire from the enemy, went to the
right-about, and the whole were put to flight.
  The General was saved by the dexterity of his servants, but
all other marks of our disgrace were left upon the field; all our
artillery, ammunition, and provisions fell to the enemy's share.
It was impossible to rally any body of men for a considerable
time, and the General was defended by very few but officers in
his repassing of the river. Some bodies of men were with
difficulty rallied at different distances, who waited till the Gen-
eral came up, and then marched on with him all that night and
all the next day, when we were joined by two companies of
Grenadiers, and some provisions from Colonel Dunbar's de-
tachment, and the whole joined the next day.
  I have given your Lordship the best account I am able of this
shameful affair, and refer you to the public account for a list of
the killed and wounded. General Braddock died the fourth
night after the action. Sir Peter Halket was killed in the field. I
hope that his Royal Highness [Cumberland] will think me
worthy of succeeding Sir Peter in his regiment, as I was the
eldest lieutenant-colonel in the action, and should have been
appointed colonel to it by General Braddock, had he lived a
few days longer. I likewise flatter myself of his protection for
the officers of the regiment succeeding to the commissions
vacant by this action, as I can with truth assure you, no officers
ever behaved better, or men worse. I can't ascribe their behav-





                      194 APPENDIX D
iour to any other cause than the talk of the country people,
ever since our arrival in America-the woodsmen and Indian
traders, who were continually telling the soldiers, that if they
attempted to fight Indians in a regular manner, they would
certainly be defeated. These discourses were prevented as
much as possible, and the men, in appearance, seemed to shew
a thorough contempt for such an enemy; but I fear they gained
too much upon them. I have since talked to the soldiers about
their scandalous behavior, and the only excuse I can get from
them is, that they were quite dispirited, from the great fatigue
they had undergone, and not receiving a sufficient quantity of
food; and further, that they did not expect the enemy would
come down so suddenly. ... Most of the wounded are in a fair
way of recovery. I received a slight wound in my belly, which is
almost well. Poor Nartlo was killed.

Commentary
  As I suggested in the text, Gage seems to have fallen victim
to his own self-interest. Prudence dictated that in his account
he attempt to exculpate himself, for having been in a key
position of command he was naturally in line for a great share
of the blame for the fiasco. He could not remove criticism from
his shoulders by laying it on Braddock's. First, both Keppel and
Cumberland had been good friends of the general's and might
resent attacks on his memory. Second, he wanted to claim
Braddock's favor. The other obvious scapegoat was the men.
By blaming them, he freed himself from any possible imputa-
tion of misbehavior or incompetence.
  It is suspicious that he describes the battle in the way that
most favors his case-suspicious, but not surprising. But while
there is more reason to challenge his integrity than there is in
the case of most other eyewitnesses, this does not mean that his
report should be tossed aside. The account he gives of the
activities of Braddock's army during the last hours before battle
seems to be reliable, as far as it goes. So is much of what he says
on the engagement itself, as is shown by comparison with other





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 195


accounts. But we must be particularly wary in dealing with him.
When he makes a statement that can be interpreted to his own
advantage, he is not worth the benefit of the doubt. One final
point: We should note how closely his own comments on the
soldiers' excuses for their misbehavior, and his reference to the
fact that there were only a few guides, tally with the report he
and Dunbar prepared for Shirley. The report may in fact have
been entirely his own creation. And although he probably
spoke to some of the soldiers about their conduct, Gage ap-
pears even more than most to have been the sort to remember
only what he wanted to.

                       Horatio Gates
  [To my knowledge, this account has never been in print and
is in fact referred to only by Stanley Pargellis, in "Braddock's
Defeat." Gates's comments are extracted from a letter he wrote
to Colonel Robert Monckton. From the reference to Gage's
advertisement in the Pennsylvania Gazette, we can gather that
Gates wrote to Monckton on September 5, 1755. Monckton
then forwarded the account, or a portion of it, to Major John
Hale, who on November 27 included the following extract in a
letter he sent to John Calcraft, an army agent in London who
was, ironically, joint executor and a major beneficiary of Brad-
dock's will. I am quoting only the Gates extract from Hale's
letter. The original is in the Loudoun Papers, LO 687, The
Henry E. Huntington Library.]

  As to a history of our Campaign I shou'd be very glad to
repeat it to you but am very cautious of writing one as there is
so much hazard in letters, they make no scruple of opening
both publick and private and here is so much curiosity in this
town, (N York) thus far I will inform you Sr that there has not
been one true account publish'd as yet a great deal of pro &
con in the news papers and yesterday Col. Gage and the
Officers of the Van Guard contradicted Captn: Orme's publick





196 APPENDIX D


letter by an advertisement which you will see in the Philadel-
phia [sic] Gazette. a few who were the Generals favourites
gratefully strive to save his fame by throwing the misfortune of
the day on the bad behaviour of the troops, but that was not
the case, the main body of the army instead of being form'd in
a line of battle, on the Van Guards being attacked moved up in
a line of march were flank'd on both sides by the enemy which
caused an immediate confusion and so great was the disorder
that there was no setting it to rights and from that instant all
was lost. the Vanguard was near ten minutes engaged before
the main body came up of which time the enemy made so good
use that fifteen out of eighteen Officers were kill'd and
wounded and half of the 300 men that composed it, in this fell
poor Stone I cannot say how as I was unluckily shot through
the left breast sometime before he got his wound, I am not
quite recover'd, the ball having cut some string that has de-
prived me of the use of my left arm. Floyer was shot through
the hand which join'd to an extream shatter'd constitution was
the death of him he was buried at Wills creek.

Commentary
  Gates's brief account obviously lacks details of the battle.
Virtually all of his noteworthy testimony has been examined in
the text. His version is clearly anti-Braddock, and angrily so at
that. However, we should note what he does not say. He does
not claim that the troops did not panic, only that the unwise
tactics used by Braddock were primarily responsible for what-
ever panic there was. Likewise, he does not say that European
tactics were inadequate in view of the circumstances, only that
Braddock's particular orders were ill chosen. In fact, he seems
to suggest that he is generally in agreement with Gage's ac-
count of the battle, at least as opposed to Orme's. Yet Gage
clearly condemns the troops and implies approval of Brad-
dock's tactics. It made well be that Gates, like British B and St.
Clair, had it in for Braddock and Orme, and looked for any
stick with which to beat them. We cannot, however, be certain





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS        197
that Gates bore his commander a grudge. Only his tone and his
inconsistencies suggest the possibility.

                       Harry Gordon
  [This lengthy and extremely important account is reprinted
from the version appearing in Stanley Pargellis's Military Affairs
in North America 1748-1765 (New York: D. Appleton-Century
Co., Inc., 1936), pp. 104-09. Charles M. Stotz has also printed
the report: "A Letter from Wills' Creek-Harry Gordon's Ac-
count of Braddock's Defeat," Western Pennsylvania Historical
Magazine, 44 (1961), pp. 129-36. Gordon's letter is dated July
23, 1755.].

  On the 11th of June we March'd from this fort with such a
train of provision & Amunition Waggons, that the first days
March Convinc'd us that it was impossible to Get on with so
many Carriages so heavily loaded. The General Diminish'd the
Carriadges By putting the greatest part of the provisions on
Pack horses, & sending Back two of the 6 pounders with their
Amunition; in this Reformation we March'd as far as the Little
Meadows, which are only Distant 15 miles from our first Camp
yet took us five Days to Get up all our Carriages, the Roads
Being steep & horses very weak.
  At the Little Meadows the General order'd another Reform,
which Reduc'd us to a Pick'd Body of Eleven hundred men &
officers; our Carriadges consisted of two 6 pounders, four 12
pounders, four Howits's, 3 Cowhorns, & 75 Rounds of Amuni-
tion, 3 or 4 provisions Waggons, which made our whole train
of Carriadges three or four & thirty. We Left the Little Mead-
ows the 19th of June with a Resolution of pushing on Directly
to fort Du Quesne, & to leave Coll: Dunbar with the rest of our
Army & Carriadges to Get up in the Best Manner he cou'd. We
Came on Extreamly well, Considering the Difficulty of making
the roads, which was so Great, that Altho' Every one us'd their
Utmost Endeavor & only halted four Days on the Road, it was





                    198 APPENDIX D
the 8th of July Before we Cou'd Get within 10 miles of the
french fort.
  on the 8th we Cross'd the Long Run which was a small
Rivulet that runs in to the Monongahela about 12 miles from
the F: fort. We were Oblig'd to Cross it many times in the
Space of two Miles, in which Distance we came along a Narrow
Valley At the widest a Quarter of a Mile, very much Com-
manded on Both Sides by Steep hills. In this March Every
proper precaution was taken to secure us. By Detaching all the
men that cou'd be Spar'd from the Advanced party, that day
Commanded By C: Burton on our flank the General Likewise
orderd 350 men to take possession of the heights on Each Side;
& the Grenadier Company of Sir P: H Regt., the Advance of
the Advanc'd party, to Gain the Rising Ground, which Shut up
the Valley in our front. No Enemy appear'd, & we Encamp'd
on the last Mention'd Rising Ground, which Brought us within
a Small Mile of the River Monongahela.
  in our Next Days March we must Either Go along the
Narrows, a very Difficult pass, on the Right Side Entirely
Commanded By high ground & on the Left hemm'd in by
the Monongahela: A Small Consultation was held, & it was
carryied to Cross the Monongahela at the Nearer End of the
Narrows, to keep along the South Side, & to Cross it again
Below where turtle Creek runs in, & without the Narrows;
As there was Danger Imagin'd, the 2 Compys of Grenadiers
with 150 men of the two Regts Commanded By Coll: Gage
were Order'd to March By 2 o'Clock of the Morning of the
9th to take possession of the Banks of the second Crossing of
the River; two of the light 6 pounders were sent along with
this party; the rest of our Little Army March'd at four,
Cross'd peaceably, & Came up with Coll: Gage about Eleven
o'Clock in peaceable possession of the furthest Banks of the
Last Crossing. Every one who saw these Banks, Being Above
12 feet perpendicularly high Above the Shore, & the Course
of the River 300 yards Broad, hugg'd themselves with joy at
our Good Luck in having surmounted our greatest Dif-





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 199


ficultys, & too hastily Concluded the Enemy never wou'd
dare to Oppose us.
  In an hour which Brought the time about Noon, the Bank
was slop'd & passable for Artillery and Carriadges; Coll: Gage
with the same Advanc'd party was ordered to [march] forward;
the covering party of the Carpenters & Pioneers followed im-
mediately in his Rear, after them then came two 6 pounders,
their Ammunition Waggon, & a Guard in their Rear, after
them follow'd the Main Body in their Usual Order of March
with a strengthen'd Rear Guard of 100 men. (this Order of
March was in My Opinion the)
  The flank partys of the Advance & Main Body were No
Stronger than Usual & Coll: Gage's party march'd By files
four Deep our front had not Got above half a Mile from the
Banks of the River, when the Guides which were all the
Scouts we had, & who were Before only about 200 yards
Came Back, & told a Considerable Body of the Enemy, Mostly
Indians were at hand, I was just then rode up in Search of
these Guides, had Got Before the Grenadiers, had an Oppor-
tunity of viewing the Enemy, & was Confirm'd By the Report
of the Guides & what I saw myself that their whole Numbers
did Not Exceed 300.
  As soon as the Enemys Indians perceiv'd our Grenadiers,
they Divided themselves & Run along our right & Left flanks.
The Advanc'd party Coll: Gage order'd to form, which Most of
them Did with the front Rank upon the Ground & Begun
firing, which they contined for several Minutes, Altho' the
Indians very soon Dispers'd Before their front & fell upon the
flank partys, which only consisted of an officer & 20 men, who
were very soon Cut off. The Indians Making their Appearance
upon the Rising Ground, on our Right, occasion'd an Order
for Retiring the Advanc'd Body 50 or 60 Paces, where they
confusedly form'd again, & a Good many of their Officers were
kill'd & wounded By the Indians, who had got possession of the
Rising Ground on the Right. There was an Alarum at this time
that the Enemy were attacking the Baggage in the Rear, which





200 APPENDIX D


Occasion'd a second Retreat of the Advanc'd party; they had
not Retir'd But a few paces when they were join'd By the rest
of the troops, Coming up in the greatest Confusion, & Nothing
afterwards was to Be Seen Amongst the Men But Confusion &
Panick. They form'd Altogether, the Advanced & Main Body,
in Most Places from 12 to 20 Deep; the Ground on which they
then were, was 300 yards Behind where the Grenadiers &
Advanc'd party first form'd. The General Order'd the officers
to Endeavor to tell off 150 men, & to Advance up the hill to
Dispossess the Enemy, & another party to Advance on the Left
to support the two 12 pounders & Artillery people, who were
in great Danger of Being Drove away By the Enemy, at that
time in possession of the 2 field pieces of the Advanc'd party.
This was the Generals Last Order; he had Before this time 4
horses killed under him, & now Receiv'd his Mortal wound. All
the Officers us'd their Utmost Endeavors to Get the men to
Advance up the hill, & to Advance on the Left to support the
Cannon. But the Enemy's fire at the time very much Encreas-
ing, & a Number of officers who were Rushing on in the front
to Encourage the men Being killed & wounded, there was
Nothing to Be seen But the Utmost panick & Confusion
amongst the Men; yet those officers who had Been wounded
having Return'd, & those that were not Wounded, By Exhort-
ing & threatning had influence to keep a Body about 200 an
hour Longer in the field, but cou'd not perswade them Either
to attempt the hill again, or Advance far Enough to support
the Cannon, whose officers & men were Mostly kill'd &
wounded. The Cannon silenc'd, & the Indian's shouts upon the
Right Advancing, the whole Body gave way, & Cross'd the
Monongahela where we had pass'd in the Morning, with great
Difficulty the General & his Aid de Camps who were Both
wounded Orme and Captain Roger Morris were taken out of a
Waggon, & hurryed along across the River; Coll: Burton tho'
very much Wounded attempted to Rally on the Other Side, &
made a Speach to the Men to Beg them to get into some Order,
But Nothing would Do, & we found that Every man wou'd





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 201
Desert us; therefore we were oblig'd to go along; we march'd
all night, & never halted till we Came to Guests's which was
near 60 Miles from the place of the Action, we halted that
night there, & next Day join'd Coll: Dunbar's party which was 6
miles further.
  Thus Sir I have sent you an Account of those transactions
Entirely consisting with my own Certain knowledge. I was
never a Critick, therefore leaves it to you to make what Re-
marks you see proper. As you are a Much Better Judge in these
Matters than I shall Ever pretend to Be, only One thing cannot
Escape me, which is, that had our March Been Executed in the
same manner the 9th as it was on the 8th, I shou'd have stood a
fair Chance of writing from fort Du Quesne, instead of Being
in the hospital at Wills's Creek.
  I am a Good Deal hurt in the Right Arm, having Receiv'd a
Shot which went thro', & shatter'd the Bone, half way Between
the Elbow & the wrist; this I had Early, & altho' I felt a Good
deal of pain, yet I was too Anxious to allow myself to Quit the
field....
  On the Road I propos'd fortifying a Camp at Licking Creek
10 miles to the Westward of the Crossing of the Yohiogany, a
very advantagious Situation, & which Cover'd the Richest part
of the Country which Lyes Betwixt Guest's & that, or at least I
imagin'd we might have Been join'd By Coll: Dunbar's party at
Guest's, where a good Camp might Easily Been had, which
fortified with two or three Redoubts in front cou'd have Been
defended By our Numbers (above 1000 fit for Duty) against
any force our Enemys cou'd Bring against us.
  Instead of all this Nothing wou'd Do, But Retiring, & De-
stroying immense Quantitys of amunition & Stores, with which
Last all our Instruments & Stationary wares shar'd the fate....
  I shoud be Extreamly oblig'd to you if you would be kind
Enough to Remind H:R:H [Cumberland] of my former peti-
tion for a Commission in some Regtt. I have Reason to Believe
that had General Braddock Liv'd I shou'd have Been provided
for in some of the Regts here.





                    INTRODUCTION xxi
alone, or should he be challenged by the account of another, it
is necessary to know something of his physical and mental
perspective before deciding whether to accept his testimony.
   In attempting to pinpoint the biases of the various eye-
witnesses, I have categorized them in various ways, some of
which have proven useful, others not. At one point in my
research, I hypothesized that perhaps those who were
wounded in the battle might have borne a grudge against
Braddock, which was reflected in their writing. This may have
been true in individual cases, but cannot be proven in any; and
indeed Orme, who was severely wounded, showed himself to
be the staunchest of Braddock's defenders. A somewhat more
promising criterion involves the various feuding parties into
which the army was divided. Those close to Braddock centered
around Orme, while the general's antagonists cleaved toward
St. Clair. Unfortunately, although Washington and Peyton-
assuming his account is at least substantially genuine-certainly
'fell in the former clique, and British B in the latter, it is
impossible to be certain in most cases, and undoubtedly many
of the eyewitnesses were members of no faction. Furthermore,
the accounts of the five who may be categorized as belonging to
one of the two groups vary considerably. It would therefore be
unreasonable to suppose that because an individual was in-
volved with a particular clique his report of a given aspect of
the battle would be similar to that of Orme or St. Clair, as the
case might be, or that the author of any such report was
necessarily of the clique. Still, it is clear that in several cases
reporters allowed a personal dislike of Braddock to color their
description of the battle in general, or of his conduct in par-
ticular. The opposite may also be true, and probably is so in the
case of Orme, but it is never so obvious.
   As we shall see, much of the controversy surrounding Brad-
 dock's Defeat revolves around the behavior of the troops, par-
 ticularly the British regulars. By and large, our eyewitnesses
 claim that the enemy carried the day because the men panicked
 and refused to follow orders. In view of this key criticism, it is





                      202 APPENDIX D
Commentary
  Gordon is not an infallible source. In terms of pure reliability,
he is probably outranked by Dunbar. He can occasionally be
tripped up on details, such as the numbers of the enemy and the
distance from the river to the battlefield. More important, he
becomes rather hazy once he has described the first few mo-
ments of battle. For example, he claims that the retreating ad-
vance party collided with "the rest of the troops." If he means
this literally, his account is incorrect, since the advance party
collided first with the working party, and then the two of them
combined fell back on Burton's detachment, which may or may
not have been in motion. It is more likely, however, that he is
guilty only of using imprecise terminology, for he soon remarks
that "They form'd Altogether, the Advanced & Main Body." In
other words, at this point he is equating the advance party with
the vanguard as a whole, something he has not done earlier in
his account. He in any case omits the collision between the ad-
vance party and St. Clair's detachment. His discussion of the
battle as a whole is delivered in this imprecise fashion.
  Despite such lapses, however, his account remains one of our
most important. Unlike Gage, he does not seem to have distorted
what he observed on the battlefield. Indeed, although he is likely
trying to blow his own trumpet, he does not have Gage's motive to
cover up, since he need not worry that he may be blamed for the
defeat. Furthermore, he seems to have been in an excellent posi-
tion to observe the first moments of fighting, better perhaps than
any eyewitness except Gage or Croghan. On the early stages of
battle, prior to the retreat by the advance party, he is apparently
our most reliable reporter, in view of his honesty and precision.
The fact that the latter fades when he discusses the remainder of
the engagement does not prevent him from being considered one
of our four or five most useful informants.

                        Philip Hughes
  [This "Extract of a Letter from Fort Cumberland, dated July
23" appeared in The Public Advertiser, October 31, 1755. I am





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 203


using the reprint in Davis's "British Newspaper Accounts of
Braddock's Defeat." The writer does not identify himself, be-
yond the fact that he is a chaplain. Davis notes that there were
two chaplains on the expedition, Hughes of the Forty-Fourth
and John Hamilton of the Forty-Eighth. Further research shows
that Hughes was wounded in the battle. Hamilton is not listed
among those who saw action, and in fact he probably remained
behind with Dunbar. It is with considerable certainty, therefore,
that I identify the author of the following as Hughes.]

  I believe I am the first Chaplain who ever saved a Pair of
Colours, which I took within fifty Yards of the Cannon, when
the Enemy were Masters of them. The French and Indians
crept about in small Parties so that the Fire was quite round us,
and in all the Time I never saw one, nor could I on Enquiry
find any one who saw ten together. The Loss killed and
wounded 864. The French had 2000 Men, besides Indians, we
had six Indians, and they at least as many hundreds, We
marched near 400 Miles in three Months, cut 350 thro' Woods,
and for the last 200 saw no House but this dirty Fort. Rum 20's
a Gallon, the worst brown sugar 4s 6d a Pound, a Year old Calf
sold to Sir Peter Halket and our Mess at 3.Y. after the 25th of
June a Dollar for a Pint of Rum, so you may judge of our
Distress. The whole Country is a Wood.

Commentary
   One point relevant to the battle has been discussed in the
 text. Otherwise, Hughes's sad remark on the high cost of rum
 recalls the complaint of the soldiers, related in the report by
 Gage and Dunbar, that during the march they had had "Noth-
 ing to Drink but Water." Hughes's account is on the whole
 unimportant, but it certainly conveys an honest, if naive, im-
 pression of the battle. Many inexperienced man, especially
 those regulars who had never seen action, undoubtedly shared
 his exaggerated estimate of the enemy's strength, and it is likely
 that this belief contributed to the panic.





204 APPENDIX D


                        Matthew Leslie

  [I am reproducing Leslie's brief account from Samuel Haz-
ard's Register of Pennsylvania, 5 (1820), p. 191. Hazard describes
his transcript as a "Copy of a letter from Major Leslie to a
respectable merchant of Philadelphia." Leslie, who was almost
certainly not a major at the time he wrote this letter, had sev-
eral contacts within the mercantile community of Philadelphia,
but to suggest an addressee would be nothing but guesswork.
Nor do we know where the letter was written. It is dated July
30, 1755.]

  You have heard the disastrous termination of our expedi-
tion, with the loss of our General and most of the army. What
could bravery accomplish against such an attack, as sudden as it
was unexpected? the yell of the Indians is fresh on my ear, and
the terrific sound will haunt me until the hour of my dissolu-
tion. I cannot describe the horrors of that scene; no pen could
do it, or no painter delineate it so as to convey to you with any
accuracy our unhappy situation. Our friend, Captain John Co-
nyngham is severely wounded, his horse fell on the first fire,
and before he could be disengaged from the animal, which had
fallen on him, received a wound on his arm; and his life was
saved by the enthusiasm of his men, who seeing his danger
rushed between the savages and him and carried him in tri-
umph from the spot. I need not tell you that the Captain is
indebted for his life to the love his men had for him. Many had
sacrificed their lives before he could be extricated from the
horse. If you have an opportunity please to communicate the
sad intelligence to our friends in Ireland. Tell them I live, but
that my feelings have been dreadfully wounded. To tell you
what I did, I cannot; suffice it that I acted as all brave men
placed like me in a similar position, would act.-We have lost
gallant officers and generous friends, not in battle, for that we
could bear, but by murder, by savage butchery. The French
dared not openly meet us; our's is the loss, theirs the disgrace.





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 205
When we meet I will give you particulars. Captain Conyngham
is doing well. I hope we shall soon be under your hospitable
roof in Philadelphia.

Commentary
  Leslie is among the most likable of our reporters. His com-
passionate account should remind us that in the wake of the
battle not all officers looked first to their self-interest. In a less
subjective vein, it appears that while he gives the impression of
reliability, his account is too anecdotal and personalized to
serve as a basis for any check on accuracy.


           Patrick Mackellar and Robert Orme: Maps
  [Orme's first sketch (map 2), showing the disposition of the
army as a whole, has been reprinted often since George Ban-
croft published it. I am reproducing it, as well as Orme's detail
of the advance party (map 3), from Sargent, History of an Expedi-
tion (facing pp. 218 and 352, respectively). Mackellar's sketches
and commentary (maps 4 and 5) are drawn from Pargellis,
Military Affairs, pp. 114-15.]

Commentary
  It is almost certain that all four of these maps are the work of
Mackellar. The first two are associated with Orme because they
were enclosed with his journal. However, as we might expect,
he did not draw them. In a letter that he sent to Napier
accompanying the journal, he protests that "I am sorry the
plans are not finished, but am to have them to-morrow night"
(Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 282). Orme would have had
one of the four engineers prepare the sketches, and Mackellar
is the most likely candidate, in view of the great similarities
between maps 2 and 4. As for Gordon, his right arm was badly
damaged during the battle, and there is little chance that he
would have recovered quickly enough to draw the maps Orme
had ordered. Whoever drew them, the captain undoubtedly













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        Map 4. Mackellar's Sketch of the Beginning of the Battle
A Sketch of the Field of Battle of the 9th July upon the Monongahela,
seven miles from Fort du Quesne, between the British Troops com-
manded by General Braddock and the French & French Indians com-
manded by Monsr de St Pierre, shewing the Disposition of the Troops
when the Action began.

                      Explanation of Map 4.
     British Troops, the long Lines express the Number of Files
     French and Indians
     Cannon
     Howitzers
     Waggons, Carts and Tumbrils
     Provision and Baggage Horses
a. French and Indians upon their march to attack the British, when
   first discover'd by the Guides
b. Guides and six light Horse
c. Van-Guard of the advanced Party
d. Advanced Party commanded by Col Gage
e. Working Party commanded by Sr Jn St Clair D.Q.M.G.
f. Two six pounder Field Pieces
g. Carts & Waggons wt Ammunition & Tools
h. Rear Guard of the Advanced Party
i. Light Hdrse
k. Sailors and Pioneers
1. Three 12 pounder Field Pieces
m. General's Guard, Foot & Horse
n. Main Body in Divisions upon the Flanks of the Convoy, wt the
   Cattle, Provision & Baggage Horse between them & the Flank-
   Guards
o. a 12 pounder Field ps in the rear of the Convoy
p. Rear-Guard
q. Flank-Guards
r. a Hollow Way
s. a Hill which the Indians took possession of soon after the begin-
   ning of the Action
t. Frazer's House










Reproduced by gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II


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         Map 5. Mackellar's Sketch of the Battle at Two o'Clock
A Sketch of the Field of Battle &c, shewing the Disposition of the
Troops about 2 a Clock when the whole of the main Body had joined
the advanced and Working Partys, then beat back from the Ground
they occupied as in Plan No 1 [map 4].

                       Explanation of Map 5
a. The French and Indians skulking behind Trees round the Brittish
f. The two Field Pieces of the advanced Party now abandoned
c, d, e, h, i, k, m, n, q. The whole Body of the British joined, with
   little or no order, but endeavouring to make Fronts towards the
   Enemys Fire
1. the three 12 pounder Field Pieces of the main Body
o. The rear Field Piece. 12 pounder
p. The Rear Guard divided (round the rear of the Convoy, now
   closed up) behind Trees having been attacked by a few Indians
N.B.The Disposition on both sides, continued about two hours nearly as
   here represented, the British endeavouring to recover the Guns (f)
   and to gain the Hill (s) to no purpose. It was proposed to take
   possession of this Hill before the Indians did, but unhappily it was
   neglected. The British were at length beat from the Guns (1). The
   General was wounded soon after. They were lastly beat back ac-
   cross the Hollow way (r) and made no farther Stand. All the Ar-
   tillery, Ammunition, Provision & Baggage were left in the Enemys
   Hands, and the General was with difficulty carryed off. The whole
   Action continued about three hours and a half. The Retreat was
   full of Confusion, but after a few Miles, there was a Body got to
   rally.


                 Engaged                  in the Field kill'd wounded
Genl Braddock
  Officers Staff included                       96      26      36
  Sergeants Corporals & private men           1373     430     484
    Total                                     1469     456     520

Monsr de St Pierre
  French                                       200       8
  Indians                                      600      20
    Total                                      800      28


N B The Number of the French & Indians is not yet certain





                   xxii INTRODUCTION
obviously desirable to seek out the testimony of "common sol-
diers" and listen to their side of the story. Unfortunately, it
appears that only two of them left accounts, and indeed most
were probably illiterate. In this case, therefore, we must go
further afield. We must backtrack, and use sources we would
prefer not to. The most important of these is a report prepared
by a commission that had been created in the wake of the battle
to investigate the behavior of the troops. The report was
framed by officers, particularly Gage, but it contains a pur-
ported paraphrase of the testimony of British privates, and the
most thorough defense of their conduct extant. To include this
account among our sources ushers in all the difficulties and
drawbacks associated with secondhand material. We do not
know how many privates testified, whether they did so as indi-
viduals or as members of a delegation, whether this testimony
was oral or was presented in writing, or how accurately and
fully the court of inquiry transmitted it. The document in
question is not useless, but it must be handled with special care.
More important than any account, however, is the simple rec-
ognition that the overall bias of our eyewitnesses is distinctly
pro-officer, anti-private. We cannot always compensate for this
slant, but we can bear it in mind.
  Two lines of categorization prove especially useful in ex-
plaining the differences among the various accounts. One
rests on nationality. Some may object to differentiating be-
tween "British" and "American" accounts of Braddock's De-
feat, and certainly those Americans who have left us their
testimony all considered themselves at the time to be loyal
subjects of the Crown. But one has only to read the various
accounts to see how important was national spirit. Those who
were American by birth or adoption tend to speak glowingly
of how their countrymen behaved during the battle, while the
British eyewitnesses for the most part do not differentiate
among the troops, or, if they do single out the provincials, it is
to criticize them. Furthermore, the Americans generally ana-
lyze the battle in a considerably different way than do the





                     212 APPENDIX D
had considerable influence over their preparation. He may
likewise have had a say in the preparation of the two sketches
known to have been drawn by Mackellar, though in their case
other officers may also have made suggestions.
  In any case, none of the maps sharply contradicts another.
There are slight differences in the stated disposition of troops
prior to battle. Regarding the number of flanking parties, I
have accepted Orme's version as more plausible, for Mackel-
lar's map implies that these units totaled considerably more
than four hundred men. A more important discrepancy favors
Mackellar. This involves distance. The advance party certainly
was not as spread out as is suggested by Orme's second map. It
may be added that the troops at the time of battle were much
farther from Fort Duquesne than Orme would have us believe,
but the Mackellar map proper gives no indication as to where
they were relative to it, so there is no contradiction here. The
same severe skew is apparent in the sketch reproduced by
Freeman (see chap. 4, n. 1), which is probably a rough version
of the first Orme map. There is a possibility that in both
Mackellar is simply departing from scale.

                        Robert Orme
  [This major account is excerpted from Orme's journal (Sar-
gent, History of an Expedition, pp. 352-57). Other reports by
Orme are noted in Appendix C. I agree with Sargent's opinion
(p. 282) that Orme addressed his journal to Napier. He did so
in the expectation that the addressee would then forward the
account to Cumberland. According to the letter that Orme sent
with the journal, the maps he had intended to include were not
yet complete. Apparently they were inserted later. The fact
that the maps were still to be finished indicates that he mailed
his report within a few weeks of the battle, and certainly before
the close of summer 1755. The manuscript journal is now in
the British Museum, no. 212 King's Mss. In his rendering,
Sargent has apparently modernized spelling.]





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 213


  U[July 8th.] Lieutenant Gage was ordered to march before
break of day with the two companies of Grenadiers, one hun-
dred and sixty rank and file of the 44th and 48th, Captain
Gates's independent company, and two six-pounders, with
proper guides; and he was instructed to pass the fords of the
Monongahela and to take post after the second crossing, to
secure the passage of that river.
  Sr John St Clair was ordered to march at 4 of the clock with a
detachment of two hundred and fifty men to make the roads
for the artillery and baggage, which was to march with the
remainder of the troops at five....
  July 9th. The whole marched agreeably to the Orders before
mentioned, and about 8 in the morning the General made the
first crossing of the Monongahela by passing over one hundred
and fifty men in the front, to whom followed half the carriages.
Another party of one hundred and fifty men headed the sec-
ond division; the horses and cattle then passed, and after all
the baggage was over, the remaining troops, which till then
possessed the heights, marched over in good order.
  The General ordered a halt, and the whole formed in their
proper line of march.
  When we had moved about a mile, the General received a
note from Lieutenant Colonel Gage acquainting him with his
having passed the river without any interruption, and having
posted himself agreeably to his orders.
  When we got to the other crossing, the bank on the other
side not being yet made passable, the artillery and baggage
drew up along the beach, and halted 'till one, when the General
passed over the detachment of the 44th, with the pickets of the
right. The artillery waggons and carrying horses followed; and
then the detachment of the 48th, with the left pickets, which
had been posted during the halt upon the heights.
  When the whole had passed, the General again halted, and
they formed according to the annexed plan.
  It was now near two o'clock, and the advanced party under
Lieutenant Colonel Gage and the working party under Sr John





214 APPENDIX D


St Clair were ordered to march on 'till three. No sooner were
the pickets upon their respective flanks, and the word given to
march, but we heard an excessive quick and heavy firing in the
front. The General imagining the advanced parties were very
warmly attacked, and being willing to free himself from the
incumbrance of the baggage, order'd Lieutenant Colonel Bur-
ton to reinforce them with the vanguard, and the line to halt.
According to this disposition, eight hundred men were de-
tached from the line, free from all embarrassments, and four
hundred were left for the defence of the Artillery and baggage,
posted in such a manner as to secure them from any attack or
insults.
  The General sent forward an Aid de Camp to bring him an
account of the nature of attack, but the fire continuing, he
moved forward himself, leaving Sr Peter Halket with the com-
mand of the baggage. The advanced detachments soon gave
way and fell back upon Lieutenant Colonel Burton's detach-
ment, who was forming his men to face a rising ground upon
the right. The whole were now got together in great confusion.
The colours were advanced in different places, to separate the
men of the two regiments. The General ordered the officers to
endeavour to form the men, and to tell them off into small
divisions and to advance with them; but neither entreaties nor
threats could prevail.
  The advanced flank parties, which were left for the security
of the baggage, all but one ran in. The baggage was then
warmly attacked; a great many horses, and some drivers were
killed; the rest escaped by flight. Two of the cannon flanked
the baggage, and for some time kept the Indians off: the other
cannon, which were disposed of in the best manner and fired
away most of their ammunition, were of some service, but the
spot being so woody, they could do little or no execution.
  The enemy had spread themselves in such a manner, that
they extended from front to rear, and fired upon every part.
  The place of action was covered with large trees, and much
underwood upon the left, without any opening but the road,






          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 215
which was about twelve feet wide. At the distance of about two
hundred yards in front and upon the right were two rising
grounds covered with trees.
  When the General found it impossible to persuade them to
advance, and no enemy appeared in view; and nevertheless a
vast number of officers were killed, by exposing themselves
before the men; he endeavored to retreat them in good order;
but the panick was so great that he could not succeed. During
this time they were loading as fast as possible and firing in the
air. At last Lieutenant Colonel Burton got together about one
hundred of the 48th regiment, and prevailed upon them, by
the General's order, to follow him towards the rising ground to
the right, but he being disabled by his wounds, they faced
about to the right, and returned.
  When the men had fired away all their ammunition and the
General and most of the officers were wounded, they by one
common consent left the field, running off with the greatest
precipitation. About fifty Indians pursued us to the river, and
killed several men in the passage. The officers used all possible
endeavours to stop the men, and to prevail upon them to rally;
but a great number of them threw away their arms and ammu-
nition, and even their cloaths, to escape the faster. About a
quarter of a mile on the other side of the river, we prevailed
upon near one hundred of them to take post upon a very
advantageous spot, about two hundred yards from the road.
Lieutenant Colonel Burton posted some small parties and cen-
tinels. We intended to have kept possession of that ground, 'till
we could have been reinforced. The General and some
wounded officers remained there about an hour, till most of
the men run off. From that place, the General sent Mr Wash-
ington to Colonel Dunbar with orders to send waggons for the
wounded, some provision, and hospital stores; to be escorted
by two youngest Grenadier companies, to meet him at Gist's
plantation, or nearer, if possible. It was found impracticable to
remain here, as the General and officers were left almost alone;
we therefore retreated in the best manner we were able. After





                     216 APPENDIX D
we had passed the Monongahela the second time, we were
joined by Lieutenant Colonel Gage, who had rallied near 80
men. We marched all that night, and the next day, and about
ten o'clock that night we got to Gist's plantation.

Commentary
  For a discussion of Orme's reliability, see Appendix C.

                        Francis Peyton
  [Peyton's letter is reprinted from John L. Peyton, The Adven-
tures of My Grandfather (London, 1867), pp. 244-49. Like Kep-
pel and Sargent, J. L. Peyton has apparently modernized
spelling and punctuation; this is the least of our worries. If
genuine, Captain Peyton's account is the earliest known, having
been dated July 13, 1755, from the Great Meadows.]

  Never did I undertake to write a letter when so overwhelmed
with grief and disappointment. Our expedition has failed! Our
commander is dead! Our noble General Braddock! He died
this day from his wounds. Alas! who could have anticipated
such a disaster-such an extraordinary and disgraceful defeat
as that which we have sustained on the Monongahela river.
   I will endeavour to give you some connected account of our
military operations since the letter I wrote you from Monaka-
tuca Camp [July 6].
   Well, my dear mother, after leaving that spot our whole
 army arrived at the Monongahela river and crossed it on the
 9th July. It is a bright and beautiful stream of about 200 yards
 width at that point, but varying both in width and depth;
 sometimes rattling playfully over the rocks which form its bed,
 and sometimes flowing silently under the rugged roots and
 branches which stretch half across it. It was very shallow where
 we crossed, as I suppose it generally is during the dry season.
 We crossed it in the first place full of hope and confidence; we
 have recrossed it in shame and confusion! I was acting as






BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 217


adjutant of Colonel Burton's regiment. According to his orders
I had formed in columns of companies to the right of the main
force, which was on the opposite side of the stream. The scouts
reported the French and Indians in great force near at hand;
therefore our whole army was drawn up in line of battle. The
General issued the order to advance. We did so; and had not
proceeded 500 yards when we heard quick and heavy firing
along nearly our whole line. In order to ascertain the force of
the enemy, and their exact position, General Braddock called a
halt; and directed that our regiment, with the vanguard of 800
men, should move forward to reinforce the pickets and recon-
noitre the enemy's position. Lieutenant-Colonel Burton placed
himself at the head of the regiment, and advanced in gallant
style. We had proceeded hardly one quarter of a mile, when we
came upon our pickets retreating in confusion, bringing
terrified and exaggerated accounts of the enemy's force. This
threw the vanguard into disorder, which disorder quickly
spread among our men. Suddenly we beheld the savage enemy
advancing toward us; for we had not been able to see them
through the thick forest in which we were. The confusion
greatly increased, and our men were now falling wounded and
dead in all directions from the brisk fire which the Red Skins
opened upon us. Colonel Burton and the other officers exerted
themselves to the utmost to induce the men to stand their
ground, and return the enemy's fire; or to advance upon, and
dislodge them from their hiding-places. But in vain; panic-
struck they retreated upon the baggage in the utmost precipita-
tion and confusion, and had hardly come back to it before the
French and Indians attacked us in this position. Every man
among us must have been destroyed, and I should never again
have addressed a letter to you, my respected mother, had it not
happened that four pieces of cannon were stationed in reserve
at that point. These were promptly manned, and chiefly by
officers, who thus succeeded in keeping back the foe. Notwith-
standing we held them in check, a murderous fire was kept up
upon us and our whole line. Nearly all of our horses and






                     218 APPENDIX D
drivers were killed, and those who were not, fled; for still our
treacherous foe could not be seen through the trees and thick
undergrowth: and excepting the road which we had cut, there
was no opening whatever.
  General Braddock seeing that it ivas necessary to advance
and dislodge the enemy, rode forward with his staff to the
front. He endeavoured to reanimate their courage, and in-
duce them to advance, dashing forward through the thick
forest to show his indifference to danger. But, oh! that I
should have to write it-he failed, and while thus exposed was
shot down, dangerously wounded. So also was the brave Colo-
nel Burton, while many officers were killed. This greatly in-
creased the panic, and in spite of our efforts to retire in good
order, we found it impossible to control the men, who fled.
The only regiment in which there was any steadiness was the
48th. At the head of this, Colonel Burton, notwithstanding his
wound and loss of blood and consequent prostration, endeav-
oured to advance. He was aided by Colonel Washington and
Colonel Lewis who had rallied around them a body of West-
ern Virginians. These men protected themselves by the trees
while they fired-after the fashion of the Indians-
and thus prevented an advance of the enemy. But for all that
their efforts were futile, the 48th refused to advance, but
stood firing helplessly at the forest trees behind which the
enemy were concealed, until they had expended all their am-
munition; after which, in spite of the officers, they broke and
fled towards the river in the wildest confusion; many of them
throwing away their arms and accoutrements. In spite of be-
ing thus forsaken by the panic struck 48th, the brave Western
Virginians whom Colonels Washington and Lewis had formed
behind the trees-after the Indian mode of fighting-
retreated, but in order, from tree to tree, loading and firing
as they drew back, upon such of our snake-like enemy who
showed themselves in advancing. The Colonial Volunteers
thus prevented pursuit, and saved the remnant of the British
army from destruction. Meanwhile, Colonel Washington had






BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 219


had the wounded General Braddock carried to the rear, and
carefully tended.
  The whole of our retreating force recrossed the river in
safety; and on the 11th we reached Gist's Plantation, where our
wounded were attended to, and the army rested for a short
time. We then continued our retreat to Rock Fort, near Colonel
Dunbar's, and thence to this point which we have only reached
this evening.
  The whole retreat has been indeed conducted by Colonel
Washington, whose remarkable talents have gained the confi-
dence of the other and senior officers. His principal and most
efficient aid in this humiliating task has been Captains Andrew
and William Lewis, of Augusta, (county) who have lived all their
lives on the frontier, and perfectly understand the Indian char-
acter. Thus, my dear mother, you will perceive that to the volun-
teers of my native Virginia, we entirely owe our escape....
  I have been with the wounded general during some or
other portion of each day. He endured agonizing pains of
body, and, if it were possible, still greater anguish of mind at
the failure of the campaign. Indeed, it appeared to be a relief
to him that he would not survive so grievous a disaster. He
entertained the hope that his king and his country-since he
had laid down his life in their service-would shield his mem-
ory from any unjust or ungenerous imputations connected
with this most fatal enterprise.
  It is a source of much pride and pleasure to me, to witness
how rapidly our friend and neighbour, Colonel George Wash-
ington, has grown in the estimation of all, by his wisdom and
prudence; and by the great ability he has displayed in extricat-
ing the army from an unfortunate and dangerous situation. He
is spoken of in terms of praise by all-both colonial and English
officers, and particularly by General Braddock, whose last
breath was drawn while sounding his praise, and exhorting
obedience to his orders. Though Colonel Washington does not
belong to the British army (for, like myself, he was a volunteer
in this expedition), has, indeed, never been to England, or





                      220 APPENDIX D
received any regular military training, he has the faculty of
inspiring confidence in officers and men alike: particularly-if
any can be singled out-is he admired by Colonel Burton. All
agree that in future campaigns against the Indians, it will be
better to conduct them under officers born and bred in this
country; and not by persons despatched from England, how-
ever competent the latter may be considered. They cannot
understand America so well as the natives, who have already
learned the way to fight the savages around them. And in this
age the Indian craftiness has been quickened by their French
allies.

Commentary
  If this account is wholly imaginary, it is not the only one.
Almost a decade before the appearance of The Adventures of My
Grandfather, William Makepeace Thackeray produced The Vir-
ginians, a novel that included the "testimony" of one George
Warrington, a survivor of Braddock's Defeat. In preparing
Warrington's report on the battle, Thackeray drew most of his
information from Sargent, text and documents. The resultant
account (1900 ed., pp. 428-30) is incorrect on numerous
points, but, as one might expect, it is told with flair. Of course,
so is Francis Peyton's. The point is, however, that while Thack-
eray wrote as a novelist, and everyone knew that his account
was fictitious, John L. Peyton wrote as a historian. In the
introduction to The Adventures of My Grandfather, Peyton writes
that he had recently come into possession of a collection of
family papers. Some of the documents had been mutilated
during the Civil War, and therefore in preparing his manu-
script, Peyton tells us (p. v), "I have been under the necessity,
in cases where the meaning appeared tolerably clear, of supply-
ing a few lines to fill the hiatus. If this should, in any instance,
have caused obscurity or anachronism, I hope this will be a
sufficient explanation, especially as it has arisen from a strong
wish to render the narrative not only agreeable to my family,
for whose gratification it is especially designed, but interesting





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 221
to the public." Peyton never specifies which documents he has
altered, or where. I strongly suspect, however, that if the letter
in question exists at all he has virtually rewritten it.
  There is, indeed, no evidence that Francis Peyton accompa-
nied Braddock. This should not surprise us, since if he were
really a volunteer of the campaign, his name would not have
appeared on the various lists of officers who took part in the
battle. If we give John Peyton the benefit of the doubt, and
assume that his ancestor fought at the Monongahela and did
write the letter ascribed to him, we are still faced with major
problems in judging his account. The letter itself is in some
ways strange. For one thing, what son would recount such a
gruesome experience to his mother and not so much as men-
tion whether he had been wounded? The style of the letter is
likewise a cause for suspicion, suggesting more a historian of
the mid-nineteenth century than a country gentleman of the
eighteenth century.
  But the main cause for concern is that the account reads
remarkably like a rehash of Orme, with other material drawn
from the "Seaman's Journal" and Sargent's narrative. Wher-
ever Peyton is original, his statements are trite, dubious, or
plain wrong. Enough material exists so that we can say with
certainty that the "savage enemy" did not advance toward the
British. Similarly, the claim that the "whole retreat" was con-
ducted by Washington is at least a gross exaggeration. But it is
Orme's influence that is most worrisome. This influence is
perhaps even more evident in Peyton's "Journal," the account
he sent his mother from Monakatooka Camp. The journal
immediately precedes Peyton's letter of July 13 in the appendix
to The Adventures of My Grandfather. There is not one verifiable
point made in that journal that is not made by Orme in his
standard account of the expedition. But we are not dealing
here with a normal case of self-corroboration, that is, one in
which one reporter provides information for another. If the
letter is authentic, Captain Peyton was in at least as good a
position to view the battle as was Orme. He would, in fact, have





                   INTRODUCTION xxiii
British, seeing in the debacle a vindication of their forest
fighting tactics.
  In their defense, most of the British eyewitnesses do not
seem to have been malicious in ignoring the role of the Ameri-
can troops. Rather, they were looking to portray the overall
scene, to note the rule rather than exceptions. And the rule, as
they saw it, was cowardice. In a brief sketch of the battle, they
were not likely to make note of the heroism of a few Ameri-
cans, when the decisive element in defeat seemed to them to be
the widespread panic of the regulars. Indeed, it is not at all
unlikely that some of them, their attention drawn to attempting
to rally the troops, failed to note what the provincials were
doing, one way or the other. In any case, the cleavage between
American and British eyewitness accounts is both real and
important.
  Of even greater moment is the line of categorization involv-
ing physical perspective. From which angle did each eyewitness
view the battle? When judging the plausibility of an account, we
must ask ourselves whether a given reporter was actually in a
position to have seen the action he describes. Even if he was, is
there a likelihood that he may have misinterpreted an event,
owing to having been some distance from where it took place?
Generally speaking, it can be said that our eyewitnesses are
reasonably accurate in describing what happened near them,
while in discussing action that they saw from a distance they
are, as one might expect, prone to factual error and misinter-
pretation. Fortunately, with only a few exceptions, we can be
fairly certain where the eyewitnesses were, at least during the
crucial first moments of battle.
  There are more questions, suggesting additional categories.
Was a given eyewitness capable of interpreting the action he
saw? On the whole, it is wise to take the opinion of an experi-
enced military man rather than that of a novice. To whom did
a particular reporter direct his account? If to a superior, he
might have been prone to glorify his own activity during the
battle, in hopes of winning a promotion. Indeed, several of





                      222 APPENDIX D
 accompanied Burton's detachment on its fateful mission, while
 Orme remained behind with Braddock.
   It is not therefore Captain Peyton's credibility that is in
 question. It is John Lewis Peyton we are primarily concerned
 with. Assuming that there was a letter at all, how much did the
 historian alter or interpolate? A great deal, I would suggest. I
 do not claim that the evidence adduced is overwhelming, but I
 do consider it to be substantial enough to justify my decision
 not to cite Peyton's letter in the text, with the other eyewitness
 accounts. I have not reached my decision lightly. If genuine,
 Peyton's report ranks with those of British A, Cholmley's Bat-
 man, Gordon, and Orme as one of our five most useful. It is
 obviously quotable, and the allusions to Washington, who was
 indeed Peyton's friend, are of great interest. Peyton provides
 us with a full account by a member of the main body, particu-
 larly welcome in view of the fact that aside from Orme that
 segment of the army is not known to have produced a reporter
 who excelled in detail. Most important of all, we have here an
 eyewitness with no apparent ax to grind. He is writing not to a
 superior, in the hope that he may glorify himself or place
 blame on others. Rather, he addresses his mother. But we
 cannot accept an account simply because it would be desirable
 to do so. The letter in question may never have existed at all.
 Even if it did, we may not assume that any given statement
 printed in The Adventures of My Grandfather is authentic. Unless
 the original letter comes to light, it seems quite unwise to put
 any stock in Captain Peyton's "account."


                       Sir John St. Clair
   [My source for the following report is Pargellis's Military Af-
fairs, pp. 102-03. St. Clair's letter, addressed to Napier, is dated
Wills Creek, July 22, 1755.]

   I wrote to you a letter on the 12th of June, which I hope you
 have received by this time, that letter gave you an Account of the






          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 223
obstructions we was like to meet with on our march on account
of Carridges: a few days after writeing that letter, General Brad-
dock with the Army arrived at the little meadows; about the 17th
of June General Braddock sent for me and told me, he laid
down a Scheme of his own for marching on, which before that
time, had been given to the Brigade Major in orders. The
Scheme was, that a detachment should be form'd of those of the
British Battalions, which Came from Ireland and that those
should march with the artillery together with three Companys of
the Virginia forces, under the Command of General Braddock,
the remaining part of the Army under the Command of Colonel
Dunbar, was to follow with the Great Convoy, this Step I look'd
upon to be a prelude to marching in divisions, which was the
only way we Could have brought up our Convoy.
  This strong detachment march'd on and arrived at the
Strong Camp of the Great-Lick which is Twenty one miles on
the other side of Yanehagane and Eighty miles from this fort.
The Great advantages of this strong Ground made me propose
to the General, to halt with his detachment to bring up Colonel
Dunbar with his Convoy; this proposal, was rejected with great
indignation; we march'd on 'till the seventh of July Twenty
three miles further, I then objected to our marching any longer
in that order of march with a Convoy, and proposed, since this
small body must march to the french fort, that we should
march part of our small numbers and take post before the Fort
leaving our Convoy to Come up I urged strongly that no
General had hitherto march'd up at midday to the Gates of the
Town he was to beseige leading his Convoy and if Genl. Brad-
dock attempted it, he must look to the Consequences.
  Tewsday the 8th we march'd to a riseing ground within three
quarters of a mile of the Monongahela and Encamp'd there.
  Wensday the 9th Colonel Gage with about 300 men march'd
at daylight, past and repast the Monongahela where he took
post, the Workmen and Cover'ers immediately follow'd and
then the rest of the detachment-so that the whole had past by
half an hour after Twelve o'Clock, being three miles; The






                     224 APPENDIX D
reason of passing the Monongahela twice was to avoid the Nar-
rows, which is a road on the bank of the River, Commanded by a
high hill, which would have taken a days work to have made
passable. After Colonel Gage and I had pass'd the river, we re-
ceived orders from Cap: Morris Aid du Camp to March on; the
underwood Continued very thick for about one quarter of a mile
beyond the Monangahela then we Came into an open wood free
from underwood with some gradual riseings, this wood was so
open that Carridges Could have been drove in any part of it;
about a mile on the other side of the last Crossing, we began to feel
the Enemys fire and to hear their Shouts; those who were under
my Command immediately form'd. On those in my front falling
back upon me, I ran to the front to see what the matter was, when
I received a Shot through the body. I then return'd to my own
people, posted Cap: Polsons Company of Artificers and Cap:
Periwees Company of Rangers to Cover my two Cannon. I then
went up to General Braddock who was then at the head of his own
Guns and beg'd of him for God-Sake to gain the riseing ground
on our Right to prevent our being Totally Surrounded. I know no
further of this unlucky affair to my knowledge being afterwards
insensible. It will be needless for me to give you any account by
hear-say. Our affairs here are as bad Can make them, with regard
to my self in particular. I was fully resolved, if we had met with
Success to desire leave to have been recalld, finding I could be of
little use being never listen'd to: but as our affairs stand at present
it is a thing I shall not think of and should be glad of haveing
another opportunity of makeing use of the knowledge I have of
the Country and its inhabitants; by the time I shall have your
answer I hope to be in a Condition of doing my duty therefore
should be glad you would point it out to me whether its to be here
or in New England under General Shirrly.

Commentary
  St. Clair's comments on the last stages of the march are
highly interesting. On the battle itself he is, however, a minor
source. We have seen in the text that his statements can be





           BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 225
unreliable, and of course his claim that he was unconscious
during most of the fighting limits his usefulness. On the last
point, one should note Colonel Dunbar's remark (see Appen-
dix E) that he had received an account of the battle from St.
Clair, "who saw the whole." It is impossible to know whom to
credit here. In any case, St. Clair's account, as reported to
Napier, seems to dovetail perfectly with his self-interest. Sir
John had written earlier of the important role he had played in
masterminding and guiding the expedition. Now, in the wake
of defeat, it is clearly wise for him to wash his hands of it. He
does this by claiming that his advice had lately been consistently
ignored. As for the defeat itself, the testimony he presents is
entirely to his own benefit. How can he be blamed if, in the first
place, his troops rallied round him while chaos spread else-
where, and if, in the second, he was unconscious after the first
few moments? I am not accusing him of misrepresenting the
facts. We have seen that, at the very least, his advice was on
several occasions rejected. And British B, for what it is worth,
seems to confirm his point about being insensible throughout
most of the battle. But we should be aware of the directions
self-interest would lead him in his report. We have judged a
parallel case in our discussion of Gage and have done the same,
respecting Orme, in Appendix C.


                        Adam Stephen
   [There are two versions of the following account, neither in
 print. One is among the Newcastle correspondence in the Brit-
 ish Museum, Add. 32,857, fol. 216. This copy of Stephen's
 letter is dated Fort Cumberland, July 18, 1755, and is ad-
 dressed to John Hunter. It is referred to by Evan Charteris, in
 William Augustus Duke of Cumberland and the Seven Years' War
 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), p. 166. The one I have
 transcribed, however, is neither addressed nor dated. It is to be
 found in the Hardwicke Papers, Add. 35,593, fol. 234, and is
 referred to briefly by Pargellis in "Braddock's Defeat."]





226 APPENDIX D


  July the 9th: about two o'clock in the Afternoon. The first
Division of our forces consisting of about 1300 effective chosen
Men & Officers under the immediate Command of General
Braddock was attacked by a Party of French and Indians near
to the River Monongahela about 8 Miles from Fort Du Quesne.
  The Private Men of the two Regiments were entirely at a
loss in the Woods. The Savages and Canadians kept on their
Bellies in the Bushes and behind the Trees, and took particu-
lar Aim at Our Men, and Officers especially, most of whom
are killed or wounded: The British Troops were thunder-
struck to feel the Effect of a heavy Fire, & see no Enemy; they
threw away their Fire in a most indiscreet Manner, and
shamefully turned their Backs on a few Savages and Canade-
ans. General Braddock strove most incessantly to rally them,
and make the proper Dispositions, but all was in vain. They
kept in a mere huddle in spite of the most ardent Endeavours
of many brave officers, and tho' our Numbers were sufficient
to have surrounded them, fought them in their own way, and
pursued our March. Shame unto the infamous Dogs! Their
Numbers only served to increase the Number of the killed.
They were infatuated to such a pitch, that they would obey no
Orders, killed one another & deserted their Colours; and
after about 3  hours-(Shame! That it should be ever heard
of) run from a small number of French and Savages, leaving
them an easy Prey of a most valuable Train, a Stock of Am-
munition, Provisions and Baggage. In short the Enemy ob-
tained an easy and compleat Victory. The few independents
and Virginians that were engaged behaved better and suf-
fered much. There were but few of them engaged, as General
Braddock had unhappily placed his confidence and whole De-
pendence on the Regiments. But his Excellency found to his
woeful Experience, what had been frequently told him, that
formal attacks & Platoon-firing never would answer against
the Savages and Canadeans. It ought to be laid down as a
Maxim to attack them first, to fight them in their own way,
and go against them light & naked, as they come against Us,





          BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 227
creeping near and hunting Us as they would do a Herd of
Buffaloes or Deer; whereas you might as well send a Cow in
pursuit of a Hare as an English Soldier loaded in their way
with a Coat, Jacket, &c. &c. &c., after Canadeans in their
Shirts, who can shoot and run well, or Naked Indians accus-
tomed to the Woods. I escorted a Convoy of 100 Bullocks,
and 100 Horse Load of Flour from Col. Dunbar's Camp to
the General's which was 50 Miles. I had only 100 Men, and
was dogged night and day by the Indians; but by Vigilance,
which is the only thing can secure one against such an Enemy,
joined the General four Days before the Engagement without
the loss of a Man or Bullock. We beat them out of ther Am-
bushes, & always had the first Fire on them. The British
Gentlemen were confident they never would be attacked, and
would have laid any Odds, that they never should, until they
came before the Fort, yea, some went further, and were of
opinion, that We should hear the Explosion of the French
Fort blown up and deserted, before We approached it. These
Notions which were very ill-grounded, served to lull them into
a fatal Security which contributed not a little to the fatal Event
which has lately happened.
  I always declared openly & at the time was not the better
thought of for it, that they would be attacked before they
arrived at the Fort. My Reasons were, that the French must
lose the Use of their Indians, if they did not. They had col-
lected a Body of them, and they would not be cooped up in
the Fort; and the character of the People We had to deal with
would not permit Us to think but the French would take all
Advantages. I had the Honour to receive the General's
Thanks for my Services in the Field; and if he had lived a
Week, I should have been provided for. Twelve Virginia
Officers were engaged, six of whom were killed. I have two
Bullet Holes in my Body at this instant. Lieut. [Walter] Stew-
art is wounded. Sr. Peter Halket fell in the beginning of the
Day. Secretary Shirley & thirteen Officers of the Regiment are
killed. Almost all wounded.





228 APPENDIX D


Commentary
  An interesting account that would be much more important
if it could be shown that Stephen himself participated in the
central engagement. Stephen is more generally critical than any
of our other eyewitnesses. Obviously, he is harsh in assessing
the behavior of the troops, particularly the regulars. But he
criticizes the officers as well, including Braddock, and one may
conjecture that he would denounce the general even more
boldly if he were not claiming his posthumous favor. Stephen is
our prime exponent of Indian-style tactics. During the battle,
he probably led his own rangers in an attack of this sort.
However, because he was in the rear guard and absorbed in
fighting in his own style, it appears unlikely that he saw much
of what was going on up ahead. Undoubtedly, toward the close
of the battle, when he helped to cover the retreat, he saw the
panic he describes here, but he does not appear to have been
on the scene when the troops in front first succumbed to
terror. For this reason I used Washington, rather than Ste-
phen, as my primary witness to the panic. Stephen's account of
the battle also suffers from a lack of precision. But although his
perspective and thoroughness may be questioned, his integrity
ranks high, and in fact he does not make a single statement
that can be successfully challenged on the strength of other
evidence. For this reason, his claim that many officers during
the march predicted an easy victory gains considerable cre-
dence. Although not without his weaknesses, Stephen generally
deserves the benefit of the doubt.

                        Robert Stewart
  [Stewart's account appears to be unknown to historians. It is
in print in only one source, the South Carolina Gazette, no. 1104
(August 14-21, 1755), p. 2, col. 3. However, it is referred to
briefly in several other newspapers of the time, including the
Pennsylvania Gazette, no. 1391 (August 21, 1755), from which
Sargent draws a reference (History of an Expedition, p. 363 n.).





BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 229


Of all the letters concerning the battle that were printed by
contemporary newspapers, this is the only one whose author is
identified by name. The version in the South Carolina Gazette is
headed "Copy of Capt. Robert Stewart's Letter to his Friend at
Williamsburg" and is dated Wills Creek, July 19.]

  As I did not till this Moment know of this Opportunity, have
scarce Time to inform you, of my having escaped safe from the
dreadful Havock we had on the 9th Instant, within Six Miles of
the French Fort,-where General Braddock, with 1300 chosen
Men and Officers, were attacked by the French and Indians, and,
after a sharp and bloody Engagement of 3 Hours and 35 Mini-
utes, our Troops yielded Ground; chiefly owing to the Conster-
nation the Indian Method of Fighting threw the British into, and
for the Want of Officers, most of them being either killed or
wounded by that Time: Very soon after our giving Way, the
Pannic became so general and great, that they shamefully
turned their Backs, and, in a great Measure, abandoned their
General and the Colours-notwithstanding the utmost Efforts
of the few remaining Officers to rally and return to the Charge,
and tho' they had to retreat upwards of 60 Miles thro' a Wilder-
ness, before they could join the other Division of the Army. As
to Particulars, it's impossible yet to give them with any Certainty.
We lost all our Artillery, Stores, Provisions, and Baggage of
every Kind, by much the greater Number of our Officers, and
most People think, at least Half of the Whole Number of Men
we carried into the Field that Fatal Day. To give the finishing
Stoke to our Misfortune, our great and brave (tho' unfortunate)
General, died the 13th Instant. He was wounded in the Arm and
Body, and I believe his Misfortune wounded his very Soul. I had
the Honour of being close by his Side during the Action, and lost
every Thing I had but my Blood, of which not a Drop was spilt,
tho' I had two Horses shot under me, one Ball grazed my right
Brow, another my Forehead, and a third shot away Sword and
Scabbard from my Side. I had only a Detachment of my Troops
with me of 29 Horses of which 25 were killed.





230 APPENDIX D


Commentary
  Stewart was in a position to tell us a great deal about the
battle. Unfortunately, he provides few details. Of course, he
gives the impression that he was writing hurriedly, and pre-
sumably he was anxious to get letters off to his other friends
and relatives. What he does provide is interesting enough. His
reference to the chaotic nature of the retreat draws general
support. On the other hand, his implication that the men did
not panic prior to their retreat does not hold up. Perhaps his
sense of time became distorted during the battle, a common
problem among our eyewitnesses. In any case, his integrity is
high, even if the same cannot always be said for his accuracy.
The fact that he addressed his remarks to a friend favors his
credibility, since he does not appear to have hoped for gain
through his letter. As for his biases, none can clearly be estab-
lished on the basis of this account. He implies that the panic
was chiefly among the regulars, and he clearly condemns
those who turned tail, but he does not claim that the Ameri-
cans behaved particularly well. His sympathy toward Brad-
dock is obvious, though this should not be taken to mean that
he approved of his tactics.

                      George Washington
  [Like Orme, Washington prepared several eyewitness ac-
counts of the battle. His autobiographical notes, which were
written years after the event, are discussed in Appendix E. The
account I have generally relied on for his viewpoint, and the
one reprinted here, represents virtually the whole of a letter he
wrote to Dinwiddie, dated Fort Cumberland, July 18, 1755
(John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington
[Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1931], 1, pp. 148-50).
It has been printed often in the past. Washington dispatched a
series of letters on the battle (ibid., pp. 148-58), but unlike
Orme he does not appear to have aimed at publication. Din-
widdie, however, publicized his account, possibly because he





           BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 231
was pleased that Washington had placed the Virginian troops
in a favorable light, or perhaps because it was the first one he
had received. On July 23, he sent copies to Robinson and Hali-
fax. He then appears to have received Orme's somewhat fuller
account, and forwarded copies of it to several parties. On occa-
sion he sent extracts from both, as he did to General Shirley on
July 29. Finally, in addressing the General Assembly, he laid
before the burgesses copies of both accounts (The Official Rec-
ords of Robert Dinwiddie, ed. R. A. Brock, Virginia Historical
Society, Collections, n.s., 4 [1884], pp. 116-17, 130, 134). Per-
haps it was as a result of this last act that fragments of the letter
began to appear in the provincial papers, for example, the
Pennsylvania Gazette, no. 1391 (August 21, 1755), p. 3, col. 1.
Washington's assertion that "the Virginian Companies behav'd
like Men and Died like Soldiers" soon became a catchphrase,
particularly in the colonies, and has remained so among histori-
ans to the present.]

  As I am favour'd with an oppertunity, I shou'd think myself
excusable was I to omit giv'g you some acct. of our late En-
gagem't with the French on the Monongahela the 9th Inst.
  We continued our March from Fort Cumberland to Frazier's
(which is within 7 Miles of Duquisne) with't meet'g with any
extraordinary event, hav'g only a stragler or two picked up by
the French Indians. When we came to this place, we were
attack'd (very unexpectedly I must own) by abt. 300 French
and Ind'ns; Our numbers consisted of abt. 1300 well arm'd
Men, chiefly Regular's, who were immediately struck with
such a deadly Panick, that nothing but confusion and disobe-
dience of order's prevail'd amongst them: The Officer's in
gen'l behav'd with incomparable bravery, for which they
greatly suffer'd, there being near 60 kill'd and wound'd. A
large proportion, out of the number we had! The Virginian
Companies behav'd like Men and died like Soldiers; for I
believe out of the 3 Companys that were there that day, scarce
30 were left alive: Captn. Peyrouny and all of his Officer's,





                   xxiv INTRODUCTION
those who addressed themselves to superiors claimed that
Braddock had promised them favor, promises which, alas, he
had not lived to keep. There is no case in which we may
question the truthfulness of such a claim, but neither should we
expect the man who makes it to be particularly hard on the
general or his tactics. On the whole, we may look for a bit more
candor in the remarks intended only for friends or relatives.
But we should not expect any participant to put himself in a
bad light, even implicitly. Furthermore, letters written to
friends may have been intended for publication. Every writer
knew that there were thousands anxious to hear his account of
the action. Despite these reservations, we shall see that it is still
worth remembering for whom the various reporters intended
their comments, at least in first instance. I believe, however,
that our flexibility in interpreting evidence in this area should
be particularly great.
  All of the preceding suggests the importance of knowing our
eyewitnesses. A few, notably Gage, Gates, Croghan, Stephen,
and, of course, Washington, are well known to historians. On
the other hand, several of the reporters are entirely strangers to
us, except for what little we can infer from their accounts. But in
almost every case we have some ground on which to judge the
bias of the individual, and in general those of whom we know
little or nothing have left only brief and somewhat trivial testi-
mony. In order to provide a basis for analyzing the various
accounts, I present a sketch of each reporter in chapter 3.
  Generally speaking, on Braddock's side of the action we have
ample source material. As I have suggested, there is enough to
allow us the luxury of deemphasizing secondhand versions,
and those written long after the event. When we survey French
accounts of the battle, however, we cannot afford to be so
choosy. We must accept second- and even thirdhand reports, in
full knowledge of the risks involved. Even when we make such
concessions to the paucity of material, we find that we must rely
on fewer than half the accounts that the members of Brad-
dock's army have left us. Furthermore, most of the French





232 APPENDIX D


down to a Corporal, were kill'd; Captn. Polson shar'd almost
as hard a Fate, for only one of his Escap'd: In short the
dastardly behaviour of the English Soldier's expos'd all those
who were inclin'd to do their duty to almost certain Death;
and at length, in despight of every effort to the contrary,
broke and run as Sheep before the Hounds, leav'g the Ar-
tillery, Ammunition, Provisions, and, every individual thing
we had with us a prey to the Enemy; and when we endeav-
our'd to rally them in hopes of regaining our invaluable loss,
it was with as much success as if we had attempted to have
stop'd the wild Bears of the Mountains. The Genl. was
wounded behind in the shoulder, and into the Breast, of w'ch
he died three days later; his two Aids de Camp were both
wounded, but are in a fair way of Recovery; Colo. Burton and
Sir Jno. St. Clair are also wounded, and I hope will get over
it; Sir Peter Halket, with many other brave Officers were kill'd
in the Field. I luckily escap'd with't a wound tho' I had four
Bullets through my Coat and two Horses shot under me. It is
suppose we left 300 or more dead in the Field; about that
number we brought of wounded, and it is imagin'd (I believe
with great justice too) that about two thirds of both [blank]
received their shott from our own cowardly English Soldier's
who gather'd themselves into a body contrary to orders 10 or
12 deep, wou'd then level, Fire and shoot down the Men
before them.
  I tremble at the consequences that this defeat may have upon
our back settlers, who I suppose will all leave their habitations
unless there are proper measures taken for their security.
  Colo. Dunbar, who commands at present, intends so soon as
his Men are recruited at this place, to continue his March to
Phila. into Winter Quarters: So that there will be no Men left
here unless it is the poor remains of the Virginia Troops, who
survive and will be too small to guard our Frontiers. As Captn.
Orme is writg. to your honour I doubt not but he will give you
a circumstantial acct. of all things, which will make it needless
for me to add more.





           BRITISH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 233
Commentary
  Aside from his estimate of the size of the enemy force, a
figure likely inherited from Gordon or Croghan, Washington
apparently sticks to information drawn from what he himself
had seen. Indeed, it is unfortunate that his report is not fuller,
for he seems to have remained with Braddock throughout the
fighting, and could have provided an unequaled account of the
general's activities. Particularly welcome would be some sort of
statement on how his commander reacted to the first firing,
and what orders he gave to Burton and his detachment. Like
Stewart, who was also in a good position to report, he lets us
down here, possibly because he felt that Orme would provide
the necessary details.
  On the whole, Washington generalizes about the battle. It
would be impossible to provide a sequential account from his
testimony. However, much of what he says is extremely impor-
tant. As we have seen, he is probably our most disinterested
reporter on the behavior of the regulars. Indeed, his greatest
contribution to an analysis of the battle lies in his criticism of
the British soldiers. Since he plays a key role on a key question,
it is particularly important to fix his reliability rating. In sup-
port of his personal integrity we have not only legend but the
historical consensus. Even ignoring the point of whom we are
dealing with, we see here an account which only on the ques-
tion of enemy numbers fails to bear the weight of evidence.
And as just noted, Washington was in a fine position to report
on the battle, so his testimony cannot be disparaged on the
grounds of faulty perspective. Integrity, accuracy-if not al-
ways detail-and physical proximity to the action he describes
help to make Washington's account exceptionally reliable.







to APPENDIX E 4o


           Other British Accounts


                            Note
I AM INCLUDING here three types of reports. First, there are
the genuine eyewitness accounts that were prepared too long
after the event to be rated as good risks on the question of
reliability. Second, there are the accounts written soon after the
battle by those who remained behind with Colonel Dunbar, or
at Fort Cumberland. Finally, there is one composite newspaper
account. Since these versions are not on the whole as important
as are those included in Appendix D, I am only describing and
commenting on them, rather than actually reprinting them.
There are, beyond these, countless second-, third-, and fourth-
hand accounts, some of which are interesting and incisive. I am
not including these here, but have made reference to the most
important of them elsewhere in this monograph.

                          British E
  [This writer's account is included in a letter to an unnamed
addressee, dated Wills Creek, July 25, 1755. The entire letter is
printed in Pargellis, Military Affairs, pp. 112-24.]

  Although not nearly so famous as the "Seaman's Journal,"
British E's account of the campaign and battle is in some ways
more interesting. First, it provides insight into the feuds that
divided the officers throughout the march. Second, Pargellis,
while referring to it as a "violent letter," made considerable use
of it in preparing his influential article on Braddock's Defeat.
The letter rambles somewhat, largely because the writer, who
was probably a British officer addressing a superior, seeks to

                             234





             OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 235
make two basic points. First, he wants to analyze the campaign,
second, to single out various officers for praise or censure. He
constantly shifts back and forth in mood between dispassion
and anger; in topic, between march and battle.
  He starts his account by casting blame. Braddock, he sug-
gests, was a good and brave man, but lazy and sadly misled by
his favorites, particularly Orme. British E moves next to the
battle, but his narrative of the action here is rather weak. Going
on the testimony he had heard from eyewitnesses, he asserts
that the enemy force numbered no more than three hundred,
and perhaps only one hundred. The attack itself he depicts as
truly an ambush, initiated by a sudden volley fired on the
British by the enemy stationed on the rising ground.
  Aspects of his account seem to suggest particular sources. He
appears to have adopted from St. Clair the conviction that the
woods surrounding the battlefield were light. Our anonymous
critic seems in any case to have been close to Sir John. Other
comments by him suggest the influence of Croghan and possi-
bly Gordon. But his discussion of Braddock's behavior during
the battle most closely resembles that of British B, whose biases
he shares. Their accounts differ in that he does concede that
the vanguard retreated, but he repeats British B's claim that
the main body was not put in any order before it marched to
the front. Furthermore, like British A and Furnis, he states that
it was Braddock himself who led the confused advance. How-
ever, while criticizing the general here, he, unlike British B,
gives him credit for his attempts to rally the troops after their
collision had brought chaos. But he feels that they should have
been in better order to begin with, and that for this reason the
disintegration of the army was only partly their fault. This is
perhaps the core of his analysis: "The General would have
Changed his disposition (or more properly made one) but the
Men were then turn'd stupid and insensible and would not
obey their officers in makeing the intended movements which
were unhappily too late attempted. The officers behaved ex-
tremely well as possibly Could be."





236 APPENDIX E


  While praising the officers for their courage, he criticizes
those in command for having blundered into an ambush. On
the other hand, he singles out Gage and Halket for commenda-
tion. In his praise of Halket, we see clear evidence that the
writer is no critic of Continental tactics, particularly since he
lauds the colonel for having prepared his troops to fire by
platoons. British E's criticism of Braddock is implicitly based on
his conviction that the general failed to apply standard proce-
dure correctly, by not having his troops ordered, and by allow-
ing the main body to march in such a way that the troops were
always separated from their respective officers by the wagon
train, thus making ordering difficult. Having given his account
of the battle, the anonymous officer bemoans the destruction of
the ammunition, and the retreat. Then he suddenly backtracks
to denounce Orme for his arrogance. Casting the captain as
villain, he describes the confrontation between Orme and Colo-
nel Dunbar, the same one British B is recounting at the start of
his truncated letter. And again putting Halket, his hero, in a
favorable light, he notes with clear approval Sir Peter's at-
tempts to limit Orme's influence. The long letter ends on an
anticlimactic note, as its author suggests that a major lesson to
be drawn from the Braddock expedition is that in the future
no army of similar size should be burdened with so many
wagons. On the whole British E's report is honest and percep-
tive, but his discussion of the battle itself is marred by his
apparent tendency to rely on the testimony of his friends, most
of whom were anti-Braddock and anti-Orme. The result is an
exceptionally partisan account, which on several important
points does not hold water.


                         Billy Brown
  [A summary of this account appears in John Fanning Wat-
son's Annals of Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time
(Philadelphia, 1887), 2, p. 141. I have made my own transcrip-
tion of the notes Watson made during an interview with






OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 237


Brown, the original being in the Manuscript Department of the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Historical Collections, Am.
3013.]

  According to Watson, Brown had been born free in Africa,
but had been captured at an early age and had come to Amer-
ica as the slave of Colonel Brown. After Braddock's Defeat, he
had become Washington's slave. When Watson interviewed him
in 1826, he described him as being "in the ninety-third year of
his age-possessed of an observing mind and good mem-
ory... incapable of fraud, and... a religious man, of the
Methodist profession." Although, as I have suggested, Watson
lacked a strong critical sense, he did not blindly accept all of
Brown's testimony. However, he probably would have done
well to accept far less.
  Before starting to analyze the account in question, we
should note that no Colonel Brown fought under Braddock,
nor any commissioned officer with that surname. But perhaps
Watson himself was confused by the testimony, so let us as-
sume that Billy Brown was at the battle, in the service of some
British officer. Brown's memory appears to have been erratic.
Some of his statements are accurate, and he furthermore re-
fuses to answer questions when he is uncertain, a tribute to his
honesty. His claim that after Braddock was buried wagons
were driven over his grave-in order to conceal its location
from the Indians-is true enough, and is supported by other
sources. However, the bulk of Brown's testimony is totally in-
accurate. His assertion that Washington was captured during
the battle, only to escape, is so far-fetched that not even Wat-
son accepts it. Similarly far from the truth is his recollection
that the engagement continued for two days. Throughout his
testimony, Brown is highly critical of Braddock and of the
British officers in general. His unkindest cut is the claim that
those in command were so incompetent that the enemy did
not attempt to kill them.
  Despite their inaccuracy, his assertions provide some tenuous





                     238 APPENDIX E
insight into the mood of the troops after the debacle. A case in
point is his statement that "Braddock all the time wore a white
handkerchief loosely tied over his hat & the men after the
disaster said it was a sign he had betrayed his trust & meant
them to have been taken!" There could well have been a rumor
of betrayal. And certainly Brown echoed a popular tale when
he said that the general was shot by one of his own men,
named Pritchett. As noted in Appendix A, Watson identifies
Pritchett with Faucett. Brown, who "reports" various state-
ments supposedly made by Braddock during and after the
battle, also makes an exceptionally quotable source, as numer-
ous historians, most recently McCardell, have discovered. On
balance, however, his account is worth little, being primarily
the stuff of legend, prepared in an age that tended to remem-
ber only the worst of Braddock. The fact that it is honest only
serves as a reminder that ninety-three-year-old men, recalling
events that had occurred more than seventy years in the past,
do not make very reliable sources.

                       William Butler
  [I am working from the summary of Watson's interview with
Butler, included in the historian's Annals of Philadelphia, 2, pp.
139-41.]

  There is even less chance that Butler would be reliable. This
hardy Pennsylvanian was no less than 104 when Watson inter-
viewed him in 1833. As with Brown, we immediately run into
the problem of identifying those officers who he claimed were
on the fateful expedition. For example, he states that at the
start of action "he saw Generals Braddock, Forbes and Grant
talking." By Forbes, he probably means the eventual conqueror
of Fort Duquesne. His "General Grant" may well have been
Colonel James Grant, who failed in his attempt. These two did
not accompany Braddock. If my assumptions as to their iden-
tity are correct, this suggests only what we would expect in a






OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 239


man of Butler's age, the tendency to telescope events. Butler,
like Brown, sees Braddock as the villain of the piece, and
Washington as the hero. He, too, claims that the general was
shot by a soldier in his own army, singling out Faucett as the
culprit. Butler seems to have had less than Brown to say about
the battle itself, or at least Watson reports less. Furthermore,
he is even less reliable-if "reliability" is the term to use when
referring to its nearly total absence.


                       Thomas Dunbar
  [There are several sources for Dunbar's testimony. Easily the
best is his letter to Napier, July 24, 1755, printed in Pargellis,
Military Affairs, pp. 109-11. See also my reference to Burd's
letter on p. 79.]

  Dunbar's report to Napier is for the most part the apology of
a modest man, who may well have had cause for modesty. First
and foremost, the colonel presents testimony on the question of
why at the time of battle his troops were so far behind Brad-
dock. Such emphasis may suggest that he expected criticism on
this point. By contrast, he spends little time defending his
retreat, perhaps indicating that he considered his reasons self-
evident. He concludes on an almost pathetic note: "This Cli-
mate by no means Agrees with My time of Life and bad Consti-
tution, I was willing to try and hoped I should be Able to go
through all that came in My Way, but find it otherwise, there-
fore beg Your Interest to gett Me leave to go home."
  Regarding the battle itself, Dunbar has little to say, despite
the certainty that he had a great deal of material to work with.
He notes that he has already forwarded Orme's account of the
action and implies that he considers it reliable. However, he
also includes some comments probably drawn from St. Clair,
who he states had witnessed the entire battle. For example, he
claims that there had been a suggestion made, and rejected,
that Braddock bring up his detachment before moving against





240 APPENDIX E


the fort. This certainly sounds like Sir John's testimony. Dun-
bar also notes Gage's assertion that he had not seen even one of
the enemy. But perhaps the colonel's most interesting comment
relative to the battle represents his synthesis of various reports:
"The Officers by All Accounts behaved As Well as Men could
and the Soldiers dont seem to think they deserve all that is
Said. That they fought an invisible Enemy is by All Accounts
Certain." Dunbar may not have been inspirational, but he was
more understanding than most.

                        Tom Faucett
  [Andrew Stewart reported Faucett's account in "Was Gen.
Braddock Shot Down by One of His Own Army?", New York
Times, October 19, 1913, sec. 5, p. 5.]

  Faucett's reported testimony revolves entirely around his rea-
sons for, as he claims, having shot Braddock. This point, and
hence the key to assessing his reliability, has been discussed in
Appendix A. Here we may note two other factors which should
aid in determining value. First, Stewart is himself recalling the
testimony of his grandfather, a friend of Faucett's. Second,
Faucett was ninety-nine when he allegedly in 1812 helped a
road crew to unearth Braddock's remains, and then delivered
the singular graveside oration quoted in Appendix A. Three
memories are therefore at work here, any of which may have
failed. It is only because of Faucett's key place in the realm of
Braddock legends that Stewart's version of his testimony is
worth noting.

                      William Johnston
  U. Cook Wilson provides us with this account, under the title
"The Campaign of General Braddock," English Historical Re-
view, 1 (1886), pp. 149-52. The letter containing Johnston's
report is dated Philadelphia, September 23, 1755. It is ad-
dressed only to "Frank," probably a close friend or relative.]






             OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 241
  The writer, an Englishman, provides us with yet more testi-
mony favorable to Orme, for he notes that he is "under great
obligations" to the captain. However, his account does not bear
Orme's imprint, and he seems to have relied on several other
witnesses. The point is not really very important, for this report
contains nothing new, and nothing that could be considered
controversial. Johnston had been left behind with Dunbar's
detachment in order to guard the military chest, and one might
hope for worthwhile information on that section of the army.
Again, however, there is nothing new, though Johnston does
corroborate the testimony of Dunbar and others that the slow
progress of the detachment was primarily due to the weakness
of the horses. Even the account of Dunbar's retreat is standard.
Johnston's report is reliable enough, but particularly in regard
to the battle he has nothing to say that merits our attention.


                      Maryland Gazette
  [This report was printed in no. 533 (July 24, 1755), p. 3,
col. 1.]

  The problem here is that the Gazette prints an amalgam,
based on the testimony contained in a letter from "an Officer in
the Army"-undoubtedly Orme-and on an interview with
"two young Gentleman Volunteers, who went from this Prov-
ince, and who were in the late Action," Joseph Hopkins and
James Calder. Although there is no proof that Hopkins and
Calder actually served in battle, neither is there reason to doubt
it. The real issue is the extent to which their testimony shapes
the Gazette report. To judge, it is necessary to assume that
Orme submitted his standard account. Given this, we note that
the Gazette does not mention the telescoping and implies in-
stead that it was the intensity of the enemy fire that caused
panic. Nor is the description of the onset of battle Orme's. I
know of no case where he attempts to discuss the first firing up
front, yet here we read that as the British "were about to





                   INTRODUCTION      xxv
reports are brief and contain surprisingly little information on
the battle itself.
  Disappointingly, only one French account would merit our
attention if we were to apply the same criteria here that we
have in the case of the English. This is the one by Captain Jean
Daniel Dumas. We are in one sense fortunate, since Dumas
emerged from the affair a hero, and was probably in the best
position to relate the action from his side. But as we might
expect, his report is extremely self-interested, and although
most English accounts are as well, in their case we have enough
material that we can generally cross-check for accuracy. With
Dumas, we return to the problem of self-corroboration. His is
the only French account definitely written by an eyewitness.
One or two others may be firsthand, but we cannot know. It is,
however, certain that most are secondhand at best, and that
some of those who prepared them relied heavily on Dumas's
testimony.
  A survey of the French accounts, other than that of Dumas,
reveals that five of the reporters are known. These are Claude-
Pierre Pecaudy, sieur de Contrecoeur, Michel Alain de Lotbi-
niere, Frantois Pouchot, and one whom we know only as M. de
Godefroy. In addition, we have a fine account passed on to us by a
M. Roucher, and although he may not actually have written it, for
the sake of convenience I shall hereafter refer to it by his name.
None of these five was present at the battle. This we know
through their own testimony. For that matter, Lotbiniere and
Pouchot were both many miles from the scene. We would expect
Contrecoeur to be of particular importance, since he was com-
mandant of Fort Duquesne when the action took place. Unfortu-
nately, it appears that he generally took Dumas's word for what
happened and passed it along to his superiors. On the other
hand, Pouchot in particular is free of Dumas's influence, having
derived his account from the testimony of several Canadians who
had fought Braddock.
   The remaining French accounts are anonymous, and in the
text will be designated "French A, B, and C," respectively.






242 APPENDIX E


ascend a Hill, they were fired upon, from the Top of the Hill,
by a great Number of French and Indians." This could suggest
an attempt to occupy the rising ground, but more probably
involves only the fact that the army was apparently marching
up a slope-"upon the ascent," according to William
Dunbar-when attacked. In any case, this description of the
early fighting suggests that the informant or informants had a
poor perspective and did not realize that Gage had advance
notice of the enemy's presence. One last line is of some inter-
est: "The Officers, with some of the Men, fought gallantly for
about 3 Hours." Orme tends not to note any case of heroism
among the men. That this account does, suggests the influence
of one or both of the Marylanders. But the claim that some of
the troops behaved well is scarcely a revelation, and in fact the
Gazette account as a whole merits only passing interest.

                       John Rutherford
  [Captain Rutherford's letter to his wife, dated "camp on Lau-
rel Hill," July 12, 1755, is printed entire in Historical Magazine,
6 (1862), p. 160. An extract of it is enclosed in a letter from
Goldsbrow Banyar to Johnson in James Sullivan, ed., The
Papers of Sir William Johnson (Albany: University of New York,
1921), 1, p. 712.1

  This is the earliest known account of the battle, first- or
secondhand. It appears for a brief time to have been the
"standard" version, until replaced by the fuller reports of first
Washington and then Orme. Rutherford's account is both brief
and vague. Like so many, he expresses grief over the loss of Sir
Peter Halket, whose death is "regretted by all Mankind." He
also lists some of the other officers killed or wounded, with
Braddock at the time falling into the latter category. Ruther-
ford seems to be particularly upset by reports that the enemy
force had been small: "The Slaughter on our side is surprising
Considering General Braddock had 1500 and I dont believe
the Indians had 300, but they chose a very advantageous






              OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 243
Ground." As for the commander who had left him and his New
York independent company back with Dunbar, Rutherford has
nothing but criticism: "The General told us he would never be
5 miles from us, so that the one Division might support the
other whenever attacked, what made him change his resolution
and order Colo Dunbar to keep us behind with Provisions and
tired waggon Horses God knows, it seems Infatuation, he
thought he had men enough and was vain of his Artillery."
From his tone, it is possible that Rutherford was of the St.
Clair-Halket faction, but there is no real evidence.


                      "Seaman's Journal"
  [There are two basic versions of this account. The longer,
sometimes known as the "Morris Journal" because it was at one
time the property of Rev. Francis-Orpen Morris of Yorkshire,
is printed in Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 366-89. Sar-
gent also provides lengthy extracts from the other version in
footnotes, and Archer Hulbert prints it entire in Braddock's
Road, pp. 83-107. The full title of the former provides some
insight into its contents: "A Journal of the proceedings of the
Seamen (a detachment), ordered by Commodore Keppel to
assist on a late expedition to the Ohio, from the 10th of April,
1755, when they received their first orders from the Army at
Alexandria in Virginia, to the 18th day of August following,
when the remaining part of the Detachment arrived on board
His Majesty's ship 'Garland' at Hampton: with an impartial
account of the action that happened on the banks of the Mo-
nongahela, and the defeat of Major General Braddock on the
9th of July, 1755." The latter version, in its title, proves useful
in dealing with the question, "Whose 'impartial account'?" for
here it is noted that the report of battle is that "related by some
of the Principal Officers that day in the Field." The fact is that
the midshipman who wrote the shorter version of the journal
took ill before the march got underway and was hospitalized on
June 10. This is why he relies on others to describe the battle,





                      244 APPENDIX E
 and why there are no entries in the journal between June 15
 and July 9. Hulbert claims that the fuller version was the work
 of Gordon, who expanded upon the material in the original.
 Although he offers some evidence in support of his view (pp.
 80-82), the respective accounts given in the two versions both
 differ markedly from Gordon's own, the engineer's version be-
 ing unknown in Hulbert's day. I therefore agree with Pargel-
 lis's assertion that the fuller journal and the original "were
 pieced together from various accounts, including perhaps that
 of Gordon himself, after the army's return to Wills Creek"
 (Military Affairs, p. 104, n. 1).]

   More than any other secondhand account, the "Seaman's
Journal" has held the attention of historians. I not only think
this reasonable, but have consistently looked to it as a corrobo-
rative source on various aspects of the battle. It is also useful in
analyzing the campaign as a whole, but I intend to restrict my
remarks to that portion of it which details Braddock's Defeat
itself.
  The account of the battle appears to be a smooth synthesis,
rather than a mere conglomerate of opinions. This has its
unfortunate aspect, in that it is generally impossible to tell
which officer is making a given contribution. Since it has been
suggested that Gordon wrote the expanded version, it is worth
noting the reporter's remark that in regard to the enemy's
numbers, "it was believed that they had at least man for man."
On this point, at least, Gordon is definitely not the source.
Neither is Croghan, nor Washington. The journal in no place
bears the imprint of Orme, St. Clair, or Gage. If one were to
suggest the eyewitness account that the seaman's report most
nearly resembles, particularly in the original version, it would
be that of British A, but even here there are significant differ-
ences. The fairest inference is that both versions are drawn
from the testimony of at least a half-dozen officers, probably
including several subalterns as well as "Principal Officers." It is
quite possible that one or more of the informants did not






             OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 245
himself leave an eyewitness account. But even if we assume
this, it is nevertheless certain that more than one source of
testimony is involved.
  Be that as it may, the end product of the synthesis is contro-
versial on only a few details. The broad sweep of the seaman's
argument is that the battle was lost because the troops pan-
icked; and certainly Orme, Gage, and most of our reporters
would applaud this conclusion. For Braddock himself, the
writer has nothing but praise, and in fact he provides material
on the general's activities during the battle that is not to be
found elsewhere. The commander's death, he claims, was
"greatly lamented by the whole Army." The American troops
receive no individual mention here, which is not surprising,
since the author himself was British. In terms of bias, as well
as content, the two versions of the "Seaman's Journal" do not
differ markedly, and they may be the work of the same au-
thor. But even if not, their common significance is that they
are both syntheses drawn from a considerable number of
firsthand reports, some of which appear not to have come
down to us, and may never have been recorded by the eye-
witnesses themselves. That the seaman's account is a synthesis
adds to its impact on the key question of the troops' behavior,
where it strongly corroborates the testimony of Orme, among
others.


                       Thomas Walker
  [Walker's account is included in a letter from Jasper Yeates
to an unknown addressee, dated Philadelphia, August 21,
1776. The letter is printed entire in Hazard's Register, 6, pp.
104-05, and by Charles I. Landis, in "Jasper Yeates and His
Times," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 46
(1922), pp. 212-14. On Walker, who was commissary general
of the Virginian forces on Braddock's expedition, see Kenneth
H. Tuggle, "Dr. Thomas Walker Bicentennial Celebration," Fil-
son Club, History Quarterly, 24 (1950), pp. 276-79.]





                     246 APPENDIX E
  Yeates's letter again presents us with the problem of who is
giving what testimony. Not one, but two, eyewitnesses are in-
volved, though Walker seems to have been the more important
contributor. Yeates explains that recently he and a party of
friends had visited Braddock's Field. Such a visit had naturally
encouraged reminiscence: "The observations I heard Sir Fran-
cis Halket make of the disasters of that bloody day, and his filial
expressions of affection to the memory of his worthy father, Sir
Peter Halket, rushed to my recollection." The former commis-
sary general was a member of Yeates's party, and spoke his
piece: "My feelings were heightened by the warm and glowing
narration of that day's events by Dr. Walker, who was an eye
witness. He pointed out the ford where the army crossed the
Monongahela (below Turtle creek 800 yds.)." This is the first
and last reference by Yeates to Walker, though it appears that
other aspects of the brief account are drawn from the latter's
testimony, including the description of Braddock's troops
splashing happily across the Monongahela on the morning of
the fatal day. But the overall appraisal of the battle appears to
have been Yeates's, though Walker may have shared or even
encouraged it.
  Yeates is hard on Braddock, more so than any eyewitness
noted in the last appendix, with the possible exception of Brit-
ish B: "My indignation was greatly excited against the com-
mander of the British army, in suffering so many brave men to
perish from an obstinate adherence to European rules of
war. .... The Savages and French had hardly an idea of victory
when they made the attack. Braddock appeared almost to have
courted defeat. Against every remonstrance of Sir Peter Hal-
ket, Major Washington, and others of his officers, he refused to
let a man leave his rank; they fired in platoons against no
object-how very dispiriting to a gallant soldier; they were shot
down in whole ranks. The enemy observing the infatuation of
the General, felt assured of victory, redoubled their exertions,
and fired with such fatal precision as to cause our men to throw
away their guns and run off in the greatest disorder. The





             OTHER BRITISH ACCOUNTS 247
officers in vain attempted to arrest their course-they were
compelled to follow their example."
  Here we have a conclusion not differing greatly from that of
British E; that is, that while the men may have panicked, others
were to blame for mishandling the situation in such a way as to
encourage hysteria. The differences are that Yeates singles out
Braddock as the culprit, with no mention of Orme, and that,
more important, he argues that the general should have used
irregular tactics. His harsh criticism of Braddock, not only as
an individual, but as a proponent of what he takes to be an
outmoded and excessively regimented style of warfare, is rep-
resentative of the sort that was rife throughout the late eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. Needless to say, the fact that
he wrote during the Revolution did nothing to improve the
attitude of the patriotic Yeates toward a British general who
had led many Americans to their death.


                      George Washington
  [The autobiographical notes discussed here were prepared in
1783 for the use of David Humphreys. The notes are printed
entire in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 29, pp. 36-50, the
portion on Braddock's expedition being on pp. 41-44.]

  One point that can be made with certainty in comparing this
account with that included in Washington's letter to Dinwiddie
is that the writer had become much more critical of Braddock
over the years. On the surface, the two versions are similar. In
both, Washington claims that the main cause of defeat was that
the troops panicked. However, virtually every detail he in-
cludes in his memoir that is not in the letter tends toward
Braddock's detriment. First, he states that during the march he
often attempted to persuade the general and his subordinates-
including, presumably, Orme, whom he mentions only in pas-
sing-that they should prepare the men to fight Indian style,
but that because of their overreliance on discipline they had





248 APPENDIX E


rejected his advice. He also asserts that during the battle he had
asked permission, probably Braddock's, "to head the Provin-
cials and engage the enemy in their own way; but the propriety
of it was not seen until it was too late for execution." Like his
earlier letter, Washington's memoir is vague on the precise flow
of events. This makes it difficult to check his accuracy on
details, some of which are included in his notes and nowhere
else. However, it does appear that time had by 1783 clouded
his memory to a noticeable degree. For example, his claim that
the enemy attacked at 10:00 A.M., while the rear guard was still
crossing the river, is clearly incorrect.
  On the whole, Washington held out admirably against the
consensus of his countrymen that Braddock displayed criminal
negligence and incompetence during the battle. But as time
wore on and the tide of hatred did not abate, it is possible that
he weakened and remembered his late commander in a more
critical light than he had at first. Furthermore, he may have
gotten caught up in his own legend, which suggested that he
would have led the provincials to victory over the enemy, had
he not been thwarted by Braddock himself. The account of
1783 is much more in step with the Washington saga than is
that of 1755. The difference does not involve contradiction so
much as elaboration. For this reason, it is difficult to judge the
merits of the later version.







APPENDIX F 'o


               French Accounts


                         Contrecoeur
[CONTRECOEUR'S ACCOUNT is included in a letter to Du-
quesne's successor, the marquis de Vaudreuil, dated Fort Du-
quesne, July 14, 1755. Only an extract remains. It is printed
entire in Pargellis, Military Affairs, pp. 129-32. Francis Park-
man, in Montcalm and Wolfe (Boston, 1884), 2, p. 424, quotes a
portion of the extract and apparently adds punctuation to it.
My translation includes portions of the letter that appear only
in Pargellis, but I am not giving the whole nor the accompany-
ing lists of French casualties and of supplies taken from the
English.]

  Since the start of this month, I had been sending Frenchmen
and Indians to harass the British, whose forces I knew to
number about three thousand. While still thirty or forty
leagues from the fort they prepared to besiege it; their troops
marched constantly on guard, always in a line of battle, so that
all of the efforts. of the detachments were to no avail.
  Finally, hearing always that the troops were coming closer, I
sent le sieur La Parade, an officer, with some Frenchmen and
Indians, in order to learn precisely where they were. The next
day, the 8th, he told me that the English were about eight
leagues from the fort.
  I immediately sent another detachment, which the same day
reported to me that they were not more than six leagues away,
and that they marched in three columns.
  That day still I organized a party to engage them, including
in it all those whom I could spare from the fort. It was com-
                            249





                      250 APPENDIX F
posed of 250 Frenchmen and 650 Indians, totaling nine hun-
dred men. M. de Beaujeu, a captain, commanded them. There
were also two other captains, MM. Dumas and Lignerie, as well
as several subalterns.
  This party marched the 9th at 8:00 in the morning, and at
12:30 found itself in the presence of the English, about three
leagues from the fort. Firing commenced on both sides. Twice
the fire of the enemy artillery caused our party to fall back a
little. M. de Beaujeu was killed by the third volley. M. Dumas
took command, and served with excellence. Our Frenchmen,
sustained by the Indians, despite the enemy artillery, fired at
the English, who were fighting boldly in a line of battle, and
drove them back in their turn. Furthermore, seeing the ardor
of our people, who fought with infinite vigor, they collapsed
entirely, after four hours of intense firing. MM. Dumas and
Lignery, who had only a score of Frenchmen with them, did
not pursue. They returned to the fort, because a large party of
Canadians had unfortunately behaved like children and had
fled at the first fire... . If the enemy had returned with the
thousand fresh troops that they had in reserve some distance to
the rear--we do not know how far-they could have greatly
embarrassed us....
  All of the Indians from Detroit and Michillimakinak left the
day after the action, despite my attempts to stop them. These
Indians, like those who are domiciliated and those of the Belle
Riviere, have done very well. It is necessary to recompense
them.

Commentary

  As I have suggested in the text, Contrecoeur's account, like
several others, appears to draw heavily on Dumas. It is most
useful on the background to the battle and serves as strong
evidence that Contrecoeur knew very little about the English
force, even as it neared the fort. His reference to several bands
of Indians leaving is confirmed by Roucher.






                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 251
                           Dumas
  [On July 24, 1756, Dumas, who had been in command at
Fort Duquesne since September 1755, wrote to Machault, the
minister of the marine. His very lengthy letter was explicitly
written in order to defend himself against his critics and to win
recognition for his achievements. He discussed his administra-
tion of the fort, particularly his success in winning over the
Indians. But the longest single section he dedicated to detailing
his role in Braddock's Defeat. The bulk of this portion is
printed in Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 2, p. 425, while the
whole letter is included by F.-J. Audet, Jean Daniel Dumas: Le
Heros de la Monongahela (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1920), pp.
22-34. The following is my translation.]
  When we learned that the enemy was marching toward us
with a force very much superior to ours, and with a train of
artillery that was quite formidable for a place like this, it was
my remonstrance alone that urged M. de Contrecoeur to send
us to fight them on the road. M. de Courtmanche, who was
present with many others, supported my plea....
  M. de Beaujeu consequently marched, and under his orders
M. Desligneris and I. He attacked the enemy with much daring,
but with his troops in total disorder. We fired our first volley
while they were out of range. The enemy waited until they were
nearer before firing. And in the first moment of combat, one
hundred militiamen--one-half of our French forces-shame-
fully turned tail, shouting "Every man for himself!"...
  This retreat encouraged the enemy to resound with cries of
"Long live the King!," and they advanced quickly toward us.
Their artillery, having been prepared during this time, com-
menced firing. This terrified the Indians, who fled. On the
enemy's third discharge of musketry, M. de Beaujeu was
killed. ....
  It was then, Monseigneur, that by word and gesture I sQught
to rally the few soldiers who remained. I advanced, with an
assurance born of despair. My platoon gave forth with a





                   xxvi INTRODUCTION
They are apparently the work of officers who gathered testi-
mony from associates, and who may not have participated in
the battle themselves. Again, they show the influence of Du-
mas. This seems to be less true of French B, but the author of
this document was definitely not an eyewitness.
  Owing primarily to Dumas's pervasive influence, the French
accounts are much more uniform than are those prepared by
men who marched with Braddock. But if we must not be
misled by such uniformity, neither must we ignore the whole.
The French side is worth telling, and it can be told. Although
most are similar, the French reports do not agree on all points,
and where there are differences, we can be critical. Even when
they do not disagree among themselves, we can check them
against English accounts, always bearing in mind the question
of perspective. In the end, I hope to prove that the "French
side" of the affair was considerably different from that sug-
gested by Dumas.
  In the final analysis, however, the study which follows gives
greater weight to the "English side" of the story. The differ-
ence in the availability of source material certainly encourages
this, but my main reason for focusing on Braddock's forces is
that I feel, as have many during the past two centuries, that this
was a battle lost, rather than won. How could the invaders have
thrown away the great advantages they held in manpower and
weaponry? This is the basic question I hope to answer. The
sources are many and, in sum, detailed and persuasive.





252 APPENDIX F


withering fire that astonished the enemy. It grew impercepti-
bly, and the Indians, seeing that my attack had caused the
enemy to stop shouting, returned to me. Now I sent M. le
chevalier le Borgne and M. de Rocheblave to tell the officers in
charge of the Indians to seize the enemy's flanks. The cannon,
being in front, encouraged this order. The enemy was attacked
on all sides, but fought with an unyielding stubbornness. Entire
ranks fell; all the officers perished. And eventually disorder
spreading from within put the whole to flight.
  The pillage was horrible, on the part of both the French and
the Indians. The wounded officers, all of whom had received
their wounds at the outset, remained without aid. I sent MM.
de Normanville and Saint-Simon to gather the soldiers; all
returned. MM. de Carqueville, Leperade, le Borgne, Mom-
midy, and Hertel were carried off, the first two dying on their
arrival at the fort. It meant a great deal to me to find the body
of M. de Beaujeu. I found it hidden in a gully near the road.

Commentary
  In the text, I suggested on several occasions that Dumas was
a basic source for some and perhaps most of our French re-
porters. We can see this in various details echoed by one or
more of them: that Beaujeu was killed by the third volley; that
the British, as they advanced, shouted "Long live the King!";
that the French and Indians broke, only to be rallied by Du-
mas. Note also that, like him, they leave out details of the
battle, except for the first few minutes of fighting. He may have
felt that, despite the enemy's "unyielding stubbornness," the
outcome was settled early on, and those who relied on him may
have accepted this opinion. But Godefroy's account, which does
not bear traces of Dumas's version, also lacks details of the
action, and one would do better to look for positive signs of the
captain's influence than negative ones. Going beyond this
point, it must be admitted that we cannot always detect
influence. Even French reporters who relied heavily on Dumas
may have gleaned material from other sources as well. There is





                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 253
yet another problem. Returning from the battle, Dumas may
have passed along information that he forgot in the interval
before he wrote to Machault, or that he did not include in his
letter. It can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that certain
reporters borrowed certain points from Dumas. But their ac-
counts may still be useful, as we have already seen in the case of
Contrecoeur. Such usefulness is, however, largely limited to the
respective reports on French preparations.

                          French A
  [Sargent prints this account, History of an Expedition, pp.
409-10. So does J. D. G. Shea, in Relations diverses sur la bataille
de Malangueulk (New York, 1860), pp. 26-29. It is translated by
E. B. O'Callaghan in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of
the State of New York (Albany, 1855-1858), 10, pp. 303-04, but
the translation that follows is my own. There is no indication
when this report was written, or by whom. However, it was
probably contained in a letter to Machault and seems to have
been prepared shortly after the battle.]

  M. de Contrecoeur, captain of infantry, commandant of Fort
Duquesne of the Belle Riviere, having been informed that the
English were arming in Virginia in order to come and attack
him, was told soon afterwards that they were on the march. He
dispatched scouts into the countryside, who advised him faith-
fully of their route. The 7th of this month he was told that
their army was composed of three thousand English troops and
was six leagues from the fort. He used the next day to make
arrangements, and on the 9th he detailed M. de Beaujeu,
seconded by MM. Dumas and de Lignery, all three captains,
with four lieutenants, six ensigns, twenty cadets, one hundred
soldiers, one hundred Canadians, and six hundred Indians,
with orders to lie in ambush in a favorable spot which had been
reconnoitered the night before. Before it had reached this
station, the detachment came into contact with the enemy,





                      254 APPENDIX F
some three miles from the fort. M. de Beaujeu, seeing that his
ambush had failed, decided to attack. This he did with so much
vigor that, although the enemy awaited us in the best possible
order, it was stunned. But when their artillery fired a round,
our company was shaken in its turn. The Indians also, terrified
by the noise of the cannon rather than by the harm it had
done, began to give ground. When M. de Beaujeu was killed,
M. Dumas at once applied himself to reanimating his detach-
ment. He ordered the officers in command of the Indians to
lead them in attacking the enemy's flanks, while he, M. de
Lignery, and the other officers who led the French, attacked
the front. This order was executed so promptly that the enemy,
which had been shouting "Long live the King," now were
occupied with defending themselves. The battle was unyielding
on both sides, and success was long in doubt, but at last the
enemy collapsed. Vainly were commands given in an attempt to
make the retreat an orderly one. The war cries of the Indians,
echoing through the forest, struck terror in the heart of the
enemy. The rout was complete.... Such a success, which no
one had expected, is the fruit of M. Dumas's experience, and of
the activity and valor of those officers under his command.

Commentary
  Although this anonymous reporter occasionally writes in the
first-person plural when referring to Beaujeu's detachment,
this does not indicate that he actually participated in the battle.
I tend to doubt that he did. His account is less individualized
than most. One can graft Contrecoeur's discussion of the back-
ground to the battle onto Dumas's account of the battle itself
and have very nearly the entire basis for French A's report. He
does add a few details, for example, giving a more thorough
breakdown of the French troops than does Contrecoeur. There
are also minor contradictions: Activities that Contrecoeur
claims took place on July 8, French A places a day earlier. In a
portion of this account that I have omitted, French A notes
intelligence reports relative to Dunbar's retreat. This additional






                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 255
news may indicate that the writer was in the garrison, but may
mean only that Contrecoeur or some other officer in a respon-
sible position had kept him abreast of events. Again, it is possi-
ble that French A was an eyewitness to the battle, but his lack of
originality militates against it.

                         French B
  [This account, the most famous of all, is printed in the original
French by both Sargent (History of an Expedition, pp. 411-12),
and Shea (Relations diverses, pp. 17-20). It is entitled "Relation
depuis le depart des trouppes de Quebec, jusqu'au 30 du mois
de Septembre, 1755." The account presented here may leave
some doubt as to whether the anonymous writer actually partici-
pated in the battle. However, the fuller version, printed and
translated in O'Callaghan, Documents, 10, pp. 337-38, reveals
that neither he nor his force was at Fort Duquesne any time
during July 1755. The translation that follows is my own.]

  The enemy had three army corps, one of which was destined
for the Three Rivers where it was defeated. This corps was
three thousand strong and was commanded by General Brau-
dolk. It intended to besiege Fort Duquesne. The troops were
equipped with a great deal of artillery-much more than is
necessary to besiege forts in this region. Most of it was not
needed, although it had cost the King [of England] a great
deal. M de Beaujeu, who was in command of the fort, had been
informed of the march, and although he had very few men, he
had become anxious to prevent the siege; he had therefore
determined to attack the enemy. This he proposed to the
Indians who were with him, but they at first rejected his opin-
ion and said to him: "Father, you want to die and sacrifice us.
The English are more than four thousand, and we are only
eight hundred, yet you wish to attack them. Certainly you must
see that you are making no sense. We ask of you until tomor-
row to make up our minds." They then consulted among them-






256 APPENDIX F


selves, as they always do before marching. The next morning
M. de Beaujeu left his fort with the few troops he had and
asked the Indians for the result of their deliberations. They
answered that they could not march. M. de Beaujeu, who was
kind, affable, and sensible, said to them: "I am determined to
confront the enemy. What-would you let your father go
alone? I am certain to defeat them!" With this, they decided to
follow him. The detachment then was composed of 72 regu-
lars, 146 Canadians, and 637 Indians. The engagement took
place four leagues from the fort, the 9th of July, at 1:00 P.M. M.
de Beaujeu was killed during the first volley. The Indians, who
loved him greatly, avenged his death with all the bravery ima-
ginable. They forced the enemy to take flight after a considera-
ble defeat. This is not extraordinary. Their mode of fighting is
quite different from that of the Europeans, which is worthless
in this region. The enemy formed a line of battle, and made a
front, which allowed those behind the trees to knock over one
or two with each shot.... One can number the enemy casual-
ties at 1,500 men. M. de Braudolk, their general, was killed, as
were many officers.... We have lost three officers, among
them M. de Beaujeu, and twenty-five soldiers, Canadians, and
Indians, with about as many wounded.

Commentary
  Ever since Sparks first used this account as the basis for his
rendering of Beaujeu's dramatic speech, it has been a favorite
among historians. Besides its quotability, various qualities en-
hance its usefulness. It is, first of all, original. There is no trace
of Dumas's influence here-the captain is not even mentioned.
The statistical breakdown of the forces given by French B
parallels Roucher's, but this does not mean that the anonymous
reporter borrowed from him. It is entirely possible that they
had a common source, or that this account, like the "Seaman's
Journal," is a smooth synthesis of several reports. In any case,
the analysis by the writer seems to come from within, rather
than from his sources. He is clearly a proponent of irregular






                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 257
tactics. Moreover, unlike Dumas, who sees Indians as a neces-
sary evil at best, French B openly admires them. Nor are they
only fighting machines to him. They are human beings, capable
of affection and loyalty.

                          French C
  [The French original, designated "Relation officielle, impri-
mee au Louvre," is printed in Shea, Relations diverses, pp. 30-
32. As a portion of a much longer document, it appears in
translation in O'Callaghan, Documents, 10, pp. 381-82. The fol-
lowing translation is mine.]

  The army that had been assembled for action by the Belle
Riviere was composed of regiments of regular troops, which
had been sent from England to Virginia, and of regiments of
militia, which had been formed in that and adjoining colonies.
It totaled three thousand men, at the time when General Brad-
dock took command, and marched against Fort du Quesne.
The sieur de Contrecoeur, captain in the Canadian troops and
commandant of the fort, had been informed of the prepara-
tions being made in Virginia, but he did not expect to be
attacked by such a large force. Having sent different detach-
ments to points along the English route, he learned on July 8
that [they were only six leagues from the fort and that
(O'Callaghan version only)] they marched in three columns. He
immediately formed a detachment of all he could spare from
the fort, in order to engage them. This detachment was com-
posed of 250 Frenchmen and 650 Indians. Sieur de Beaujeu,
who commanded it, had with him the sieurs Dumas and Lig-
neris, and in addition several subalterns. He marched at 8:00
A.M., and by 12:30 he found himself in the presence of the
English, about three leagues from the fort. He attacked them
immediately, with great spirit. The first two volleys from the
enemy artillery caused his small force to fall back a little. On
the third volley, he had the misfortune to be killed, but the





258 APPENDIX F


sieur Dumas, who took command, as well as the sieur de
Ligneris and the other officers-followed by the French and
Indians-fell on the English with such vigor that they forced
them to fall back in their turn. The latter continued to fight
boldly for some time, but finally after four hours of fierce
firing they collapsed, and the rout was general. Our forces
pursued them for some time, but sieur Dumas, having learned
that General Braddock had left some leagues to the rear a
corps of seven hundred men under the orders of Colonel
Dunbar, ordered a halt. The English have lost nearly 1,700
men. Almost all of their officers are dead, including General
Braddock, who died a few days after, from his wounds.
Commentary
  It is obvious that this is primarily a rehash of Contrecoeur's
account, with perhaps some minor embellishments from other
sources. There are occasional discrepancies, most notably in-
volving the numbers of British dead-Contrecoeur presents
the slightly inflated, but much more reasonable, figure of six
hundred. Of course, there is always the possibility that his
report was misread, or that there was some clerical error in the
preparation of the "official account." Although it could be that
Vaudreuil himself is "French C," this is unlikely, since he is
mentioned at several points in the fuller account, always in the
third person. It is entirely possible, however, that the document
in question is a slightly altered version of his report.

                          Godefroy
  [I know of this account only through Shea, who prints it
under the title of "Relation sur l'action... par Mr. de Gode-
froy, officer en garnison au dit fort" (Relations diverses, pp.
9-16). Godefroy includes lengthy lists of casualties and of the
British losses in men and materiel. These should be compared
to Contrecoeur's, which differ slightly. The portion of Gode-
froy's account that I am translating here involves the battle and
its immediate background (pp. 10-12). ]





                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 259
  The 6th [of July], we learned from an Indian of the Five
Nations that the English were on the bank of the Mononga-
hela River. The chevalier de La Perade was detached to
reconnoiter.
  The 7th, he reported that the enemy was near. That same
day, a detachment was prepared to engage.
  The 8th, the Indians wished to delay. But the prudent Nor-
manville brothers persuaded them to reconnoiter, and they
found the enemy at six leagues distance.
  The 9th, the day of the action, M. de Beaujeu left with about
150 Frenchmen, as many officers as cadets, and in addition
regulars, militiamen, and five hundred Indians. He marched at
8:00 A.M. Three hundred of the Indians took a route different
from that of their commander. They crossed the Monongahela
River, so that as it approached the enemy the detachment was
very weak, but as it prepared to strike the three hundred
Indians rejoined the party, and all advanced together on the
attack, which took place at a point about three and one-half
leagues from Fort Duquesne, where the enemy had stopped to
eat. The enemy troops cried out and struck back from high
ground, which was very disadvantageous to us, but although on
three occasions we retreated slightly, it was not more than ten
paces. They had their cannon charged with grapeshot. M. de
Beaujeu was killed on the third volley, and M. Dumas took
command. The Canadians held firm to the front of the enemy
troops, facing their cannon, while the Indians fired on the
opposing army from both flanks. They both did their duty so
well that although the battle lasted until 4:00 P.M. they did not
fall back, and they forced the enemy to abandon their principal
pieces of cannon, which fired more than eighty rounds. The
English numbered two thousand men. They were always in
column, unfortunately for them, for that made them easy to
kill. But when they left the field, they did so in such good order
that they did not seem to retreat, that instead by half-ranks
they wheeled right and left, and regrouped to charge from the
rear.





260 APPENDIX F


Commentary
  Dumas's influence here is very limited, though perhaps it is
manifested in the claim that Beaujeu was killed on the third
volley. Judging from the fact that Godefroy singles out the
Canadians for praise, he may himself have been a native of
New France, or else have been relying primarily on the testi-
mony of Canadian officers and militiamen. This account con-
tains interesting details not found elsewhere-the role of the
Normanvilles in rallying the Indians, the temporary division of
Beaujeu's forces-but the errors contained in it, particularly
that the British were attacked while dining, suggest that one
should not rely on Godefroy too heavily.

                          Lotbiniere
  [Lotbiniere's report appears in a letter to the minister of war,
the Count d'Argenson, dated "Au camp de Carillon," October
24, 1755. Those portions relevant to the battle are printed in
French by Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 412-13, and by
Shea, Relations diverses, pp. 40-44. The entire letter is translated
in O'Callaghan, Documents, 10, pp. 365-68. The following is my
translation.]

  Last autumn, as I had the honor of informing you, the
English began to construct a fort at the foot of the Aliganai
mountains, and named it Fort Cumberland. The fort is 110
miles from ours on the Belle Riviere, according to their esti-
mation. Last winter, two regiments of regular troops, number-
ing five hundred men apiece, departed from Europe under
the command of General Braddock, and they arrived at Alex-
andria in Virginia on February 24. The king had given him
the commission of general of all the forces in North America,
and it was he who was to carry out operations planned at the
court in London, invading this country even as it diverted the
attention of the French court with a thousand propositions of
peace. As soon as he arrived in Virginia, General Braddock





                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 261
began to prepare his campaign, with the intention of march-
ing in early April. He reserved for himself the reduction of
the fort on the Ohio, and took all precautions to assure suc-
cess. However, since he had not been provided for according
to his wishes by the provinces of New England [that is, the
colonies in general] and since he had to wait a long time for
the wagons and other things he lacked to be supplied by
them, he was not able to leave Fort Cumberland until the first
days of June. Our Indians had reported to us during the
winter that the English were making great preparations, but
M. Duquesne, to whom the news was brought, treated it as a
boast and said that it was a flash in the pan. Consequently, he
did not take any of the precautions necessary against such a
general movement. M. de Vaudreuil arrived in the month of
June, and was told that the government was in a marvelous
state. M. Duquesne, who had known that his fort was men-
aced, had sent help there, neglecting totally the other areas.
Aid arrived at the place named, and Contrecoeur, knowing
that the enemy was only three leagues from Fort Duquesne,
sent 891 men, including 250 Frenchmen, the rest Indians,
under the command of M. de Beaujeu, the captain of our
troops. At 11:00 A.M., Beaujeu found himself face to face with
the enemy. He attacked with great vigor, and after five hours
of fighting our detachment succeeded in putting totally to
rout a vanguard of 1,300-odd men, not including wagoners.
General Braddock was among them. His rear guard was about
eight leagues distant and was not attacked.

Commentary
  Although Lotbiniere's comments on the battle are too brief
to be of use, his account is important for two reasons. First, it
epitomizes the anti-Duquesne propaganda that various officials
put out in the wake of the governor general's departure from
New France. Since it was Vaudreuil who spearheaded the cam-
paign, it is possible that he inspired Lotbiniere's attack on
Duquesne. Second, Lotbiniere in his account reveals the extent







Braddock at the Monongahela 4





                     262 APPENDIX F
to which the captured British documents enabled the French to
piece together a history of Braddock's expedition.

                          Pouchot
  [The portion of Pouchot's memoirs that relates to Braddock's
Defeat is reprinted in the original French by Shea, Relations
diverses, pp. 21-25. However, the version I am producing is
taken from Franklin B. Hough's translation, in Memoir Upon the
Late War in North America, Between the French and English, 1755-
60 (Roxbury, Mass., 1860), 1, pp. 39-43.]

  We will give here an account, as received from some Cana-
dian officers who were present, of the order of battle in which
the English were found.
   M. de Contre-coeur being apprised by the Indians, of the
march of a large body of English from Fort Cumberland, who
-were opening the road from day to day as they advanced;-
sent a detachment of two hundred Canadians and colonial
troops, under Captains Beaujeu and Dumas, with several other
officers, having under them Indians of the upper country, and
our domiciliated Indians, to the number of five hundred. This
detachment expected to meet the English at some distance, and
hoped by some surprise or check, to retard their march, rather
than to prevent them from reaching Fort Du Quesne, as the
officers were told that the enemy was in greatly superior force.
  But the latter, confident in their numbers, proposed to come
and form an establishment, feeling assured that it would cost
them little beyond the trouble of showing themselves, and
convinced that they could take the fort in a day. They, how-
ever, marched with great caution, and upon arriving within
three leagues of Fort Du Quesne, they halted after crossing a
little stream near the house of a blacksmith named Frazer, a
German who had settled there to begin his trade with the
Indians, but had left when the French began to occupy upon
the Ohio.





                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 263
  About eleven o'clock in the morning, the English began to
defile over a hill forming a little mountain, with twenty cavalry-
men at the head, ten carpenters, two companies of Halke[t]'s
grenadiers, the seven companies of that regiment, six recent
companies of Virginia troops, three on the right and three on
the left, while the regiment of Dunbar, and its grenadiers
formed the rear guard. Then followed the laborers and twenty
horsemen, forming the column under the orders of General
Braddock. The artillery was in the centre, and the regimental
baggage munitions and provisions were in the rear. All these
equipages were well protected by troops who were ranged by
companies in alternate order.
  The cavalry upon reaching the hill top, having discovered
the French who were marching down a hill, fell back upon the
advance guard, who were distant from them a full musket shot.
  The French, on their part, upon seeing the English, threw
themselves behind trees and began to fire, while the Indians
passed to the right and left of the hill. They were thus exposed
to a fire of musquetry and artillery from the column, and were
not accustomed to hear such loud discharges, but seeing the
French remain firm, and noticing that the fire was not very
destructive, they with their accustomed cries, resumed each a
place behind every tree.
  The English were not expecting this attack, yet they held a
firm aspect, facing to the front and flanks, but seeing that they
covered too much ground, they made a movement to advance,
and returned a very sharp fire, their officers on horseback,
sword in hand, animating their men. After the death of M. de
Beaujeu, who was killed on the first fire, M. Dumas took com-
mand of the French, or rather, they continued each one to do
his best in the place they were in.
  Soon afterward, the English abandoned two pieces of artillery,
and fell back toward the rear of their column, which still pressed
towards the front, to attack, but they lost their cannon one by
one, and were thinned out by the musketry during a space of
five hours. The Indians taking this movement of the column





                     264 APPENDIX F
from the front towards the rear, as a tendency to retreat, rushed
upon them with their tomahawks, as did the French also, when
they disbanded, and a great massacre followed.
  They pursued the English, who threw themselves into the
stream to swim, and many were killed in crossing. They did
not, however, pursue far, because the Indians could not wait to
plunder and drink.... The total loss was estimated at 1,270.
They abandoned their wounded, who mostly perished in the
forest. Of one hundred and sixty officers, only six escaped. ....
  This action, the most important and glorious that the Indians
had ever witnessed, and which was partly won by the accuracy
of their own fire, only cost them eleven killed, and twenty-nine
wounded.
  If on a battle field, with no natural advantage, this event
should happen to brave and well disciplined troops, from not
knowing how to fire steadily, and not being acquainted with the
kind of enemy they had to deal with, it is an impressive lesson
upon these two points. This victory, which was received on the
9th of July, put the whole country in good spirits.

Commentary
  The Canadian officers who reported to Pouchot appear not to
have been anxious to share their triumph with Beaujeu or Du-
mas. Add to this Pouchot's own apparent dislike of Dumas (see
Sargent, History of an Expedition, p.224 n.), and we get an account
that glorifies the French troops and the Indians, rather than
their commanders. Pouchot does not seem to have been very
interested in the preparations for the battle, and perhaps his
informants, anxious to describe their own hour of glory, had
little to say on this score. The writer's account of the disposition
of Braddock's forces is likewise not particularly useful. As re-
gards the battle itself, Pouchot provides the most detailed report
known from the French side. One might wish, however, that he
had more to say about their own disposition. His remarks about
the British behavior are interesting, not because he includes any
material that is both new and reliable, but because he provides
insight into what the French and Indians may have believed they





FRENCH ACCOUNTS 265


were seeing. His reference to a British advance seems to involve
Burton's detachment. On the other hand, his comment that one
section of the army left two pieces of artillery and retreated, only
to be met by the rear, "which still pressed towards the front," is
an apparent reference to the telescoping of forces, and may
suggest that Burton was advancing before the combined van-
guard began its retreat, though this is a tenuous inference. As
for the "very sharp fire" that came from Braddock's troops, we
can be quite certain that the men did fire a great deal, but not for
the most part in an orderly way, and not very effectively. Pou-
chot's statement that the British had suffered "from not know-
ing how to fire steadily" may in fact be his way of saying that,
from what he had heard, Braddock's men fired wildly.

                          Roucher
  [The following is my transcript of a translation of Roucher's
account. The translation is among the Chatham Papers at the
Public Record Office, P.R.O.30/8/98, pt. 1, fols. 1-2. It is in a
polished hand, but some portions are badly worn, and a number
of words are torn off at the margin. I have therefore supple-
mented the manuscript with a French draft which appears in
Rapport de l'archiviste de la province de Quebec, 1932-1933, pp.
307-10. I also used the French version to correct the more im-
portant errors in the English translation, particularly where
names are involved. All material incorporated into the latter is
bracketed. The English manuscript also serves to embellish the
RAPQ text, suggesting that there was originally at least one other
copy in existence. The editor of the French version credits it to
the chevalier de La Pause, but although he may have had a copy
of it among his personal papers, it is doubtful that he was the
author. The P.R.O. document is accompanied by the translation
of a letter from Louis Perrault to M. Pascaud, the French trea-
surer, undated, but on the basis of internal evidence written at
Fort Duquesne a few days after Braddock's Defeat. Perrault
opens by writing that "this is to accompany a Journal which Mr.
Roucher gave me to send to you, at the same time he desired me





266 APPENDIX F


to make his most sincere Compliments & let you know he has a
larger Present to make you-a Copy of a Journal he has and will
keep of all that has past or shall happen with our enemy." Per-
rault's letter suggests Roucher as our most likely author. It is
likely that the P.R.O. version, all of which is printed below, is an
extract from Roucher's first journal. The document reproduced
in the RAPQ is considerably longer and includes material not
related to Braddock's Defeat.]

  Fort Duquesne July 6th 1755
  The Hurons who had been out on the discovery, brought
Advice that the English were within 8 leagues marching briskly
with their Artillery.
  The Chevalier de la Parade an officer; was sent with some
french and Indians to be certain of the discovery the Hurons
had made; but his Guide (who was an Iroquois of the five
Nations settled on the River Ohio) [not wishing] to conduct him
above 3 or 4 leagues, he was obliged to return
  The [Ottawas] and Missillimakinaks, from the falls, who
should have gone in a party that day against the English; were
detained by [the] other Nations to hold a Conference with
Monr: Contrecoeur; at which it was [held] that all the Indians
Nations should march together; and the Expedition was de-
fered till next day.
  Messr: de Contrecoeur & Beaujeu sent Monsr: De la Parade
& Mr: Bailleul with a party of french and Indians on the
discovery by two different Routes.
  We understood at the Return of these Gentlemen, and that
of Mr: Rigoville (out ever since the 28th: of last month with
120 Indians; Hurons and of the Nations from the falls
[Detroit], & 10 french men; in a party against the english) that
they were but 8 Leagues distant that they marched in [a] body
of 3000 Men with a strong train of Artillery.
  Mr. Roctoyade, who had been out with a party of Indians &
french on the same design, informed us that his party had
fixed on the Enemy and had kill'd some of them; but the





FRENCH ACCOUNTS 267


Indians (according to their cruel Custom) had not been able to
scalp them; the English always keeping in good order.
  After all these discoveries which confirm'd one another, to-
gether with the Certainty Mr: Contrecoeur had of the Ap-
proach of the English with a train of Artillery which seemed
considerable, it was resolv'd we should the next day march out
to meet them with all the Indians, only reserving some french
for the Defence of the Fort.
  8th. All the Indian Nations were called together, & invited to
joyne & assist the french to repulse the English who came to
drive them out of that land they were then in possession of.
   Mr. Beaujeu began the Warsong & all the Indian Nations
Immediately joined him except the Poutiawatamis of the Nar-
rows [Detroit], who were silent. Which occasioned all the other
Nations to desire not to march till next day.
  The Chawanons & Iroquois of the five Nations, who [are] all
near Fort Duquesne came to wait on Mr: Contrecoeur & told
him that being informed he was determined to oppose the
English who was very near, they came to joyne him and assist to
repulse them.
   They were genteelly entertained in order to engage the other
 Nations, and not to spin out time, all their demands were granted;
 & in consequence thereof were arm'd & equipt the same day.
   9th. Mr. Beaujeu proposed to march at daybreak, but the
 Indians not being quite ready retarded him. He was oblig'd in
 order to hurry them to advance with the detachment of french
 two Musket Shot from the Fort; from whence he could not
 march till 8 o'Clock, the Indians not having joyned him sooner.
 The Poutiawatamis march'd with the rest.
   Detachment of French & Indians that marcht against the
 English
   3 Captains Vizt. Messrs. Beaujeu, Dumas & Deligney
   4 Lieutenants, Messrs. Courtmanch, La Bourque, Mommidy
       & Carqueville
   6 Ensigns. Messrs. Longueville, La Parade, Bailleul, Cor-
       breare, Bleury; & the Chevr. de [Celeron]





268 APPENDIX F


23 Cadets. Messrs. Pecudy, Courtmanch, Beaulac, St. Cherre,
      Hartell, Cabanac, [Demuy,] Rocheblas, Saquepec, So-
      anna, St. Simon, Labourque, Linctot, the Elder, [and the
      younger], Daillebout, La Framboise, Normanville, Rocto-
      rade, Calaron, Blanville, Monsr. St. Ours & Morandiere
112 [72] Regular Troops
146 Militia
637 Indians
891 Men in all
  At one in the Afternoon we heard from Fort Duquesne [the]
blast of great guns & Musquetry which made us apprehend our
detachment had joined in with the English Army nearer than
they imagined, & that they were ingaged.
  Our Scouts had indeed about that time discovered the En-
glish Army [had called] the Halt (who probably had receiv'd
intelligence of us) & immediately acquainted Monsr. Beaujeu
who was at No very great distance. That Commander directly
advanced with his detachment & was soon engaged with the
English Army; the Indians instantly set up the Warr Cry as is
their Custom, our detachment was posted in the woods, it was
very clear. The English Army which form'd a Coloum of about
15 men in front made a brisk fire from both Artillery and
Musquetry with all the order imaginable, & was answer'd with
the same Vivacity by our detachment who having advanced
under cover of the Woods and the Indians being posted behind
the Trees, attack'd the column of English in front, of whom
they made a great Slaughter.
  The English seeing that the fire of their Musquetry made no
impression on our Detachment, their Artillery was of no more
service, & that our fire did not Slacken; broke their Ranks, which
gave fresh Courage to our detachment, they retreated in good
order, but we did not fail to pursue them for 4 or 5 hours: The
Indians seeing us Masters of the Field of Battle & Artillery
stoped to Scalp, we french then halted by parts return'd to carry
of the wounded, the remainder with some Indians pursued the
English as far as the River Monongahela 3/4 of a League from





                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 269
the Field of Battle, which they had forded that Morning, but
now repast in disorder.
  Messrs. Dumas & Lignery when they march'd home left
Messrs. Courtmanch, Montigny & Bleury to take care of the
Artillery and sent to demand an hand to strengthen the guard
whom Mr. Contrecoeur sent under the command of Monsr.
Godfiore; and Indian frighten'd at the first discharge took flight
and alarmed us in the fort about 4 of the Clock in the afternoon
with an account that french and Indians were defeated.
  But two hours after we learn'd the Victory which our detach-
ment had gain'd over the English; however our joy was mingled
with greif as we understood that Mr. De Beaujeu was kill'd the
third discharge: Mr. Dumas having taken on him the Command,
appeared at the head of the detachment with a real bravery and
encouraged the troops all he could by his Countenance.
  Monsr: Deligney was nothing behind him, several Officers &
Cadets wounded likewise some soldiers & Militia; but could one
gain so compleat a Victory without some loss; the Indians also
have lost men and some wounded.
  The Officers, Cadets, Soldiers, a great part of the Militia &
almost all the Indians fought with an invincible Courage; we
may judge it by the loss of the English which is very Considera-
ble, in spite of their strength and Artillery whose number or
Quantity we are as yet ignorant of. We reckon they were from
1500 to 2000 men, all regular Troops.
  Mr. De la Bourque, Lieutt. Mr. Bailleul Ensign, Messrs. Nor-
manville, Hartell & St. Cerre, Cadets, all wounded march'd on
foot to the fort, Messrs. Carqueville & Laparade were carried,
but Monsr. Carqueville died on his Arrival.
   Mr. Rocheblas Cadet brought in the same evening on horse-
back two [iron] Cohorn morters.
   10th. Monsr. de Courtmanche, who had remain'd all Night to
 guard the Artillery sent to desire Canoes in order to carry them
 off having heard nothing of Mr. Godfiore who having wandered
 in the woods during the Night had not then joyn'd him.
   Monsr. Contrecoeur immediately dispatched 12 Canoes with





                     270 APPENDIX F
six men each Commanded by Mr. de Coleron the elder. Mr.
Laparade died and was buried with Monsr. Carqueville de-
ceased the Night before.
  The greatest part of the Indians who had remained behind
to scalp and plunder arrived with many horses loaded with
spoils of the English consisting of furniture Cloaths, Utensils,
Gold, Silver &c. they brought in but 20 prisoners whereof
Seven Women or Girls where of the Number, but they brought
an infinite Number of Scalps.
  Some Indians afraid that the French would wrong them of
their plunder Spread the Report that the English had rallied &
were on the March to recover their Cannon, Orders were
immediately sent to Mr. De Celeron to halt and send out
parties on the Discovery.
  After a long deliberation, it was determined, that as the
Artillery was the principal subject to hinder the English from
attempting a second Attack this Year, it was absolutely neces-
sary to be Masters of it.
  Captain Dumas offered to conduct that Expedition Mr. de
Lerie (whom Mr. Contrecoeur had prevented going to the
Engagement the day before, by command [that he oversee] the
Artillery & Works,) was given him for a Second with a detach-
ment of 100 french & some Indians to go on the look out.
  Mr. Dumas having rejoyn'd Mr. De Celeron sent some
french & Indians in the Discovery, who reported that the
English were retired having seen nothing but dead bodies for
more than six Leagues from the field of Battle; this news
made our detachment pass the night a great deal more at
their ease.
  The Utowawas, Misillimakinaks & Poutiawatamis at the Nar-
rows demanded leave of Mr. Contrecoeur to return home to
their Wives and Children, having drove the English back a
great way.
  Mr. Contrecoeur, replyed, that they were not so far off, per-
haps, as they Imagined, & that they ought to defer their depar-
ture: but notwithstanding all the Arguments he made use of,
they departed the next day with their horses & a great booty.






                 FRENCH ACCOUNTS 271
  July 11th: At 4 of the Clock this morning a Piece of brass
Cannon of 12 lb. bore was brought here which Messrs. De
Lerie & Dumas had put on board a canoe the preceding Even-
ing. At 3 in the afternoon those Gentlemen return'd, &
brought with them
3 Peices of Brass Cannon of the same bore.
2 Peices of Brass Cannon 6 lb. bore
4 Mortars brass of 7  Inches diameter
the same evening this artillery was brought into the Fort, there
was likewise brought in about 80 head of horned Cattle with
which the Indians made as great Slaughter as they had done
with the English.
  They return'd without the Body of Mr: Beaujeu which they
could riot find altho strongly recommended to them.
  Messrs: de Montigny et Corbrere were sent with Canoes & a
detachment to bring in the Bomb shells, Balls, Granedoes &
powder, & to destroy what they could not bring away.
  Monssr: de Montisembert was also sent with some french &
Indians [to] observe the Retreat of the English.
  A Party of the Missisaque Indians came in this Evening [with
a] Scalp, which they told us was of an Officer belonging to the
English army, [whom] they had found in the morning six
leagues or thereabouts from the field of [battle] And told us
that the Enemy no Longer march'd in Order.
   Messrs. de Montigny & Corbrere returned from the field of
 Battle & brought in their Canoes the Body of Monsr. de Beau-
jeu in a Coffin sent on purpose: He was buried with all the
marks of Honour due to his Bravery.
  These Gentlemen brought with them in their Canoes
  19740 Musquet Cartridges fill'd
    17 Barrels of Powder, each 100 lb:
    192 Bombshells of 43 lb. Weight
    55 Grenadoes of 6  lb.
    175 Twelve pound Balls
    57 Six pound Balls. Shovels &c.
  The French & Indians at the time of Battle have kill'd a
Quantity of Horses, they have kill'd a great many more since,







to, Braddock at the Monongahela %







272 APPENDIX F


broke all the Carts & destroyed every thing they possibly cou'd
Powder & Flower are scatter'd over the Field of Battle the
Indians have brought off a great deal of the last.
  The Bodies of a great number of men kill'd & those of eight
Women or Girls entirely strip'd, lie promiscuously with dead
horses for more than half a League.
  It is assured that the General of the English Army, whom
they called Mr: Braddock is kill'd with the Officers of Artillery
and Engineers; there is all the just appearance that, that army
will not rally again, as the Principal Officers are left on the field
of Battle.
  That Army march'd not to attack a wooden Fort, but the
Strongest fortified in Canada. Without saying too much of it,
one cannot say enough.

Commentary
  In the wake of Braddock's Defeat, both sides sought out
enemy accounts of the battle. One British report used by the
French, translated by them and then put back into English by
Albert J. Edmunds, is in print: "Unpublished Contemporary
Account of Braddock's Defeat," Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography, 20 (1896-1897), pp. 409-11. It is thirdhand,
however, and is not particularly interesting. Certainly the
French cannot have discovered a more important source of
information than the British did in Roucher's account. This is
not only the longest and fullest French narrative of events
pertinent to the battle-it is also in many ways the best. We
have here the most thorough account of French preparations
for the engagement, as well as an excellent discussion of the
salvage operation that took place in its wake. I have printed this
document entire, including the lists of materiel. Similar lists in
Contrecoeur and Godefroy have not been given, since they are
available in print. In any case, the differences among the three
are not dramatic.
  The care for detail that Roucher reveals in his account of the
salvaging is typical of him. He is, in fact, a welcome change






FRENCH ACCOUNTS 273


from the other French reporters, who tend to be vague. As I
have noted in the text, he is more specific in discussing the
Indian forces than is any other contemporary source. Likewise,
he alone identifies the French officers who participated in the
action. His account of the battle, apparently drawn from sev-
eral eyewitness reports, including Dumas's, ranks only behind
Pouchot's in detail. Like all French versions of the affair-and
most of the British ones, for that matter-Roucher's concen-
trates on the first few minutes of fighting, an emphasis that
may cause some confusion. When Roucher refers to "the En-
glish Army" firing "with all the order imaginable," he really
means the advance party, prior to its retreat. This is made clear
in the next paragraph. The French and Indians did not pursue
the retreating army "for 4 or 5 hours." After all, Roucher later
mentions that the chase ended at the Monongahela, which is
correct. What he means in suggesting a lengthy pursuit is that
during the battle, which lasted for "4 to 5 hours"-in reality,
slightly less-the French and Indians kept up the pressure on
the British, who first collapsed into a dense mass and later
retreated.
  Although in his account of the battle, which is, after all,
secondhand, Roucher needs interpretation, he generally stands
as a very reliable source. His reference to certain Indian tribes
having been present stands corroboration, as we have seen. A
point he makes in passing, that the parties of Roctoyade and
Rigoville did not return from their respective missions until
July 7, reconciles perfectly the otherwise incongruous data that,
on the one hand, British sources confirm that Braddock's army
was constantly harassed by parties of French Indians, and that,
on the other, Contrecoeur knew very little about his enemy
until just a few days before the battle. In view of his reliability
and taste for detail, it is highly unfortunate that Roucher was
not himself an eyewitness to the battle.














                                Notes



The following abbreviations are used throughout the notes:

AHR             American Historical Review
AM              Archives of Maryland, ed. William H. Browne
BD              Braddock's Defeat, ed. Charles Hamilton
CR              Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (standard abbre-
                   viation for "Colonial Records")
MA              Military Affairs in North America 1748-1765, ed. Stanley Pargellis
NYCD            Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York,
                   ed. E. B. O'Callaghan
NYHSColls       New-York Historical Society, Collections
PA              Pennsylvania Archives, ed. Samuel Hazard
PH              Pennsylvania History
PMHB            Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
Shirley Corr.   Correspondence of William Shirley, ed. Charles H. Lincoln
Walpole's Corr. Horace Walpole's Correspondence, ed. W.S. Lewis
WHSColls        Wisconsin State Historical Society, Collections
WPHM            Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine


                                  Preface
    1. "Braddock's Defeat," AHR, 41 (January 1936), p. 253.


                 Chapter 1. March to the Monongahela
    1. Regarding the number of troops in Braddock's army and the relative
strength of Britons and Americans, see chap. 3., n. 4. Their uniforms are
described in detail by Franklin T. Nichols, "The Organization of Braddock's
Army," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 4 (1947), pp. 126-27, 133. See
Nichols also for further references on equipment.
    2. The mood of the troops toward the close of their march is entirely the
subject of speculation. On June 30, an officer wrote a letter from camp that was
excerpted in the New York Mercury, no. 154 (July 21, 1755), p. 3, col. 1. In part,
he claimed that "our Men are all in high Spirits, and have Plenty of Provisions."


275







276 NOTES TO PAGES 6-7


At least the second point is doubtful and is, in fact, contradicted by two letters
appearing in the following number of the Mercury, p. 3, col. 1; see also p. 72.
    3. All three basic journals of the expedition give several instances of Indians
attacking those who became separated from the main body. Since only those
sections of the journals dealing with the battle itself are appended to the pres-
ent work, I shall here note page references. On the various Indian attacks prior
to July 6, see "The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman" and "The
Journal of a British Officer," both in Braddock's Defeat, ed. Charles Hamilton
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), pp. 21, 23, 44-45, hereafter
cited as BD. See also "Captain Orme's Journal," appended by Winthrop Sar-
gent to The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755: Under Major-
General Edward Braddock, Pennsylvania Historical Society, Memoirs, 5 (Philadel-
phia, 1856), p. 341. The author of the letter in the Mercury of July 21 also states
that "the Indian Scouts have killed three Batmen, a Waggoner, and one
Horse."
   4. BD, p. 44. This reporter is hereafter called "British A."
   5. Although the journals in note 3, as well as the "Seaman's Journal" (see
Appendix E), provide some insight into the activities of the working party, they
include very little material on road-building during the last three weeks of the
campaign. Some information on the type of work needed to cut a path through
the forest may be found in the brief notes by Mackellar, which he appended to
his map of the route. This map and the notes are reproduced in a plate facing
p. 94 of Military Affairs in North America 1748-1765, ed. Stanley Pargellis (New
York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936), hereafter cited as MA. Pargellis does not
identify the author here, but he does so in his article, "Braddock's Defeat," p.
259, n. 16.
   6. This is a composite account. The authors of all three journals mentioned
in note 3 give considerable space to the incident, including the funeral; and
while they include different details, they do not contradict each other on any
point. See BD, pp. 25-26, 47-48, and Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 350.
British A and Orme both claim that the Indians were mollified by the presents
they received, and indeed Monakatooka himself may have been less concerned
by the death of his son than by the fact that the brave had been shot by an ally
(BD, 48; [William Smith,] A Brief View of the Conduct of Pennsylvania, for the Year
1755 [London, 1756], p. 47 n.). On Monakatooka, who was also known as
Scarrooyady and Half-King, see Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 173, n. 2,
and Wilbur R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry Along the
Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1747-1763, Stanford University Publications in
History, Economics, and Political Science, 6 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1950), p. 90, n. 4. The seven Indians who fought for Braddock, all of
whom survived the battle, are identified by Robert Morris in a speech he
addressed to them and their fellows on August 15, 1755 (CR, 6, p. 524).
    7. On Braddock's intentions, see Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 302, n.







NOTES TO PAGES 7-8 277


1, and Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, ed. John Bigelow (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1927), p. 271. On June 23, Governor Horatio Sharpe informed
the Maryland Assembly that Braddock had told him that after capturing Fort
Duquesne he would make any repairs necessary and garrison it with provincial
troops, before pushing on with his regulars. South Carolina Gazette, no. 1104
(August 14-21, 1755), p. 1, col. 1.
    8. For the troops' crossing, see Cholmley's Batman's account; BD, pp. 7-8.
On initial delays, Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 137-39, provides good
coverage.
   9. On Braddock's past life and career, see Lee McCardell, Ill-Starred General:
Braddock of the Coldstream Guards (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1958); see also Appendix A.
   10. Very little has been written on why Cumberland chose Braddock. McCar-
dell suggests possible motives (Ill-Starred General, p. 124). John Entick, in his
General History of the Late War (London, 1763), implies that the officer was
selected because his "courage and military discipline had recommended him, as
of ability for so great a trust" (1, p. 114). Cumberland had begun his military
career in the Coldstreams and had been acquainted with Braddock for some
time. I feel that the duke chose him because he believed that Braddock, being
both a disciplinarian and an administrator of ability, was capable of organizing
an offensive in America quickly and efficiently. The commander-in-chief had
to do more than simply direct a campaign; he was generally responsible for
placing the colonies on war footing. See Harry M. Ward, "Unite or Die": Intercol-
ony Relations 1690-1763 (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1971), pp. 39-41,
94-95. In addition, he had to whip a rather motley assortment of troops into an
efficient fighting machine.
   11. Braddock's instructions are printed in Sargent, History of an Expedition,
pp. 393-97, and in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New
York, ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, 1855-1858), 6, pp. 920-22, hereafter cited
as NYCD. On the origins of this document and on the planning of the cam-
paign generally, see T. W. Riker, "The Politics Behind Braddock's Expedition,"
AHR, 13 (1908), pp. 742-52; L. H. Gipson, The Great War for Empire: The Years
of Defeat, 1754-1757, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, 6 (New
York: Knopf, 1946), pp. 54-58; and McCardell, Ill-Starred General, pp. 123-30,
132-33. Shirley's proposed strategy for the campaign was similar to Halifax's
(McCardell, p. 127). For Braddock's reaction to the suggestion by Shirley, see
Douglas E. Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in
North America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 355-56.
   12. It is impossible to know how much money Braddock actually had to work
 with, or even how much was allocated by the colonies. Apparently Virginia
 provided Y36,000 for the expedition itself, Pennsylvania .5,000, North Caro-
 lina W8,000, and South Carolina W6,000, while the Maryland legislature re-
 fused to contribute anything (Hayes Baker-Crothers, Virginia and the French and







278 NOTES TO PAGES 8-10


Indian War [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928], p. 78). However,
funds were sometimes granted under different guises; for example, the assem-
bly in Pennsylvania gave .-15,000 "for the king's use" in the campaign (Ward,
"Unite or Die," p. 94). The collection of funds was much hampered by political
in-fighting between the governors and their legislatures, and sometimes be-
tween the two houses of bicameral assemblies; note, for example, Arthur M.
Schlesinger, "Maryland's Share in the Last Colonial War," Maryland Historical
magazine, 7 (1912), pp. 147-48, 248. On the origins of the scheme to provide a
common fund for financing the war, Braddock's advocacy of this plan, and its
failure, see Ward, "Unite or Die," pp. 93-94. Concerning British allocations for
the campaign and army finances in general, see McCardell, Ill-Starred General,
p. 130; Dora M. Clark, "The British Treasury and the Administration of Mili-
tary Affairs in America, 1754--1774," PH, 2 (1935), pp. 197-204; and Stanley
Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1933), chap. 11, esp. pp. 279-92. The most famous incident revealing negli-
gence on the part of Braddock's contractors involves Thomas and Michael
Cresap, father and son (McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 200).
  13. Braddock to Newcastle, March 20, 1755 (MA, p. 80)
  14. Braddock's desperation and anger may be seen in his letter to Sir Tho-
mas Robinson, dated June 5, 1755. A condensed version of the letter is among
the Hardwicke Papers, no. 136, ms. 17; Manuscripts and Archives Division,
New York Public Library, Astor, Lennox and Tilden Foundations: "Govr. of
Virginia [Robert Dinwiddie] upon the credit of .2000 Currency Voted by the
assembly made a Contract for 1100 Beeves to be delivered in July & Augst.
Convoys regulated accordingly-Contractor informed the Genl. that the assem-
bly had refused to fulfill the Governors Engagement & the contract was Void[.]
The Genl. offered to Advance the Money... But the Contractor rejected this
unless the Genl. paid him one third more and postpone the Delivery.... This
Behaviour of the people does not only provide infinite difficulty but also
greatly Encreases the Expences[.] The Charge thereby... is many times more
than double the Original Cost."
  15. Mrs. Conway R. Howard, ed., "Extracts from the Diary of Daniel Fisher,
1755," PMHB, 17 (1893), p. 272.
  16. McCardell gives good coverage to the foraging (Ill-Starred General, pp.
200-03). Orme provides a very detailed account of the beginning of the march
(Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 326-33).
  17. BD, p. 48. On the road, see Appendix A.
  18. D. S. Freeman, George Washington: A Biography (New York: Scribner's,
1948), 2, p. 52; McCardell, Ill-Starred General, pp. 222-23. Reports that enemy
reinforcements were on their way to Fort Duquesne were common and, of
course, true. On July 1, an anonymous correspondent wrote a letter in which
he reported that: " 'Tis said, this morning the general has had advice, that 500
regulars are in full march to the fort, which is the reason he is determined to







NOTES TO PAGES 10-14 279


be there before him [sic]" (South Carolina Gazette, no. 1106 [August
28-September 4, 1755], p. 2, col. 3).
  19. Easily the most detailed account of the composition of Braddock's army
after the division is given by Orme (Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 336).
British A, British B, Duncan Cameron, Thomas Gage, and Harry Gordon (the
most complete, aside from Orme) also provide details; see Appendix D.
  20. On St. Clair's activities relative to Braddock's campaign, see Charles R.
Hildeburn, "Sir John St. Clair, Baronet, Quarter-Master General in America,
1755 to 1767," PMHB, 9 (1885-1886), pp. 2-7. Hildeburn is something of an
apologist for St. Clair and, I think, not a convincing one. At the very least, he
cannot clear Sir John of the charge of shooting from the hip.
  21. This incident is detailed by Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 158-60.
He quotes from the letter containing those portions printed above; the 'entire
text is in CR, 6, pp. 368-69. Sargent also prints Franklin's famous advertise-
ment for wagons, in which the latter makes reference to "Sir John St. Clair, the
Hussar" (pp. 164-66).
  22. However, Braddock did chastise St. Clair for his tirade of April 12 and
relayed Sir John's apologies to Morris (William Shirley [the younger] to Morris,
May 21, 1755, PA, 2, p. 317; and Braddock to Morris, May 24, 1755, CR, 6, p.
400). Still, such a dressing-down was clearly called for and does not suggest
either that the general was growing cool toward St. Clair or that their eventual
split in any way stems from the latter's outburst.
  23. St. Clair claims that his proposal was rejected "with great indignation";
see Appendix D. Orme's account of what happened (Sargent, History of an
Expedition, pp. 346-48) is much more plausible, as far as I am concerned. For
further discussion, see pp. 106-07.
  24. More biographical details on Orme and Washington appear in chapter 3.
On Burton's relationship with Braddock, see McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p.
159. Daniel Dulany, a violent critic of Orme's (see Appendix C), claims that
from the moment Braddock arrived in America, "I heard of young men being
favorites, and of other, whose rank and age and character entitled them to
respect, being in disgrace, and kept at a distance" ("Military and Political Af-
fairs in the Middle Colonies in 1755," ed. John H. B. Latrobe, PMHB, 3 [1879],
p. 13). He is obviously implying that Orme was one of the "young men," and in
fact the captain would have been close, but St. Clair, at least in his own mind,
held great influence over Braddock prior to the march from Wills Creek.
   25. St. Clair's version is in Appendix D; for Orme's, see Sargent, History of an
Expedition, p. 352.
   26. The quotation is from Gordon's journal; see Appendix D.
   27. Edward P. Hamilton breaks down the forces into percentages of composi-
tion, which I have approximated here (The French and Indian Wars [Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962], p. 158). However, he makes the mistake of as-
suming that the men who actually fought under Braddock were divided along







280 NOTES TO PAGES 15-17


the same lines. The make-up of the army that saw action is discussed in chap. 3,
n. 4.
  28. The recruitment of Braddock's forces on both sides of the Atlantic is best
handled by Nichols, "Organization of Braddock's Army," pp. 127-32, 136-39.
See also J. Allen Rogers, "Impressment in Western Pennsylvania, 1755-1759,"
WPHM, 52 (1969), pp. 255-62. A good idea of when and where the American
troops enlisted may be gained from the list of deserters published in the wake
of the battle (Pennsylvania Gazette, no. 1394 [September 11, 1755], p. 1, cols.
1-3). One should avoid the tendency to speak of Braddock's provincial troops
simply as "Virginians," even though the general himself did so on occasion.
  29. On Braddock's early career, see McCardell, Ill-Starred General. There is
some possibility that he had seen action; Sargent believes this (History of an
Expedition, pp. 126-27). However, there is no real evidence to back up such an
assertion, and the material accumulated by McCardell suggests that whenever
British armies were engaged in a major battle, Braddock was elsewhere.
  30. The first two quotations are from letters to Robert Napier, June 8 and
April 19, 1755, respectively (MA, pp. 83, 84). Cameron's entire statement is
included in Appendix C. For the order of June 17, see "Halkett's Orderly
Book," BD, p. 109. Braddock was certainly not alone in his attitude toward
provincial troops; see Peter Wraxall to Henry Fox, September 27, 1755 (MA, p.
141). In his letter to Napier, dated February 9, 1755, St. Clair provides a fairly
balanced review of the independent companies (MA, p. 62).
  31. Freeman gives the best description of The Narrows, as well as a fine
discussion of the difficulties involved had the army attempted to pass through
it and to cross Turtle Creek (George Washington, pp. 62-63). According to
Orme, St. Clair, on returning from reconnaissance, had suggested an alterna-
tive route; it had been found impracticable, but only after St. Clair's efforts
(presumably, the attempts by his working party to make the route passable) had
caused a halt in the march (Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 351-52).
However, it appears from other journals that any delay involved was insig-
nificant, and British A asserts that the march was held up only because the
guides lost their way (BD, p. 48).
  32. The accounts of this consultation are similar, except that Orme alone
claims that the guides told Braddock the two fords "were very shallow, and the
banks not steep" (Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 352). See also St. Clair and
Gordon, in Appendix D.
  33. Letter to his brother, John Augustine Washington, June 28, 1755, in
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), 1, p. 143. St. Clair claims (Appendix
D) that Braddock told him that the plan to divide the forces was his own.
British E discusses the Braddock-Halket feud (MA, pp. 121-22).
  34. The importance of winning over, or winning back, neutral Indians and
"bridling" those tribes loyal to the French is noted several times in Braddock's







NOTES TO PAGES 17-21 281


"secret instructions." On the possibility that he hoped his Indians would fight as
well as scout, see p. 98.
  35. Gist served as the general's guide and on July 4-6 undertook an impor-
tant and dangerous reconnaissance mission. On the whole, little is known of his
activities during the march and battle; he does not appear to have left behind
an account of his experiences. On Croghan, see chap. 3.
  36. Gage himself says this. Cholmley's Batman and Gordon both claim that
he marched at 2:00; see Appendix D. The point is scarcely crucial. It may well
be that while he was supposed to march at 2:00 (Halket's Orderly Book; BD, p.
120), he was delayed.
  37. Quotation drawn from Dr. Thomas Walker's account; see Appendix E.
See also Peyton and British A in Appendix D.
  38. Gordon's quotation; see Appendix D.


                    Chapter 2. The French Prepare
    1. Shirley (the younger) to Morris, June 7, 1755 (PA, 2, p. 347).
    2. There are two excellent and full accounts of Fort Duquesne, both accom-
panied by good sets of references: William A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania
Frontier, 1753-1758 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Com-
mission, 1960), pp. 106-12; and A. P. James and C. M. Stotz, Drums in the Forest
(Pittsburgh: Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, 1958), pp. 128-37.
Although it was the largest in the area, Fort Duquesne was only a fraction of
the size of its successor, Fort Pitt; see Stotz's sketch comparing the two, p. 163.
    3. [John Mitchell,] The Contest in America Between Britain and France (London,
 1757), pp. 182-83, 188. As a botanist who spent more than twenty years in
 North America, Mitchell presumably had visited the Ohio Valley. Moreover, he
 was in contact with many Americans who were interested in the area. See
 Lyman Carrier, "Dr. John Mitchell, Naturalist, Cartographer, and Historian,"
 in American Historical Association, Annual Report (1918), pt. 1, pp. 199-219.
    4. Translated and quoted by Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, p. 113.
    5. There are numerous studies of the French move into the Ohio Valley
and of Washington's Fort Necessity campaign. One lesser-known piece I
recommend, for bibliography as well as content, is Ronald D. Martin,
"Confrontation at the Monongahela: Climax of the French Drive Into the
Upper Ohio Region," PH, 37 (1970), pp. 130-50. On Contrecoeur and
Ward, see Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, pp. 102-04. There is a good
biographical sketch of the French captain by Reuben G. Thwaites, "The
French Regime in Wisconsin-1743-1760," Wisconsin Historical Society, Col-
lections, 18 (1908), p. 49, n. 82. A volume of his correspondence has
appeared, edited by Fernand Grenier (Papiers Contrecoeur et autres documents
concernant le conflit anglo-franfais sur l'Ohio de 1745 a 1756 [Quebec: Presses
Universitaires Laval, 1952]. Hunter, in particular makes good use of it. It







0 ONE 0&


      March to the Monongahela


JULY 6, 1755 An impressive array, this army in the forest.
Perhaps the once resplendent uniforms were soiled and tat-
tered after a month on the march, but still they bore a proud
message to the murky green that echoed out in all directions.
For here came the British, strong in number and weaponry,
their red coats calling up a proud tradition. Among them,
particularly to the head and rear of the column, marched
several hundred Americans, distinct in blue uniforms, but re-
vealing in red trim their loyalty to a distant sovereign.1 Should
their mission succeed, the troops would bring joy to both
shores of the Atlantic, and glory to themselves. For they aimed
to take Fort Duquesne, that citadel overlooking the nexus of
three great rivers, that lynchpin of a network of outposts which
the French had constructed to tighten their hold over the Ohio
Valley.
  And how could this army fail? The men were weary, and
perhaps hungry as well. But they must have known that they
were less than three days' march from their objective. Then a
brief siege, and the prize for which they had sweated and
suffered these long months would be theirs. Or possibly they
would arrive to find the fort abandoned. They had the num-
bers. They had the artillery. They had every reason to hope for
an easy triumph. Perhaps, for all their privations, optimism
lightened their steps.2
  But, deep down, were they uncertain of victory? The forest
had been their enemy these long weeks, yet they knew that
there were those who called it friend. The backwoodsmen who
accompanied the troops had filled them with tales of Indian
horrors, of scalping, torture, ambush. And they knew that the







282 NOTES TO PAGES 22-25


provides some insight into preparations to meet Braddock, but nothing new
on the battle itself.
    6. Translated and quoted by Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, pp. 103-04.
    7. Walter O'Meara, Guns at the Forks (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
 1965), p. 135; Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, p. 115.
    8. Duquesne to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, July 6, 1755 (NYCD, 10, p. 300).
    9. See Martin, "Confrontation," pp. 147-48. Duquesne's role in reinforcing
the fort helps to defend him against the charge of negligence that was leveled
at him by his incompetent successor, Vaudreuil; see Charles W. Dahlinger,
"The Marquis Duquesne, Sieur de Menneville, Founder of the City of Pitts-
burgh," WPHM, 15 (1932), pp. 251-54. It is not known exactly how many
French and Canadian troops occupied the fort on July 9, 1755, but we can
deduce an approximate figure. Between July 30 and August 3, three detach-
ments, totaling 321 men, departed from the fort. Captain Franqois-Marie le
Marchand, sieur de Ligneris, left on July 22, but we do not know how large a
company went with him. These departures left a garrison of 260 (Hunter, Forts
on the Frontier, p. 116). Since it does not appear that any large body of rein-
forcements arrived after July 9, one may infer that the total on that date stood
between six and seven hundred men and officers, depending on the size of
Ligneris's party.
  10. For the accounts by French B, Contrecoeur, and Dumas, see Appendix F.
Burgoyne in 1777 credited Langlade with having planned the ambush (Joseph
Tasse, "Memoir of Charles de Langlade," in WHSColls, 7, p. 133). Several
writers, most flotably John D. G. Shea ("Daniel Hyacinth Mary Lienard de
Beaujeu," PMHB, 8 [1884], p. 124, n. 1), have claimed that Beaujeu had al-
ready succeeded Contrecoeur by July 9. This point has been ably refuted by
Francis-J. Audet, Jean Daniel Dumas: Le Heros de la Monongahela (Montreal: G.
Ducharme, 1920), pp. 65-75. The accounts printed in Appendix F tend to
support him. On Beaujeu, see also the article in the Dictionary of Canadian
Biography, 3 (1741-1770) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
  11. The faultiness of French and Indian reconnaissance is recognized implic-
itly in several of the accounts in Appendix F; see Contrecoeur, Roucher, and
French A, B, and C. There is some danger of self-corroboration here, but it is
insufficient to discredit the conclusion, especially since Contrecoeur himself
obviously wrote on the basis of "inside information."
  12. See Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts, esp. pp. 90, 116-17, 130. Although
on the whole this is a fine work, the author in my opinion exaggerates the role
the French tactics of violence played in winning over the Indians.
  13. One can only estimate the number of Indians present at Fort Duquesne
on July 9, 1755. Our only source is Augustin Grignon, Langlade's grandson,
who relates that "how large a band my grandfather led from the North-West [I
do not know]; but I remember his saying, that when they assembled at Fort Du
Quesne, the total number of French and their Indian allies amounted to not







NOTES TO PAGES 26-28 283


far from fifteen hundred; and my strong impression is, that nearly all the
Indian force was composed of the bands led forth by my grandfather" (Lyman
C. Draper, ed., "Seventy-Two Years' Recollections of Wisonsin," WHSColls, 3
[1857], p. 213). The total of about 1,500 jibes well with the general body of
data, balancing as it does the suggested total of 600 to 700 Frenchmen and
Canadians with the fact that a reported 637 Indians actually fought. Adding
those warriors who remained at the fort for any of various reasons, a total of
800 seems reasonable. In 1748, Indian agent Conrad Weiser estimated that
there were 789 warriors in the Ohio Valley, the Delawares, Senecas, and
Shawnees being most numerous (Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, p. 9).
  14. Draper, "Seventy-Two Years' Reflections," pp. 212-13. Grignon also pro-
vides an account of the battle (pp. 213-15), but in view of the fact that he
related it more than a century after the event I have decided not to append it.
As one might expect, it is grossly inaccurate on some points, but interestingly it
contains a tale also told by Godefroy (see Appendix F): that Braddock's forces
were attacked while they were eating dinner. Perhaps Langlade was a common
source.
  15. Roucher's account is printed in Appendix F. On the Shawnee role, see
Vaudreuil to Machault, August 8, 1756 (NYCD, 10, p. 437). In early 1763, the
Indian trader James Kenny overheard one Delaware tell another that "at Brad-
dock's Defeat there was not One of the Delawares & only four Mingoes & three
Shawanas, all the rest Northrn Indians" (John W. Jordan, ed., "Journal of
James Kenny, 1761-1763," PMHB, 37 [1913], p. 183). Grignon's statement that
almost all of the Indians at Fort Duquesne at the time of the battle were those
who had accompanied Langlade (n. 13) may be somewhat exaggerated, and in
fact Roucher refers to two substantial war parties composed of Indians who
had apparently long been present; but it tends to bear out the point that
"Northrn Indians" were a preponderant majority. Some Delawares, however,
do seem to have fought against Braddock; see chap. 6. Croghan (see Appendix
D), working from rumor, conjectures on the composition of the Indian contin-
gent, but the numbers he suggests are vastly inflated. His opinions are interest-
ing nevertheless, for he had access to exceptionally capable informants.
  16. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts, p. 27.
  17. Shea, "Beaujeu," p. 123. The commands he had earlier held, at Niagara
and, apparently, at Detroit, both called for officers experienced at Indian
diplomacy. That he received the Cross of St. Louis while at Niagara, as well as
his later assignment to replace Contrecoeur, indicates that he was considered
capable.
   18. Godefroy claims that three hundred Indians became separated from the
rest and crossed the river before rejoining the main force. Such an odd twist, if
it actually happened, might well have delayed Beaujeu, although Godefroy
does not claim that it did. In any case, I consider the episode suspect. Godefroy
is not a particularly accurate source (see commentary in Appendix F) and is not







284 NOTES TO PAGES 29-31


corroborated on the point in question. That, for whatever reason, Beaujeu's
troops had not reached the site chosen for ambush at the time they confronted
the English is supported by the fact that they were rushing and out of order
when contact was made (see chap. 4). Historians have generally assumed that
Beaujeu planned to ambush the enemy at the river (Francis Parkman, Montcalm
and Wolfe [Boston, 1884], 1, p. 220; Shea, "Beaujeu," p. 124). I tend to agree,
but in fact the evidence is spotty. Grignon (Draper, "Seventy-Two Years' Recol-
lections," p. 213) asserts that this was indeed the French design, and British B
(see Appendix D) cites a rumor to the same effect.
   19. French B; entire text in Appendix F.
   20. On Beaujeu's receiving communion, see Shea, "Beaujeu," pp. 125, 127.
In a letter to Sir Thomas Robinson, dated November 5, 1755, Shirley noted
this testimony: "The Baron de Dieskau (the French General who was taken
Prisoner at Lake George) in speaking of General Braddock's defeat, said that
none of their (the French) Officers were in the least Surprised at it, as it was a
Maxim with them never to Expose Regulars in the Woods, without a sufficient
Number of Indians and Irregulars for any Attack that might be Expected"
(Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Correspondence of William Shirley [New York: Macmil-
lan, 1912], 2, pp. 319-20, hereafter cited as Shirley Corr.). According to Pou-
chot, the French did not hope to defeat the British through ambush, but only
"to retard their march."
  21. Historians have generally assumed that Contrecoeur was about to sur-
render the fort when Beaujeu persuaded him to make at least one stand, in the
form of an ambush; see, for example, Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 221.
However, Roucher asserts that Contrecoeur retained some of his troops "for
the Defence of the Fort" when he sent out the detachment under Beaujeu.
Indeed, he probably would not have held back such a large contingent had he
not intended to defend the fort. The chances for a successful defense were,
however, reduced by structural defects in the fort; see Hunter, Forts on the
Frontier, pp. 109, 112-13; James and Stotz, Drums in the Forest, pp. 128-37.
  22. The account of the division of weaponry and gunpowder comes from
Colonel James Smith, who was a prisoner at Fort Duquesne at the time of the
battle (Samuel G. Drake, ed., Tragedies of the Wilderness [Boston, 1846], p. 183).
Smith recorded his testimony forty-four years after the event, but the scene as
he describes it suggests a vividness that time would not likely dull.
  23. French B. He may not have included officers. See Roucher, Appendix F.


                   Chapter 3. The Pen and the Sword
    1. Cholmley's Batman claims that the advance party crossed in line of battle,
apparently at Gage's orders. Peyton, on the other hand, suggests that the men
were drawn into battle line only after they had crossed; and by stating that this
order involved the whole army, he implies that it came from Braddock. British







NOTES TO PAGES 31-32 285


B, a violent critic of the general's, writes that Halket and St. Clair persuaded
Braddock to order the army into a line of battle, apparently after the second
crossing, but that he soon took it upon himself to order the men back into a
line of march. Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the reader may assume that
all material from British accounts is printed in Appendix D, from French
accounts, in Appendix F.
   2. McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 246.
   3. Gage himself states this.
   4. The number of men who accompanied Braddock to the Monongahela
has been the subject of much speculation. Pargellis ("Braddock's Defeat," p.
257, n. 14) deduces that there were 1,319 rank and file, including, by infer-
ence, about 250 provincials. Including the officers probably present would
bring the total to about 1,410. Gipson, citing an official list, sets the number
present at the battle at 1,459, including 86 officers (Great War for Empire, p. 96).
Both of these figures may be a bit high. Not a single eyewitness suggests there
were more than 1,300 officers and men, and only Washington, Stewart, and
Stephen note that high a total. British A, British B, Cameron, Furnis, Gage,
and Orme (in his letter to Napier, July 18, 1755, MA, p. 98) all speak of 1,200
men, while Campbell suggests 1,150, and Dunbar and Gordon 1,100. In some
cases, the lower figures do not include officers. The consensus seems to be
1,200, and several who use it were certainly in a position to know. If we add in
the officers and allow for some leeway, we reach a total of 1,300. In the wake of
the Defeat, the numbers in Braddock's army were exaggerated by some
sources, such as the Boston Evening Post, which claimed that the total number of
troops who had faced the enemy was 1,689, including 217 Americans, "besides
Pioneers, Waggoners, Suttlers and Gentlemen's Servants, about 250 killed and
wounded; and out of 54 Women only 4 returned" (no. 1042 [August 18, 1755],
p. 2, col. 1). To our basic figure of 1,300 we may add perhaps 200 who would
likewise have been armed and capable of fighting, chiefly batmen and volun-
teers, and perhaps also pioneers and seamen, as well as smaller groups like
Indians. Some wagoners may have been armed, but as a group they fled during
the battle. Braddock probably had more Americans under his command than is
generally assumed. Despite his order of June 17, his detachments of regulars
could not have been drawn entirely from those who had accompanied him
from Ireland. An epidemic of "bloody flux" (dysentery) had dogged the march
from the beginning, and undoubtedly illness caused many regulars to remain
behind with Dunbar. Cameron's assertion that he was one of "800 old Regulars
pick'd out" for the final march seems reasonable. The shortage of regulars
would have been counterbalanced by the use of American recruits.
    5. Orme, in Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 350. See also Larry G.
Bowman, "Virginia's Use of Blacks in the French and Indian War," WPHM, 53
(1970), pp. 57-63. Bowman argues convincingly that batmen, including blacks,
fought and died in Braddock's Defeat (p. 59).







286 NOTES TO PAGES 33-38


   6. Croghan himself claims that "he had a free sight of the Enemy as they
approached." This suggests that he was up front with the guides, and in any
case, that would have been his natural position. There are several biographies
of Croghan, the finest of which is Albert T. Volwiler's George Croghan and the
Western Movement 1741-1782 (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926). The
pages on Croghan's activities during Braddock's expedition contain some er-
rors; for one thing, Volwiler makes the common mistake of assuming that
Monakatooka and Scarrooyady were two different men. As a check, see Jacobs,
Diplomacy and Indian Gifts, pp. 140-44.
    7. In my analysis of the line of march, I am relying primarily on the two
maps by Mackellar reprinted in Appendix D. A detailed plan of the advance
party, ascribed to Orme but probably also by Mackellar (see Appendix D), is
printed in Sargent, History of an Expedition, facing p. 352, and is the source of
some of my comments on that detachment and on the flanking parties.
    8. There are surprisingly few biographies of Gage. The best is John R.
Alden's General Gage in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1948); pp. 21-31 are relevant to Braddock's expedition. Although generally his
work is excellent, Alden is somewhat too critical of Orme; see Appendix C. He
also tends to take Dulany's favorable remarks on Gage at face value. They may
be sincere, but Dulany was highly antagonistic toward Orme and would have
favored those who criticized the captain in print, as did Gage, at least by
implication, after the battle (see p. 65).
    9. Dunbar died as a major while serving in Canada (Gentleman's Magazine, 58
 [1788], p. 1125). Charles Lee attests to his heroic behavior. See his two letters to
 his sister, Miss Sidney Lee, December 7, [1758], and July 30, [1759], Lee Papers,
 New York Historical Society, Collections, 4 (1871), pp. 18-19.
   10. Duncan Cameron, The Life, Adventures and Surprising Deliverances of Dun-
can Cameron, Private Soldier in the Regiment of Foot, late Sir Peter Halkett's, 3d ed.
(Philadelphia, 1756).
   11. On Cholmley's Batman, see Hamilton's introductory comments, BD, pp.
5-7. His linking of the young servant to Cholmley represents a good job of editing.
I derive my statement that the batman was courageous from his unpretentious
remarks about his own activities during and immediately after the battle.
   12. Sources relative to Gates's career prior to 1760 are scanty. Samuel W.
Patterson, his major biographer, satisfactorily recounts his involvement in the
expedition (Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties [New York: Columbia
University Press, 1941], 12-16). Although there is no reason to doubt its verac-
ity, we should note that the story of Gates's meeting with Newcastle comes only
from Walpole.
   13. The quotation is drawn from St. Clair's eyewitness account. Hildeburn's
account, "Sir John St. Clair," is the fullest. See also Pargellis's sketch in MA, p.
58, n. 1; this volume, incidentally, contains the bulk of St. Clair's printed
correspondence.







NOTES TO PAGES 39-46 287


   14. The best account of Gordon and Mackellar, as well as of their role in
Braddock's army, is George T. Ness, Jr., "The Braddock Expedition, 1755,"
Military Engineer, nos. 339-41 (1959), pp. 20-21, 211-13. That Mackellar was in
the rear of the working party is revealed by Shirley in his letter to Robinson,
Shirley Corr., 2, pp. 320-21. Mackellar's writings are largely in print, including a
journal and several letters by him printed in MA, and his journal of the capture
of Quebec, used as a common source of reference by A. Doughty and G. W.
Parmelee, The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (Quebec:
Dussault and Proulx, 1901). Loudoun valued his services; note the earl's two
letters to Cumberland, November 22, 1756, and October 17, 1757 (MA, pp.
278, 407). Pargellis includes not only much of their correspondence, but fine
biographical sketches of Gordon and Mackellar (MA, pp. 104, n.1, 187, n.1).
   15. On Furnis, see Edward G. Williams, "Treasure Hunt in the Forest,"
WPHM, 44 (1961), pp. 386-88, and William S. Ewing, ed., "An Eyewitness
Account by James Furnis of the Surrender of Fort William Henry, August
1757," New York History, 42 (1961), p. 307. Furnis likely rode with Thomas Ord,
who was in command of the wagon train, as reported by Governor James De
Lancey in a letter to Morris, June 5, 1755 (PA, 2, p. 346).
   16. There is a fine sketch of Stewart by William C. Stewart, "A Study of Some
Stewart and Allied Families," Kentucky Historical Society, Register, 61 (1963),
pp. 80-83.
   17. On the seamen and pioneers, see Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp.
 195-96, British D, and analysis of the "Seaman's Journal" in Appendix E.
   18. The best accounts of Orme are by Sargent (History of an Expedition, p. 283,
n. 1) and Pargellis (MA, p. 98, n. 1). See also Appendix C.
   19. Needless to say, every cradle-to-grave biography of Washington includes
a discussion of his role in Braddock's expedition. Freeman gives easily the
fullest and best account (George Washington, 2, pp. 1-102). Washington's com-
ment about the whistling of bullets is included in his letter to John Augustine
Washington, May 31, 1754, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George
Washington, 1, p. 70. In attending Braddock, Washington was breaking (or
perhaps forgetting) a promise he had made to the French when surrendering
Fort Necessity not to reenter the Ohio Valley for at least one year.
  20. In this discussion of Peyton, I am working on the basis of his purported
account and related correspondence, printed by John Lewis Peyton, in The
Adventures of My Grandfather (London, 1867). Regarding the trustworthiness of
this material, see Appendix C.
  21. The chaplain's account of the battle is anonymous. See Appendix C on
the probability that Hughes was the author. It is not certain that he was with
the main body, but the detachments were specialized, and he would have had
no place among them.
  22. On the whole, my sketch is derived from Mary V. Mish, "General Adam
Stephen, Founder Martinsburg, West Virginia," West Virginia History, 22 (1961),






288 NOTES TO PAGES 47-49


pp. 63-75. The quotations come from his autobiographical notes, "The Ohio
Expedition of 1754," ed. Bunford Samuel, PMHB, 18 (1894-1895), p. 44.
Pargellis ("Braddock's Defeat," p. 256) states that Stephen was in the rear
guard but offers no proof, and there seems to be none. However, the rangers
he captained appear to have been in the rear guard, those of Captains Peyronie
and Waggoner having joined St. Clair in the working party. On the latter point,
note the order of June 27, BD, p. 114. If Stephen's company did indeed serve
in the rear-not certain, but probable-it is fair to assume that he was likewise
there.
  23. Leslie's rank is a matter of some dispute. Sargent designates him a lieute-
nant in the Forty-Fourth (History of an Expedition, p. 360, n. 1); Pargellis, in the
index to MA, lists him as one in the Forty-Eighth (p. 501). Samuel Hazard
refers to him as "Major Leslie" (Register of Pennsylvania, 5, p. 191). A letter
written by the officer himself is endorsed "Capn Leslie" (PA, 2, p. 356), al-
though Sargent says he was not promoted to a captaincy until 1760. Something
of his activities during the Braddock expedition may be gleaned from the letter
noted earlier, which he directed to Morris, as well as from one by the latter to
the Committee of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, May 19, 1755 (ibid., p. 316).
He later served Wolfe in a similar capacity and also reconnoitered for him
(Doughty and Parmelee, Siege of Quebec, 2, pp. 10, 153). On St. Clair's attitude
toward Leslie, note Loudoun to Cumberland, October 2, 1756, MA, p. 234. As
for Campbell, the note that introduces his account refers to him as "one of
General Braddock's Messengers" (CR, 6, p. 481).
  24. My reasons for having positioned British A and C as I have are discussed
in Appendix D. So are my suspicions that British B and C may not actually
have witnessed the battle. My concern is not as great in their cases as in
Peyton's.
  25. Only Stewart and Washington definitely escaped unscathed. On the other
hand, British D, Cameron, Dunbar, Gage, Gates, Gordon, Hughes, Leslie,
Mackellar, Orme, St. Clair, and Stephen are known to have been wounded,
though some just slightly. This information is drawn from their respective
accounts and, where applicable, from the various lists of officers who saw
action. The best of these lists is the one appended to British A's narrative, BD,
pp. 54-58. Hamilton provides cross-references to two other lists.
  26. As regards Furnis, see his second letter to the Board of Ordnance, Oc-
tober 7, 1755, in Williams, "Treasure Hunt," pp. 390-95. Gates is also critical
of Braddock, but there is no way to prove that he was biased previously.
Washington, like Gage, Gordon, and Stephen, claimed that Braddock had
promised him preferment, but the Virginian did so some months after the
battle, by which time he had already decided on a military career (letter to
Loudoun, January 1757, in Fitzpatrick, Writings, 2, p. 18).
  27. Generally, see introductory remarks in Appendix D. Although in the
cases of British A, Dunbar, and Gordon the addressee is not known, they







NOTES TO PAGES 49-51 289


almost certainly realized that their accounts would be forwarded to superiors.
The last even asks that his letter be passed along, while it is probably not
coincidental that the reports of the first two are to be found among the Hard-
wicke Papers. The same may be said of Mackellar and Stephen. Both knew
their accounts would be forwarded, and in fact this helps to explain the polemi-
cal style of the latter.
  28. See citation of Dumas's account in Appendix F. Only the portion of his
letter relevant to the battle is appended. On Dumas personally, see Sargent,
History of an Expedition, p. 224, n. 1. It is probable that he, as well as Contre-
coeur and other French principals in Braddock's Defeat, will receive articles in
the forthcoming volume 4 of the Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Meanwhile,
there is the French biography by Audet.


                Chapter 4. "The Indiens Was Upon Us!"
    1. Peyton suggests the same: "Our treacherous foe could not be seen
through the trees and thick undergrowth." Mackellar, however, backs St. Clair
in his notes accompanying a rough sketch of the area: "The Woods are pretty
open upon the Field of Battle." Freeman reproduces the sketch (George Wash-
ington, 2, between pp. 67 and 68).
    2. On Beaujeu's dress, or lack of it, see "Seaman's Journal" (Sargent, History
of an Expedition, p. 387).
    3. The distance of the battlefield from the river is mooted among the eye-
witnesses. Gage gives the extremely low figure of a quarter-mile, British A,
British B, Dunbar, and Gordon all opt for a half-mile or 800 yards; Cameron
and St. Clair say one mile, and Cholmley's Batman, a mile and a half. By this
they mean the distance marched by the vanguard after completing the second
ford. On the basis of Mackellar, as well as the probable location of the hillock
by which the battle was fought, I feel that the higher figure of one mile is most
reasonable. The line of march itself was clearly more than a half-mile in length,
even if Mackellar is not entirely accurate.
    4. The quotation is from Cholmley's Batman. He would have been on the
scene and appears not to have been biased against Gage. Note that he also
mentions prudent actions Gage had taken earlier in the day, such as drawing
out the cannon for possible use. Dunbar, who was also in the advance party,
confirms that it had left camp that morning with two six-pounders, while Mac-
kellar's first sketch reveals that, at the onset of battle, the cannon were being
pulled along by the working party. The position of the troops relative to the
rising ground is clearly shown by Mackellar, and he is by inference supported
by the mass of evidence. British B refers to a rise on the left as well, and may
possibly be correct, but even if the second rise did exist, it appears not to have
played an important role in the battle.
    5. One o'clock is a compromise figure. It is the one given by Cholmley's






290 NOTES TO PAGES 56-72


Batman and Dunbar. Campbell says noon; British A, between 12:00 and 1:00;
Furnis, 1:30; Stephen and Orme, 2:00.
   6. The same sequence is suggested in the "Seaman's Journal" (Sargent, His-
tory of an Expedition, p. 387); however, the author may simply be relating Gor-
don's or Croghan's testimony. There is a possibility that the Indians acted on
their own.
    7. Jared Sparks, who himself covered every inch of the battlefield, popular-
ized the idea that Braddock's enemies fired from natural trenches. On this
legend and generally for descriptions of the terrain, see Herbert B. Adams,
ed., The Life and Writings of Jared Sparks Comprising Selections from His Journals
and Correspondence (Boston, 1893), 1, pp. 551-52; Hazard, Register of Pennsylva-
nia, 16 (1835), pp. 97-99; and Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 218-20. The
use to which the legend has been put by Braddock's critics is dealt with in
Appendix B. There seems to be some confusion on the question of whether
any of the trenches ran parallel to the road, but the consensus seems to be that
most, if not all, of them cut across it. Mackellar's sketches reveal "a Hollow
Way" which from its location is apparently to be identified with the "remark-
able ravine" described by Sparks. However, Sparks claims that the ravine was
six to ten feet deep. Perhaps erosion had deepened it by his day, but it could
not have been so in 1755, or else the vanguard would never have been able to
get past. Indeed, one apparent reason the legend was so enduring is that
Sparks and most of his contemporaries seem not to have known that the van-
guard had already passed the hill, and hence the defile, before encountering
the enemy. Potter was apparently referring to a different trench (Hermanus
Alricks to Morris, July 22, 1755, PA, 2, p. 383). Note also Morris's letter of July
1755, quoted in Appendix C.
    8. Peyton backs this testimony almost exactly, but the similarity here is actu-
ally one of my main reasons for questioning the authenticity of his account.
    9. Nos. 1388 (July 31), p. 3, col. 1, and 1393 (September 4, 1755), p. 4, col.
3. Dulany also identifies Gage as the author of the advertisement ("Military and
Political Affairs," p. 17).
   10. I have some reservations in treating British B as an eyewitness. See Ap-
pendix D.
   11. This is quoted from Washington's letter to Dinwiddie, which I have ap-
pended. However, note that he gives almost the same account to his mother,
Mary Washington (July 18, 1755, in Fitzpatrick, Writings, 1, p. 151). 'Inciden-
tally, some may wonder why I am bothering to "prove" that the men panicked,
when the point is generally conceded. First, not all consensuses are reliable,
although I agree with this one. Second, as we have seen, not every reporter
suggests that there was panic, though most do. Third, I intend to lean heavily
on the issue of panic in the next chapter and therefore need a firm foundation.
   12. Shirley Corr., 2, p. 312.
   13. British B supports Cholmley's Batman: "The men on that day the battle






NOTES TO PAGES 72-76 291


was fought, [had eaten] little or nothing for two days, and drank only water,
under an excessive hot sun." The weight of evidence, in fact, supports the
argument that the men were short on rations. However, it should be noted
that, according to Halket's Orderly Book, on the evening of July 8 the troops
were supposed to be supplied with provisions, including meat and flour, which
were to sustain them until the 10th (BD, p. 120).
  14. Shirley raises a similar objection during the course of his analysis of the
testimony (Shirley to Robinson, November 5, 1755, Shirley Corr., 2, p. 317).
  15. In his letter to Albemarle, Gage comments that "I can't ascribe their
behaviour to any other cause than the talk of the country people, ever since our
arrival in America--the woodsmen and Indian traders, who were continually
telling the soldiers, that if they attempted to fight Indians in a regular manner,
they would certainly be defeated." However, Gage may have written the "court
findings" himself, so one must beware of self-corroboration in this case; see
Appendix D.
   16. Describing the Battle of Niagara (1759), the editor of the Annual Register
(8th ed., 1810) writes that "the engagement began by a violent and horrid
scream of the enemy's savages, according to their barbarous custom. It was this
scream, perhaps the most horrid sound that can be imagined, which is said to
have struck a panic into the troops of General Braddock, and was one of the
principal causes of that defeat" (p.. 34). Note the parallel impact of the Scottish
war cries (see p. 120).
  17. British A claims that these Americans accompanied Braddock. I have al-
ready suggested that the general himself did not at first ride up, and that in any
case it appears unlikely that the Americans would have been associated with him,
since they were but a small part of the main body. British A may have seen
members of the working party, which was largely composed of provincials, and
mistaken them for troops from the main body. It may be said with greater
certainty that he was confused about time regarding the early stages of the battle.
   18. The view expressed in this paragraph is substantially that of Pargellis,
"Braddock's Defeat," p. 261. I agree that the disordering of the ranks played
some part in causing the panic but feel that he overestimates its impact.
   19. Colonel Dunbar unwittingly contradicts him. Note Appendices D and E.
   20. The scene was not entirely one of chaos and cowardice. We have already
noted the evidence provided by Cholmley's Batman and Leslie to the effect that
some of the men were actually heroic. British D, a writer not often given to
praise, also suggests that at least some of the regulars behaved well. But they
appear to have been exceptional.
  21. On the massing, see Mackellar, Dunbar, Orme, Gage, Gordon, and
Stephen.
  22. Although the implicit dispute is not of earthshaking importance, one may
note that five horses is the apparent consensus and is also the number given by
Cholmley's Batman, who provided several of the mounts for Braddock.















































                                                             allroa

                                                             R IVER                               '".:
                                          A ELA                        ..    ...:

                                                                             1000          0           1000         2000
WEST     MIFFLIN
                                                                                                feet              Delineated by
                                                                                                                  Barbara A. Roby


                                                 Map 1






292 NOTES TO PAGES 77-84


  23. Peyton also singles out Burton.
  24. Shirley, in enclosing the two maps in his letter to Robinson, comments
that they were "approv'd of by the principal Officers in the action" (Shirley
Corr., 2, p. 321). This suggests that they represent a consensus, thus adding to
their value. British E (see Appendix E) asserts that Halket ordered his men to
fire by platoon. Mackellar's second map suggests that, in accordance with Brad-
dock's orders, the rear guard was attempting to guard the baggage.
  25. CR, 6, p. 501. This account meshes well with that of Tom Faucett; see
Appendices A and E. Regarding the Americans' behavior, it appears that the
rangers companies at the front generally stuck together. Those secreting them-
selves were largely or primarily recruits. Although there is no firm proof, all
evidence tends to lead to the conclusion that even before the troops were
divided there had been bad blood between Braddock and Dunbar. Washington
stated this for a fact, but many years after the event (Niles' Register, 14 [1818], p.
179; see also Orme's letter of August 25, Appendix C).
  26. Orme claims that the troops were confined to the road, which was only
twelve feet wide. Mackellar's second sketch, however, appears to support Fur-
nis's assertion that the battlefield was a clearing.
  27. Judging from Mackellar's second map, the British retained control of at
least three of their six field pieces, and according to Godefroy they made much
use of them, though this apparently had little effect. A sixth piece was appar-
ently surrounded by the Indians (Mackellar's second map), but they would not
have used it.
  28. See p. 84 on Burton's attack. Gage may exaggerate the enemy's tendency
to retreat, and the consensus on both sides supports British A's claim that the
Indians "never gave ground." But see chap. 5, n. 40. Whatever British counter-
thrusts there were may have been enough to convince Dumas that he faced a
stubborn foe.
  29. [William Smith,] An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio
Indians (London, 1765), p. 45. Colonel James Smith later recalled a message
received at Fort Duquesne during the battle: "Braddock would certainly be
defeated;... the Indians and French had surrounded him.... and if they did
not take the river, which was the only gap, and make their escape, there would
not be one man left alive before sundown" (Drake, Tragedies of the Wilderness, p.
184). It is noteworthy that the British seem to have retreated only after the
artillery was taken. Perhaps this enemy success convinced them that the day
was indeed lost.
   30. Faucett's account supports this, in the case of Braddock himself. See also
p. 97.
   31. Although there is a possibility that British B was not an eyewitness (Ap-
pendix D), in this case the question is unimportant, for he would nonetheless
have heard the surgeons' reports only in Dunbar's camp.
   32. British A, Cholmley's Batman, and Furnis all claim that the retreat began






NOTES TO PAGES 84-91 293


between 4:00 and 5:00. Campbell is probably somewhat off, fixing on 3:00,
while Dunbar and Stephen opt for 5:00 and 5:30, respectively.
  33. Gage and British A both imply that the wagoners, who included in their
number a young Daniel Boone, fled only toward the close of battle, but circum-
stantial evidence indicates that a sizable proportion had left earlier. The list of
casualties in the Boston Gazette, no. 23 (September 1, 1755), p. 2, col. 3, includes
this appended comment: "What seems most remarkable is, that all the Waggon-
ers ... have returned safe but two." It is remarkable, and I would suggest that,
even though the enemy was undoubtedly centering its fire up ahead, such a low
figure indicates a rapid retreat on the part of many, if not most, wagoners.
Furnis implies an early flight. See also Orme, Peyton.
  34. Most eyewitnesses make no mention of an order being given to retreat,
and several, notably British A, strongly imply that the men simply quit the
field.
  35. Croghan himself confirms the story of the pistols. However, neither he
nor any other eyewitness provides insight into which individuals were responsi-
ble for rescuing Braddock. I would judge that Croghan was probably one, since
he cared enough for the general to stop and attend him. Apparently only
legend credits Stewart (Sargent. History of an Expedition, p. 232; William H.
Lowdermilk, History of Cumberland,... with a History of Braddock's Expedition
[Washington, D.C., 1878], p. 162). Washington, in his autobiographical ac-
count, gives himself the credit for having saved his commander (Fitzpatrick,
Writings, 29, p. 43). The rumor about Orme, which he himself apparently
started, is related by Walpole in a letter to Sir Horace Mann, August 28, 1755
(W. S. Lewis, ed., Horace Walpole's Correspondence [New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1960], 20, p. 495). The various accounts are not contradictory, and all
are plausible. Regarding Braddock's sash, in which he was carried from the
field, see Appendix A.
   36. Ord and Furnis detail the ordnance lost during the battle, and also that
destroyed by Dunbar prior to his retreat (MA, pp. 96-97). Three French ac-
counts provide further information. That by Roucher is appended, but not
those by Contrecoeur and Godefroy. Roucher also provides details on Dumas's
salvage operations. The captain does likewise and discusses his fears that the
British might counterattack, but this is in portions of his letter that are not
appended. Lotbinibre includes in his account information gleaned from Brad-
dock's papers. On the French use of the papers for propaganda, see Guy
Fregault, Canada: The War of the Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (To-
ronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 97. Regarding the general's war
chest, I agree with Williams's assertion that most sources tend to exaggerate the
amount of cash lost ("Treasure Hunt," pp. 395-96).
   37. The accounts of casualties vary considerably; note British A, Dunbar, and
Mackellar. Gipson, citing an official list, states that "of 1,373 non-commissioned
officers and privates, but 459 were neither killed nor wounded; of 86 officers,






294 NOTES TO PAGES 91-94


but 23" (Great War for Empire, p. 96). The Pennsylvania Gazette provides totals of
456 killed, 421 wounded, and 583 safe (Sargent, History of an Expedition, p.
238), while the Boston Evening Post, which I have already suggested exaggerates
in its listing, prints figures of 308, 474, and 707, respectively. The South Caro-
lina Gazette, no. 1104 (August 14-21, 1755) prints the account of one of Brad-
dock's subordinates (p. 2, col. 3; after Stewart's letter). He claims that of 350
wounded, three-quarters were expected to die. Although such a view may have
been pessimistic, in view of the poor hygiene of the day many undoubtedly
died from even minor wounds.
  38. Washington's memoir, in Fitzpatrick, Writings, 29, p. 44.
  39. Roucher claims that they took "20 prisoners whereof Seven Women or
Girls where of the Number."
  40. Drake, Tragedies of the Wilderness, p. 184.
  41. Peter D. Keyser, ed., "Memorials of Colonel Jehu Eyre," PMHB, 3 (1879),
p. 303. After having taken Fort Duquesne, Forbes ordered a detail to bury the
remains of Braddock's men, but perhaps rain had exposed the skeletons.


                          Chapter 5. Retrospect
    1. Letter to Orme; in Fitzpatrick, Writings, 1, p. 154.
    2. On the privates' charges (and Gage's), see chap. 4. Gage had other criti-
cisms as well. More than two decades after the event, he told an interviewer
that "the cause of General Braddock's disaster, is to be attributed, first, to the
Province's disappointing him in the carriages and provisions, they engaged to
furnish by a stated time; by which he was detained several weeks, when other-
wise ready to proceed; and the plan he had concerted with the Governors, to
march with expedition to Fort Duquesne, before the enemies' reinforcements
could arrive, was, by that means, prevented" ("Queries of George Chalmers,
with the Answers of General Gage, in relation to Braddock's Expedition-The
Stamp Act-and Gage's Administration of the Government of Massachusetts
Bay," Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, ser. 4, vol. 4 [1858], p. 368).
At the same time, Gage acknowledged that inexperience in wilderness warfare
had been costly to Braddock's army.
    3. Cumberland was seldom criticized openly, in deference to his rank. How-
ever, the strategy he laid down for the Braddock expedition often was, particu-
larly his decision, originally Newcastle's, to launch the attack from Virginia
instead of Pennyslvania. See Entick, History of the Late War, 1, p. 141; Gentle-
man's Magazine, 25 (1755), p. 389.
    4. Dunbar's retreat has received too little attention, in view of its impact and
the various controversies that surrounded it at the time. See Freeman, George
Washington, pp. 104-06, particularly on Dinwiddie's criticism. The fullest and
most able defense of the colonel's conduct is contained in an anonymous letter
written by one of his subordinates. It appeared in the New York Mercury, no.






NOTES TO PAGES 94-99 295


160 (September 1), p. 2, col. 2; the Boston Gazette, no. 23 (September 8), p. 2,
col. 3; and the Virginia Gazette, no. 247 (October 3, 1755), p. 1, col. 1. The
writer blames the general situation on Braddock.
   5. Not all historians have been antagonistic. See Appendix B.
   6. Shirley's comments are in CR, 6, p. 407. On the anonymous critic, see
Appendix E (quotation from MA, p. 119); and Franklin's Autobiography, p. 271.
    7. Lee's comments are included in a letter to his sister, June 18, [1756],
NYHSColls, 4 (1871), p. 5. Findley recalls Washington's statement in a letter to
Niles' Register, 14 (1818), p. 180. As Findley suggests, the "one person" who
objected to Braddock's tactics may well have been Washington himself.
   8. The break between traditional and modern accounts is discussed further
in Appendix B.
   9. "Major-General Edward Braddock's Orderly Books," p. xxxiv. This tran-
script was published separately in 1880 but was first appended to Lowdermilk's
History of Cumberland. The pagination is identical. It should be noted that the
orderly book does not cover the greater part of the march, and that Halket's,
which does, fails to give much insight into camp discipline. We therefore do not
know whether Braddock became stricter as the march progressed. Among
those accusing him of brutality is Evan Charteris (William Augustus Duke of
Cumberland and the Seven Years' War [London: Hutchinson and Co., 1925], p.
130). Charteris claims that the general's martinetism stamped him as a member
of the "old school," rather than the new, "enlightened" generation exemplified
by Wolfe. But the age factor does not seem to have had much bearing on this
question. Most of the officers under Braddock were young, yet there is consid-
erable evidence that they were far stricter than was the general himself. Ac-
cording to Cameron, on the retreat they constantly whipped the men and on
the whole dealt with them so harshly that he wondered if they had become
barbarized (Life, Adventures, p. 14).
   10. The quotation is from an anonymous letter that first appeared in the
London Evening Post, September 9-11, 1755, and was reprinted by N. D. Davis
in "British Newspaper Accounts of Braddock's Defeat," PMHB, 23 (1899), p.
316. I have assessed British D's claim in chap. 4. On the question of whether
Braddock was shot by one of his own men, see Appendix A.
   11. Autobiography, p. 272. Braddock may have spoken in this manner, but we
should note that Franklin is recalling a conversation which had taken place
more than thirty years before. And note that Braddock had been able to fend
off Indian attacks prior to the Defeat. Most modern historians, including Par-
gellis ("Braddock's Defeat," p. 269), concede that at least prior to July 9, Brad-
dock took all precautions necessary.
   12. Monakatooka made this statement at a council held by Morris on August
22, 1755 (CR, 6, p. 589).
   13. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Manuscript Department, Autograph
Collection of Simon Gratz, case 4, box 6.






296 NOTES TO PAGES 100-105


   14. Braddock's letter to Morris is in PA, 2, p. 290. Croghan's letter, dated
 May 12 and also addressed to the governor, is printed in CR, 6, pp. 374-75.
 For Croghan's statement, see Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 408. Peters
 made his comments during a council held in Philadelphia on June 2, 1755 (CR,
 6, p. 397).
   15. Shingas gave this account in an attempt to justify the Delawares' decision
to side with the French. For the text, see Beverly W. Bond, Jr., ed., "The
Captivity of Charles Stuart 1755-57," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 13
(1926), p. 63. C. A. Weslager notes this version, as well as Croghan's, and
chooses to believe Shingas (The Delaware Indians [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1972], pp. 224-25). Readers may be interested in his reason-
ing. Croghan's comments are printed in Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp.
407-08.
   16. Orme's statement is contained in his journal (Sargent, History of an Expe-
dition, p. 336). On the Iroquois' "ownership" of the Ohio, see Jacobs, Diplo-
macy and Indian Gifts, p. 89, and Hunter, Forts on the Frontier, pp. 15-16. It is
quite possible that, as Croghan suggests, the Delaware chieftains--or at least
Shingas-were already leaning toward the French at the time of the confer-
ence and may even have been committed to them. Twice during the two years
previous, Shingas had responded coldly to British blandishments (Hunter, pp.
27, 56).
   17. On the Glen-Dinwiddie feud and its consequences, see John R. Alden,
John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier (New York: Gordian, 1966), pp.
42-47. There were indeed several reasons why the Iroquois failed to support
Braddock. See Johnson to the Lords of Trade, July 21, 1755, NYCD, 6, p. 963,
and Wraxall's "Thoughts upon the British Indian Interest," ibid., 7, pp. 22-23.
   18. Quoted in Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 54, n. 1. When contempo-
 rary writers speak of "Half-King," they usually mean this man, Tanacharisson,
 though occasionally the reference is to Monakatooka.
   19. For his part, Braddock may have wished that the Indians would be more
 forthcoming with their advice. It is quite possible that they were reluctant to
 reconnoiter; see Orme's comments, ibid., pp. 348-49. Of course, such un-
 willingness may have stemmed from their dislike of Braddock.
   20. Washington's statements are included in his memoir, Fitzpatrick, Writ-
ings, 29, pp. 41-43. In this chapter, I am attempting to handle only what seem
to be the most basic examples of purported advice; other suggestions are men-
tioned in the appended eyewitness accounts.
   21. Pargellis, relying on British E and Mackellar, claims ("Braddock's De-
 feat," pp. 260-63) that the companies were divided by the wagon train as they
 marched, though he at the same time concedes that the Orme map (map 2,
 Appendix D) shows proper platooning. His assertion has drawn able but exces-
 sively violent criticism from Robert L. Yaple in "Braddock's Defeat: The The-
 ories and a Reconsideration," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 46






NOTES TO PAGES 106-109 297


(1968), pp. 199-200. According to Yaple, "Mackellar's map seems so ambi-
guous that it 'can be interpreted' in several fashions." In chapter 3 and else-
where, I have usually relied on Mackellar, rather than Orme, though I have
noted exceptions. My reasoning has been that the Mackellar maps proper seem
to have been drawn to the specifications of various officers and therefore rep-
resent a consensus. But Yaple's point is well taken, and certainly any of our
maps can be pushed too far. Whatever Braddock's marching formation, it does
not seem to have pleased British B. Clearly it was not a "line of battle" as
defined in the text, my own definition being drawn from the entry for "Line"
in A Military Dictionary, 3d ed., rev. (London, 1708). However, to show just how
loosely the term was used in Braddock's day, we may note Contrecoeur's com-
ment that the British marched most of the way from Fort Cumberland "in a
line of battle." What he means is that they were on guard, perhaps in the
fashion Gordon describes-for the march of July 8. What precautions Braddock
took as he marched from the river we do not know; Gordon implies negli-
gence, at least in part the general's. As for the action itself, French B notes,
with implied criticism, that "the enemy formed a line of battle." Again, the
usage is vague.
  22. If St. Clair relayed the opinion of Monakatooka, this comment applies to
the latter as well. But despite any reservations he may have had, it appears that
the sachem fought with courage (Smith, Brief View, p. 47 n.).
  23. On the council of war, see Sargent, History of an Expedition, pp. 346-48.
Regarding the behavior of Dunbar's troops on July 10, see CR, 6, p. 482. The
quotation is drawn from the testimony of Mathew Laird, a wagoner who had
fled and had later been captured. His tale is corroborated by two other wit-
nesses (ibid., pp. 482-84).
  24. Statements such as Washington's were to contribute mightily to the belief
that Braddock's Defeat demonstrated the superiority of both American tactics
and soldiers.
   25. George Washington Parke Custis, Recollections and Private Memoirs of Wash-
ington (New York, 1860), p. 375. The first quotation is drawn from a letter
originally printed in the Public Advertiser (Davis, "British Newspaper Accounts,"
p. 318).
  26. The tendency of the regulars to fire at anything that moved in the forest
is discussed on pp. 82-83.
  27. Concerning the function of the rear guard, see Humphrey Bland, A
Treatise of Military Discipline: In Which is Laid Down and Explained the Duty of the
Officer and Soldier, Through the Several Branches of the Service, 8th ed., rev.
(London, 1759), p. 138. John Schlebecker discusses further the issue of deser-
tion ("Braddock's Defeat," The Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly,
58 [1949], pp. 172, 180-81). Washington's statement is to be found in his
memoir (Fitzpatrick, Writings, 29, p. 43). Since he is recalling an event that
had taken place more than a generation before, one may question his mem-






298 NOTES TO PAGES 110-114


ory. But in this particular case the incident he describes is vivid; the reference
may be to maneuvers by Polson or Peyronie.
  28. Bland makes numerous statements suggesting his desire that the com-
mander be decisive and expect strict obedience. For his own part, he was
extremely authoritarian (see McCardell, Ill-Starred General, p. 117).
  29. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," passim.
  30. The figure of one-quarter mile is given by Furnis and by the author of
the "Seaman's Journal" (Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 385). Both, how-
ever, are rather vague in defining the points whose distance apart they ap-
proximate. Mackellar's first map, which I relied on primarily in determining
distances in chapter 3, indicates that the light horse was about four hundred
yards behind the rear of the working party (not the rear guard of the advance
party), and that the general's guard was perhaps one hundred and fifty yards
farther back. On Braddock's orders to Burton, see p. 63. My differences with
Pargellis, which in no way lessen my respect for him, center on his rejection of
Orme; on this point, see Appendix C. His work suffers also from the limited
number of his sources (no fault of his) and from reliance on an anonymous
secondhand reporter whose account is not generally plausible (see "British E,"
Appendix E). On Pargellis, see also Appendix B. It should be mentioned here
that I am not dealing with all of his criticisms of Braddock, though I feel that
the ones discussed are most central, and that material noted in various contexts
throughout this work serves as a basis for answering some of his remaining
charges.
  31. Bland, Treatise, p. 154. Immediately before making this statement, Bland
comments that "it is impossible to say in what manner he is to act when he
meets with the enemy, without knowing their numbers, quality, and disposi-
tion." This suggests another reason why he emphasizes drill, rather than tactics,
in his treatise: There are fewer variables.
  32. On the tactics Bland proposes, see Treatise, pp. 97, 135-38. The eye-
witnesses most critical of platoon firing are British A and Stephen. On the
wagon train, see p. 39. Pargellis, on the basis of British E's secondhand account
(see appendix E), asserts that the wagons hindered Braddock's formations
("Braddock's Defeat," pp. 261, 263) but no eyewitness supports this claim.
   33. That Braddock should immediately have ordered an attack on the rising
ground is Schlebecker's view ("Braddock's Defeat," p. 178). In fact, it appears
that the general did so, on several occasions (see chap. 4). Sparks argues for
bayonets (Adams, Life and Writings, 2, p. 553). It would be surprising indeed if
Braddock did not order this. The officers of the advance party did so, accord-
ing to Dunbar, but were stymied by the mass panic. Sargent discusses the feint,
but concedes that it would have been a very difficult maneuver (History of an
Expedition, pp. 255-56). He, like many others, is impressed by the success en-
joyed by Bouquet in his famous victory at Bushy Run (August 1763). On that
occasion, Bouquet, after having been surrounded by Indians, used a feint to






NOTES TO PAGES 114-118 299


lure them from the trees, and then put them to rout. Pargellis ("Btraddock's
Defeat," p. 269) claims that such a tactic could evolve only after years of experi-
ence in wilderness warfare, and would have been impossible for. Braddock.
Perhaps more important, Bouquet's men were battle-hardened and kept their
heads, making the feint possible. See O'Meara, Guns at the Forks, pp. 236-44, on
Bushy Run.
  34. O'Meara (Guns at the Forks, p. 145) criticizes Halket for having "managed
to ram his baggage train against the rear of Burton's column." It is true that
Mackellar's second map reveals that the baggage moved ahead at some point
after the battle began, but it is unclear who, if anyone, was responsible for this.
Howard H. Peckham is also critical of Halket, in this case for having, after the
initial collision, "stupidly moved forward and wedged against the desperate
troops" (The Colonial Wars,, 1689-1762 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1964], p. 146). No eyewitness suggests this to have been the case, and Mackellar
goes quite against it. Gipson (Great War for Empire, p. 94) criticizes St. Clair, as
well as Gage, for having failed to occupy the hillock to the right as their
respective detachments first marched past it. But such occupation was primarily
the job of Gage.
   35. Niles'Register, 14 (1818), pp. 179-80. William Findley, who recorded Wash-
ington's conversation, used the president's recollection as the basis for charging
Gage with cowardice. Note that there are two memories at work here. For this
reason, and since we have Washington's own memoir, Findley's account is not
dealt with in Appendix E.
   36. On Gage's failure to occupy the rising ground, or to take along the field
 pieces, see also pp. 50-51. Hamilton likewise criticizes Gage for leaving behind
 the cannon (BD, p. xix). Leach (Arms for Empire, p. 366) and Gipson (Great War
for Empire, p. 94) feel as I do that his decision not to secure the hill constitutes
gross negligence. This is, incidentally, one case where Braddock's weak recon-
naissance undoubtedly hurt, though the battle would probably not have gone
differently had Gage been forewarned to occupy the hill.
   37. Bland's quotation is from Treatise, p. 138. The relevant criticism of Brad-
 dock by Pargellis is in "Braddock's Defeat," p. 264.
   38. The History of the Late War in North-America (London, 1772), pp. 21, 26.
 Bancroft, inspired by Mante, writes that when he first encountered the enemy
 "Gage should, on the moment, and without waiting for orders, have sent
 support to his flanking parties. His indecision lost the day" (History of the
 United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent [Boston, 1852], 4,
 p. 188).
   39. Taking causation back one step further, one can also criticize Cumber-
 land and Newcastle for having directed that Braddock use the route through
 Virginia and Maryland, instead of one through Pennsylvania. This would have
 reduced somewhat the problems of road-building and supply. This error on
 their part was particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that the Pennsylvan-






300 NOTES TO PAGES 119-124


ians appear to have been more cooperative than other provincials, though
undoubtedly the seeming cooperativeness was to a large extent merely a
reflection of Franklin's ingenuity. Some might also feel, as did Shirley, that the
duke was unwise in concentrating on Fort Duquesne and should instead have
ordered a concerted campaign against Fort Niagara. The danger in attacking
Cumberland arid Newcastle is that there is a tendency to go too far. Braddock's
assignment was difficult, and his route ill chosen. But he could easily have
succeeded, if not for the delays he encountered before departing from Wills
Creek and the panic of his men on the battlefield. Indeed, only uncanny good
luck permitted the French to carry the day.
   40. Smith, Historical Account, p. 45. This tendency to retreat makes somewhat
 more plausible Gage's assertion that the enemy gave way whenever the troops
 advanced "even on the most faint attack." Croghan's claim that the attackers
 "intended to dispute every inch of Ground between the river and the Fort" is
 quite plausible, although the product of conjecture or rumor.
   41. J. W. Fortescue notes the impact on the soldiers of the Scottish war cry
and also of the belief that the Scots tortured their prisoners (A History of the
British Army [London: Macmillan, 1910], 2, pp. 141-43).
   42. Wolfe's comments, as well as others critical of officers, are included in a
 letter to his father, September 4, 1755 (Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters of
James Wolfe (London: William Heinemann, 1909), p. 274. More fatalistic are
Mante (History of the Late War, p. 20) and Bland (Treatise, pp. 168-69); the latter
is, of course, not writing in terms of Braddock's Defeat.


                          Chapter 6. "So What?"
    1. Several historians have touched briefly on the question of significance,
 but usually in respect to only one or two points. To my knowledge, only Ness
 ("Braddock Expedition," p. 117) tries a systematic approach, but in keeping
 with the limitations of an article even he provides only a brief list of reasons.
    2. Of course, Braddock's forces had not really been ambushed, although the
 French had planned to use the strategy. Rather, both sides had been surprised
 by the suddenness of the confrontation. It should also be noted that, while
 Americans were by and large more familiar with such strategy than were the
 British, they did not necessarily approve of it. This was particularly true of the
 more refined easterners. Not all Britons were averse to ambush. Thomas Simes
 went so far as to include in his military treatise a section on how to prepare one
 and suggested, among other things, that ambushers bribe the enemy's guides to
 lure them into the trap (The Military Guide for Young Officers [Philadelphia,
 1776], 1, pp. 61-72). However, Simes's amoral approach to ambush was far
 from typical, and furthermore he wrote fully two decades after Braddock's
 Defeat.
    3. The New York Public Library, Em. 2320. One ballad, written by Stephen






NOTES TO PAGES 124-129 301


Tilden, is reprinted in James L. Onderdonk, "Colonial Patriotism in Song,"
American Historical Register, 3 (1895-1896), p. 476. A poem honoring the gen-
eral is in Sargent, History of an Expedition, p. 415.
   4. Edward McCrady, South Carolina Under the Royal Government (New York:
Macmillan, 1900), p. 312. On the Indian attacks and their impact on the
American mentality, see Winfred T. Root, The Relations of Pennsylvania with the
British Government, 1696-1765 (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1912), pp.
304-05; Roger Wolcott to Richard Partridge, January 28, 1756, Connecticut
Historical Society, Collections, 17 (1918), p. 196; and the remarks by Hugh
McAden in The Colonial Records of North Carolina, ed. William L. Saunders
(Raleigh, 1887), 5, p. 1202. The French themselves were in some cases shocked
by the barbarity. See the abstract of an anonymous dispatch (1756) and the
letter from Rev. Claude Godfroy Cocquard to his brother (March [?] 1757),
NYCD, 10, pp. 481, 528.
    5. "Captivity of Charles Stuart," p. 64. This aspect of Shingas's testimony
seems reasonable. The Delaware support for the French prior to Braddock's
Defeat was indeed limited; see chap. 2, n. 16. Shingas and his followers, how-
ever, may have been leaning toward France (chap. 5, n. 18). On the heroic
behavior of the British Indians at Lake George, see Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian
Gifts, pp. 158-59.
    6. Washington's quotation comes from his memoir in Fitzpatrick, Writings,
29, p. 45. The remainder of this paragraph is drawn from Pargellis, Lord
Loudoun, pp. 299-300. Pargellis's discussion of the evolution of tactics, though
brief, is the best of its kind. It falls in an area that requires far greater study
than it has so far received. In passing, it should be noted that in his work on
Lord Loudoun, Pargellis provides easily the fullest and best portrait of the
British Army in North America during the French and Indian War. Perhaps
because the title suggests a mere biography, Lord Loudoun is too seldom
consulted.
    7. Forbes is quoted by Leach, Arms for Empire, p. 440. Also on the rangers,
 whose usefulness varied, see Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, pp. 300-05.
    8. On the colonies' contributions to the war cause in the wake of Braddock's
 Defeat, see Ward, "Unite Or Die," pp. 95-96. Information on the various witch
 hunts may be found in Dinwiddie to Colonel Charles Carter, July 18, 1755, in
 The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, ed. R. A. Brock (Richmond, 1884), 2, p.
 102; Justices to Governor Horatio Sharpe, two letters, one n.d., the other
 October 21, 1755, AM, 31, pp. 80-81; and Howard, "Diary of Daniel Fisher,"
 p. 274. On the anti-Catholic activity in Maryland, see also John W. McGrain,
 Jr., "Priest Neale, His Mass House, and His Successors," Maryland Historical
 Magazine, 62 (1967), esp. pp. 268-73.
    9. Regarding the fall of the Quakers, see Robert L. Davidson, War Comes to
Quaker Pennsylvania 1682-1756 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957),
pp. 158-65, 179-88; and Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experi-





                    Map 1. The Battle Site Today
This is a composite of a map of the battlefield drawn by an eyewitness,
Patrick Mackellar, superimposed over one of present-day Braddock,
Pennsylvania. On the inset, the solid rectangle indicates the area of the
larger map. The explanation is from Mackellar's map. Little remains
today to remind one of the battle. All that can still be seen is the
notorious "rising ground on the right." Today, it is capped by the
tower of radio station WLOA and is known locally as "Matta's Hill."

                       Explanation of Map 1
      British troops (long lines express number of files)
      French and Indians
      Cannon
      Howitzers
      Wagons, carts, and tumbrils
      Provision and baggage horses
a. Position of French and Indians when first spotted by guides
b. Guides and six light horse
c. Vanguard of advance party
d. Advance party commanded by Gage
e. Working party commanded by St. Clair
f. Two six-pound field pieces
g. Carts and wagons with ammunition and tools
h. Rear guard of advance party
i. Light horse
k. Sailors and pioneers
1. Three twelve-pound field pieces
m. General's guard, foot and horse
n. Main body in divisions on flanks of convoy, with cattle,
   provisions, and baggage horse between them and flank guards
o. Twelve-pound field piece in rear of convoy
p. Rear guard
q. Flank guards
r. A hollow way
s. Hill taken by Indians shortly after action began
t. Frazer's Cabin






302 NOTES TO PAGES 130-131


ence (New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 53-62. The quotations are drawn
respectively from CR, 6, p. 734, and Davidson, p. 188. Some might suggest that
Braddock's Defeat was only indirectly responsible for the Quaker abdication,
and even then that its influence was limited. Of course, the fact of war en-
dangered their position, as did pressure from the government on both sides of
the Atlantic. But, as Davidson observes (p. 187), "Strong opposition had not
unseated them before-nor had the threat of war." What tested them, and
finally forced them out, was the Indian situation-not only the raids, but their
own failures in Indian diplomacy. And it seems fair to say that the sad state of
Indian affairs in Pennsylvania stemmed primarily from Braddock's Defeat. On
another point, some would perhaps argue that Pitt's rise was related to the
Battle of the Monongahela.' Certainly the affair helped to discredit Cumber-
land and the Newcastle ministry, but they were weakened much more by events
on the Continent.
  10. Not all of the Washington legends associated with the battle are plausible.
For example, he certainly did not conduct the retreat to Dunbar's camp, al-
though he played an important role in it. Bancroft quotes Halifax (History, 4, p.
190). Washington's quotation is drawn from his letter of July 18, 1755 (Fitzpat-
rick, Writings, 1, p. 152). Craik had been present at the battle but seems not to
have left behind any testimony beyond a tribute to Washington's heroism: "I
expected every moment to see him fall. His duty and situation exposed him to
every danger. Nothing but the superintending care of Providence could have
saved him from the fate of all around him" (quoted, as is Davies, by J. F.
Schroeder, The Life and Times of Washington [New York, 1857], 1, p. 96). On the
chieftain's statement, see Custis, Recollections, pp. 300-05, 375.
   11. On this particular legend, see p. 104. Brown and Butler both confirm it
(John F. Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time
[Philadelphia, 1887], 2, pp. 139-41). Braddock's Defeat raised the age-old
question of the usefulness of a professional army as opposed to a militia. The
debate extended to Britain itself, as might be expected. See letter quoted by
Davis, "British Newspaper Accounts," pp. 327-28.
   12. The letter quoted is from Henry Laurens to James Cowles, August 20,
 1755, reprinted in Ward, "Unite or Die," p. 159. The popularity of the
 provincial soldiers in London circles actually led to some exaggeration of their
 feats, according to Washington; see his letter to Stephen, November 18, 1755,
 in Fitzpatrick, Writings, 1, p.237. Nor were the Virginians alone praised.
 Indeed, as a result of their role in the capture of Fort Beausejour, the New
 England militiamen received equal acclaim. Note the excerpt taken from a
 letter written by an anonymous New Yorker and printed in the Boston Weekly
 News-Letter, no. 2771 (August 14, 1755), p. 3, col. 1, and [Charles Chauncy], A
 Letter to a Friend, Giving a Concise, but Just, Account... of the Ohio Defeat
 (Boston, 1755), pp. 11-12. Newcastle reacted to news of the defeat by
 exclaiming, "Now we must employ Americans to fight Americans." Ligonier







NOTES TO PAGES 132-151 303


had been of this opinion for some time. See Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal
Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1958), pp. 202-03.
   13. Franklin's quotation (Autobiography, p. 274) refers to the retreat, as well as
the battle. On the question of what role Braddock's Defeat played in increasing
American self-reliance, see also Leach, Arms for Empire, pp. 407, n. 44, 506-07.


                  Appendix B. Bibliographical Survey
    1. "Braddock's Defeat," p. 253.
    2. Sparks's account contains offhand references to his sources (Life of Wash-
ington, pp. 62-66). On Watson, Butler, and Billy Brown, see Appendices A and
E. On the question of trenches, see p. 58. Besides French B, the reporters
whose accounts Sparks discovered were probably French A and Lotbiniere,
since it is they to whom Bancroft and Sargent refer. See also version of Brad-
dock's Defeat by Sparks in The Olden Time, ed. Neville B. Craig (Cincinnati,
1876), 1, pp. 126-33.
    3. Among Sparks's admirers were Sargent (History of an Expedition, p. 220, n.
 1) and Craig (Olden Time, 1, p. 126).
    4. Bancroft's account (History, 4, pp. 186-92). He drew his criticism of Gage
 from Mante; see chap. 5, n. 38.
    5. The quotations are from Montcalm and Wolfe, 1, pp. 225 and 198, respec-
 tively. For his characterization of Orme, see p. 210.
    6. Although none is of high quality, the accounts by Hadden and Lowder-
 milk, as well as "From Braddock to Bouquet," Kittochtinny Magazine, 1 (1905),
 pp. 24-35, 123-35, 229-40, are better than most of the material that came out
 during this period. They are otherwise characteristic of it, as is C. de B. Boone,
 "Braddock's Campaign and Its Lessons," The United Service Magazine, n.s., 39
 (1909), pp. 88-93. Boone's work is interesting in that he was a soldier, and a
 Briton, who nonetheless felt that Braddock should have allowed at least his
 American troops to fight Indian style.
    7. Besides his four "finds" noted above, Pargellis discovered the set of
 Mackellar maps at Windsor, Parkman having used that in the Public Record
 Office. Pargellis, incidentally, makes fuller use of maps than does any other
 writer on the battle. In his article, he also deals with the accounts by Orme,
 Washington, and Gage, and notes Leslie's (p. 254, n. 3), but dismisses it as too
 brief. These nine he describes as having been the only eyewitnesses known to
 have come from the British side. He appears not to have heard of Peyton,
 which may be just as well. However, he should have known of British D and
 Croghan-the latter particularly--both of whom had been referred to by Sar-
 gent. More unfortunate, in my opinion, is his decision to use, and rely on, an
 anonymous secondhand account written by British E, one of those in Dunbar's
 detachment; see Appendix E.







304 NOTES TO PAGES 152-156


    8. Although historians since Pargellis's day have tended to claim that Brad-
dock was justified in prohibiting his provincial troops from using Indian-style
tactics, they have done so on different bases. Pargellis himself argues that the
general, in view of his background, cannot be expected to have been familiar
with them, or to have recognized their potential. Gipson feels, as I do, that
those Americans who fought from behinl trees were endangered by the pan-
icky regulars, while Schlebecker insists that forest fighting tactics were simply
inferior. These views are not mutually exclusive.
    9. Quotation, Great War for Empire, p. 84; narrative of battle and analysis,
pp. 94-98. It is through Gipson's excellent bibliographical volume, printed in
1968, that I first learned of British B's account.
   10. Although this appendix deals primarily with Braddock's Defeat, I might
mention that Freeman is an excellent source on the entire campaign. His dis-
cussion of the topography of Braddock's Road (George Washington, pp. 46-47)
is typical of his originality, scholarship, and devotion to detail.
   11. The narrative approach is by no means dead, nor should it be. To my
mind, the most impressive narration of the campaign and battle to have come
out in recent years, strictly from the stylistic point of view, is that by Harrison
Bird, Battle for a Continent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.
45-57. O'Meara's account is also quite readable.


                     Appendix C. Orme's Reliability
    1. The earliest-July 16--and also possibly the fullest, appeared in the Pub-
lic Advertiser, September 20; it is reprinted in Davis, "British Newspaper Ac-
counts," pp. 316-18. The remainder, some brief extracts, others full and in-
cluding lists of casualties, were published in various American newspapers:
Boston Evening Post, no. 1041 (August 11), p. 3, col. 1; Boston Gazette, no. 19
(August 11), p. 1, col. 3; p. 2, col. 2; Boston Weekly News-Letter, no. 2771 (August
14), p. 2, cols. 1-2; New York Mercury, no. 156 (August 4), p. 2, col. 3; p. 3, col.
1; Pennsylvania Gazette, no. 1388 (July 31), p. 3, col. 1; Pennsylvania Journal and
Weekly Advertiser, no. 660 (July 31), p. 2, col. 3; p. 3, col. 1; South Carolina
Gazette, no. 1106 (August 28-September 4), p. 3, col. 3. Although written
anonymously, his letters are easy to recognize, even without the evidence pro-
vided by Gates. They are all very similar to that which Orme wrote to Morris
on July 18 (CR, 6, pp. 487-92).
    2. Besides the letter to Morris, note those to Shirley, Shirley Corr., 2, pp.
207-09; to Sharpe, AM, 6, pp. 252-54; to Napier and to Henry Fox, MA, pp.
98-101; and to Keppel, "Illustrative Documents Descriptive of the Defeat of
Major-General Edward Braddock," American Antiquarian Society, Proceedings,
n.s., 19 (1908), pp. 295-96.
    3. Orme's influence was manifest among writers of his own day as well, such
as Chauncy and Entick.







                  NOTES TO PAGES 157-160            305

   4. CR, 6, p. 496; PA, 4, p. 400.
   5. Dulany, "Military and Political Affairs," pp. 20-21. Nor did all Britons
accept Orme's account. In a letter to her brother, dated August 23, 1755,
Elizabeth Anson, wife of the admiral, summarizes the respective versions of
Orme and Washington, both of which had just arrived with Keppel. She con-
cludes, "I really hardly know what I write, I believe with as much confusion as
our People in America are in, by an endeavour to melt the two accounts into
one; but Washington's is much the plainest, some having guarded his, & made
no distinction between the behaviour of English and Americans, & slurred the
whole a little, not to offend" (British Museum, Add. 35,376, fol. 127). But she
seems to have been exceptional, and was in any case writing before Orme
returned to England bearing further information.
   6. Orme's letter dated March 2, 1756; in Letters to Washington and Accompany-
ing Papers, ed. Stanislaus M. Hamilton (Boston, 1898), 1, p. 199. On his mar-
riage, note Walpole's Corr., 20, p. 495, n. 5.
   7. "Braddock's Defeat," p. 267.
   8. Letters to Washington, 1, p. 83.















                       Bibliography



                          Archival References

British Museum, London
    Additional
Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California
    Loudoun Papers
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
    Autograph Collection of Simon Gratz
    Historical Collections
    Peters Papers
New York Public Library
    Emmet Collection
    Hardwicke Papers
Public Record Office, London
    Chatham Papers



                       Newspapers and Journals

  Annual Register, 1759
  Boston Evening Post, 1755
  Boston Gazette, 1755
  Boston Weekly News-Letter, 1755
  Gentleman's Magazine, 1755, 1788
  Historical Magazine, 1862, 1867
  Maryland Gazette, 1755
  New York Mercury, 1755
  New York Times, 1913
  Niles' Register, 1818
  Pennsylvania Gazette, 1755
  Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 1849
  South Carolina Gazette, 1755
  Virginia Gazette, 1755

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6 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


French had "their" Indians out observing the march, skulking
in the foliage, flitting from tree to tree, but invisible except for
the briefest of glimpses. All-seeing, but themselves unseen, they
sometimes reached out, snatching up an unwary straggler. The
claws of the forest.3 True, one of their own Indians had
claimed that five of his French counterparts had been terrified
at the mere sight of the approaching army, with its wealth of
artillery.4 The officers knew this, and possibly the men did as
well. But still there were daily signs of the Indian menace. The
forest was all around, shielding its Indians, imprisoning the
marchers. Far ahead, and out of sight, a working party hacked
away at the stubborn green foe, allowing the column to inch
ahead.5 And yet all knew that the enemy whose branches
clutched at them would fight to the last. Perhaps, too, its claws
would strike out once again, this time intent on a larger prey.
  Suddenly, the sound of gunfire froze the men in their tracks.
A small band of Indians had ambushed the rear, killing three.
Without hesitation, a company of grenadiers marched to the
scene and fired a volley, even as the attackers were melting into
the woods. The moments passed, the march continued. But
soon another round of gunfire crackled from the forest, this
time along the right flank. Now confusion and panic spread
among the troops. Some out-rangers fired at the enemy, but
again it had disappeared. A few warriors who had accompa-
nied the march set out in pursuit, but their maneuver merely
confused the out-rangers, who were, as experience dictated,
wary of all Indians. They fired into the forest, to be answered
only by the shouts of the Indian allies, who were returning
after an unsuccessful search. On orders, the warriors per-
formed a ritualized countersign, holding up a bough and
grounding their arms, thereby signaling that they were of the
British party. But the rangers were edgy, perhaps did not see,
certainly did not understand. They fired again, killing one
brave-a son of Monakatooka, the Oneida sachem whose small
company represented the only Indian aid the British had.
  That night, the warrior was buried. All officers were ordered







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Riker, T. W. "The Politics Behind Braddock's Expedition." American Historical
    Review, 13 (1908), pp. 742-52.
Ritenour, John S. Old Tom Fossit. Pittsburgh: J. R. Weldin Co., 1926.
Rogers, J. Allen. "Impressment in Western Pennsylvania, 1755-1759." Western
    Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 52 (1969), pp. 255-62.
Root, Winfred T. The Relations of Pennsylvania with the British Government,
    1696-1765. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1912.
Sargent, Winthrop. The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755:
    Under Major-General Edward Braddock. Pennsylvania Historical Society,
    Memoirs, 5. Philadelphia, 1855.
Schlebecker, John. "Braddock's Defeat." The Ohio State Archaeological and His-
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    Magazine of History and Biography, 8 (1884), pp. 121-28.
Sparks, Jared. The Life of George Washington. First published in 1839. Boston,
    1855.
Stewart, Andrew. "Was Gen. Braddock Shot Down by One of His Own Army?"
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    Society, Collections, 7 (1876), pp. 123-87.
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    1900.
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                              Index



Note: The appendices are indexed only for names; portions of appended
documents mentioned in the text are noted here only in terms of their textual
reference.


Advance party: van of, 33; composi-
  tion of, 33-37; rear guard of, 39;
  fires on French, 51-52; panic
  spreads in, 59-60; falls back, 60-
  61; collides with working party, 61;
  mentioned, 18, 31. See also Gage,
  Thomas
Allison, Robert, 138
Americans: apathetic to expedition,
  8; Braddock's attitude toward, 8, 9;
  influence of Braddock's Defeat on,
  123-24, 129-32, 302n12; mone-
  tary contributions of, to campaign,
  277n12
-in Braddock's army: background
  of, 15, 78; resist discipline, 15, 96,
  97; spread panic, 72-73; fight In-
  dian style, 78; berated by Brad-
  dock, 78-79; success of, in battle,
  107-08
Anson, Elizabeth, 305n5
Army, British: uniforms of, 3; morale
  of, 3, 6, 18, 72, 275-76n2; fear of
  Indians of, 3, 6, 72-73; composi-
  tion of, 3, 14, 15, 31-32, 285n4;
  quality of recruits in, 14, 106-07,
  120; order of march of, 31-46 pas-
  sim; effects of discipline on, 96-98;
  finances of, 277n12
-in battle: attempts to advance, 80-
  81; wild barrage of, 82-83, 108-
  09; flees field, 84-87; material
  losses of, 90; casualties in, 91,
  293n37. See also Panic; Tactics


Army, French: confident of victory,
  29, 284n20; composition of, 30,
  282n9
-in battle: momentary panic of, 52-
  57' fights from behind trees, 58-
  59; fails to pursue British, 87-89;
  casualties of, 88

Bailleul, Francois Pierrot de, 266,
  267,'269
Batman, Cholmley's.-See Cholmley's
  Batman
Batmen, 32, 285n5
Beaujeu, Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie
  Lienard de: to replace Contrecoeur,
  22; as possible planner of ambush,
  22, 24; attempts to persuade Indi-
  ans, 27-29; expects victory, 29;
  races toward river, 50; reacts to ap-
  pearance of British, 51-52; killed,
  52; background of, 283n17; men-
  tioned, 56, 142, 250-71 passim
Bellamy, George Anne, 135-36
Blacks, 127, 285n5
Bland, Humphrey: rationale of judg-
  ing Braddock by, 111-12; quoted,
  112, 115; implied criticism of Brad-
  dock by, 113
Bleury, Ensign, 267, 269
Bolling, John, 138
Boone, Daniel, 293n33
Bougainville, Louis-Antoine de, 21
Bouquet, Henry, 298n33
Braddock, Edward: as center of


315







316 INDEX


  conflict among subordinates, xxi;
  arrives in America, 7; rejects
  Shirley's strategy, 7-8; hostility of,
  to Americans, 8, 9; supply problem
  of, 8, 9, 118; as disciplinarian, 8,
  15, 96-98; as acting governor of
  Gibraltar, 8, 135; chosen by Cum-
  berland, 8, 277n10; career of, in
  Coldstreams, 8, 280n29; divides
  army, 10, 16; guards against am-
  bush, 13-14, 98; and regulars, 14-
  16; on American troops, 15; seeks
  advice from subordinates, 16; re-
  cruiting of Indians by, 17-18, 98-
  104; plans three-week march, 19;
  learns Fort Duquesne being rein-
  forced, 10, 19, 278n18; plans for
  march of July 9, 31; heads main
  body, 32; and Croghan, 33; and
  Cameron, 36, 98; and Washington,
  42, 44; death of, 93, 137-40; letter
  to Johnson of, 99; letter to Morris
  of, 99-100; on forest fighting, 108,
  125-26; biographical information
  on, 135-36; letter to Robinson of,
  278n14
-in battle: sends Burton forward,
  63; seeks to rally men, 76-77;
  orders retreat, 79-80; wounded,
  84-85; helped from field, 87; con-
  temporary attitudes toward, 93-95;
  traditionalist view of, 95-110; mod-
  ernist view of, 110-14; historians'
  attitude toward, 142-54. See also
  Bland, Humphrey; British B; Brit-
  ish D; Burton, Ralph; Dinwiddie,
  Robert; Dulany, Daniel; Dunbar,
  Thomas; Fisher, Daniel; Franklin,
  Benjamin; Furnis, James; Gage,
  Thomas; Halket, Sir Peter; Iro-
  quois; Monakatooka; Orme,
  Robert; Peyton, Francis; Stephen,
  Adam; Stewart, Robert; Washing-
  ton, George; Women
Braddock, Fanny, 136
Braddock's Battlefield, 50-51, 58-59,
  61, 64, 84, 85, 92, 114, 290n7


Braddock's Road, 9, 136-37
British A, 47, 62, 166
-account of battle by: quoted, 62, 72,
  73, 76, 80, 83, 86, 292n28; assessed,
  62, 74, 87, 165-66, 222, 292n28;
  printed, 163-65; mentioned, xx,
  50, 77, 84, 87, 89, 235, 276n6,
  279n19, 285n4, 288n27, 289n3,
  290n5, 292n32, 293nn33,34,
  298n32
British B: and Braddock and Orme,
  xx, 48, 67; mentioned, 47, 49, 196,
  225
-account of battle by: quoted, 66, 72,
  83, 290n13; assessed, 66-67, 104-
  05, 173-74; printed, 166-73; men-
  tioned, xx, 69, 104, 105, 180, 225,
  235, 236, 279n19, 284nn18,1,
  285n4, 289nn3,4
British C, 47, 49
-account of battle by: quoted, 83;
  printed, 174; assessed, 175; men-
  tioned, xx
British D: and Braddock, 48;
  wounded, 288n25; mentioned, 47,
  49
-account of battle by: quoted, 82;
  printed, 176; assessed, 177; men-
  tioned, xx, 97, 147, 179
British E, account of battle by:
  quoted, 94; analyzed, 234-36, 247;
  mentioned, 292n24, 296n21,
  298n31
Brown, Billy, 138, 237
-account of battle by: quoted, 138;
  analyzed, 237-38; mentioned, xviii,
  xx
Browne, Charlotte, 137
Burd, James, 79
Burton, Ralph: and Braddock, 13;
  second-in-command of main body,
  32; sent to reinforce vanguard, 63,
  111; detachment of, collides with
  vanguard, 64-67; heroism of, 77; is
  wounded, 84; tries to rally men, 89;
  mentioned, 160, 164, 215, 217,
  218, 220, 232







INDEX 317


Bushy Run, Battle of, 298n33
Butler, William, account of battle by:
  quoted, 138-39; analyzed, 238-39;
  mentioned, xviii, xx, 144
Calcraft, John, 195
Calder, James, 241
Cameron, Duncan, 35-36, 48, 68, 98
-account of battle by: quoted, 15-
  16, 55, 60, 68, 87; assessed, 35, 68,
  91, 179-80; printed, 177-79; men-
  tioned, xx, 49, 67, 90, 91, 153, 177,
  285n4, 289n3
Campbell, John, 47
-account of battle by: printed, 180;
  assessed, 180; mentioned, xx,
  285n4, 290n5, 293n32
Cannon, British, 57, 79, 140-41. See
  also Gage, Thomas
Carqueville, le sieur de, 252, 267,
  269, 270
Catholics, 127-28
Celeron [de Blainville], Pierre-Joseph,
  267, 268, 270
Cholmley, Robert, 36
Cholmley's Batman, 36, 49
-account of battle by: quoted, 51, 55,
  57, 60, 68, 82, 86, 107, 290n19; as-
  sessed, 81, 184, 222, 289; printed,
  181-83; mentioned, xx, 62, 72, 78,
  81, 165, 188, 279n19, 284n1,
  289nn3-5, 291n22, 292n32
Coldstream Guards, 8, 13, 42
Contrecoeur, sieur de, Pierre Claude
  Pecaudy, 21-22, 27, 253-73 passim.
  See also Indians
-account of battle by: assessed, xxv,
  24, 88, 89, 250; discovered, 148;
  printed, 249-50; mentioned, 24,
  52, 87, 282n31
Conyngham, John, 68, 204
Corbreare [Corbiere], Ensign, 267,
  271
Courtmanch, Jacques-Francois le
  Gardeur de, 251, 267, 269
Craik, Dr. James, 130, 302n10
Croghan, George, 17, 32-33, 48, 87,
  100-02


-account of battle by: assessed, xix-
  xx, 89, 185-86, 202, 283n15;
  quoted, 87, 89, 286n6; printed,
  184-85; mentioned, xxi, 49, 60,
  83, 147, 166, 202, 233, 244,
  283n15, 293n35
Cumberland, William Augustus,
  Duke of: and Braddock, 7, 8, 194,
  277nl0; and Gordon, 38; criticism
  of, 93, 299-300n39; mentioned, 35,
  36, 90, 135, 190, 193, 201
Cumberland, Fort. See Fort Cumber-
  land
Custis, George Washington Parke,
  108

Davies, Reverend Samuel, 130
Delawares, 26, 100-02, 125, 296n16
De Lerie [De L ry], Gaspard-Joseph
  Chaussegros, 270, 271
Deligny. See Lignery
Dieskau, Baron Ludwig August von,
  284n20
Dinwiddie, Robert: and Indians, 17,
   103; quoted, 127; publicizes ac-
   counts by Washington and Orme,
   230-31; mentioned, 136
 Diplomacy, 21, 90
 Dulany, Daniel: and Gage, 35; and
   Orme, 157, 286n8, 290n9; and
   Braddock, 279n24
 Dumary [Demery], Paul, 176
 Dumas, Jean Daniel, 49, 50, 250-70
 passim
 -account of battle by: assessed, xxv,
   xxvi, 52-57, 59-60, 69, 81, 252-
   53; quoted, 52, 68; discovered, 148;
   printed, 251-52; mentioned, 24,
   56, 58, 87, 88, 89, 256, 260, 273
 Dunbar, Thomas: commands Forty-
   Eighth Foot, 14; and Braddock, 17,
   292n25; and Orme, 42; and Wash-
   ington, 44; leads retreat, 93; criti-
   cized, 93-94; account of battle by,
   239-40; mentioned, 71, 72, 78, 79,
   87, 88, 104, 106, 107, 124, 159, 167,
   172, 174, 180, 195, 197, 215, 232,
   243. See also Munitions







318 INDEX


Dunbar, William, 35, 288n25
-account of battle by: quoted, 50, 55,
  57-58, 60, 75, 242; assessed, 55,
  188, 202; printed, 186-88; men-
  tioned, xx, 60, 62, 69, 83, 87, 89,
  285n19, 288n27, 289nn3,4, 290n5,
  291n21, 293n32
Duquesne, Ange de Menneville, Mar-
  quis, 19, 22, 261, 282n9
Duquesne, Fort. See Fort Duquesne

Eyre, Jehu, Colonel, 92

Faucett, Joseph, 139, 140
Faucett, Thomas, 138-40, 238
-account of battle by: assessed, xviii,
  138-40, 240; quoted, 139;
  mentioned, 20
Findley, William, 95, 114, 299n35
Fisher, Daniel, 9, 127-28
Flanking parties, 33, 63
Forbes, John, 126-27, 141, 238,
  294n41
Fort Cumberland: Braddock's forces
  at, 8-9, 100; mentioned, 14, 15, 78,
  96, 117, 260, 261
Fort Dtiquesne: strategic importance
  of, 7, 19-21; described, 19; arrival
  of reinforcements at, 19, 22,
  278n18; preparations for attack at,
  22; structural defects in, 284n21;
  mentioned, 3, 7, 18, 24, 26, 30, 39,
  50, 54,. 91, 92, 106, 117, 141, 177,
  182, 189, 196, 197, 226, 229, 253-
  68 passim
Fort Frontenac, 7, 140
Fort Niagara, 7
Fort Oswego, 140
Forty-Eighth Foot, 14, 33. See also
  Dunbar, Thomas
Forty-Fourth Foot, 14, 35, 45. See
  also Halket, Sir Peter
Franklin, Benjamin, 9, 94, 95, 98, 132
Frazer, John, 31, 262; cabin of, 16,
  31, 46, 50, 163, 181
French A, account of battle by:
  printed, 253-54; assessed, 254-55;


  mentioned, xxv-xxvi, 52, 147, 148,
  282n11
French B, account of battle by: as-
  sessed, 24, 28, 58-59, 256-57;
  quoted, 28-29, 58; discovered, 144;
  influence of, 146; printed, 255-56;
  mentioned, xxv-xxvi, 24, 27-29,
  147, 282nl1
French C, account of battle by:
  quoted, 87; assessed, 88, 89, 258;
  discovered, 148; printed, 257-58;
  mentioned, xxv-xxvi, 52, 282n11
Frontenac, Fort, 7, 140
Furnis, James, 39, 48, 62, 159
-account of battle by: quoted, 62;
  printed, 189-90; assessed, 190;
  mentioned, xx, 235, 285n4, 290n5,
  292n32, 298n30

Gage, Thomas: heads advance party,
  18, 32; sketch of, 33, 35; and St.
  Clair, 37; and Braddock, 48; and
  cannon, 50-51, 79, 114-15; fails to
  occupy hill, 50-51, 115; quoted, 65,
  195, 294n2; report of, to Shirley,
  71-72; criticism of, 114-16, 118-
  19, 146, 152; mentioned, xxii, xxiv,
  55, 158, 162, 187, 189, 195, 196,
  198, 202, 213, 236. See also Dulany,
  Daniel; Findley, William; Washing-
  ton, George
-account of battle by: quoted, 59, 60,
  65, 80-81, 85, 291n15; assessed,
  59-60, 66, 77, 81, 86, 194-95; dis-
  covered, 145; printed, 191-94;
  mentioned, xx, 67, 69, 83, 84, 244,
  245, 279n19, 285n4, 291n21,
  293n33
Gates, Horatio, 36-37, 288n25
-account of battle by: quoted, 60, 62,
  64, 65; discovered, 151; printed,
  195-96; assessed, 196-97; men-
  tioned, xx, xxiv, 63, 66, 75, 105
General's guard, 40
George II, 90
Gist, Christopher, 17, 172, 281n35
Glen, James, 103







INDEX 319


Godefroy, account of battle by:
  assessed, 28, 260; discovered,
  148; printed, 259; mentioned, xxv,
  27, 252, 272, 283nn14,18,
  292n27
Godfiore [Godefroy?], 269
Gordon, Harry: 38, 48, 51, 288n25;
  mentioned, 39, 158-59, 205
-account of battle by: quoted, 13-
   14, 18, 55, 61, 67, 82, 84, 85-86,
   89-90; assessed, 55-56, 86, 202,
   222, 285n4, 288n27; discovered,
   150; printed, 197-201; mentioned,
   xx, 56, 60, 67, 69, 77, 233, 244,
   279n19, 289n3, 291n21
Grey, John, 176
Grignon, Augustin, 25-26, 282n13,
  283nnl4,18

Hale, John, 195
Half King (Tanacharisson), 103-04.
  See also Monakatooka
Halifax, George Montagu Dunk, Earl
  of, 130
Halket, Sir Francis, 246
Halket, Sir Peter: commands Forty-
  Fourth Foot, 14; and Braddock, 17,
  168, 169; and Cameron, 36; killed,
  78, 165, 169, 172-73, 178, 193,
  227; criticized, 299n34; mentioned,
  76, 104, 179, 227, 232,.236, 243,
  246. See also Rear guard
Hamilton, John, 203
Hartell [Hertel], Cadet, 252, 268, 269
Hopkins, Joseph, 241
Hopkins, Stephen, 123-24
Horses, 40, 90, 106
Hughes, Philip, 45, 49, 288n25
-account of battle by: quoted, 57;
  printed, 203; assessed, 203; men-
  tioned, xx

Indians: British, 6, 7, 17-18, 32, 98-
  104; French, 6, 20-21, 22, 24, 25-
  30, 72-73, 75-76, 124-25, 128,
  270n3, 283nl7, 291n16
Iroquois, 26, 27, 99, 102, 125


Johnson, Sir William, 17, 90, 99, 123-
  24, 125
Johnston, William, account of battle
  by, 241

Kenny, James, 283n15
Keppel, Augustus, Viscount, 40, 194

La Bourque [Le Borgne], Paul, 52,
  252, 267, 269
Lake George, Battle of, 123-24, 125,
  284n20
Langlade, Charles de, 24, 26, 283n14
La Parade [La Perade], Ensign, 249,
  252, 259, 266, 267, 269, 270
Lee, Charles, 95, 286n9
Leslie, Matthew, 46-47, 49, 288n25
-account of battle by: quoted, 68, 73,
  123; printed, 204-05; assessed,
  205; mentioned, xx, 147
Lewis, Andrew, 219
Lewis, Charles, 218
Lewis, William, 219
Light horse, 32, 37, 75
Lignery, Franois-Marie le Marchand
  de, 250, 251, 253, 254, 257, 267,
  269
Little Meadows, 10, 90, 106, 177, 191,
  197
Lotbinibre, Michel Alain de, account
  of battle by: printed, 260-61; as-
  sessed, 261-62; mentioned, xxv,
  147
Loudoun, John Campbell, Earl of,
  126, 287n14

Machault d'Arnouville, Jean-Baptiste,
  49, 69
Mackellar, Patrick, 38-39, 288n25
-maps and account of battle by:
  printed, 4-5, 208-11; quoted, 78,
  80, 85; assessed, 85, 86, 207, 212,
  292n24, 296n21; discovered, 148;
  303n7; mentioned, xx, 64, 67, 105,
  286n7, 289nn27,3,4, 290n7,
  291n21, 292nn24,26,27, 298n30
Main body: composition of, 40-45;






320 INDEX


  follows Burton, 63; collides with
  vanguard, 64-67
Mante, Thomas, 115-16
Maryland, 8, 9, 127, 277n12
Maryland Gazette, account of battle in,
  241-42
Mercer, James, 170, 173
Mitchell, John, 20
Mommidy [Montigny], Jean-Baptiste-
  Philippe Testard de, 252, 267, 269,
  271
Monakatooka, 6-7, 97, 167, 276n6,
  297n22
Monckton, Robert, 195
Monongahela, 16, 18, 31; mentioned,
  19, 28, 105, 130, 163, 168, 178,
  181, 184, 198, 226, 246, 259
Montisembert, Pierre-Louis Boucher,
  sieur de, 271
Montresor, James, 38
Morris, Robert Hunter, 156-57;
  mentioned, 12, 100, 128
Morris, Roger, 200, 224
Munitions, British, 90, 93

Narrows, The, 16, 198
Nartlo, William, 194
Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles,
  Duke of, 36-37, 299n39,
  302n12
  Niagara, Fort, 7
  Normanville brothers, 27, 252, 260,
  268, 269

  Ord, Thomas, 190, 293n36
  Orme, Robert: wounded, xxi, 200,
  288n25; and Braddock, 13, 16;
  sketch of, 40, 42; and Washington,
  42, 157, 159-60; letter to Fox of,
  155; mentioned, 102, 195, 235,
  239, 240, 244, 245, 247. See also
  British B; Dinwiddie, Robert; Du-
  lany, Daniel; Dunbar, Thomas;
  Furnis, James
  -maps ascribed to: discovered, 140;
  assessed, 205, 212; printed, 206-
  07; mentioned, 286n7


-account of battle by: assessed, xxi,
  48, 63-67, 155-61, 175, 222, 239,
  292n24, 296n21, 305n5; quoted,
  63, 64, 67, 76, 77, 80, 114;
  influence on historians of, 144,
  147-48, 150, 152; discovered, 145;
  printed, 213-16; mentioned, xx,
  50, 69, 70-71, 84, 87, 89, 106, 115,
  221-22, 232, 233, 276n6, 290n5,
  291n21, 292n26
Oswego, Fort, 140

Panic, British, 6, 67-76, 108, 120-21
Pennsylvania, 8, 9, 94, 127-29
Perrault, Louis, 265-66
Peters, Richard, 100
Peyronie, William de, 83, 108, 231-
  32
Peyton, Francis: and Braddock, xxi,
  48; sketch of, 45; mentioned, 49.
  See also Washington, George
-account of battle by: assessed, xix,
  220-22, 290n8; printed, 216-20;
  quoted, 289nl; mentioned, xx,
  284nl, 290n8, 292n23
  Pioneers, 40
  Polson, William, 170, 232
  Potter, John, 58
  Pouchot, Fran ois, 54
-account of battle by: assessed, xxv,
  54, 58-59, 88, 264-65, 273;
  quoted, 54, 87; printed, 262-64;
  mentioned, 56, 147

Quakers, 128-29, 301n9

Rear guard: commanded by Halket,
   32, 45; composition of, 45; fights
   Indian style, 78; importance of,
   109; mentioned, 63
 Rigoville [Rigauville], Jean-Baptiste-
   Marie Blaise Des Bergeres de, 266,
   268, 273
 Rocheblas [Rocheblave], Cadet, 52,
   252, 268, 269
 Roctorade [Roctaillade], Godfroy de,
   266, 268, 273






INDEX 321


Roucher, account of battle by: as-
  sessed, 28, 58-59, 272-73; quoted,
  58; printed, 266-72; mentioned,
  xxv, 26, 27, 28, 54, 256, 282n11,
  283n15, 284nn20,23, 294n39
Rutherford, John, account of battle
  by, 242-43

St. Cherre, Cadet, 268, 269
St. Clair, Sir John: and Braddock, 10,
  12-13, 16, 104-07, 280n31; criti-
  cism of Morris's agents by, 12;
  sketch of, 37-38; wounded, 75,
  170, 288n25; mentioned, xxi, 31,
  32, 33, 35, 40, 46, 48, 51, 104, 158,
  159, 168, 169, 171, 180, 181, 191,
  196, 213, 232, 235, 243, 244
-account of battle by: quoted, 38, 50,
  61; assessed, 50, 61, 224-25; dis-
  covered, 150; printed, 222-24;
  mentioned, xx, 67, 155, 239, 289n3
St. Simon, Cadet, 252, 268
Sash, Braddock's, 140
Scouts: British, 9, 16, 18, 32, 51;
  French, 24-25
Seaman's Journal, account of battle
  in: discovered, 147; analyzed, 244-
  45; mentioned, xviii, 221, 289n2,
  290n6, 298n30.
Seamen, sent by Keppel, 40
Sharpe, Horatio, 127, 277n7
Shawnees, 26, 27, 283nl 7
Shingas, 100-02, 125,.296n16
Shirley, William (governor of Mas-
  sachusetts), 7-8, 284n20; men-
  tioned, 71, 90, 99, 195, 224
Shirley, William (secretary to Brad-
  dock), 94, 227
Smith, James, 91-92, 292n29
Smith, Dr. Thomas, 81
South Carolina, 103, 124
Stephen, Adam, 45-46, 48, 288n25;
  mentioned, 95. See also Washing-
  ton, George
-account of battle by: quoted, 70; as-
  sessed, 70, 228; printed, 226-27;
  mentioned, xx, 77, 104, 151,


  285n4, 289n27, 290n5, 291n21,
  293n32, 298n32
Stewart, Robert, 39-40, 87; men-
  tioned, 49, 95, 235, 288n25. See also
  Washington, George
-account of battle by: printed, 229;
  assessed, 230; mentioned, xx, 75
Stewart, Walter, 227
Stone, Captain, 196
Sutlers, 31, 47
Swaine, Charles, xix-xx, 186

Tactics: British, 77, 125-26; French,
  24, 29-30, 81-82, 119
Torture, 3, 72-73, 91
Townshend, Charles, Viscount, 158
Turtle Creek, 16, 28, 198, 246

Vaudreuil de Cavagnal, Pierre Fran-
   ois de Rigaud, Marquis de, 258,
   282n9. See also Duquesne, Ange de
   Menneville
Virginia, 8, 9. See also Dinwiddie,
  Robert
Volunteers, in British army, 31-32

Waggoner, Edmund, 83
Waggoner, Thomas, 83, 288n22
Wagoners, 31, 84, 107
Wagons, 9, 10, 39, 40, 47, 90, 113,
  117, 296n12
Walker, Dr. Thomas, account of
  battle by: quoted, 18; analyzed,
  246-47; mentioned, xviii, xx. See
  also Yeates, Jasper
Walpole, Horace, 36, 135-36, 137
Ward, Edward, 21
Washington, George: and Orme, 13,
  16, 42; and Braddock, 16-17, 87;
  driven from Ohio, 21, 287n19; and
  Gage, 35; and Stewart, 39; sketch
  of, 42, 44; and Peyton, 45; and
  Stephen, 46; criticized by Half
  King, 103-04; lionized, 129-31;
  quoted, 44, 93, 126, 130; men-
  tioned, xxi, xxiv, 40, 48-49, 94,
  142, 159, 160, 170, 171, 173, 215,





            MARCH TO THE MONONGAHELA           7
to attend, and a volley was sounded over the grave by way of
special tribute. Gifts were distributed among the remaining
Indians. It was the least the British could do, but, under the
circumstances, the most as well.6
  By the graveside stood a graying, heavyset man. At sixty,
Edward Braddock was facing the greatest challenge of his long
career. As a major general, as commander-in-chief, he was
responsible for coordinating the entire North American cam-
paign. He himself had been charged with driving the French
from the Ohio Valley. The capture of Fort Duquesne would be
much more than a promising start to his expedition. It would
virtually clinch success, for the other French forts in the area
were smaller and less well manned. He would sweep them away
and soon rendezvous with the forces under William Shirley, the
governor of Massachusetts and a major general in his own
right. Together they would take Fort Niagara and, if the
weather held, move against Fort Frontenac, at the head of Lake
Ontario.7 With luck, by the close of the year the French threat
to the area south of the Great Lakes would be ended.

  Fate owed him some luck. Ever since receiving his assign-
ment the year before, Braddock had met with nothing but
delay and recrimination. He had arrived in America on Febru-
ary 20, considerably later than he had planned, though eigh-
teen days in advance of his men, who were being shipped in
from Ireland.8 The delayed start had proven ominous. Despite
his desperate attempts to get on with the campaign, he had
been stymied.
  First, there had been differences over strategy. Shirley had
wanted the basic plan of operation scrapped. Ignore Fort Du-
quesne for the moment, he had argued, and move a combined
force against Fort Niagara. Even if the commander-in-chief
had wanted to follow this advice, he in turn had his orders
from the Duke of Cumberland himself. They dictated the ap-
proximate plan of march and specified not only that Fort
Duquesne must be taken, but that it must come first. To revise






322 INDEX


  237, 244, 246, 288nn25,26. See also
  Dunbar, Thomas
-account of battle by: quoted, 70, 89,
  107; assessed, 70-71, 107, 233;
  printed, 231-32; mentioned, xx,
  62-63, 83, 144, 228, 285n4. See
  also Dinwiddie, Robert; Findley,
  William
-autobiographical account: quoted,
  91, 109; analyzed, 247-48; men-
  tioned, xviii, 104


Weiser, Conrad, 283n13
Wills Creek, 8. See also Fort Cumber-
  land
Wolfe, James, 120
Women: with Braddock's army, 31; in
  wagons, 47; with Indians, 100;
  character of, 137
Woodward, Luke, 96
Working party: 6, 37-39, 61, 276n5

Yeates, Jasper, 245-46









(continued from front flap)


of heated public debate. Paul Kopperman
has used all of the known eyewitness reports
of Braddock's Defeat-some of them never
before- printed-to present an exciting critical
account of the battle. By comparing the
various reports, both French and English, and
by analyzing the perspectives and reliability
of their authors, he is able to give a thoughtful
evaluation of previous studies and to offer
his own persuasive interpretation.
  In his final chapter, Dr. Kopperman offers
some provocative thoughts about the impact
of Braddock's Defeat on the subsequent
conduct of the French and Indian War, on
the Washington legend, on American atti-
tudes toward the Indians, and on British-
American relations before the Revolution.
His appendices provide more than forty con-
temporary accounts of the battle, many of
them printed in full, along with evaluations
of their accuracy and significance. The book
is illustrated with portraits of French and
English officers and with maps of the battle
drawn by eyewitnesses.
  Paul Kopperman is Professor of History at
Oregon State University. He is the author of
Sir Robert Heath, 1575-1649: Window on an Age
and articles on British, Colonial American,
and military history, 1600-1800.


JACKET DESIGN/GARY GORE






Other books about Western Pennsylvania
Ill-Starred General
Braddock of the Coldstream Guards
Lee McCardell

The career of Edward Braddock began during the court
intrigues of Queen Anne and George I, gained momen-
tum in continental military campaigns in the early 1750s,
and ended abruptly in the rout of his army near present-
day Pittsburgh in 1755. This highly acclaimed biography
reveals the man-and the politics-behind his defeat,
one of the major setbacks to British imperial power in the
American colonies. "A first-rate biography."- New York
Times

Guns at the Forks
Walter O'Meara

The violent history of Fort Duquesne and Fort Pitt and
the French and Indian War between 1750 and 1760, told
in a spirited and intelligent narrative. O'Meara describes
Fort Necessity, Braddock's defeat at the Monongahela,
and Forbes's successful campaign to retake Fort
Duquesne.

University of Pittsburgh Press
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260


ISBN 0-8229-3326-8





          8 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the overall design, Braddock would have needed the permis-
sion of his superior, and, even if he had been of a mind to
petition for it, the reality of communications meant that ap-
proval would be at least two months in coming.
  But it is doubtful that he would have considered such a
petition even if time had not been a factor. Braddock had spent
more than forty years working his way up in the Coldstream
Guards. He knew how to take orders. But during 1753 and
1754 he had served as acting governor of Gibraltar, and the
administrative ability he had displayed there had shown that he
knew how to give them as well.9 Perhaps it was his unswerving
loyalty to discipline that had commended him to the martinet-
ish Cumberland when he was looking for someone to com-
mand the campaign in North America.1o If so, the duke's
nominee had not failed him. Almost as soon as Shirley had
proposed his scheme, Braddock had thrust it aside, choosing
instead to stand by his original orders."
  The question of strategy had proven simple compared with
that of supplies. Braddock had probably not expected the
Americans to treat him as a savior, but he had been astonished,
as well as angered, by their lack of interest in his expedition.
They had seemed confident that he would succeed, but un-
willing to help. Those colonies far removed from the scene of
conflict had felt no need to aid their neighbors against the
French. Even Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York, which
were directly involved, had given aid grudgingly, while Vir-
ginia had been only slightly more forthcoming. Worse yet, the
provincial contractors had repeatedly failed to live up to their
agreements. And when they had delivered, their goods had
often been substandard and sometimes entirely worthless.12
  Originally, Braddock had hoped to begin his march to Fort
Duquesne by the end of April,'" but June had arrived with the
general and his forces still at Fort Cumberland, on Wills Creek
in Maryland, more than one hundred miles from their destina-
tion. The necessary supplies had not yet been delivered, and
the contractors, far from sympathizing with his situation, had





            MARCH TO THE MONONGAHELA           9
sought to extort vastly inflated sums for goods that would yet
be months in coming. Braddock had become a desperate com-
mander seeking out supplies, cajoling, threatening, pleading,
all the while building up a contempt for the provincials that
bordered on hatred.14
  Then, when all the blustering and begging had failed, when
the expedition itself had seemed jeopardized, help had arrived
from an unexpected quarter. In early May, a middle-aged,
bespectacled gentleman, entirely unheroic in appearance, had
arrived in camp. This was Benjamin Franklin, on that occasion
wearing the hat of deputy postmaster general. His original
mission had been to aid Braddock in improving postal commu-
nication within the military, but in view of the desperate situa-
tion he had turned his attention to the problem of supplies.
Braddock, in no position to be distrustful, had provided him
with eight hundred pounds, and begged him to concentrate on
the procurement of wagons, without which the expedition
could not proceed. Miraculously, within a fortnight the wagons
had come, loaded with provisions. Franklin had not only used
the general's allotment wisely, but had contributed two hun-
dred pounds of his own. The provisions, and twenty extra pack
horses, had been the gift of the Pennsylvania Assembly. From
that moment, Braddock had made Pennsylvanians an excep-
tion to his generally low opinion of colonials. With gratitude
overflowing, he had written to Franklin that while Pennsylvania
"had promised nothing and performed everything," Virginia
and Maryland "had promised everything and performed noth-
ing."'5 Thanks to Franklin, and the foraging missions of some
of his own subordinates, Braddock had finally been able to lead
his army from Fort Cumberland on June 10.16

JULY 7, 1755 A day of frustation. In order to avoid swampy
ground, the army was forced temporarily to leave the old
Indian road it had been following, and as a result the guides
lost their way, delaying the march for "at least four hours,"
according to one source."7 In the history of the campaign, this





10 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


delay was probably insignificant, but it symbolized the bad luck
which had from the beginning hindered the march.

  The troops' departure from Wills Creek had not signaled a
rapid advance on Fort Duquesne. Far from it. The problems of
road-building, accidents, illness, the traditional "halting days"
that allowed the men to rest, and above all the large and
cumbersome wagon train had impeded the march. On June 16,
the seventh day on the trail, the men had camped at the Little
Meadows, a mere twenty-two miles from Fort Cumberland.
This was impossibly slow progress, and, to make matters worse,
a report had reached Braddock that a large body of reinforce-
ments was heading for Fort Duquesne."8 That night, he had
reached a decision. In order to speed up the march and reach
the fort before the reinforcements arrived, it would be neces-
sary to divide the army and press forward in a flying column,
The next day, he had marched on with a force of about thir-
teen hundred picked men and most of the artillery, but only
about one-quarter of the cumbersome wagons, leaving the re-
mainder with a detachment commanded by Colonel Thomas
Dunbar.19 This had been the true beginning of the march.
Within twenty days, Braddock's force was at the Monongahela,
only ten miles from its objective.

  After their long day of skirting the swamps, the troops made
camp and rested. Alone in the darkness, Sir John St. Clair
pondered the state of the campaign and his own situation. Like
most of his fellow officers, he saw the two entwined. To say that
he was pompous in no way singles out the little lieutenant
colonel. It would indeed be surprising if, in view of his experi-
ence, he had not been confident enough of his judgment to
believe that he was qualified to advise his commander.

  And advise he had, from the beginning. Even before Brad-
dock had arrived in America, St. Clair had been there, acting in
the role of deputy quartermaster general. It had been he who
















































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          12 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
had overseen the planning of the road along which the army
now marched. It had been he who had rooted out misfits from
the American auxiliaries which were to join the army. It had
been he who had been most responsible for recruiting more
Americans for the forces.20

  Along the way, he had made many enemies. Quick-
tempered, haughty, he was not the sort to hide his feelings. His
most memorable outburst had been reserved for five agents of
Governor Robert Morris of Pennsylvania. Morris had commis-
sioned them to survey and lay out the road to Fort Duquesne.
A shortage of funds had delayed them, as had other factors,
and indeed they had made surprising progress under the cir-
cumstances. However, when they had attended St. Clair on
April 12, he had complained that their commission should have
been issued earlier, and had insisted
that the troops must march on the first of May; that the want of this
road and the provisions promised by Pennsylvania, has retarded the
expedition.... That instead of marching to the Ohio, he would in
nine days march his army into Cumberland county to cut the roads,
press horses, &c. That he would not suffer a soldier to handle an axe,
but by fire and sword oblige the inhabitants to do it.... That he
would kill all kind of cattle, and carry away the horses, burn houses,
&c.; and that if the French defeated them by the delays of this pro-
vince, that he would with his sword drawn pass through the province,
and treat the inhabitants as a parcel of traitors to his master.21
  Certainly Sir John was somewhat wanting in the art of diplo-
macy. Of course, his commander was known to make a scene
now and then, so it is doubtful that Braddock would have held
St. Clair's temper against him.22 In the beginning, the two ap-
pear to have been close. Indeed, as late as June 13 Sir John had
lauded the general as one who carried out his plans "with a
great deal of vigour and Vivacity." But his attitude had
changed rapidly after that. The decision to divide the army had
certainly taken him by surprise, and he had always had reserva-
tions regarding it. Finally, on July 3 he had advised Braddock





MARCH TO THE MONONGAHELA 13


to bring up Dunbar's detachment. The general had called a
council of war, and Sir John's proposal had been rejected.23
But still he had worried about the weakness of Braddock's
force, and about his own position.
  For as his influence had waned, so had that of others risen.
Braddock had from the beginning been close to a small group
of favorites, and they had finally come to replace Sir John in
his counsels. Most important among them was Captain Robert
Orme, a handsome young Coldstream Guardsman who ap-
parently had first attracted Braddock's attention when he had
entered the regiment a decade before. Second only to Orme in
the commander's circle was Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burton.
Just slightly less influential with Braddock was the young Vir-
ginian, George Washington, like his good friend Orme an
aide-de-camp.24

  And so, on the evening of July 7, St. Clair was worried, and
not least of all for himself. He was not the type to worry alone.
Instead, he again approached his fellow officers, and perhaps
the general as well. Possibly he petitioned once more that the
march be halted so that the convoy might be brought up.
Certainly he suggested that a small detachment be sent ahead
to invest the fort. Also certain is that he got nowhere. Accord-
ing to the fullest report of what transpired, the other officers
told St. Clair that there would be no way to reinforce the
detachment were it attacked, at which point "Sr. John immedi-
ately acquiesced." The reporter-Robert Orme.25

JULY 8, 1755 The army passed through a narrow valley,
some three miles in length, commanded throughout by steep
hills. There could be no more natural place for an ambush.
Braddock answered by the book:
In this March Every proper precaution was taken to secure us. By
Detaching all the men that cou'd be Spar'd from the Advancd party,
that day Commanded By C: Burton on our flank the General Likewise
orderd 350 men to take possession of the heights on Each Side; & the





14 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Grenadier Company of Sir P: H[alket's]Regt, the Advance of the Ad-
vanc'd party, to Gain the Rising Ground, which Shut up the Valley in
our front.26
The precautions proved unnecessary. Not so much as a sniper
appeared to harass the troops.
  As he passed the far end of the valley and rode on, men
surrounding, Braddock must have been relieved. Certainly he
would have been pleased that the enemy had not opposed his
passage. Quite possibly this meant that they had already con-
ceded Duquesne, or else were preparing for the siege. If they
had planned to attack the approaching army, why not here?
  But perhaps another thought cheered him. Two days before,
a small party of Indians had spread confusion among his
troops. Today, however, under pressure, they had followed
orders with precision. Indeed, this was an army. The discipli-
narian in Braddock must have smiled.

  The troops that had followed him across the Atlantic had
scarcely been the cream of the British army. Two regiments had
been assigned to the American venture-the Forty-Fourth Foot,
Colonel Sir Peter Halket, and the Forty-Eighth Foot, Colonel
Thomas Dunbar. Both regiments had been comparatively new,
and far undermanned. Braddock's superiors had directed that
they sail at the strength of five hundred men apiece and that in
Virginia their numbers be enhanced to seven hundred. But even
to reach the first figure, it had been necessary to draft men out
of other regiments, and naturally the officers who received
orders for this levy had sent their misfits. Once across the ocean,
Braddock and his subordinates had sought out recruits, at the
same time despairing of their quality. Men had also been drafted
into the regiments from the independent companies sent by
Virginia, while three of these companies, intact, had accompa-
nied the march. In the end, only about two-fifths of the troops
that had assembled at Fort Cumberland had been original mem-
bers of the two regiments, while one-quarter had been British
draftees, and one-third Americans.27





           MARCH TO THE MONONGAHELA            15
  Who were these Americans? Were they the backwoodsmen
of legend, who blazed trails through the forest, could shoot the
eye out of a squirrel at fifty paces, and knew as they did their
own the mind of the Indian? A few of them were. But for the
most part, they were the dregs of colonial society-seaboard
society, at that. With few exceptions, they were Virginians,
Pennsylvanians, and Marylanders, none of the three provinces
owning a majority. Not only those who joined the two regi-
ments, but the men of the independent companies as well, were
generally recent recruits who had never known discipline or
been under fire.28
  Braddock himself had yet to serve in battle, but during his
forty-five years in service he had come to accept the dictum
that in an engagement the more disciplined force would usu-
ally emerge victorious. His years of garrison duty had enabled
him to hone his abilities in drill.29 He had become a devotee of
precision. This devotion he would now attempt to instill in his
motley troops.
  It had been hard. The provincials in particular had resisted
his attempts to forge them into a unit of his military machine.
But in fact he had concentrated on them, for they had known
nothing of Continental modes of warfare.
  To Braddock's mind, they had proven to be poor students.
Just before departing from Fort Cumberland, he had written
the duke's secretary that "the whole of the Forces are now
assembled, making about two thousand Effectives, the greatest
part Virginians, very indifferent Men, this Country affording
no better; it has cost infinite pains and labour to bring them to
any sort of Regularity and Discipline: Their Officers very little
better." At the same time, he had been pleased with the troops
who had followed him across the Atlantic. As early as April 19,
he had noted that "the officers and Men of these two regiments
behave well and shew great Spirit and Zeal for the Service,
which will be a good Example to the rest." He was to remain of
this opinion. A British private, Duncan Cameron, would later
recall fondly that the general's "Dependence was chiefly upon





         16 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
us Regulars." When issuing the orders of June 17, dividing his
army, Braddock had directed that "the Men of the two Regts
that Are to March [are] to be taken out of those Landed from
Ireland."30

  On July 8, the army camped near the east bank of the
Monongahela. Fort Duquesne stood about eight miles north-
west. But in order to march directly toward it, the men would
have to pass through The Narrows, a strip of land lying be-
tween their camp and Turtle Creek, and then ford the creek
itself. Throughout, this route would be time-consuming and
dangerous. A path of sorts ran through The Narrows, but it
was rough even by wilderness standards, and to make it pas-
sable would require many hours of labor, hours of delay. Not
only was the path entirely inadequate, but for most of its length
it paralleled the east bank of the river and was dominated by
high ground to the right. Even after negotiating The Narrows,
there would be hazards to face. The banks of Turtle Creek
were steep on both sides. Much work would be necessary be-
fore the army could move across with its wagon train. In the
meantime, it would be very vulnerable to attack.31
  Perplexed, Braddock called on his guides. They suggested
that the army could avoid both The Narrows and Turtle Creek
by fording the Monongahela, marching north on its western
bank, and recrossing it opposite Frazer's Cabin, a point above
the creek. The river was low, they pointed out, and its banks
easily ascended. The general accepted their proposal. He pre-
pared his orders accordingly.32

  Braddock had seldom been too proud to heed advice. In
fact, he had often sought it, not only in frequent councils of
war, but in private consultation. St. Clair, for one, had valued
highly his influence over the general. Orme had always been
something of a gray eminence, and his power had grown in
recent weeks. Washington proudly claimed that when his com-
mander had determined to divide the army and push on in a





           MARCH TO THE MONONGAHELA           17
flying column, he had done so on his advice, advice that Brad-
dock himself had solicited. Of course, as some officers had
achieved greater influence, others had been pushed to the side.
These included Halket, Dunbar, and, as we have seen, St. Clair
himself.33
  However, Braddock had continued to seek out the advice of
those who were not his favorites. In particular, he had looked
to his Indian guides. They must reconnoiter. They must be his
eyes in the forest. To his chagrin, their aid had been minimal.
  He had from the beginning had poor relations with the
Indians. At the time of his arrival in Virginia, there had
seemed every likelihood that a considerable number of warri-
ors would accompany the march. Braddock can only have been
happy at the prospect. Certainly he would need them to scout
and, if need be, to fight. Besides, he knew that even traditional
Indian allies were deserting the British. Every Indian he could
win over would be one lost to the French.34
  Throughout his stay in America, the general had been fortu-
nate in his advisors on Indian affairs. When he had in mid-April
held a conference in Alexandria to coordinate strategy for the
coming year, he had met not only with a delegation of gover-
nors, but also with Colonel William Johnson. Johnson was al-
ready famed for his expertise in Indian affairs; one day, he
would be a legend. The colonel had not accompanied Braddock
on his march, for he had been assigned his own mission. How-
ever, two who had joined were Christopher Gist and George
Croghan, both of whom had long since shown themselves to be
capable in their dealings with the Indians.35 Of the two, Cro-
ghan had probably played a greater role in Braddock's counsels.
But both had advised their commander on matters relating to
the Indians, and both had sought to win him more Indian allies.
In the end, both had shared his failure. Not only they, but
others, responsible men like Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Vir-
ginia, had assured Braddock that Indian allies were on their way
to join the march. Indeed, they had for the most part spoken
fairly. From all directions, warriors had moved toward Fort





          18 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
Cumberland, anxious to swear allegiance to the English and to
join in their campaign. But for a multiplicity of reasons, few had
made it to camp. In the end,just eight had joined Braddock. His
scouting could only suffer in consequence.

JULY 9, 1755 The men marched long before daybreak, the
advance party, led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage, de-
parting at three o'clock.36 By noon, the army was at its second
ford. More than one eyewitness would recall the beauty of the
crossing. All was brilliant in the sunlight-the troops in their
dazzling livery, the river afire with reflected radiance: "A finer
sight could not have been beheld, the shining barrels of the
muskets, the excellent order of the men, the cleanliness of their
appearance, the joy depicted on every face at being so near
Fort Du Quesne, the highest object of their wishes-the music
re-echoed through the mountains.""37
  Still, the British were wary. Before their second crossing, some
believed they saw Indians on the opposite bank. Braddock's
guides had misled him. Far from being easily ascended, the east
bank at the ford was steep and forbidding. It would take time to
slope it so that the march might proceed. Worse still, the high
ground offered a perfect opportunity for ambush.
  But the crossing was completed without incident and the
officers and men relaxed. As one of them later told a correspon-
dent: "Every one who saw those Banks, Being Above 12 feet
perpendicularly high Above the Shore, & the Course of the
River 300 yards Broad, hugg'd themselves with joy at our Good
Luck in having surmounted our greatest Difficultys, & too
hastily Concluded the Enemy never wou'd dare to Oppose us."38







TWO O


            The French Prepare


EVEN AS BRADDOCK'S ARMY waded across the Monongahela,
even as apprehension eased and gave way to euphoria, Fort
Duquesne was alive with activity. There would be no retreat or
abject surrender. Perhaps the siege would come. Perhaps the
citadel would fall. But the general would pay for his victory.
  When he had marched from Wills Creek on June 10, Brad-
dock had expressed the hope that he would arrive at the fort
within three weeks.' Of course, he had often rewritten his
schedule in the face of delay, and would do so again. But even
disregarding all of his earlier frustration, had he managed to
reach the Ohio by the end of June, or the first days of July, the
French defenders could have made no more than a token
stand. As it turned out, his intelligence had been only too
accurate. All of his reports, including those he had received
just three days before, had indicated that the garrison was
poorly manned, but that large bodies of reinforcements,
French and Indian, were on their way. Such had indeed been
the case; however, the fresh troops had arrived. And among
the arrivals was a dynamic Canadian officer who had brought
with him dreams of glory. There would be a stand at the forks.
  The French knew they were playing for high stakes. Fort
Duquesne was not merely another outpost. From the moment
of inception, it had been singled out as a focal point of empire.
Even its name symbolized this key role, for it honored Ange de
Menneville, Marquis Duquesne, the governor general of New
France. Its size contributed mightily to an impression of pre-
dominance. The great bastions jutting from its four corners
made the whole more than one hundred fifty feet sqare, easily
the largest of any of the four French forts in the area. It was
                             19





          20 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the central garrison, the most heavily manned. Above all, it
served as headquarters for the commander on the Ohio.2
  The key importance of Fort Duquesne was no coincidence.
Its location, overlooking the confluence of three broad rivers,
placed it at the very heart of the Ohio Valley. And this valley
was in turn the focal point of a spiraling struggle between
England and France. In 1755, John Mitchell, who knew the
area well, wrote:
Nature itself has conspired to render the river Ohio hereabouts a place
of consequence of all the people in North America that are within
reach of it, far and nigh.... To these ponds and other salt springs
hereabouts, great flocks and herds of deer and wild oxen constantly
resort.... This draws numbers of huntsmen here to pursue their
game, the chief employment of these parts. The traders again follow
the huntsmen for their skins and furs. These are the chief causes of
war.... Fort du Quesne then is the very center of all the French force
in N. America put together, and will unite their many settlements in it,
and all the natives of that whole continent, in one body; if it has not
done so already.3
French officials would by and large have agreed with Mitchell's
assessment of why Fort Duquesne was important, but they
would have suggested different priorities. Certainly the fur
trade was important, and the fort was a major trading post. But
the contest with Britain was for territory and strategic advan-
tage. Whichever nation could make good its claim to the Ohio
Valley would limit the other's ability to expand its North
American empire, and enhance its own. Trade would be the
mere concomitant of expansion.
  Fort Duquesne therefore stood as both a symbolic and a real
citadel of dominion. Even at that, it was more. It gave the
French a major advantage in their struggle for men's minds.
There were Indian allies to be won in the valley, allies who
might easily tip the scales against Britain. As long as the fort
stood unchallenged, it would bear witness to French predomi-
nance on the Ohio, to their power to protect the tribes which
went to war on their behalf-and to punish those which sided





                THE FRENCH PREPARE 21
with the enemy. Trade itself might go on at a loss. Within the
walls of the fort, Indians were treated royally. Gifts were dis-
tributed among them, and items of all kinds were sold cut-rate.
This was one means of forging an Indian alliance. As a noted
French officer, Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, argued, "One
cannot give too much care that goods be low priced, so that the
Indians, finding the trade favorable there, may not go among
the English, an objective important for trade and even more
for policy.'"4
  Time pressed the French as they sought to secure the valley.
They had been at peace with England only since 1748, and
even then both sides knew that the respite would be brief, for
the last war had decided nothing. On both shores of the Atlan-
tic, the ancient enemies jockeyed for position. Still, they lauded
peace. All problems, including boundary disputes in the New
World, might be settled amicably, claimed the two courts. How-
ever, this diplomatic ruse was an old one that never worked,
and preparations for war continued. In Braddock's expedition,
the British sought a preemptive strike, but the French were on
guard.
   From the beginning, Fort Duquesne had been an extension
of its commander, Captain Claude Pierre Pecaudy, sieur de
Contrecoeur. In January 1754, he had been charged with se-
curing French authority in the Ohio Valley. Three months
later, he had evicted Ensign Edward Ward, who with a handful
of men had sought to entrench the British at those same forks
where Fort Duquesne now stood. In an ironic twist, the victors
had dismantled the facility that Ward had hurriedly con-
structed, and had used the timber in building their own fort.
Later that same year, Contrecoeur had sent out two parties
successively to drive Washington from the valley. Certainly he
was most responsible for the military presence that had made
formidable the French claim to the Ohio.5
   When he had challenged Ward, Contrecoeur had addressed
 the local Indians with a bravado aimed at putting them in awe
 of French arms, while at the same time encouraging them to



PAUL E. KOPPERMAN


  Braddock
     at the
Monongahela


UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PRESS





         22 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
deride the British: "I warn you, my children, that I am calling
upon the English to withdraw, and that if they do not I am
quite able to force them to go."6 But then he had faced only
token opposition. Now, as Braddock approached the fort, the
commander knew that this time he would be outnumbered.
  The previous autumn, a chronic illness had caused Contre-
coeur to ask Duquesne to relieve him of his command.7 How-
ever, this wish could not be fulfilled immediately, and it was the
old commander who had prepared the fort to face Braddock.
By May 24, 1755, he was able to report to the marquis that "the
works at Fort Duquesne are completed. It is at present
mounted with six pieces of cannon of six, and nine of two [or]
three pound ball [and is] in want of neither arms nor ammuni-
tion."8 But where were the men?
  Reinforcements had been slow to arrive. The year before,
Fort Duquesne had been heavily manned in anticipation of an
English attack, but none had come, and the bulk of the troops
eventually departed. By winter there had remained only one
hundred French and Canadian soldiers, and a like number of
Indians. With spring had come an unexpected drought, which
had caused the rivers to run shallow, slowing the movement of
men down from Fort Presqu'isle. But help had come. Several
detachments had arrived at the fort in early July, bringing the
total of French or Canadian men and officers to something in
excess of six hundred.9
  Among those officers arriving with the reinforcements was
Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Lienard de Beaujeu, a strik-
ingly handsome Canadian, in early middle age. He would suc-
ceed Contrecoeur as commander-if Braddock were somehow
repulsed. There was a cruel irony in the fact that the most
important command he had ever been assigned would likely be
snatched away from him before he could assume it. But Beau-
jeu was not the sort to give up easily. Descended from a long
and illustrious line of military men, he was very much the hero.
  We shall never know whether it was Beaujeu himself who
first formulated the plan to ambush Braddock's army. One

















































Captain Daniel-Hyacinthe-Marie Libnard de Beaujeu





         24 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
anonymous reporter-hereafter known as "French B"-claims
that Beaujeu did indeed originate the scheme, but the fact that
this writer refers to the captain as commander of the fort, and
also that he is relying on second- or thirdhand reports, limits
his credibility. A letter written in mid-July strongly suggests
that it was Contrecoeur who created the design; however, he
also created the letter. Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas, in a lengthy
panegyric dedicated to himself, claims that it was he who first
suggested an ambush. Legend brings forth the name of
Charles de Langlade, the great Indian agent, who had only
recently arrived at the fort with more than six hundred of his
followers.10
  Any one of the four might merit the honor. All of them had
considerable battle experience and knew well the tactics of
forest fighting. Ambush was the obvious strategy, considering
the circumstances. It would, of course, take advantage of the
forest cover. It might provide an equalizer for the outmanned
defenders of the fort. Finally, it was well suited to the Indians.
And should it fail, the casualties would probably be few.
  To plan was one thing. Of far greater importance was per-
suading the Indians to join in an attack. Undoubtedly, those
who had accompanied Langlade to the fort had done so partly
out of loyalty to him and to the French, but they had no desire
to tie themselves to a lost cause. They had probably known that
a battle was imminent, and had seen in it a chance for glory
and plunder. However, they apparently had believed that the
English force was small. Now, to their chagrin, they learned
that the opposite was true.
  Historians have tended to believe that long before Braddock
arrived at the Monongahela, the French at Fort Duquesne were
well aware of the strength at his command. This assumption is
inaccurate. Our sources uniformly suggest that it was only on
or about July 6 that Contrecoeur even learned that the British
were at hand. He had, of course, known that they were on their
way, but he had been able to learn little of their movements.
What information he had received tended to convince him that






THE FRENCH PREPARE 25


Braddock's army was small. Now, with a confrontation ap-
proaching, reconnaissance reports were swinging in the oppo-
site direction, toward panic. French and Indian scouts alike
were bringing in alarming accounts of the enemy. They were
awed by the display of British artillery. And the numbers!
Some said there were three thousand men marching under
Braddock. Four thousand, claimed others."1
  The Indians were in no mood to face such odds. Yet the
French would have to fight for them, as well as for the fort. To
surrender meekly, to abandon their stronghold, would be tacitly
to acknowledge their hated enemy the stronger. They had
worked too hard to lose now by default. For years they had
battled for control of the Indian. They had boasted that they
could, and would, drive the British from tribal lands. They had
bestowed countless gifts on the natives. And when persuasion
had failed, they and their Indian allies had wreaked vengeance
on those tribes which had yet cleaved toward Britain.12 Should
they now give up, the Indians would see their boasts as empty.
The tribes that were wavering would join their enemy. Even
their traditional allies would decline to fight for them. But these
last must fight Braddock; otherwise, the cause was hopeless. The
French themselves knew their weakness. Only stout Indian sup-
port might win for their bravado a tenuous credibility.
  There were Indians enough at the fort to provide at least a
hope of success. In all, there were about eight hundred warri-
ors, a total perhaps exceeding the number normally to be
found in the entire Ohio Valley.'3 Where had they come from?
Historians have generally had little to say about the make-up of
this Indian force. Their unwillingness to speculate is under-
standable in view of the fact that there is only a small body of
evidence on the question. Basically, we have two major docu-
ments and some random testimony, all tending toward the
conclusion that the majority of these Indians, perhaps more
than 90 percent, had come from the area of the Great Lakes.
The first source is clearly not one that we would choose
willingly. In 1857, Captain Augustin Grignon gave a lengthy





         26 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
account of the career of his grandfather, Langlade. At the
time, Grignon was well into his seventies, and although he
apparently was recalling stories he had heard from Langlade
himself, time had probably clouded his memory. Some of the
material he provides is plainly inaccurate, although of course it
is possible that it had been so when passed on to him. With
these reservations, we may note his statement that he "thought"
the Indians whom his grandfather had led to Fort Duquesne in
1755 had been "the Ottawas, Chippewas, Menomonees, Winne-
bagoes, Pottawotomies, Hurons or Wyandotts, and perhaps
others." A legend had persisted that the great Pontiac was of
their number. Grignon thought this possible but was uncertain,
and we should be as well.14
  Our other source is in every way more dependable; indeed, it
is the best we have on the French preparations to meet Brad-
dock. This is the journal of a garrison officer, possibly M.
Roucher, to whom I shall in any case ascribe it, for the sake of
simplicity. Perhaps surprisingly, Roucher not only does not
contradict Grignon's description of the Indian forces, but tends
to corroborate it. Roucher, who was very much on the scene,
does not list tribes, as does Grignon, but rather notes them in
passing. His testimony confirms that there were Hurons, Pot-
tawotomies, and Ottawas at the fort on that July day in 1755.
In addition, he refers to the Shawnees, Missisaugas, and Iro-
quois. That the Shawnees were there is confirmed by other
sources, and it also seems certain that Delaware and Mingo
warriors were present, though few in number.,5 On the whole,
the list is not surprising, for it shows the preponderant
influence of the traditional "French Indians," the Algonquin
tribes and western Iroquois. The other Iroquois noted by
Roucher may have been renegades, although in fact the French
had more impact within the Six Nations than they have gener-
ally been given credit for, and were particularly influential with
the Senecas.16 It appears, however, that the Ohio Indians,
whom they were particularly anxious to impress, were little in
evidence at Fort Duquesne in July 1755. On the whole, the






                 THE FRENCH PREPARE 27
local tribes were straddling the fence, waiting to see which way
the nascent war would turn.
  On the evening of July 8, Beaujeu approached the Indians.
Having spent his life in New France, he was wise in their
customs. He knew that he could not take their aid for granted.
Moreover, he knew that he must not seem to do so. He must
play on their anti-British feeling and on their pride. Certainly
he was aware of the rumors sweeping the Indian camp to the
effect that Braddock's army was unbeatable. He must persuade
them that they could and would carry the day.
  That night he failed. This much we know. Little else is
certain. According to Roucher, Beaujeu called on the assem-
bled warriors to aid him in driving out the enemy who had
seized their lands. He then began the war song, and they joined
in-all except the Pottawotomies. The Indians refused to go
while some of their number held back, and the conference
dissolved. During the night, some Shawnees and Iroquois of
the Valley attended Contrecoeur and told him that they would
try to persuade their fellows to join in an attack on the ap-
proaching army. By inference, their assistance was conditional,
since Roucher asserts that they "were genteelly entertained in
order to engage the other Nations, and not to spin out time, all
their demands were granted."
  A second account, by M. de Godefroy, is less specific. He says
only that the Indians wished to delay their decision, but were
persuaded on the spot to join in the attack. Godefroy credits
their change of heart not to any verbal heroics on the part of
Beaujeu, but rather to the persuasiveness of the brothers Nor-
manville, two officers of whom little is known.
  Both accounts are plausible, if prosaic. But so is a third,
which has been repeated in countless versions, and has in the
process become one of the great legends in the history of New
France. Was it Beaujeu himself who, with a desperate elo-
quence, rallied the Indians to his cause? The anonymous re-
porter who tells us he did was not at the scene; in fact, he was
many miles distant. Still, circumstantial evidence supports his





         28 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
version, without necessarily challenging either of the others.
Beaujeu was a master of Indian diplomacy, fully capable of
stirring up his followers.17 More important, since it deals
specifically with the case at hand, is the question of what de-
layed the captain's party on the morning of July 9. That there
was delay is beyond question. Both Godefroy and Roucher
claim that the men under Beaujeu marched at eight. Yet,
within the next five hours, they were able to advance only
about six miles. It appears that they had planned to ambush
Braddock's army as it forded the Monongahela above Turtle
Creek. In any case, they were never to arrive at their intended
destination. How could such a force, lightly armed and led by
scouts who knew the area well, make so little progress? There
are various possibilities, but the most likely is that the detach-
ment actually left considerably after eight, and not that it was
delayed after it started. The French reporters have little to say
about the march, but this in itself may indicate that no major
obstacles arose to hinder it.18
  Who, then, delayed the departure? Roucher claims that
Beaujeu actually intended to march at daybreak, but that the
Indians were not ready. Although he hurried them along, the
detachment did not depart until eight. But this is too early to
account for the facts. Did the Indians perhaps reconsider their
decision to fight? As we have seen, rumor had made the enemy
awesome. Did they, on this July morning, see discretion as the
better part of valor? Our third reporter believes so, and his
version best accounts for the lateness of departure. Perhaps
Roucher and Godefroy are also correct, as far as they go, in
their reports of what took place on the night of July 8 and the
morning of July 9. Possibly the Indians wavered, one moment
allowing themselves to be persuaded to join the French, the
next moment reconsidering. There is enough glory to parcel
out. Let legend have its way:

M. de Beaujeu... determined to attack the enemy. This he proposed
to the Indians who were with him, but they at first rejected his opinion,





THE FRENCH PREPARE 29


and said to him: "Father, you want to die and sacrifice us. The English
are more than four thousand, and we are only eight hundred, yet you
wish to attack them. Certainly you must see that you are making no
sense. We ask of you until tomorrow to make up our minds." They then
consulted among themselves, as they always do before marching. The
next morning M. de Beaujeu left his fort with the few troops he had,
and asked the Indians for the result of their deliberations. They
answered that they could not march. M. de Beaujeu, who was kind,
affable, and sensible, said to them: "I am determined to confront the
enemy. What-would you let your father go alone? I am certain to
defeat them!" With this, they decided to follow him.19

Certainly it would not have been that simple. So few words,
even emphatically spoken, could not have swayed the Indians.
Over an hour or more, Beaujeu must have played on their
emotions. He must have spoken glowingly of their loyalty to
the French, and of the need to stand together against a com-
mon foe. He must have insinuated that the world could only
despise those who would desert their father in his hour of
need. But most of all, he must have sought to convince them
that victory was theirs for the taking. Voice rising, eyes alive
with ardor, he must have hammered away at their doubt. The
long minutes passed, until it was almost too late. And then,
finally, his arguments carried the day! The Indians joined him!
  Was Beaujeu actually so certain of defeating the British? He
had taken communion that morning, in anticipation of the
worst. But naturally one could die in a battle that proved
victorious for his cause. In point of fact, later testimony indi-
cates that the French were indeed confident of victory, and
their leader in the field likely shared this optimism.20
  Even if the ambush were to fail, the cause would not be
entirely lost. Contrecoeur had detached only one-third of his
men. Some four hundred of them remained behind to guard
the fort. Braddock's army might overcome the ambush, but was
unlikely to inflict very heavy casualties. The remaining men,
French and Indian, could continue to harass the march, or
they, particularly the former, could retire to the fort, there to





         30 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
await investment. Considering the strength of Braddock's ar-
tillery and the size of his force, it was unlikely that they and
their comrades could long withstand a siege. But they would
not surrender without a fight.21
  Although Beaujeu had persuaded the Indians to join him, he
still faced delay. First, having driven them into a frenzy, he had
to wait for them to calm down. Then they had to arm them-
selves. It appears that barrels of gunpowder and bullets had
been left outside the gates of Fort Duquesne, on the assumption
that the Indians would join Beaujeu. Now the warriors grouped
together in front of the fort, sharing out the ammunition.22
  It must have been at least nine before the detachment was
ready to move out. According to the most detailed account,
there were 36 officers, 72 French regulars, 146 Canadians, and
637 Indians.23 Clearly, without Indian help Beaujeu's mission
would have been not only hopeless, but pointless. As it was, his
forces would be facing an enemy more than half again their
size, and better armed as well.
  Finally, hours behind schedule, the motley aggregation ad-
vanced into the forest. Now those defending the fort could
only wait, and stare expectantly into the warmth of a July
morning.







THREE u


         The Pen and the Sword


BY STAGES Braddock's army reassembled on the east bank of
the Monongahela. It took St. Clair's working party a full hour
to slope the banks sufficiently for the wagons and artillery to
get over. All during this time, the troops were exposed, and
Braddock had them drawn into a battle line. The work com-
pleted, however, he ordered them back into a line of march.1
  Gage had led his advance party to Frazer's Cabin, a point
perhaps one hundred yards east of the river. Here stood the
charred reminders of French enmity. John Frazer, a Scottish
merchant, had achieved ties with the Indians sufficiently close
to have prompted the French to drive him from the valley. His
cabin, which now served as a rendezvous point, had long since
been put to the torch.2
  With the crossing complete, Braddock ordered Gage to
march on until three o'clock.3 His apparent plan was that the
army would then make camp, only three or four miles from
Fort Duquesne. The next day they would reach it and occupy it
quietly or commence a siege, as the case might be.
  The troops marched off, slowly winding northward from
Frazer's Cabin. This was not, by Continental standards, an
exceptionally large force, but here in the wilderness it may well
have seemed awesome. Included in it were some thirteen hun-
dred men and officers, perhaps two-fifths of whom were
Americans. There were in addition between forty and fifty
women, most of them wives of soldiers on the march. A small
but unknown number of volunteers accompanied the troops.
Finally, there were the batmen, sutlers, and wagoners, totaling
somewhat less than two hundred.4 We should not be too quick
to disregard the fighting capabilities of these "extras." The
                            31



















      Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260
                Copyright © 1977, University of Pittsburgh Press
                              All rights reserved
                              Eurospan, London
                 Manufactured in the United States of America
                           Printed on acid-free paper

                           Second printing, 1992



Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kopperman, Paul E.
  Braddock at the Monongahela.

  Bibliography: p. 307
  Includes index.
  1. Monongahela, Battle of the, 1755. 2. Braddock, Edward, 1695?-1755.
I. Title.
E199.K77             973.2'6           76-6662
ISBN 0-8229-3326-8

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.






The following organizations and individuals have graciously permitted re-
printing of copyrighted material: The Historical Society of Western Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland Historical Society, Mrs. Stanley Pargellis, and the University
of Oklahoma Press.





         32 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
volunteers were armed. More important, so were the batmen,
on the strength of recent orders.5
  The vanguard was that day divided into two main detach-
ments, the advance party, headed by Gage, and the working
party, St. Clair in command. Braddock himself commanded the
main body, seconded by Burton. The rear guard, smallest by
far of the three units noted, marched under the direction of
Halket. Although we cannot be too precise on formations,
enough evidence exists to fix the order of march, the numbers
in each detachment, and the position of most key figures. Of
particular importance to us are the twenty-two who would leave
accounts of the day's action. Who were they? Where did they
stand in the line of march? For which audience did they write
and why? Did they have a particular ax to grind?
  At the head of the troops marched the guides and light
horse. They were few in number, certainly no more than
twenty. Most of the Indians were in this small party. So was
George Croghan, their commander and the first in our list of
eyewitnesses.
  Then about thirty, Croghan had been born in Dublin, but
had emigrated to North America in 1741. Capable and intelli-
gent, he had quickly established himself as one of the foremost
traders and Indian agents in Pennsylvania, and had achieved
fluency in several tribal tongues. He had constructed a series of
trading posts in the Ohio Valley during the early 1750s and
had been so successful in winning over the Indians that the
French, fearing his competition, had raided the outposts and
driven him from the area. When Braddock had appointed him
as his Indian manager, with the rank of captain, Croghan must
have looked on this as a chance to exact some share of ven-
geance. Certainly, too, if the operation were a success, he could
again move into the valley. He always had been, and would
remain, an avid speculator, and Washington among others had
come to consider him unscrupulous. Croghan's experience
during the expedition had not been altogether happy. Despite
his promises to Braddock that considerable Indian aid was on





THE PEN AND THE SWORD 33


the way, and his own efforts at recruitment, he had in the end
managed to engage only Monakatooka and his small band. Still,
Braddock seems not to have lost faith in him. For his own part,
Croghan appears to have admired the general, and was never
to speak of him except in fond terms. On the other hand, we
may be certain that he was never close to St. Clair, for he had
been one of the five whom Sir John had excoriated in his
memorable eruption of April 12.6
  Just behind Croghan and the guides came the van of the
advance party, apparently consisting of a subaltern and twenty
men. To either side of the van marched the headmost of a
series of small flanking parties, each containing a sergeant and
ten privates. There were perhaps twenty-five of these units
covering the entire line of march, at a distance of one to two
hundred yards from the column.' It does not appear that any
of our eyewitnesses was a member either of such a group, or of
the van.
  Following its van, at a distance of perhaps fifty yards, came
the advance party itself, consisting of about three hundred men
led by Gage. Several members of this detachment would later
recall the events of that day. Unfortunatley, it is often impossi-
ble to tell precisely where they marched or rode. The advance
party may well have stretched back for two hundred yards,
  Gage himself is, of course, well known to any student of
American colonial history. As commander-in-chief of the Brit-
ish forces in North America, and as governor of Massachusetts,
he would have a fateful role in the events of April 1775. By the
time of Braddock's expedition he was already rising quickly in
the officer caste, boosted by the fact that he was the son of an
Irish peer. In early 1741, at the age of twenty, he had been
commissioned a lieutenant in a new regiment that was soon to
be designated the Forty-Eighth Foot. He would have advanced
with even greater speed had the wars of the 1740s dragged on,
or had he possessed a still more exalted social position than the
one his father had provided for him. As it was, in 1751, he had
been gazetted a lieutenant colonel in his regiment, and it was in















































Thomas Gage





              THE PEN AND THE SWORD         35
this capacity that he now accompanied Braddock. He appears
to have gotten on well with the general. At least, if there was
any ill will between the two, he, unlike St. Clair, did not choose
to publicize the fact. In doing his part to further the expedi-
tion, Gage had won some admirers, including the young pam-
phleteer from Maryland, Daniel Dulany. He had also struck up
a friendship with Washington. Needless to say, it would not
stand the test of time.8
  It appears that the troops directly behind Gage were grena-
diers from the Forty-Fourth Foot, the elite of that regiment.
Among them was Lieutenant William Dunbar. Little is known
about him. Since he was still in active service when he died in
1788, he was probably no more than thirty at the time he
joined Braddock. It appears that he possessed the stuff of
heroism. During the French and Indian War, he would on
several occasions distinguish himself by his bravery. But on this
July day of 1755 his career was young, and he had yet to prove
himself.9
  Of much lower status than Dunbar, but wearing his private's
rank with dignity, was Duncan Cameron, who also appears to
have marched near the head of the advance party. Nothing is
known of Cameron except what he himself reveals in a brief
memoir that he wrote in 1756. According to him, he had been
born in the highlands in 1722. He had entered the army at
seventeen, had seen considerable action, narrowly escaping
death on several occasions, and had been badly wounded at
Culloden. If we take his word for it, he had spied on Bonnie
Prince Charlie during the Forty-Five, and his report had con-
tributed to Cumberland's greatest victory. After a few years
away from the army, he had grown restless, and had in 1754
enlisted in the Forty-Fourth Foot. Cameron was always truthful
enough to admit that his rank prevented him from writing the
"inside" story of any campaign or battle. He notes in his mem-
oir that privates of the day were "generally kept very ignorant
of every Thing"-no great revelation, but a tribute to his hon-
esty. Still, he was not in all ways a typical private. This he





36 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


proved by the mere fact that he was literate. Through the
medium of the written word, he indulged in the private's pas-
time of criticizing superiors. In some cases, while not naming
names, he would describe officers in enough detail that their
identities could be established. Then again, he might offer
blanket condemnations. But there were two officers whom he
would recall with particular fondness: one was Braddock, the
other Halket. He does not appear to have known of the rift
between them.'x
  Perhaps one hundred yards to the rear of the grenadiers
marched an independent company, normally commanded by
Captain Horatio Gates, but this day under the leadership of his
superior in the field, Captain Robert Cholmley. Cholmley him-
self holds little interest for the historian. Of much greater
importance is his batman, whose account of that day's action is
one of the four or five most significant. Unfortunately, we
know almost nothing about him. He was British or possibly
Irish, since he had accompanied his master across the Atlantic.
One can infer from his journal of the expedition that he was
amiable, and not so critical of his superiors as was Cameron.
On the other hand, he almost certainly lacked Cameron's expe-
rience and, therefore, his perspective on the behavior of those
in command. The batman was young, perhaps still in his teens.
He was, in his own small way, also heroic, with a strong sense of
duty. "
  In all probability, Gates rode next to Cholmley. It was only
fitting that he should be a part of this expedition, since he had
in a sense been involved with it even before Braddock. Like
Gage, Gates was fortunate in his connections, knowing Horace
Walpole as godfather and patron. He had early been connected
with North America. As a teen-age lieutenant, he had served in
Nova Scotia under General Edward Cornwallis. Perhaps it had
been a combination of this limited acquaintance with the colo-
nial scene and his tie to Walpole which in 1754 had brought
about an extraordinary development. The Duke of Newcastle,
whose ignorance of American affairs was already legendary,





THE PEN AND THE SWORD 37


had sent for Gates and had asked his advice on how to conduct
the projected campaign. Pleading youth and inexperience, the
twenty-six-year-old officer had declined to offer an opinion.
His disclaimer had done nothing to harm a budding military
career, for in September of that year he had been commis-
sioned a captain in the New York Independent Company, and
it was in this capacity that he marched with Braddock. Despite
his experience in America and a friendship with Washington
that appears to have originated during this campaign, he, un-
like Croghan, in 1755 still considered Britain his home, and he
would indeed spend most of the next decade there. Of course,
he would one day again cross the Atlantic, and finally emerge
as a major figure in the American Revolution. His behavior
toward Newcastle should not be taken as an indication of
diffidence. In fact, throughout his career he would show him-
self to be hot-tempered and quick to state a view.12
  Hard on the heels of Gage's detachment came the working
party, St. Clair in command. Sir John was probably the oldest
member of Braddock's army to leave an account of that day.
He was in all likelihood well into middle age, having succeeded
his father as third baronet in 1726. Age and social status natur-
ally made him anxious for advancement, but he appears not to
have made dramatic progress in the military prior to 1754, a
year whose entrance had found him lieutenant colonel of the
Twenty-Second Foot. Although the rank may appear impres-
sive, Sir John himself would not have thought so. Gage, per-
haps fifteen years younger than he, was his senior as lieutenant
colonel. Braddock's expedition had come as his great opportu-
nity. In October 1754, he had been appointed deputy quarter-
master general in North America, a post he would hold until
his death in late 1767. As we have seen, he had from the
beginning been active in this role, if not always successful or
tactful. It must have galled him to see Orme, much his junior
in age, rank, and service, hurtle by him in Braddock's counsels.
St. Clair undoubtedly believed that he had done more than any
other officer aside from Braddock to insure the success of the





         38 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
expedition. And certainly he had worked at a fever pitch, not
only in the early months of 1755, but during the march itself,
when as commander of the working party he had been particu-
larly responsible for building the road to Fort Duquesne. For
his efforts, he had expected the general's gratitude and favor.
Instead, he had been shunted aside. It was an embittered and
frustrated man who now led the working party these last miles
to the fort. By his own testimony, he had decided to petition
for his recall, feeling that he "could be of little use being never
listen'd to."'3
  With St. Clair rode the engineers, among them Harry Gor-
don and Patrick Mackellar. It is not known exactly where Gor-
don was situated. Mackellar was toward the rear of the working
party, which contained some two hundred and fifty men and
extended back for more than one hundred yards.
  Gordon's specialty was road-building. It was on this basis that
Cumberland had recommended him to Braddock. He had
joined the Royal Engineers in 1742, which would suggest that
he was now in his early thirties. From the start, his career had
been active. He had served in Flanders in 1745, and had joined
Cumberland in the field in 1747-1748. Presumably, during this
time he had become acquainted with battle conditions
firsthand. Gordon, like St. Clair and others, seems to have
hoped for great things from Braddock's campaign. As an engi-
neer he held no commission, and this seems to have bothered
him. His obsession with status was never to disappear, and for
that matter it was by no means unusual. In 1776, a dispute over
rank would lead him to resign his place as chief engineer in
Canada. But in 1755, all he hoped for was a commission. As
matters stood, even among the four engineers who accompa-
nied Braddock, he was outranked by Mackellar and by the
chief engineer, James Montresor.
  Mackellar was several years older than Gordon, having been
born in 1717. During the latter half of the 1730s he had spent
four years as a clerk in the Ordnance Department at Woolwich,
but he had made his reputation as an engineer at Minorca,





              THE PEN AND THE SWORD        39
where he had served from 1739 until his appointment as Brad-
dock's engineer en second in 1754. He was in particular an
expert on military architecture and fortifications, and may have
been looked to as a potential advisor should it be necessary to
besiege Fort Duquesne, or, having taken it, to make extensive
repairs. But his talents and powers of observation were far-
ranging, as he was to show during a long and illustrious
career. 14
  To the rear of the working party, a line of wagons loaded
with ammunition and tools stretched back for almost two hun-
dred yards. Quite possibly present in this procession was James
Furnis, commissary of stores for the Ordnance Board. Furnis is
for the most part a shadow figure, but it can be said with
certainty that he, like Gordon, resented his inferior status.
Commissaries held a peculiar position in the army, and indeed
many of them were civilians in military service. Furnis himself
may well have remained a civilian during Braddock's cam-
paign. At least he appears not to have been an officer, although
he was to win a commission later in the war. From offhand
remarks in two of his letters that have come down to us, it is
clear that he found his place under Braddock a source of
humiliation.15
  Immediately behind the wagons was the rear guard of the
advance party. This completed the vanguard, which accounted
for perhaps half of Braddock's men and was drawn out over a
distance of about one-third of a mile.
  Another hundred yards back, a detachment of twenty-nine
light horse headed the main body. This unit was under the
command of Captain Robert Stewart, a Scot by birth, a Virgin-
ian by adoption. Stewart was one of many who could call
Washington friend, although he was almost a full generation
senior to the squire of Mount Vernon. He had accompanied
the young colonel on his abortive expedition the year before,
and had been wounded in a skirmish with the French-on July
9. This failed to deter him, for he appears to have felt that he
had a military vocation. He was anxious for advancement, and





         40 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the passage of time made him impatient. As late as 1763, he
was in London, petitioning Lord Bute to help him gain a
command. But even in 1755, he may have felt that his years
were against him. Although his character appears to have been
very different from St. Clair's, and much more geared to the
acceptance of frustration, he would probably have understood
Sir John's fear that time was passing him by.16
  The light horse was followed closely by a larger body of
"sailors and pioneers." As one might guess, the pioneers were
Americans, specifically those who had been recruited to assist
in building the road. The sailors were British seamen whom
Commodore Augustus Keppel had detached for Braddock's
use. The general apparently intended to employ them in build-
ing bridges or floats, should there be any major rivers to cross.
Later in the campaign, they might construct a makeshift navy
to ferry the troops to Niagara. In the meantime, their skill with
tools would be useful. It appears, finally, that Braddock ex-
pected them to help man the artillery in the event of a siege or
battle.17
  One hundred yards to their rear was the general's guard,
some mounted, others on foot. Next we come to the main body
proper. Perhaps five hundred strong, and composed almost
entirely of regulars, it covered about one-third of a mile. The
men were divided into twelve companies, six on either side of a
long string of wagons that contained provisions and baggage.
Complicating their march still further were herds of cattle and
horses that on both sides separated them from their flank-
guards. At the head of this conglomerate rode Braddock him-
self, surrounded by a personal staff that included two key
aides-de-camp, Orme and Washington.
  The accounts of Orme contrast so sharply that they seem to
refer to two different men. This apparently stems from a
tendency on his part to treat his inferiors with contempt, while
turning on the charm for the benefit of those whom he wished
to impress. During his career he had impressed many, and
probably as a consequence had won promotions at a rate which























































Robert Orme















             TO MY PARENTS

           My smallest debt is existence,

My greatest sorrow, that they cannot read this together





42 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


should be considered imposing, in view of the fact that he does
not appear to have had strong family connections. After serv-
ing briefly as an ensign in the Thirty-Fifth Foot, he had in 1745
entered the Coldstreams. Presumably it had been between that
year and 1753, when Braddock himself had left the regiment,
that the two had become close. Perhaps it was the older man
who had in 1751 been responsible for Orme's promotion to the
rank of lieutenant in the Coldstreams, equivalent to captain of
the line. In any case, Braddock had looked to his protege from
the very beginning of the American campaign. In 1755, Orme
would have been in his early thirties, old enough to impress
Washington as one possessed of great experience and wisdom,
yet young enough that their relationship might be one of
brotherly affection. Nor was Washington alone in his closeness
to the captain. During the campaign in America, Orme's
combination of youth and experience, enhanced by charm,
attracted many young officers to his circle. But what they
admired, their aging superiors envied. Braddock himself seems
to have preferred the company of younger officers to that of
men his own age. This helps to explain not only Orme's great
influence over him, but the fact that the captain was openly
disrespectful in his attitude toward certain of his superiors,
notably Colonel Dunbar. He knew that there was little they
could do to him, or that the general would do. These men who
despised him, who did their best to keep him down-was it not
exhilarating to attack them with impunity?18
  At Orme's side rode young Washington. It had taken consid-
erable coaxing on Braddock's part to bring him here. An order
issued by the general early in 1755, limiting the authority of
colonial officers, had upset the proud Virginian to the extent
that he had resigned his own commission. However, Braddock
himself, far from wishing to see Washington shun the military,
had early on singled him out as one who would profit from the
experience of participating in a full-scale campaign. On March
2, he had ordered Orme to send a note to Mount Vernon,
inviting Washington to join his "Family." Such flattery had had

















































George Washington





         44 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
the desired effect, and on March 15 Washington had written
back to Orme to say that although he had earlier wished to
retire to a less active life, he was now anxious to learn the
martial arts under Edward Braddock, their distinguished prac-
titioner. In May, the general had appointed him an aide-de-
camp, causing him to boast that "I am therefore freed from all
commands but his, and give Orders to all, which must be
implicitly obey'd." This assessment of his authority was vastly
exaggerated, but he, like Orme, does appear to have had a
more subtle influence, owing to his personal relationship with
Braddock. We have seen that Washington himself claimed that
the suggestion to divide the army had come from him, and that
the general had actually sought his advice on this matter. How-
ever, their association was often stormy. Although Washington
had in the beginning freely criticized the Pennsylvanians for
what he saw as an uncooperative attitude toward the expedi-
tion, he had later condemned the general for his anti-American
tirades. Perhaps what upset him most was that after a time
Braddock had begun to mellow in his attitude toward Pennsyl-
vania, while at the same time becoming ever more critical of
Washington's own fair province. In any case, at the age of
twenty-three Washington was himself headstrong and quick to
judge. He had not yet decided on a military career. Yet he was
already possessed of that blend of courage and compassion
which was to be his key to greatness. The hero in him loved the
crash of battle, even while his humane self recoiled from its
carnage. In the wake of his Fort Necessity campaign, he had
commented to his brother that "I heard the bullets whistle,
and, believe me, there is something charming in the sound." It
is a part of the Washington legend that, after a dangerous
illness had forced him to remain behind with Colonel Dunbar,
the young Virginian had left his sickbed and ridden hard to
catch up with the main army. He had arrived in Braddock's
camp on the evening of July 8, weak, but anxious to take part
in any possible action. Perhaps, in those last long miles to the
fort, the bullets would again whistle.19






              THE PEN AND THE SWORD 45
  In command of one of the companies in the main body was
Captain Francis Peyton, like his friend Washington a young
Virginian volunteer. On that day, he was acting as adjutant to
Burton, whom he admired intensely. Peyton was more reserved
in his attitude toward the general himself. Like many provin-
cials, he admired him for his courage, yet feared that he was
dangerously ignorant of the problems involved in forest
fighting. He could only hope that this ignorance would not
prove costly.20
  Yet another member of the main body would one day re-
count the events of July 9, 1755. This was Philip Hughes,
chaplain of the Forty-Fourth Foot. He was probably a rather
young man, having secured his commission only in early 1752.
Aside from this, we know nothing about him, which is of no
great concern, since his account is a very minor one.21
  Slightly less than one hundred yards behind the main body
marched the rear guard, Halket in command. This was a small
detachment, five- or six-score men, almost all Americans.
Among those who marched here were an unknown number of
Virginians from the First Company of Rangers, captained by
Adam Stephen.
  Today Stephen is remembered, if at all, as a friend of Wash-
ington's and as a fiery American general during the Revolu-
tion. Indeed, his military career would come to a somewhat
ignominious end as the result of a court-martial's finding him
guilty of being drunk during a 1777 battle-between his troops
and another American regiment. But perhaps his finest hour
would come in 1788 when, at about seventy, he used his ora-
tory to persuade the Virginia Assembly to ratify the Constitu-
tion. Stephen was always a man of strong principles coupled
with a combative and restless nature. Already in 1755 he could
look back on a checkered career. Born in Scotland, he had at
first seen medicine as his proper vocation, and had acquired a
degree in this field at the University of Edinburgh. During the
early 1740s he had served as surgeon on a British hospital ship,
learning in the process at least the more gruesome aspects of





         46 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
war. Later in the decade he had begun to travel, a journey in
keeping with his own belief that the desire to view foreign
shores was "Natural to the Young & Curious." He had finally
settled in Virgina, where he had "made himself known by
making an incision into the Liver of Mrs. Mercer of Stafford
County, [and] cleansing, & healing the Ulcers there." But the
threat of a new war, and his own turbulent nature, had caused
him to give up medicine in the early 1750s in order to devote
himself to the military. He had accompanied Washington on
his Fort Necessity campaign, in the process establishing a sound
friendship. Now they were together again under Braddock.
Stephen, like many and perhaps most of the officers and men
on this -expedition, had probably been involved in only a few
battles. But during his brief military career he had evolved a
fixed belief that the proper means of handling an Indian am-
bush was to fight the enemy in its own way.22
  Behind the rear guard, there was only the charred remnant
of Frazer's Cabin. Ahead of it, the column stretched on for
about a mile, almost all of it invisible in the forest.
  Such was the disposition of Braddock's troops as they
marched off toward Fort Duquesne. In viewing them, we have
so far encountered sixteen of the men who would in the near
future record their recollections of that day. But there were
another six-what of them? They cannot be placed in the line
of march with any degree of certainty. For that matter, little is
known about any of them.
  Of the six, the only one whom we may know at all, beyond what
we can infer from his testimony, is Lieutenant Matthew Leslie,
who served St. Clair as assistant deputy quartermaster gene'ral.
He appears to have been efficient in his post and was largely
responsible for the success of the foraging expeditions that had at
last allowed Braddock to march. Leslie was on good terms with St.
Clair, and had apparently won his respect. But from the little we
know of him, he seems to have lacked those negative qualities
which Sir John possessed in such abundance. Leslie does not
appear to have despised Americans. Indeed, he seems to have






               THE PEN AND THE SWORD        47
been an amiable sort, diplomatic in his relationships with civilians
and brother officers alike. Perhaps, in view of his key role in
dispensing supplies, he rode with the wagon train as it creaked its
way toward the fort. The wagons also carried those who would
have no place in any fighting, including women, sutlers, and pos-
sibly John Campbell, one of Braddock's messengers. That we
know virtually nothing about Campbell should not upset us. Of
the twenty-two eyewitnesses whose reports we shall examine, he is
for our purposes the least important.23
  The four remaining reporters cannot be identified at all, and
can be discussed only in terms of what their testimony reveals
about them. To differentiate them, I will refer to them as
"British A, B, C, and D," respectively. I am using "British" here
to reflect the fact that they were members of a British army. In
point of fact, British B and, probably, British C were colonials.
British A, on the other hand, was certainly one of those who
had crossed the Atlantic, while British D excelled even St. Clair
in despising things American. All four were almost undoubt-
edly officers, though probably none held a lofty rank. It is
impossible to do more than guess where they stood in the line
of march on July 9, and in fact even such conjecture is totally
undesirable in the cases of British B and D, who provide no
clues whatever. On the basis of inferences from their testi-
mony, it is quite likely that British A served toward the rear of
the advance party or perhaps in St. Clair's detachment, while
British C was probably a member of the main body.24
  Here we have our twenty-two British and American corre-
spondents from the past. That afternoon, they would live
through three hours of a horror which, even with their testi-
mony, is difficult for us to envision. They would face not
merely death, but the terrifying prospect of slow and searing
torture at the hands of an enemy they considered demonic.
They would see their comrades fall, and know the helplessness
of challenging an unseen foe. The ranks would break, a proud
army would dissolve into chaos. Valor would avail nothing. The
forest would protect its own.





         48 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
  But they would survive, these twenty-two, wounded though
most would be.25 Their accounts of the action would convey to
an anxious audience a message both pathetic and irate. For
they would be the first to seek to answer the question, "How
could it have happened?" Some would lay the chief blame on
the troops, others on the general. Most would seek out scape-
goats of some sort. All would rationalize in such a way that they
themselves, and those whom they saw as comrades, might bear
no part of the blame.
  With such a chance to dip their pens in bile, some would not
be able to resist the temptation to settle old scores. British B's
account shows him to have been extreme in this regard. His
dynamic was hatred, in this case directed primarily toward
Braddock and Orme. Ranking just behind in vindictiveness was
St. Clair, whose biases we know. Yet a third who bore ill will
toward the general and his chief favorite was Furnis, who felt
that Orme had treated him contemptuously and that, worse
yet, Braddock had been slow to pay debts owed to him. But to
Furnis's credit, his report bears no obvious marks of bias. On
the other hand, there is the case of those favorably inclined
toward the general, or, by the time they wrote, to his memory.
Chief among them were Washington and, of course, Orme
himself. Peyton was another who admired Braddock, making
up in fervor what he lacked in importance. Cameron, British
D, and Croghan likewise would continue to think fondly of
their commander. Then there were those-Gage, Gordon, Ste-
phen-who would remember him for a more practical reason,
though perhaps sentimental ones as well. They would recall,
for the benefit of their superiors, that the general had prom-
ised them favor but-bad luck!-had not lived to keep his
word, leaving this task to others.26
  The last point raises another question. To whom did our
reporters write? Orme wrote numerous accounts, some in-
tended for public consumption, others for colonial governors
or for chiefs of the military. Washington was only slightly less
prolific, but most of his testimony was directed toward relatives,






              THE PEN AND THE SWORD        49
although one report was addressed to Robert Dinwiddie, gov-
ernor of Virginia. Otherwise our informants are known to us
through only one account apiece, and that generally intended
for a superior. Cameron wrote for a mass audience, while there
is no way of knowing at whom Cholmley's Batman aimed his
comments. British B, Croghan, Leslie, and Peyton directed
their remarks to friends or relatives. Ostensibly, so did British
C and D, Hughes, and Stewart, but we should be wary of
private correspondence that 'just happens" to find its way into
print almost immediately, as did theirs.27
  And what may be said of our French reporters? First and
foremost, that in all probability only one of them was actually
present at the battle. This was Dumas. His extant account is
contained in a letter to Jean-Baptiste Machault d'Arnouville,
the minister of the marine, written in late July 1756. The
intervening year was not altogether a happy one to the mind of
the French captain. He saw those junior to him in rank receive
promotions and honors he felt should be his. Such real or
imagined slights he complained of to Machault. At the same
time he sought to correct any misimpressions the minister
might have gotten as a result of having been "badly informed
of the circumstances" of the battle-presumably, by those Du-
mas considered enemies.28
  Taking into account such differences in background, motiva-
tion, and character, it is scarcely surprising that the accounts of
our twenty-three eyewitnesses vary widely. Often apparent er-
rors may be accounted for in terms of perspective. If not, there
is the more difficult question of bias. No one remembers every
detail of an incident. Instead he recalls a general impression,
and some elements that fit into it. Such a conception is, in turn,
almost certain to be shaped by partiality. To that degree, in
most cases a large one, the process is involuntary. The most
honest and perceptive of eyewitnesses may therefore fail us.
But by taking into account what we know of each informant,
we can minimize the impact of any such failure.







0 FOUR tO-


    "The Indiens Was Upon Us!"


THE BRITISH MARCH toward Fort Duquesne took them up a
gentle but steady slope. Dunbar recalls the favorable scouting
reports he had heard before leaving Frazer's Cabin: "The
Ground... we were told was pretty good, & the woods open,
but all upon the ascent."
  Were the woods "open"? "Yes," answers St. Clair emphati-
cally-so much so "that Carridges Could have been drove in
any part." But British A and Orme suggest the opposite.'
Obviously, not all of us would agree on what constitutes "open"
woods, so we cannot expect that our eyewitnesses will. Still, the
overall evidence suggests that St. Clair is exaggerating. Quite
possibly the woods did thin out-a bit. But they remained
dense enough to hide an enemy.
  While the British marched deliberately, the French and Indi-
ans were racing toward the river. Here came the heroic Beau-
jeu, fresh from one victory, in search of one far greater. Like
the warriors who followed him, he was stripped to the waist, his
gorget alone marking him as a French officer.2 Matching his
quick stride was Dumas, his second-in-command.
  About a mile from the river, a hillock rose to the right of the
line of march.3 The experienced Gage, heading his detach-
ment, cannot have failed to notice it. Perhaps he thought for a
moment of ordering a detachment to occupy this rising
ground, potentially so strategic; certainly standard procedure
suggested such a step. But the enemy was nowhere in sight,
and Gage appears to have felt that this precaution would only
slow the march unnecessarily. Just an hour before, at the river,
St. Clair had asked him whether the advance party would
continue to drag along the two six-pounders that had been in
                            50






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 51


its keeping earlier in the day. Gage had answered, "No Sir I
think not, for I do not think we Shall have much Occation for
them and they being troubolsome to get forwards before the
Roads are Cut." This was the voice of confidence. The enemy
could have attacked the day before, with great advantage. The
river, too, had been a perfect site for ambush. There had been
no attack. Now, with those opportunities past, there would be
none. The French and their Indian allies were clearly planning
to make their stand at the fort, if at all. So thought Gage. He
led his troops past the hill.4
  The remaining units of the vanguard followed him, so that
in a few minutes the rising ground on the right was bisecting
the line of march. Still no enemy appeared, and the troops
pushed on with confidence. It was one o'clock on a lazy July
afternoon.5 The warmth of the day, the sweet sounds of the
forest, and most of all the anticipation of victory lulled the men
into a soft contentment. They had worked hard and suffered
much these long months. Now at last they could relax.
  Suddenly, a cacophony of shouting rooted them in place. It
was the guides, racing toward them through the forest. "The
enemy!" they shouted. The enemy was but two hundred yards
ahead!
  Gordon, who had ridden toward the front in hope of finding
the guides, perhaps to discuss with them the nature of the
terrain that lay ahead, now found himself confirming their
terrified reports. The enemy force was not large, he observed,
only about three hundred. But its sudden appearance shocked
him, as it had the scouts. As it had the troops.
  The French, too, were surprised. They and their Indian
allies halted, confused. Their scheme to ambush Braddock's
army at the river had failed. Suddenly, they had no plan.
  Perhaps Beaujeu, thinking quickly, recovered from his initial
shock and hat in hand motioned his followers down the British
flanks. If so, he had but little time to direct or to see to the
execution of his orders. For now Gage's detachment poured
forth a volley, or possibly several. Since the fire came from two







          52 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA

hundred yards, and only from muskets, it caused few casual-
ties. But among these few was Beaujeu, who fell dead at the
roadside.
  How badly shaken were the French forces? Certainly there
must have been some confusion in their ranks, not only be-
cause of the surprise confrontation and the opening British
volley, but most of all as a result of Beaujeu's death. It is the
extent of disorder that is in question here. If we take the
testimony of Dumas at face value, as have many historians in
the past, we must conclude that the British firing caused the
French and Indian force virtually to disintegrate, only to be
rallied by the erstwhile second-in-command, now rising to
glory. Dumas leaves us in no doubt of his own greatness, taking
it upon himself to play both Horatius and Macaulay:
In the first moment of combat, one hundred militiamen-one-half of
our French forces-shamefully turned tail, shouting "Every man for
himself!"... This retreat encouraged the enemy to resound with cries
of "Long live the King!," and they advanced quickly toward us. Their
artillery, having been prepared during this time, commenced firing.
This terrified the Indians, who fled. On the enemy's third discharge of
musketry, M. de Beaujeu was killed.... It was then, Monseigneur,
that by'word and gesture I sought to rally the few soldiers who re-
mained. I advanced, with an assurance born of despair. My platoon
gave forth with a withering fire which astonished the enemy. It grew
imperceptibly, and the Indians, seeing that my attack had caused the
enemy to stop shouting, returned to me. Now I sent M. le Chevalier le
Borone and M. de Rocheblave to tell the officers in charge of the
Indians to seize the enemy's flanks.

  Self-serving? Undoubtedly, and we must expect as much, in
view of the fact that Dumas was directing his account to a
superior, and was anxious to impress. But this does not disqual-
ify the report, and in fact much of it is plausible. Furthermore,
French A, French C, and Contrecoeur support his claim that at
the first firing the troops fell back. Still, taking into account all
of the evidence, it appears that at the very least he let his
dramatic flair get the better of him. First, two French reporters,











































Captain Jean-Daniel Dumas





          54 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
Pouchot and Roucher, make no mention of a retreat, no matter
how brief, and in fact both imply that their forces from the first
stood up to the British. Pouchot is most emphatic here. Accord-
ing to him, the troops, including the Indians, were already in
position and attacking the British flanks at the time of Beau-
jeu's death. On the fall of their commander, "M. Dumas took
command of the French, or rather, they continued each one to
do his best in the place they were in."
  We must treat all of these accounts with care, however. Dumas
is the only confirmed eyewitness on the French side to have left
an account of the battle. Some of the other French reporters
may have been present at the engagement, but this is unlikely.
Therefore, we run into the problem of self-corroboration. Du-
mas, who returned to Fort Duquesne as commander of a victori-
ous army, would certainly have been in a position to give the
"official" account of what had occurred. It is not surprising,
therefore, that several French reports besides his own bear his
imprint. Among these are the three I have noted as supporting
his account of the initial moments of battle. On the other hand,
the fact that some (like Pouchot, who was definitely not an eye-
witness) chose to relate the testimony of others does not suggest
that their accounts are necessarily more correct; nor does it
eliminate the possibility of self-corroboration. Pouchot, for that
matter, seems to have disliked Dumas, so the fact that he dis-
parages his contributions to victory should not surprise us. On
the key question of how the French and Indians behaved during
the first moments of battle, those who report from their side are
not very helpful, except for Dumas, who is almost too helpful-
to himself.
  The British accounts, however, are enlightening and tend
toward a strong consensus. In judging them, we may set aside
those prepared by men who were not in the advance party or
among the scouts when the firing began. These communicants
cannot have known what was going on up front, and in fact
most of them discuss only what happened in their little corner
of the field when gunfire was first heard. We may also tempo-






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 55


rarily shelve the testimony of Gage, since that will be used
momentarily in discussing a different point. Eliminating these
and also, of course, the accounts that are vague even though
the eyewitnesses who prepared them may have been close to
the action, we are left with four reporters-Dunbar, Cameron,
Cholmley's Batman, and Gordon.
  Dunbar's testimony is brief, but worthy of interpretation:
"We were allarmed by the Indian Hollow, & in an instant,
found ourselves attacked on all sides." He may be telescoping
events here, since the first fire likely came from the front, but it
is nonetheless noteworthy that he conveys the impression of an
immediate French attack. The suggestion is supported by Cam-
eron: "The Firing as a Signal began in the Front, and immedi-
ately was follow'd from behind the Hills and Trees all-along
each Flank." Cholmley's Batman writes in somewhat greater
detail, noting that a guide, on first sighting the enemy, "imme-
diately discharged his piece, turned Round his horse [and]
Cried, the Indiens was upon us. My Master Called me to give
me his horse which I tooke from him and the Ingagement
began. Immediately they began to Ingage us in a half Moon
and still Continued Surrounding us more and more." As usual,
Gordon gives a particularly full and plausible account:

As soon as the Enemys Indians perceived our Grenadiers, they Di-
vided themselves & Run along our right and Left flanks. The Ad-
vanc'd party Coll: Gage order'd to form, which Most of them Did with
the front Rank upon the Ground & Begun firing, which they contin-
ued for several minutes, Altho' the Indians very soon Dispers'd Before
their front & fell upon the flank partys.

  In these four versions, we have a perfect cross-section of
eyewitnesses. Those who wrote them were, respectively, an
officer, a private, a servant, and an engineer, equally varied in
their experience under fire. We may note that at least three of
them were writing for an audience, and that Gordon and Dun-
bar may have been desirous of impressing superiors, but their
motive for distortion on this point is not nearly as great as





56 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


Dumas's, and Cholmley's Batman in particular does not appear
to have had anything to gain through his testimony. Their
consensus that the French attacked immediately is therefore
both plausible and impressive.
  Gordon brings in another point worthy of note. He claims
that the enemy began to run down the British flanks before
Gage's troops opened fire, that is, before Beaujeu was killed.
The implication is that Beaujeu himself ordered the move,
assuming that it was in fact coordinated. Even if he did not,
Gordon seems to challenge Dumas's assertion that it was he who
gave the fateful order. In this, Gordon is far the more disinter-
ested of the two, and is also supported by Pouchot, whose
testimony in this regard has already been noted.6 But we can
still allow Dumas the benefit of the doubt here. He by no
means claims that Beaujeu did not order his men to seize the
enemy flanks, only that he himself did. In all probability, Beau-
jeu gave such an order but was killed before it could be satisfac-
torily carried out. His death caused confusion in the ranks,
somewhat negating the command, but Dumas repeated it and
saw to its execution.
  Dumas's testimony is more directly challenged on a some-
what broader point. The French captain, perhaps unintention-
ally, gives the impression that his force almost disintegrated
under the opening barrage. Clearly, it would have taken time
to rally such a confused and panic-stricken army, and Dumas
likewise suggests that it did. Let us recall his implied sequence:
opening barrage, panic, flight, Beaujeu killed on the third
British volley, further chaos, Dumas struggles to rally the men,
a few of his own troops respond, their gunfire stops a British
advance, Indians slowly return, he orders the French officers in
charge of them to lead them down the enemy flanks, they carry
out the order. It is inconceivable that this could have taken
place in less than ten minutes. Even granted that during a
battle one's sense of time may become distorted, it is unlikely
that four British eyewitnesses would all have seen the attack
starting immediately if it really took ten minutes to evolve. On





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 57


the strength of their testimony, it seems clear that although the
French forces may have given way at the first firing, they
quickly regained the initiative and retaliated. This is not to
deny Dumas his moment in the sun. He may well have been the
individual most responsible for the flank attack. But the prism
of his memory appears to have distorted the actual flow of
events.
  On still another important point Dumas differs from the
British eyewitnesses. He claims that during the first volley the
British made use of their cannon. As we might expect, French
reporters under his influence make similar statements, but in
fact so do those who, like Pouchot, work from other sources.
On the other hand, no British eyewitness mentions that the
advance party used artillery during the first moments of battle,
and in fact we may recall that Gage had left his two six-
pounders behind. It could be that the French reporters are
simply confused in the sequence they suggest. Undoubtedly,
the British did use their artillery later in the battle, but almost
certainly not during these first crucial moments, when indeed it
was probably not even at hand.
  So much for the onset of battle-from the French point of
view. The attackers, who had briefly become the attacked, had
recovered from their initial confusion. Now most of them were
racing down the enemy flanks. As they moved into their new
positions, they disappeared from view. The consensus among
reporters who fought for Braddock is that the enemy was
virtually invisible. Cholmley's Batman recalls in his account that
"if we saw five or six at one time [it] was a great sight," while
Hughes tells us that "the French and Indians crept about in
small Parties so that the Fire was quite round us, and in all the
Time I never saw one, nor could I on Enquiry find any one
who saw ten together."
  How had they vanished, these enemy warriors who could see
Braddock's forces and yet not be seen? The British eye-
witnesses are, as we might imagine, not very helpful. Dunbar's
assessment of enemy tactics is typical: "their methods, they





          58 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
immediately seise a Tree, & are certain of their Aim." But of
course, to expect a more precise statement is to imagine that
the eyewitnesses might describe what they could not see.
  During the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth,
historians regularly contended that the French and Indians
had fired at Braddock's army from the sanctity of defiles. To
my knowledge, their assertion has never been challenged, al-
though it has been heard less lately. Like most historical leg-
ends, it originated at the time of the event. Within a fortnight
of the battle, John Potter, sheriff of Carlisle, reported "that the
French & Indians had cast an Intrenchment across the road
before our Army, which they Discover'd not Untill they Came
Close up to it, from thence and both sides of the road the
Enemy kept a Constant fireing on them." Potter's account was
quickly embroidered, and soon the belief spread that the en-
emy had fired not only from a defile to the head of the line of
march, but from others lining the road.7
  The trouble with this legend is that the French themselves
appear to refute it. Unfortunately, Dumas throws no light on
the issue. Having carefully described his own acts of heroism,
he has little to say about the remainder of the battle. However,
three other reporters, none an eyewitness but all privy to ac-
counts besides his, state specifically that the Indians fought
from behind trees. Roucher gives a rather confused version,
stating that after Braddock's army had given forth with its
initial volley, it had been "answer'd with the same Vivacity by
our detachment who having advanced under cover of the
Woods and the Indians being posted behind the Trees, attack'd
the column of English in front." French B's account meshes
better with those of the British: "The enemy ... made a front,
which allowed those behind the trees to knock over one or two
with each shot." Pouchot is the most precise of all: "The
French, on their part, upon seeing the English, threw them-
selves behind trees and began to fire, while the Indians [after
momentary panic assumed] each a place behind every tree."
On the strength of these three accounts, it seems that, legend






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 59


or no, the bulk of the French and Indian forces were stationed
behind trees on both sides of the road. However, it is quite
possible that a large proportion of the French and a few Indi-
ans stationed themselves in a trench at the head of the British
column. If so, they could not only have killed a number of
Braddock's men but, more important, could have made it im-
possible for the British to advance.
  The French and Indians had passed their moment of
danger. They had recovered from their brief panic and were
now concealed behind trees, with a clear sight of the enemy.
Meanwhile, what of the British? To understand where they
stood and why, it is necessary to backtrack slightly, to the first
seconds of battle.
   If we take Gage at his word, Braddock's army started to
disintegrate even before firing began. According to him, on
first hearing of the enemy's approach,
the guard in our van came to the right-about, but, by the activity of
the officer who commanded them, were stopped from running in, and
prevailed on to face again. The detachment was ordered to fix their
bayonets, and form in order of battle, with intention of gaining a hill
upon our right, which was partly already possessed by an officer's
party that was scouring out right flank. The first was obeyed in a good
deal of hurry, but none of them would stir to the posts assigned them.
Though I had all the assistance that could be expected from the
officers, not one platoon could be prevailed upon to stir from its line
of march, and a visible terror and confusion appeared amongst the
men. By this time, some few shots were fired on the parties who were
on the right and left flanks, on which the whole detachment made
ready, and notwithstanding all the opposition made by the officers,
they threw away their fire, when, I am certain, scarcely two of the men
could be seen by them.

   Like Dumas, Gage clearly had something to gain by writing
as he did. One was attempting to glorify his role in, a victory,
the other to minimize his responsibility for a defeat. In the end,
neither reporter's effort is entirely persuasive. But if we restrict
ourselves to their respective accounts of the opening moments





         60 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA
of battle, we find that Gage holds up as a source slightly better
than does Dumas. One key question here involves the sequence
of events. According to Gordon and Croghan, the British made
the opening volley, but Dunbar, Cholmley's Batman, and Cam-
eron, as well as most French sources, support Gage in his claim
that Beaujeu's men fired first. On this question of sequence, the
evidence against him is not strong enough for us to reject his
testimony. The same can be said on the question of whether
the advance party panicked from the start. Gordon says no, but
this in itself is not enough to discredit Gage. However, it does
appear that he, like Dumas, though not to the same extent,
exaggerates the amount of time involved.
  Even if we treat with skepticism Gage's assertion that panic
spread within the advance party before the enemy opened fire,
we may conclude that soon after the battle began this key de-
tachment started to disintegrate. During the first moments of
action, at least, the enemy fire was deadly, a fact revealed in the
testimony of almost everyone who was in the advance party or in
a position to observe it. Gates claimed that during the first ten
minutes of battle the enemy made such good use of its time "that
fifteen out of eighteen Officers [in the advance party] were kill'd
and wounded and half the 300 men that composed it." Dunbar
supports him with his claim that before help arrived "most of
our advanced Party were laid sprawling on the ground."
  Gage's detachment writhed under the withering enemy fire.
For a few minutes the men held their ground, then fell back-
those who could. Perhaps, as Gage says, the retreat was disor-
derly, the first step in a process that would culminate with
almost the entire army crushed together like an accordion:
This fire [the wild barrage by Gage's troops] killed several of our men
on the flanking parties, who came running in on the detachment, as
did also the vanguard, which completed our confusion. The enemy
took advantage of it by coming round us covered by trees, behind
which they fired with such success that most of us [officers] were in a
short time killed or wounded, as also many of the men, and the rest
gave way.





             "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 61
Gordon gives the impression of a more disciplined retreat, car-
ried out under orders, presumably those of Gage himself. But
the difference between the two accounts is basically on the de-
gree of disorder, for neither implies neatness:
The Indians Making their Appearance upon the Rising Ground on
our Right, occasion'd an Order for Retiring the Advanc'd Body 50 or
60 paces, there they confusedly form'd again, & a Good many of their
Officers were kill'd & wounded by the Indians, who had got possession
of the Rising Ground on the Right. There was an Alarum at this time
that the Enemy were attacking the Baggage in the Rear, which Occa-
sion'd a second Retreat of the Advanc'd party.
  We have noted references by both Gordon and Gage to "the
rising ground on the right." This was the hillock that Gage had
neglected to secure when he passed it earlier that afternoon.
Now it served the French and Indians as a vantage point from
which to pour fire down on the British.
  Thus, within perhaps fifteen minutes of the first fire, we find
the enemy in a half-moon, almost entirely concealed behind
trees and perhaps in a trench to the fore, and in possession of a
strategic knoll. We also find the advance party in retreat, bear-
ing with it the remnants of its vanguard and outscouts.
  But of course Gage's detachment could retreat only so far.
Soon it backed into the working party. Strangely, few of our
reporters mention this collision, and there is in fact a tendency
on the part of eyewitnesses to speak of the "vanguard" in a
broad sense, rather than of the detachments composing it.
Even our best source, St. Clair, is not as specific as we might
wish, for he notes only that "on those in my front falling back
upon me, I ran to the front to see what the matter was." If we
credit this testimony entirely (and there is no reason not to), we
find another suggestion that the retreat of the advance party
took place early in the battle: St. Clair appears not to have had
time to send an aide up for intelligence.
  The various parties composing the vanguard were now inter-
twined and helpless before the enemy barrage. In all proba-
bility, the mass retreated again; but before dealing with this











                   Contents


List of Illustrations                                 ix
Preface                                               xi
Acknowledgments                                      xv
Introduction                                        xvii
1. March to the Monongahela                            3
2. The French Prepare                                 19
3. The Pen and the Sword                             31
4. "The Indiens Was Upon Us!"                        50
5. Retrospect                                        93
6. "So What?"                                        122
Appendix A. Tangents                                -135
Appendix B. Bibliographical Survey                   142
Appendix C. Orme's Reliability                       155
Appendix D. British Eyewitness Accounts              162
Appendix E. Other British Accounts                  234
Appendix F. French Accounts                         249
Notes                                               275
Bibliography                                        307
Index                                               315





62 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


question we should concern ourselves with what was going on
in the main body.
  How did Braddock himself react at the first sound of
gunfire? British A states that he advanced to the fore, and
quickly: "At the first of the firing the General who was at the
head of the detachment came to the front." Furnis supports
him fully: "The General who was about a quarter of a Mile
Distant, immediately advanced with the Troops and drew up in
an open place, when the Action became general." We have
here two points-that Braddock himself led his troops to the
fore, and that he did so at first firing. On the weight of the
evidence, it seems that British A and Furnis are incorrect on
both scores, owing perhaps to their limited perspective.
  To deal with the second question first, it seems clear that
Braddock's response was not instantaneous and, in fact, may
have been dilatory-at least in the opinion of some. Dunbar
and Cholmley's Batman both claim that before reinforcements
arrived, most men in the advance party were already wounded.
So does Gates, who in apparent anger claims that "the Van-
guard was near ten minutes engaged before the main body
came up." Indeed, it appears that Gates's estimate of ten min-
utes is low. Assuming that the main body did not meet the
vanguard until the latter was already in retreat, it is possible
that this particular action took place more than twenty minutes
after the first firing. As we shall see, such an assumption is
justified.
  Thus far, all of the eyewitnesses we have heard from in this
chapter were, at the start of action, definitely or probably in the
vanguard. Naturally, they have been the ones to look to for
insight into the behavior of those who bore the brunt of the
early fighting. But when we ask how Braddock conducted him-
self at the outset, we should look first to the eyewitnesses
nearest to him.
  Of all our eyewitnesses, Washington and Orme are the two
best situated to describe the general's reactions. The young
Virginian unfortunately has nothing to say on this question,






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 63


but he does implicitly back the account given by his older
comrade, who is both vehement and, for the most part, precise.
According to Orme, at the first firing,
the General imagining the advanced parties were very warmly at-
tacked, and being willing to free himself from the incumbrance of the
baggage, order'd Lieutenant Colonel Burton to reinforce them with
the vanguard, and the line to halt. According to this disposition, eight
hundred men were detached from the line, free from all embarrass-
ments, and four hundred were left for the defence of the Artillery
and baggage, posted in such a manner as to secure them from any
attack or insults.8
Aside from his closing comment that Braddock positioned his
men "in such a manner as to secure them from any attack or
insults," Orme's version is clear. However, perhaps his refer-
ence to the numbers involved requires some elaboration. He
does not mean that eight hundred men were to be detached
from the main body and sent forth under Burton. Indeed,
there were only about five hundred in that unit. Rather, he is
saying that Braddock had decided to divide his army. Eight
hundred, including perhaps three hundred from the main
body and the entire vanguard, would march forward, Burton
in command, in some sort of counterattack. Presumably, he
intended to call up the rear guard, and perhaps bring in some
of the flanking parties, in order that they might help the rem-
nant of the main body to guard the baggage. In the former
case, we shall see that he did indeed give such an order.
  Naturally, it took time for Burton to prepare his detachment.
How the main body was divided is not known, but any such
division must have been complicated, and the troops cannot
have been ordered and ready to march until at least ten min-
utes had elapsed. Even then, it would have been necessary to
march them forward for about four hundred yards before they
could meet the vanguard. But some, like Gates, were in no
mood to be patient.
  Having seen Burton safely on his way, we follow him into
what was perhaps the most controversial event of the battle.





64 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


What can be established by consensus is that after he had
advanced almost one quarter of a mile his forces collided with
those of Gage and St. Clair, which were retreating in confusion.
The point in dispute is whether his detachment was a viable
fighting force at the moment of impact.
  Here again, Orme gives specific testimony: "The advanced
detachments soon gave way and fell back upon Lieutenant
Colonel Burton's detachment, who was forming his men to face
a rising ground upon the right." It might at first glance seem
implausible that Burton would have halted his detachment to
prepare it for an attack on the rising ground, in view of the fact
that Braddock had ordered him to take command of the van-
guard and then advance against the enemy. But actually the
account is entirely credible in this respect, and Orme is proba-
bly relating the testimony of his good friend Burton, who
unfortunately does not appear to have left a report of his own.
That the collision took place beside the hillock is confirmed by
Mackellar's sketch. Gates also tends to support Orme on this
point, though, as we shall see, he at the same time questions his
version in another area: "The main body... on the Van
Guards being attacked moved up in a line of march [and] were
flank'd on both sides by the enemy which caused an immediate
confusion." This testimony suggests Burton's motive for taking
a new initiative. As he advanced, his detachment was fired on,
with success sufficient to threaten its viability. The most deadly
volley of all probably came from the rising ground. Burton
may have felt that leaving the enemy in control of such a
strategic point would allow it to divide the army, once he and
the vanguard had pressed on ahead. He may also have believed
that his men could not successfully run the gantlet. Or perhaps
he thought that by taking the hill he could divide the enemy
force and throw it into confusion. In any case, the rising
ground was probably the greatest strategic advantage held by
the French, and we shall see that at least once more that
afternoon Burton was to make a heroic attempt to seize it.
  While supporting the plausibility of Orme's account in one






"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 65


respect, Gates challenges it in another. The obvious implication
in Orme's statement is that the vanguard was most responsible
for destroying Burton's detachment as an effective fighting
force. But Gates claims that the detachment was already in a
confused state when it came into contact with the vanguard,
because of the enemy barrage. Nor is he the only one so to
argue.
  Orme later encapsulated his version of the affair in a letter
published in the Pennsylvania Gazette. In this summary, he re-
peated his charge that it was only because the retreating van-
guard had crashed into Burton's detachment that the latter had
been thrown into confusion. His letter brought a sharp re-
sponse, in the form of an advertisement in a later issue of the
Gazette:
It is thought proper to inform the Publick, that in the Account given
of the late Action on the 9th of July, wherein it is said, that the
Detachment of Three Hundred (which was the Van Guard of the
Army) fell back on the main Body, and put it in such Confusion that
no military Expedient could retrieve, is a Mistake; the main Body
being in Confusion before it joined the above Detachment.9
Gates claims that this entry was the work of "Col. Gage and the
Officers of the Van Guard." At the very least, we can easily see
the hand of Gage, for his description of Burton's detachment
parallels the one he gives in his appended letter to the Earl of
Albemarle: "We [of the retreating advance party] found Sir
John Sinclair's working party in the same confusion, as also the
main body under General Braddock."
  Perhaps we should clarify the issue before proceeding. Gage
is not saying that the vanguard itself was not disorganized, that
Burton's detachment crashed into it, or even that both units
were in motion at the time of impact, although on this last
point he may be aiming to imply such a condition. All he is
specifically claiming is that when the forces collided, the rein-
forcements were already in a disorganized state. There is a
question of culpability here. Gage does not want all of the
blame for chaos to fall on the vanguard. Yet it is worth repeat-






          66 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA

ing that just because a given eyewitness may have a vested
interest in making a particular point as he does, we should not
take this to mean that he does not believe his claim to be true.
Quite possibly Gage is accurately describing what he feels he
saw, and indeed Gates supports him. Orme, on the other hand,
probably was not himself an eyewitness to the incident in ques-
tion. He would also be anxious to make his commander and his
friend Burton look good. In this case, he would be free to
believe what and whom he wished. The evidence seems to
stand against him, but it is far from conclusive.
   Again we should recall that no one cited so far has claimed
 that Burton's detachment was in motion at the moment it
 encountered the retreating vanguard, much less that it was
 itself the cause of the collision. However, one reporter insists
 that both were true. This is British B, who definitely had a
 greater store of bile in which to dip his pen than any of our
 other eyewitnesses. Here, drawn from what seems to have been
 a letter to a friend, is his description of the first moments of
 battle:

 In the front were 500 grenadiers called Halket's grenadiers as choice
 men as could anywhere be seen. These men bore the first brunt of the
 fire in the front, till at last both Sir John St. Clair, and Coll. Gage's
 party were put into the utmost confusion by the Irregularly tumultu-
 ous pressing on and crowding of the men behind, who as they were
 hurried and pushed Irregularly forward, and commanded to march,
earnestly requested to be put into some kind of order and instructed
how to proceed. You'll perhaps see in some of our newspapers a
foolish account from some of the triumvirate, that the foremost ranks
falling back upon the rest of the army as yet not formed, threw them
into a pannic and Confusion which neither the Intreaties nor threats
of the officers could divest them from or persuade them to stand their
ground, but this is as false and foolish a gloss as ever was Invented.
The affair was quite the reverse and therefore you'll do well not to
believe a word of it.

   It is entirely possible that British B was not an eyewitness to
the collision itself. Not knowing his place in the line of march,






            "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 67
we cannot be certain one way or the other. My own guess is
that his version is a conglomerate of wild reports, made wilder.
In any case, when we weigh the evidence ranged against him, it
becomes clear that he is, simply speaking, wrong. Even disre-
garding Orme's testimony, we have seen that Gage, Gordon,
and St. Clair all claim that early in the battle the advance party
retreated. To their accounts we may add those of Cameron and
Mackellar, who assert, the latter through his maps, that Gage's
detachment did indeed fall back. So much for British B's argu-
ment that it stood and fought. Gage, by implication, and
Mackellar likewise, in his second map, also support Orme's
statement that the massed vanguard was in retreat when it met
Burton's unit. As we have seen, Orme can be challenged on the
question of whether the vanguard was solely responsible for
throwing Burton's detachment into disorder. Perhaps, indeed,
Burton was advancing at the time of the collision. But on bal-
ance, British B, and not Orme, should be considered the au-
thor of "as false and foolish a gloss as ever was Invented."'o
  British B clearly detested Orme, the apparent head of his
"triumvirate." Burton, too, may have been one of his triumvirs.
It is therefore not surprising that he by implication blasts both,
and particularly Orme. His account serves as a reminder that
while we must be on guard against those of Braddock's army
who direct their remarks to superiors, lest they mislead us
through self-praise, we must not assume that we get "the truth"
in private correspondence. We may get extreme recklessness,
for eyewitnesses writing to friends and relatives can expect that
their accounts will be believed and will not be compared criti-
cally with those of others. From British B we get not candor,
but calumny.
  The troops collided. Disorder spread. Here there is no ambi-
guity, and we can call our sources at will. Orme: "The whole
were now got together in great confusion." Gordon: "Nothing
afterwards was to Be Seen Amongst the Men But Confusion &
Panick."
  Panic. This is the key word. Did the men now panic?





68 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


  That there was confusion does not mean that there was
panic. It would be desirable to hear the testimony of "common
soldiers" to see if they were willing to accuse their comrades of
cowardice. Unfortunately, the evidence here is thin. We have
only two eyewitnesses who fall into this category, and the remi-
niscence of one, Cameron, is almost worthless. His account of
the action is straightforward enough: "Our Officers as well as
Men generally behaved well." But where was he when the army
telescoped? By his own testimony, he was wounded during the
first moments of battle, and lost consciousness. While he lay
stunned, the advance party retreated, so that when he regained
his senses he found himself alone. Fortunately, he was able to
conceal himself in a hollow tree nearby. The implication of his
story is that he was unconscious during the few minutes that
were to decide the battle. Even if he had made his escape, he
was far from the action and could see only bits of it through a
knothole. So much for him.
  The account given by Cholmley's Batman is much more
useful. He does by implication note the milling together of the
troops that most eyewitnesses associate with panic: "We was
drawn up in large Bodies together, a ready mark." However,
by "large Bodies" he may merely be referring to troops in
formation. Moreover, far from describing hysteria, he sees
heroism in the conduct of his fellows: "Having only death
before us made the men fight Almost longer than they was
able." Nor is he alone in claiming that some of the men be-
haved well, or even heroically. Leslie relates that after Captain
John Conyngham was wounded, his men "seeing his danger
rushed between the savages and him and carried him in tri-
umph from the spot."
   On the question of whether the troops by and large pan-
icked, French accounts are very little help. Most of them are
vague in describing the conduct of Braddock's forces. Dumas
himself is, however, pointed in his reference to British beha-
vior: "The enemy was attacked on all sides, but fought with an
unyielding stubbornness." Those reporters who normally rely





"THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 69


on him echo the statement. But we must look more deeply
here. Dumas was from the beginning out to make the most of
his triumph. The battle represented his hour of glory. It had to
be in all ways a great victory. Moreover, his main account was,
as noted earlier, directed to a superior. The writer was eager to
defend himself against his critics and also to win favor, perhaps
a promotion. Clearly he was not going to do this by making his
victory seem to have been a mere massacre. How impressed
would Machault have been to read that "no sooner had we
begun our counterattack than the enemy ranks disintegrated,
and for three hours we butchered the helpless mass?" Natur-
ally, it would be to Dumas's advantage to play up Braddock's
army as a worthy antagonist. I note this merely to suggest a
motive for mnemonic refraction. Quite likely Dumas believed
what he wrote, and he may have been impressed by the fact
that, no matter how poorly, the British had stood up to his
forces for three hours. But this still does not suggest that his
account is accurate.
  Now to return to the British side. As we might expect, most of
the officers at least imply that the troops panicked, and none
denies it. British B, Dunbar, Gage, Gordon, and Orme are par-
ticularly pointed in their testimony. In weighing it, we should
again note the question of self-interest. By blaming the disasters
of that day on panicky troops, Orme could exculpate his beloved
commander. By similar means, Gage could clear of any possible
charges one still dearer to his heart-himself. British B, through
his account of how the collision of detachments took place, man-
aged to throw the blame for the ensuing hysteria back on Brad-
dock and his favorites. Beyond this, all five had the bias of
"class." Provided that their recollections and integrity allowed
them sufficient leeway, they were likely to blame the common
soldiers rather than the officers, for the latter would represent,
even in the case of Gordon, a peer group. Without challenging
their testimony, let us at least look further.
  Stephen is certainly specific in his account of how the men
behaved:





70 BRADDOCK AT THE MONONGAHELA


The British Troops were thunderstruck to feel the Effect of a heavy
Fire, & see no Enemy; they threw away their Fire in a most indiscreet
Manner, and shamefully turned their Backs on a few Savages and
Canadeans.... They kept in a mere huddle in spite of the most ar-
dent Endeavours of many brave officers. ... Shame unto the infamous
Dogs!
Unfortunately, for all his vehemence, Stephen is not reliable on
the point in question. He was, we should recall, a member of
the rear guard. At the time the collision took place, he was
probably just approaching the rear of the wagon train, which
he was to help cover. Therefore, he was about one-half mile
from the point of impact. Undoubtedly he saw panic-stricken
men during the course of the afternoon, and heard numerous
accounts, Washington's among others, of what had happened
up ahead during the first minutes of battle. But he did not
himself see this action.
  Taking into account the question of perspective, Washington
is a much better source. He may not have been at the scene
when the collision took place; but, as we shall see, he was there
soon after. There are other reasons for liking him as an eye-
witness. He sent his various reports of the day's action not to
superiors, but to friends and relatives, the one exception being
Dinwiddie. Washington was not looking for favor, and indeed
at this point in his life he was by no means committed to a
military career, though he was leaving his options open. Cer-
tainly he was not without his biases, but they are not relevant
on the point in question. As for the fact that he was young and
somewhat inexperienced, this is immaterial. When an eye-
witness observes panic, he knows it.
  And Washington did indeed observe panic. In his recollec-
tion, at an unspecified point early in the fighting, the British
regulars "were... struck with such a deadly Panick, that noth-
ing but confusion and disobedience of order's prevail'd
amongst them."" He does not claim that disintegration came
about as a result of telescoping or even at the time this oc-
curred. In fact, Orme is the only reporter to suggest that it was





             "THE INDIENS WAS UPON US!" 71
the collision that threw the men into a frenzy, and even he
implies that the vanguard had been collapsing prior to this
point. However, the implication on all hands is that panic set in
no later than the moment when the vanguard and Burton's
detachment crashed together.
   Even when we take into account the bias of the officers, the
weight of evidence tends very strongly toward the conclusion
that most of the troops, or at least the British regulars, pan-
icked early. First, there is the overwhelming testimony of the
officers. If we ignore that-a course which could really be
justified only by persuasive evidence that they are decisively
misrepresenting the situation-we are still left with Washing-
ton. Finally, there is the common-sense approach. As we shall
see, in about three hours of fighting, the British mounted few
counterthrusts, and apparently none involving more than one
hundred men-despite constant attempts to rally the troops.
True, many officers were quickly incapacitated, but those re-
maining could certainly have mounted a significant attack, pro-
vided that there were sufficient men to follow them. In fact,
however, few did follow, and the only satisfactory explanation
for their timidity is panic.
  We now pass on to the next question. What caused the panic?
There is no simple answer. First, we should take into account the
views supposedly expressed by the troops themselves. In the
autumn of 1755, Shirley directed Gage and Colonel Dunbar to
report on why the men had behaved as they had during the
battle. The two officers later summarized what they claimed to
be the testimony of the regulars who had fought. In trying to
justify their behavior, these participants had purportedly stated:
1st: They were greatly Harrass'd by dutys unequal to their Numbers,
Dispirited by Want of Sufficient Provisions, and not allowed time to
dress the little they had, with nothing to Drink but Water, and that
Often Scarce and Bad.
2d: The frequent Conversations of the Provincial Troops and Country
People was, that if they engaged the Indians in their European Man-
ner of fighting, they would be Beat, and this some of their Officers