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86 Leonardo Curzio

yond Mexico's borders, affecting three spheres simultaneously: subnational, na-
tional, supranational.”

The complexity of the problem is reﬂected in the ways that the ﬁght against or-
ganized crime has been undertaken. First it fell within the purview of state forces.
As a result, narco—trafficking corrupted the judicial system, police, and even politi-
cians in some states. For example, the former governor of Jalisco, Flavio Romero,
is under investigation for money laundering.“

Narco—trafﬁcking eventually became too big for the local sphere, and because
of the size and the risks that it represented, federal security forces joined the ﬁght.
Soon after, allegations began surfacing that the federal police, judges, and politi-
cians were also implicated in drug trafficking. This was when the Mexican and
U.S. presses began reporting that General Arevalo Gardoqui, the former Defense
Secretary, along with former Mexico City police chief Arturo Durazo and former
Interior Secretary Manuel Bartlett and members of the now-disbanded Federal
Security Directorate had some ties to organized crime.”

In this same period, suspicions were raised that sectors of the Mexican govern-
ment protected drug traffickers, and the security problem became more serious.
An effect, or perhaps a cause, of the situation was the growing tension over the is-
sue in U.S.-Mexican relations. Godson and Olson sum it up well:

For many years, U.S.-Mexican cooperation, or lack of it, was the subject of ongoing contro-
versy and recrimination. This was exacerbated by the Enrique Camarena case, where Mexi-
can drug traffickers, with the possible complicity of some Mexican state and federal
officials, kidnapped and tortured to. death a U.S. DEA agent stationed in Mexico. The con-
troversy surrounding the murder, the alleged cover-up, and the U.S. seizure in Mexico of
one of the alleged perpetrators of the torture/ murder, seriously damaged bilateral relations
for years. Hence not only does Mexican organized crime undermine the Mexican govern-
ment’s ability to rule, it also undermined U.S.-Mexican relations. Although relations have
improved, the potential for Mexican criminals to sidetrack cooperation and aggravate an
already sensitive political environment is likely to remain a major problem for years to
come.”

The nearly simultaneous inaugurations of Carlos Salinas and George Bush as
presidents of their countries in 1988-1989 began the process of easing tensions be-
tween the two nations. Salinas de Gortari gave high priority to ﬁghting drug
trafficking. In 1990, he unveiled his National Drug Control Program, in which he
gave “a top priority in the national agenda to ﬁghting drug trafﬁcking.”17 Still, the

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 87

problems linked to drug trafficking persisted. The case of Admiral Mauricio She-
leske, the former secretary of the navy, who was relieved of his duties after suspi-
cions were raised that he was linked to the drug trade, once again fueled the de-
bate over the extent of the illicit trafﬁcking. The ﬁring of Ignacio Morales Lechuga
from the attorney general’s oﬂice in January 1993 and the naming of Jorge Carpizo
to replace him appeared to open a new chapter in the ﬁght against drugs.

Carpizo’s appointment as attorney general in effect marks a break in relations
between drug trafficking and the government. He later told the Mexico City daily
Excélsior that his departure from Mexico to be ambassador to France resulted
from, among other things, threats that he had received from the drug cartels.“
Whether or not circumstances reached that extreme, it is fair to assume that dur-
ing his administration the interests of the drug traffickers and the attorney gen-
eral’s oﬂice appeared to diverge. Carpizo thoroughly purged the federal judicial
police commanders, exposed procedural irregularities by the police that favored
drug traﬂickers, and began an anti—drug trafﬁcking propaganda campaign.

There is a particularly telling event that to this date remains shrouded in mys-
tery: the assassination of Cardinal Jesus Posadas Ocampo at the Guadalajara air-
port on May 24, 1993. The ofﬁcial story is that the cardinal was gunned down be-
cause he was mistaken for a drug kingpin. In some government circles, however,
the murder was understood as a threat or a warning from the maﬁa not to break
the “traditional understanding” that existed between the security forces and drug
traffickers. There are still others who believe that the real reason for the assassina-
tion was that the cardinal had been given copies of documents taken from the
ofﬁce of Justo Ceja, a secretary to Carlos Salinas de Gortari, that allegedly linked
the Salinas family to the drug cartels.”

Posadas’s murder not only was the ﬁrst in a series of assassinations of high-
level Mexicans but also sparked a debate about links between security forces and
organized crime. Relations between the two would go beyond the question of why
it was necessary for organized crime to move into the highest circles of power to a
much more basic point: The interests of certain drug cartels coincided with the in-
terests of some in the country’s highest political spheres.

The apparent divergence of interests between the drug cartels and the Mexi-
can government during the Salinas administration seemed to be a valid view until

his brother, Raul Salinas de Gortari, was accused of various crimes (including

88 Leonardo Curzio

money laundering) that appeared to link him to organized crime. We will leave
aside the details of Raul Salinas de Gortari’s case for reasons of space, but it sug-
gests a clear nexus between criminal interests and the highest spheres of power in
Mexico. Surprisingly, Salinas was successfully prosecuted and sentenced to a ﬁfty-
year prison term.” f

The failure to prosecute——or impunity——for certain drug-related crimes in
Mexico may arise from deliberate cover-ups or negligence. In either case, it is clear
that virtually all signiﬁcant drug investigations began outside the country. In fact,
the DEA began the probe into Raul Salinas de Gortari’s alleged money laundering,
and police investigators in Switzerland and Great Britain broadened it. The case
of Mario Ruiz Massieu is even more clear. The former deputy attorney general left
Mexico legally with no arrest warrants issued against him. The U.S. authorities ar-
rested him and went to work trying to ascertain the origin of the millions of dol-
lars in his bank accounts.

The case of Carlos Hank Gonzalez remains one of the most controversial. The
former secretary of agriculture has a fortune of nearly mythic proportions (no one
knows how much) and has been accused by the press of having direct ties to the
drug trade. As of this date, Mexico has never investigated him.” The U.S. embassy
in Costa Rica conﬁrmed that Carlos Hank Gonzalez and his son Jorge Hank Rhon
are under investigation by U.S. law enforcement for allegedly participating in drug
trafficking and money laundering.” This became public knowledge when Presi-
dent Miguel Angel Rodriguez, at the time Costa Rica’s presidential candidate from
the Social Christian Unity Party, allegedly accepted a contribution from Hank.”
The scandal received international press coverage, and most of the articles at least
hinted that Hank had some sort of ties with dirty money from organized crime.“

Other cases have been widely discussed without any real conclusions. A New
York Times article accused the former governors of Morelos and Sonora, Jorge Car-
rillo Olea and Manlio Fabio Beltrones, respectively, of having links to traﬂickers.
They reacted angrily and sought damages from the New York paper. To support
the allegations, lawyers for the reporters produced two sworn statements from
former members of the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center as proof of Beltrones’s
and Carrillo Olea’s involvement. New scandals piled on to old ones. In the 1997
elections, Vicente Teran Uribe, a candidate for the post of mayor in Agua Prieta in
Sonora, was described by the Dallas Morning News as one of Mexico’s most impor-

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 89

tant trafﬁckers. The source was a report from the El Paso center, and, according to
the DEA report, Teran Uribe was not being sought by Mexican police.25

The Zedillo administration has been dogged persistently by the allegations of
narco-politics. Although no cabinet minister has been directly implicated, there
have been cases like those of General Jesus Gutiérrez Rebollo, Mexico’s former
drug czar, which demonstrate the ability of organized crime to penetrate the
country’s highest decision-making circles.

It is clear that organized crime has inﬁltrated sectors of the Mexican political
system, but there is little hard evidence. In this regard, the question that Jorge
Chabat asked in 1994 remains unanswered several years later: “Can we not say
that the institutional pillars of the Mexican government are taken advantage of
[by drug-traﬂ"1cking]?” At that time, Chabat wrote: “The relative tolerance of drug
traﬂicking probably derives from the fact that it in itself doesn’t threaten stability,
given that its ends are not political and given that the unﬁnished modernization
of the Mexican state leaves open space for corruption generated by drug traﬂick-
ing.”25

Perhaps institutional development to strengthen the rule of law and more en-
ergetically ﬁght the maﬁa, along with international supervision of that ﬁght, has
made it harder to buy protection from the Mexican police and judicial‘ system.
These new conditions could explain why criminals are seeking protection from
some sectors of the political system that oppose both a new legal framework (the
1996 law against organized crime, for example) and the Mexican governments
greater willingness to grant extraditions to the United States and to promote
closer cooperation between the two nations in the ﬁght against drugs. But cur-
rently there is no evidence that such a strategy is being pursued by criminals. Nev-
ertheless, several recent incidents suggest areas of analysis into the channels that
organized crime may be using to penetrate deeper into the political system. To do
this, we should look into the ﬁnancing of Mexico’s political parties, and that of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PR1) in particular.

The Financing of Mexico's Political Parties

The issue of ﬁnancing political parties is one of the biggest debates in the Mex-

ican political transition. There are three primary areas of focus:

90 Leonardo Curzio

1. Lack of fairness in political competition.”
2. Oligarchical tendencies and shared loyalties between economic and political
powers.

3. Financial inﬁltration by organized crime.

There is little solid information on how the PR1 ﬁnances its campaigns. As Os-
car Hinojosa wrote in one of the few articles available on this subject: “Financing
is without a doubt one of the most delicate areas in the history of the PNR-PRM—
PR1 because this is where the essence of any official party is found: its ﬁnancial de-
pendence on the government.”23 The mystery that has historically surrounded the
PR1’s ﬁnances hides a well-known secret. The symbiosis between the party and the
three levels of government was a constant for several decades. The government’s
material and human resources were placed at the disposal of PR1 candidates. This
was considered normal for decades. The PR1 became one of the “public” depend-
encies that consumed the most resources.”

But as the opposition gained more political clout in national life and, parallel
to this, the electoral system was cleaned up, the question of unfairness in the elec-
toral process came to the fore. Criticism of the traditional political system focused
on the government’s illegal ﬁnancial support for the official party. Faced with this
new situation, the PRI began to explore new forms of ﬁnancing.

The 1994 election reopened the controversy over campaign expenditures. The
fact that the PRI spent 80 percent of the combined expenditure by all campaigns
caused a scandal that remains divisive. (See Table 4.1 for a breakdown of cam-
paign expenditures.) Still, the PRI’s astronomical campaign budgets had been ex-
posed before in local elections, like the 1992 election in Michoacan.3° The report
on the 1994 election was written by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). IFE’s elec-

Table 4.1 Expenditures of Parties in the 1994 Mexican Presidential Campaign

Party Expenses (pesos) Expenses (S millions) Percentage of total
PAN 43,003,758 12.6 10.37
PRI 324,681,340 95.4 78.28
PRD 6,286,604 1.8 1.52
PT 4,637,703 1.3 1.12
Others 36,167,400 10.6 8.71

Source: The 1994 Federal Electoral Process (Mexico: IFE, 1994), 246.

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 91

toral advisors included doubts about the amount and origin of the resources used
by the PR1 and the lack of serious accountability of the other parties’ ﬁnances.“

Miguel Aleman—the treasurer of PRI——acknowledged that the party's cam-
paign expenses “required between [US Dollars] $300 and $500 million.” The cap
on the public subsidy was about $70 million, and individual contributions were
restricted to about $700,000.32 If we take Aleman at his word, the difference be-
tween the maximum and minimum is enormous. But even if we take the mini-
mum ﬁgure, there is a $230 million difference between public subsidies for the
PRI and the money its treasurer stated was needed. Where did this money come
from? In legislation to regulate campaign ﬁnancing, in addition to public ﬁnanc-
ing, three other sources may be considered: quotas or other ﬁnancial support
from party members, donations from supporters, and building a system of trusts
and ﬁnancial investments. The debate centers not on ﬁnancing from party mem-
bers but on donations, some of which were made surreptitiously and others that
were clearly illegal.

One of the most publicized charges was that of the former director general of
Aeroméxico, Gerardo de Prevoisin, who was accused of embezzling $72 million
from his company. The New York Times reported that de Prevoisin donated $8 mil-
lion to the PRL33

Another highly publicized incident, reported in detail by journalist Andrés
Oppenheimer,“ was a dinner given on February 23, 1993. The event was hosted by
then—President Carlos Salinas de Gortari for the country’s richest business leaders
at the home of Antonio Ortiz Mena, a former Treasury Secretary and a long-
standing bridge between the political and business communities. Some of the in-
vitees were people who had beneﬁted from the privatizations of government busi-
nesses. They were asked for a “voluntary donation” of $25 million each. At ﬁrst,
the dinner and discussion of party ﬁnance were closely guarded secrets. Then the
Mexico City daily El Economista published the names of the attendees, the agenda,
the discussions, and even the reactions of the participants to the proposed dona-
tions.

The scandal was huge, and even major personalities like writer Octavio Paz

jumped into the debate. The Nobel Prize Laureate wrote:

The question of democracy is vital for the vast majority of Mexicans. Now, the transition
that Mexico is making toward becoming more democratic and pluralistic demands a re-

92 Leonardo Curzio

form of all political parties, the PR1 most of all. It has been and is the party of the govern-
ment; it must separate itself and win its autonomy. But independence will be impossible as
long as it receives a government subsidy. A week ago we learned that—to achieve this sepa-
ration—a group of business leaders offered the PR1 a donation of several hundred million
dollars. The cure was worse than the disease. It is critical that limits be set on donations
that individuals make to political parties. Democracy is a system founded on credibility,
and thus it is urgent that we re-establish credibility in Mexico, breaking with years and
years of bad habits and irregularities.”

The press report on the dinner caused the termination of the ﬁnancing
scheme. Even so, Porﬁrio Mufioz Ledo, who was the PRD president in 1994 and
his party's leading negotiator in the 1996 electoral reform, commented that the fa-
mous dinner “to pass the collection plate” to the best-known business leaders was
in itself a money laundering operation. Or, put another way, the PRI had collected
a large amount of money that it could not explain and exposed the meeting to es-
tablish a legitimate source for the funds. Muﬁoz Ledo seemed to believe that the
PR1 decided that a business/ political scandal was preferable to a scandal over em-
bezzled government monies given to the party or, still worse, a narco-scandal.”

As Mexico’s political transition has progressed, it has become harder for the
government to channel its customary support to the PR1. The opposition parties
showed as early as 1993 that they could effectively compete with the regime and so
the cost of ﬁnancing the ofﬁcial party machinery has risen substantially. The in-
creasing autonomy of the media has also made it difficult for the government to
manipulate public ﬁnances without getting caught. As Andrés Oppenheimer

wrote:

The PR1 needed the money badly, and not just because it wanted to avoid an embarrass-
ment during the electoral race over the massive ﬁnancial help it had long received from the
government. After decades of functioning like a de facto government agency that got its
money directly from the Finance ministry, the PR1 was discovering that the ﬂow of govern-
ment funds was running dry. A few months earlier, Finance Secretary Pedro Aspe had sent
a memo to party president Borrego informing him that the central government would no
longer ﬁnance the party’s needs. . . . Aspe, a conservative economist . . . had explained his
memo to Borrego as part of the government’s overall policy of reducing public
expenses. . . . The party needed to generate its own resources.”

If this hypothesis is true, it is probable that the PR1 has seen a dramatic drop in

resources, including government support for campaigns. It is very likely that the

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 93

party is looking into other revenue sources that include more or less voluntary do-
nations from business sectors. And ﬁnally, there are those like Pedro Pérez who
argue that the loss of the PRI’s governmental support could lead to solicitation of
drug trafﬁcking resources to ﬁnance campaigns: “Having reduced the official do-
nations that keep the system alive . . . [the PRI] appears to have started to lean to-
ward drug trafficking money to preserve its privileges.”38

In any case, the events in question and the PRI’s position with respect to how
to ﬁnance the amounts needed for campaign expenditures show that for the PRI,
and the government that it created, demonstrating a source for the funds was a
major problem for national and international credibility. Since it was an enor-
mous amount of money, much of it in cash, drug trafﬁcking cannot be ruled out,
as we will see later in the attorney general’s probe of the Tabasco case. But, what
evidence exists that criminal elements were getting involved in campaign ﬁnanc-
ing? The case of Tabasco is particularly interesting because it provides clear evi-
dence of how the PRI ﬁnances its campaigns.

The Case of Tabasco

On November 20, 1994, Tabasco held the most controversial elections in the
history of the state. Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, gubernatorial candidate of
the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), challenged the result, alleging ir-
regularities before and during the election. The PRD leadership in Tabasco then
decided to organize a march on Mexico City to demand that the electoral results
be reviewed.” The PRD marchers arrived in the capital several days later. In Mex-
ico City, Lopez Obrador, who met them there, “mysteriously” received several
boxes of documents on PR1 campaign expenditures in Tabasco.“ In June 1995,
Lopez Obrador, now a PRD leader, and other party members ﬁled a formal com-
plaint with the federal attorney general’s oﬂice against Tabasco Governor Roberto
Madrazo Pintado alleging embezzlement and abuse of power.“ These charges
were based on the alleged expenditure of almost $238 million pesos (about $68
million) on his campaign. The plaintiffs also alleged a possible violation of federal
laws, including those barring use of public funds for campaigns.

To support his allegations, Lopez Obrador turned in the twenty-one sealed
cardboard boxes containing eighty-nine ﬁles. The contents of the ﬁles varied:
there were check vouchers, payment records, check stubs, receipts, bills, notes,

94 Leonardo Curzio

and memos. The job of going through all of this material was turned over to
Auldarico Hernandez Jerénimo, the PRD senator from Tabasco. Once that review
was complete, a real investigation began. The attorney general’s office requested
that federal investigators be named to decide whether any crime had been com-
mitted.

In response, the Tabasco governor, together with Pedro Jimenez Leon, the
speaker of the state legislature, and state district attorney Andrés Madrigal
Sanchez, went before the Supreme Court and sparked a constitutional contro-
versy by asking it to declare invalid all the previous ﬁndings and the attorney gen-
eral’s investigations related to the case. They argued that the probe was federal in-
terference in local affairs. Governor Madrazo said he was defending states’ rights,
but public opinion was of the mind that someone had something to hide. On
March 26, 1996, the Supreme Court resolved the constitutional controversy by
ruling that the federal entity, in this case the attorney general’s oﬂice, had jurisdic-
tion to continue its investigation of Lopez Obrador’s complaint.

The attorney general’s office went to work and, after interviewing PRI leaders

in Tabasco,” came up with the following results:

1. The PRI state committee directorate in Tabasco spent $128 million pesos
($36.5 million) between June 7 and November 20, 1994, alone.

2. It was impossible to determine the origin of most of the funds managed or
apportioned by the PR1 in Tabasco since payments were made in cash. Thus, in
those cases it was impossible to determine whether federal laws against embez-
zling federal funds were violated. Nevertheless, it was possible to determine that
money came from:

a. Lomas Mil S.A. de CV ($12.44 million pesos). This company’s board of
directors includes people linked to criminal activity by Carlos Cabal Peniche,
individuals such as Paul Karam Kassab, who has previously been under investi-
gation for money laundering.“ C

b. A company called San Carlos World Trade ($1 million pesos), also linked

to the same person.

Between them, Cabal and Karam contributed $13.44 million pesos to a PRI
ﬁnancial board (Fideicomiso PR1 F-2939-1) operating in Tabasco from August 5,

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 95

1993, to November 11, 1994. The boards technical committee was made up of
Roberto Madrazo, president, and Oscar Saenz Jurado (the state’s ﬁnance secretary
for the PRI in Tabasco) as vice president. The ﬁduciary institution was the Banco
Union, whose president of the board of directors at that time was Carlos Cabal
Peniche.“

The case of fugitive banker Carlos Cabal Peniche is one of the most controver-
sial. The origin of his fortune has come into question since the government sold
him the Banco de Cédulas Hipotecarias in an auction as part of the privatization
of the banking system in 1991. After a series of mergers with other banks, Cabal
created the Banco Union. Suspicion grew when Cabal bought Del Monte Fresh
Produce using virtually fraudulent ﬁnancial practices. By the time Cabal put a
$1.06 billion bid on Del Monte Foods, questions over how he got rich were every-
where.“ But the deal fell through, and Cabal disappeared. He was located in Aus-
tralia in 1998, and is currently being extradited to Mexico. As with Cardinal
Posadas, there has been no investigation to determine whether Cabal used his
banks to launder money, as the press has speculated.

Returning to the ﬁnancing of the PR1 campaign in Tabasco, given the attorney
general’s ﬁndings on Cabal’s contributions, what defense does Roberto Madrazo
have‘? The governor said that he spent 3.8 million pesos on his campaign, less than
the 4 million allowed by law. He also released a report on his expenditures that is
shown in Table 4.2. Madrazo said that these were his campaign expenditures and
that the rest of the money was used elsewhere. In sum, it is difﬁcult to determine
the origin of more than 114.6 million pesos (U.S. $32.7 million) used to ﬁnance PRI
activities in 1993-1994.

The governor of Tabasco said that Cabal never contributed to his campaign
and concluded that the money given to the PRI campaign ﬁmds was part of the

Table 4.2 PRI Campaign Expenditures in Tabasco’s
1994 Governor's Race (pesos)

Government financing 1,152,412
Contributions from party activists 238,580
Contributions from supporters 1,150,000
Contributions from self 1,229,849

Source: Roberto Madrazo, ”Precisiones,” in El Financiero, lune 18,
1996, 46.

Acknowledgments

The editors thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
for the generous ﬁnancial support that made this book possible.
Phil Williams of the University of Pittsburgh provided a useful
overall critique of the book. Adriana Perez Mina, administrator
of the Mexico Project at Georgetown, played a major role from
start to ﬁnish. She tended to the planning and logistics for our
authors’ meeting and handled the communications among the
editors and authors. She did a marvelous job in managing the
ﬂows of drafts, translations, corrections, and detail checking that
went into the preparation of the ﬁnal manuscript. Jeffrey Berman
of the National Strategy Information Center also provided help-
ﬁll support. Maria Granados, Lisa J. Kuhn, Nike Papadopoulos,
Ann Pennell, Janette Stevens, and Jeffrey Villaveces contributed
useﬁil research assistance.

We also thank Agustin Gutierrez Canet, Susana Chacon, and
Ricardo Macuzet of the Universidad Iberoamericana for hosting
our authors’ meeting in Mexico City. We note in passing that on
the day of our meeting, July 7, 1997, an armed robbery occurred
at the university’s bank. Whatever doubts we might have har-
bored about the relevance and timeliness of our study were
quickly dispelled.

96 Leonardo Curzio

party's national strategy, begun in 1993 and not limited to Tabasco, to raise money
for its ongoing political programs. Roberto Madrazo concluded: “Since 1993,
when there was neither a campaign nor a candidate, the Tabasco PRI, like its
counterparts in other states in the republic, received countless contributions from
individuals through a campaign ﬁnance board created ex proﬁeso to make them
transparent.”45

As if they had been expecting them, the governor’s explanations failed to con-
vince many sectors‘ of public opinion. When told of the ﬁles, José Agustin Ortiz
Pincheti, a magistrate from the Federal Electoral Institute in 1994, said: “For the
ﬁrst time, we see clear evidence of how the ﬁnancial political entrails of Mexican
politics are managed.”47 In any case, Madrazo’s arguments sought to relieve him
of any direct responsibility by making it very clear that the money was used by all
the PRI campaigns that year. However, nothing he said shed any light on the ori-
gin of the funds. Faced with this lack of clarity, each sector felt free to create its
own hypotheses on the origin of the money. CODEHUTAB (Consejo de Dercchos
Humanos de Tabasco, or the Tabasco Human Rights Council), a Tabasco non-
governmental human rights group close to the PRD, asked for an investigation
into the possibility that the money had been embezzled from a fund earmarked to
aid Mexicans hurt by PEMEX’s activities as required by a recommendation from
the federal National Human Rights Commission (recommendation 1oo—92).48

A national newspaper suggested that the money could have come from busi-
ness. Although the business group COPARMEX always appeared willing to sup-
port Madrazo and dismiss the PRD accusations, there are two elements to con-
sider. The ﬁrst is that some business leaders told reporters from the daily La
jornada the following: “Madrazo’s campaign didn’t ask for our cooperation, it was
real extortion. If we didn’t we wouldn’t be able to work.”49 The second was that
the COPARMEX president in Tabasco was Carlos Madrazo Cadena, the governor’s
cousin, who was removed from his post for accepting two checks for 82,500
pesos5° from the PRI for the “quick count” that the business group carried out in
the November 20, 1994, elections.“

The debate over the recipients of the ﬁinds was huge. In the boxes of docu-
ments discussed by the weekly magazine Proceso there was evidence that journal-
ists and academics were in Tabasco at the PRI’s expense. The uproar was such that
columnist German Dehesa denied his involvement.”

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 97

The boxes of campaign ﬁnance records were turned over to the treasury secre-
tary who, through federal district attorneys, failed to ﬁnd evidence of criminal be-
havior in the operations investigated by the attorney general’s office and banking
authorities.“ The rest of the documentation was sent to Tabasco authorities, and
the ﬁrst federal circuit court with residence in Villahermosa ruled that there was
no evidence to press charges against Roberto Madrazo for excessive campaign ex-
penditures.“ That was the end of the court proceedings. Still, questions remained
on the political side. The Tabasco case dominated negotiations on the 1996 elec-
toral reform and decisively inﬂuenced the drafting of new legislation regulating
ﬁnancing for political parties and the budgets approved by the 1997 campaigns,
which will be discussed in the next section.

Debate over the 1996 Electoral Reform

The electoral reform approved in late 1996 was supposed to be a “deﬁnitive” re-
form, according to the president. Despite this and the hopeful signs that pointed
toward a consensus on the constitutional aspects of the reform, the president
could not convince the main opposition parties to implement laws even though
the government and the parties spent months making a series of wide-ranging
concessions in hopes of getting a consensus.55 In the end, the PR1 deputies ap-
proved the reforms without opposition support. The biggest sticking point was
ﬁnancing for the parties. There had been agreement that public ﬁnancing would
predominate over private ﬁnancing, but there was no agreement on amounts.“
The opposition believed that the limits were excessive both in absolute and rela-

tive terms (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Public Financing of Political Parties

Amount Pesos spent
Party Amount (pesos) ($ millions) per vote in 1994
PAN 520,799,290 66.0 59.8
PRI 873,343,620 110.0 51.6
PRD 388,450,456 49.0 69.2
PT 186,254,292 23.0 207.0
Others 164,071,800 20.7 83.7

Source: Estimates from Voz y Voto; quoted in Reforma, November 15, 1996, 11A.

98 Leonardo Curzio

In 1986, the Mexican constitution was amended to state that it was in the pub-
lic interest to ﬁnance political parties and that the parties had the right to public
ﬁnancing for their activities." In fact, under the constitution, the parties’ public
ﬁnancing must predominate over other sources of ﬁ1nding.58 The distribution of
public funding is as follows: 30 percent is distributed equally to support ongoing
activities while the rest is divided proportionally according to party representa-
tion in each of the political formations.” For campaign expenditures, the parties
are given an amount similar to that received for permanent expenditures, but
only in election years.

This means that public ﬁnancing takes precedence over private ﬁnancing un-
der the new legislation. The parties can accept private donations, but they are lim-
ited. In the case of the 1997 election, the ceiling was $84,500 for each of the goo
deputies and a maximum of about $22 million for the senators.“ Public ﬁnancing
is allocated as follows: 30 percent is divided equally among the parties and divi-
sion of the remaining 70 percent depends on each party’s showing in the most re-
cent vote for the Chamber of Deputies.

The increase in public ﬁnancing for political parties was not politically accept-
able for three reasons. In the ﬁrst place, a conﬂict arose between a public treasury
dedicated to cutting costs in all areas and the prodigious amount of money going
to the parties. Second, the amount appropriated to ﬁnance the parties was about
the same as that spent on public security. Vast sectors of Mexican society disagree
with the concept of spending the same amount of money to ﬁnance political par-
ties and to ﬁght crime. It is widely known that crime has become one of the most
important issues on the public agenda in Mexico, while political parties have con-
siderably less impact on society. And third, the amount of money involved and
the pace of its growth is spectacular, as is shown in Table 4.4.

What prompted the government to accept the huge political cost of authoriz-
ing so much public ﬁnancing for political parties? There are two possibilities. The
ﬁrst is that the PRI realized that increased monitoring by opposition parties and
society at large meant that it would have less access to illegal funds for its activities
and hence decided to crack open its books. If this is true, it means that the party
backed such a huge expenditure so that it would not be forced to cut spending
that had previously come from a variety of government agencies’ budgets or from
other means. While the PRI claimed that it had spent a total of $95.4 million in

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 99

Table 4.4 Increases in Public Financing of Political
Parties, 1992-1997

Amount ($ millions,

Year Amount (pesos) rounded)
1992 86,1 74,205 28
1993 135,175,644 41

1 994 201,308,002 58
1997 2,132,917,000 267

Source: For 1992, 1993, and 1994: Memoria del proceso electoral federal,
IFE; and for 1997: Budget of IFE, 1997.

1994, including both public and private ﬁnancing, the public ﬁnancing alone for
1997 was $110 million. In other words, the party received enough to mount a real
campaign without upsetting. businessmen, or having scandals in the newspapers
or bills coming in after the election.

The second is the perception of the risk of other scandals, like the magnates’
dinner or the Tabasco case discussed earlier. It is also likely that there was a perva-
sive fear of imminent inﬁltration by organized crime, or even that it had already
occurred. The government has recognized that the amounts appropriated were
extremely high but has defended its proposals, citing “reasons of state.” President
Zedillo jumped into the controversy, defending the reform and the enormous
amount of government money given to the political parties by saying that it was a
priority to prevent them from resorting to illegal ﬁnancing.

In a speech on November 18, 1996, Zedillo summed up the recently approved

electoral reform as follows:

An agreement was reached to expedite the new general law governing the means of elec-
toral competition; and unanimously—and this is very important—the IFE general council
was created as well as an electoral court. In fact, there was agreement on the vast majority
of the substantive changes in the IFE. The main point of disagreement has been over
ﬁnancing for parties and electoral campaigns. I want to stress—because there has been a
lot of confusion over this—that this was not a disagreement among the political parties: I
want to say it clearly, the disagreement was with the Federal Executive. As a principle, I
have considered this point as one in which the State’s vision must prevail at the expense of
the necessary partiality of each political party. And the State's vision would lead Mexico,
like any nation, toward a system of preponderantly public and clearly adequate system of
ﬁnancing with the goal of ensuring transparency and certainty about the ﬁnances of those
who hold power. This system is the best guarantee that a campaign or a party will not be

100 Leonardo Curzio

subject to undesirable pressures from particular interests, including shameful promises.
We do not want Mexico, as has unfortunately occurred elsewhere, to be a place where par-
ties or candidates become vassals of people or organizations which, in fact, could be crimi-
nal.61

One of the negotiators of the 1996 electoral reform, Porﬁrio Muﬁoz Ledo,” be-
lieves that the president’s preference for public ﬁnancing was clear from the be-
ginning, and this is reﬂected very clearly in his speech. It is possible, judging from
subsequent events, to suppose that Zedillo felt uncomfortable with how his own
campaign had been ﬁnanced. Not only did he have to listen to Roberto Madrazo
say on television that huge sums of money had been spent in 1994 on all of the
1994 campaigns (not only on his own), but Zedillo also had to avoid speculation
that the Cali cartel had inﬁltrated his presidential campaign.

The issue of ﬁnancing for the 1994 presidential campaign was reopened by an
article in the weekly Proceso by Pascal Beltran del Rio. The article was based on a
conversation that he had with an American academic, Peter Lupsha, who told him
about a conversation with a U.S. DEA agent named Sandy Gonzalez. According to
that information, in April and June 1994, two aircraft took off from Colombia’s
San Andres Island carrying $40 million that belonged to the Cali cartel, and
landed in Mexico. The destination of the funds was not known. In Beltran del
Rio’s bylined article, he notes that the funds could have been for the Zedillo cam-
paign or for investments.“ We should note that Lupsha has contested Pr0ceso’s ac-

count of the conversation, writing in a letter to the weekly that it was clear

by a 70 or 80 percent probability that the previous summer (1994), the Cali cartel took
about $40 million dollars from Colombia to Mexico on two ﬂights. But I stressed that it was
a hypothesis and a conjecture based on the timing. What I said was that it may have been
used to corrupt the coming elections. It was equally likely that the money was used by
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela to buy a 707 or a 727 jet. Or to invest in developing ports or
tourist resorts.“

It is possible that he was misquoted, but Lupsha himself wrote about the
difficult subject as follows:

Usually reliable sources say that one of the major contributors from the foreign private sec-
tor to this campaign [the one in 1994] was the Cali drug traﬂicking cartel. During the late
spring and summer of 1994, they report, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela of the Cali group sent
40 million dollars (U.S.), in two shipments to Mexico. While this could have been for eco-

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 101

nomic investment, they hypothesize it was for political corruption, to guarantee Cali a su-
perior, favored and protected position in the new administration.“

Amid the quibbling, the subject has been catching the attention of inﬂuential
sectors, which consider it a rumor but are keeping an eye on it. This is the case of
the National Defense University’s Strategic Assessment, which says the following:
“Colombian organizations even are rumored to have contributed funds to the
1994 presidential campaigns of Ernesto Pérez Balladares in Panama and Ernesto
Zedillo in Mexico.”“5 Lupsha’s backing down from information given to Proceso re-
duced the impact of what was said. It was very difficult to prove that there was a
link between drug trafficking and the campaigns, but the ghost of a doubt hov-
ered above the negotiations on political reform, and perhaps the legislation and
the budgets appropriated were inﬂuenced by the same risk.

The way in which the president himself conceptualized his support for elec-
toral reform indicates that he is not prepared to give up. A president inclined to-
ward political consensus in electoral matters, as Zedillo has been, not so subtly
broke with it and left no room for reconsideration. It is impossible to determine
how worried the government was about the possibility that organized crime
would get involved in the campaigns, but it is clear that the ghost of organized

crime and its power to corrupt is a concern in Mexican political life.

Conclusion

The crisis of the Mexican political system that began in the mid-1980s paved
the way for a transition to democracy. This process has been reﬂected in three fun-
damental areas: (1) pluralization of the political system; (2) increased demand for
a genuine rule of law; and (3) demands for more accountability in management of
public resources.

During the transition period that began in 1985 (the year of the controversial
Chihuahua elections which called into question the legitimacy of the system) and
stretched into 1997, the debate over the organization of the state focused on con-
trols to guarantee a reasonable electoral system and on building and controlling
judicial and accounting mechanisms to ensure that public resources are used

legally.

102 Leonardo Curzio

New threats and conﬂicts have appeared in this gray zone of transition. The
crisis in the traditional electoral system has cost the PR1 positions in the territorial
structure and federal legislature, lessening its margin to maneuver in decision
making. Reform of the judicial system and the periodic house cleaning and re-
structuring in the attorney general’s oﬂice were aimed at reducing the margin of
tolerance or complacency that existed with regard to organized crime. Finally, in-
creased scrutiny by political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and society
at large have increased the political costs of illicit enrichment via traditional cor-
ruption.

In this scenario of displaced politicians—wh0 in addition to remaining out-
side the political game are seeing fewer opportunities to make deals via privatiza-
tion—coupled with better social controls (at the governmental level there is a lot
to do in this area), organized crime could ﬁnd the political system easy to culti-
vate. Concern about this possibility appears to be what underlies new legislation
regarding the ﬁnancing of political parties, which despite all the deserved criti-
cism is a model that addresses the nature of the Mexican transition, attempting to
meet two fundamental goals. The ﬁrst is to break the ties that link the PRI to the
government. The second is to ensure that the parties have sufﬁcient resources to
reduce the chance that organized crime may penetrate their structures, as other
pressure groups have done.

Much still needs to be written about the relationship between crime and poli-
tics in contemporary Mexico. More detailed works will follow, with evidence that
will reﬁite or conﬁrm the hypotheses we have put forward in the ﬁnal portion of
the chapter. But one thing seems clear: Mexico’s governability during this transi-
tional period still depends on arrangements between the government and the
pressure groups that have a proven capacity to destabilize an economy that ap-
pears solid and a president who won 17 million votes. The exit from the gray zone
would entail the consolidation of a state that is strong enough and anchored
ﬁrmly enough in the law so that no pressure group would be able to put the stabil-
ity of the nation at risk. But that is the topic for another discussion.

Chapter 5

Scope and Limits of an Act of
Good Faith

The PAN’s Experience at the Head of the Office
of the Attorney General of the Republic

Sigrid Arzt

THE PURPOSE or THIS CHAPTER is to identify the
challenges that the PAN (National Action Party) administration
confronted in the Ofﬁce of the Attorney General of the Republic
from December 1994 to December 1996. The chapter consists of
three main sections. The ﬁrst part provides a brief sketch of the
country’s political context in early 1995, in which there were ex-
pectations of change when, for the ﬁrst time in Mexico’s postrev-
olutionary history, a member of the opposition was appointed to
a cabinet post. The job, however, was to head up the most dis-
credited institution in the political system—the Office of the At-
torney General of the Republic (PGR).

The second main part describes the juridical and legal instru-
ments that PAN Attorney General Antonio Lozano Gracia had at
his disposal at the beginning of his term of office. This section in-
cludes a description of the functions of the PGR, the body whose
constitutional sphere of competence is to investigate and prevent
crimes under federal law. The section also includes the reforms
promoted by this administration and examines the groundwork
that was laid to professionalize both the police and public prose-
cutors. Finally, a brief diagnosis is offered of the dysfunction that
results when the army is assigned tasks that are the duty of the
federal public prosecutor’s office as a solution to the problem of

organized crime and drug trafficking.

103

104 Sigrid Arzt

Political Context

Before dealing with the condition of the Ofﬁce of the Attorney General at the
outset of President Ernesto Zedillo’s administration, we need to place in context
the political moment that Mexico was living, speciﬁcally as regards law enforce-
ment. By December 1, 1994, Mexico had already witnessed three horriﬁc political
assassinations that were replayed on television several times. During President
Salinas’ six-year term of oﬂice (1988-1994), Mexico saw the appointment of ﬁve
attorneys general, accompanied by their respective changes in personnel and
forms of organization}

Moreover, the political atmosphere at the end of Salinas’s term of oﬂice was
complicated by the course of the investigations into the assassination of PR1 Sec-
retary General José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Ruiz Massieu’s brother, who held the
post of principal deputy attorney general, began to accuse the incumbent attorney
general of obstruction of justice and of protecting members of the PR1 political
class who might be responsible for the death of Jose Francisco. Finally, Mario Ruiz
Massieu resigned and became an adviser to the Party of the Democratic Revolu-
tion (PRD). Later, in March 1995, he was arrested in the United States for making
a false declaration about the amount of currency in his possession upon entering
the country?

This turmoil was compounded by accusations and statements discrediting the
PGR, and by the continual leaks to the news media about the penetration and ex-
tent of drug trafﬁcking. No less serious were the continual abuses committed by
the federal judicial police. Experts have pointed out an image problem: Both the
PGR and the police are viewed as the “sewage” of the public ediﬁce.3

The attorney general’s office totally lacked credibility and legitimacy, and was
viewed by Mexican society as one more instrument of power for the president of
the Republic. Furthermore, the PGR was sufﬁciently powerful for the police corps
to be permeated by a culture of “unconditional obedience in exchange for im-
punity.”4 In a political gesture by Salinas, and with the aim of establishing the “in-
dependence” of the PGR in relation to the political system, Dr. Jorge Carpizo was
appointed as the ﬁrst attorney general who did not come from the ranks of the
PR1 and who, owing to his academic background, would dedicate himself to es-
tablishing the institution’s credibility and promoting the rule of law.5

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 105

During the Salinas administration and up to mid-2000 the government has
been unable to overcome the perception of the impunity that prevails in the police
corps and in the administration of justice. The government has proved incompe-
tent in reversing this image and, even worse, in sanctioning and prosecuting those

who have abused their position as public servants.

A Member of the Opposition in the Cabinet

The political crisis seriously endangered President Ernesto Zedillo’s capacity to
govern, that is, to begin his administration given such uncertainties. In a bold
move, the incoming president invited a member of the opposition to become part
of his cabinet. Zedillo had already expressed his commitment to perform major
surgery on the justice apparatusf‘ but, more than mere goodwill, this required
granting total independence to the person undertaking the task. The ﬁrst step
would be to promote amendments to the Mexican Constitution so as to achieve
greater autonomy for the performance of the office of the federal public prosecu-
tor, and therefore of the attorney general himself.7

Forthwith, Antonio Lozano, a member of the center-right PAN, was invited to
join the cabinet and undertake the necessary internal reforms to attain true rule
of law. The appointment was welcomed by society in general and even applauded
in international circles. It was undoubtedly a gesture of political commitment to
changing things and promoting democracy. It did not, however, seem the most
appropriate decision to all, and as soon as the PAN attorney general took office,
he became the target of all the system’s connivers. Expectations were very high.
Society demanded unprecedented changes, and immediately.

One of the key obstacles in effecting reforms in the PGR was the isolation that
Lozano encountered from the start. This meant that he did not have the support
of the system's other political forces. The center-left Party of the Democratic Revo-
lution (PRD), for example, undermined the credibility of this effort by accusing
the PAN of negotiating an agreement with the PRI for the post. Hard-line PR1
members, for their part, viewed what seemed a commitment to change as an act
of betrayal on Zedillo’s part, one contrary to the party’s interests. Moreover, one
could even speculate that more than one politician feared being targeted by a
“witch hunt” resulting from a real internal cleanup in the institution or by the


106 Sigrid Arzt

simple act of applying the letter of the law. Finally, even some members of the
PAN expressed concern over acceptance of the post and criticized at length the
different tasks being performed. Even with the intraparty tensions, however, the
PAN leaders acknowledged that, having demanded so often that this institution
should be in the hands of the opposition, “it would have been a contradiction, and
even an act of cowardice, not to accept it now.”3

During his inaugural address, President Zedillo acknowledged the degree of
disintegration reached by the justice system and announced a series of reforms he
would promote to change this situation. Among the ﬁrst reforms were requiring
Senate ratiﬁcation of the attorney general’s appointment and creating the Legal
Counsel for the Presidency. These were the ﬁrst pillars that granted greater inde-
pendence to the office of the public prosecutor, and hence also to the functions
and performance of the attorney general as head of that institution. This greater
independence enabled the PGR to stop acting as judge in its own case in matters
concerning the federal governmentf’ It meant that the legal counsel would deal
with the executive branch’s legal affairs and even with the development of legisla-
tive bills without involving the PGR or the attorney general.

Regardless of the reforms, however, the political assassinations that took place
during Salinas’s six-year term and the dismay produced by the “December error”
(the sudden devaluation of the peso at the end of 1994) had led the public to make
its own judgment. So, to achieve a real change in law enforcement it was essential
to do away with the ruling elite’s impunity and abuse of power. This public sense
of anxiety and frustration exerted enormous pressure on the PGR, placing it al-
ways at the center of the political debate.“ Society expected the PGR to establish
new rules on political practices and on coexistence between the different actors,
but the agency was never really prepared to accomplish that.

Faced with attacks from various quarters, on several occasions President
Zedillo had to express publicly his full support for Lozano’s work and stated, in a
republican gesture: “The Attorney General knows that he should perform his
work with absolute freedom, with no other limit than the law, and without paying
attention to pressures of any kind.”” But such backing gave rise to contrary reac-
tions and even indiscipline among members of the PR1. To illustrate this point,
from the time Lozano took oﬂice, on every March 23 the PGR was invaded by Fed-
eral District PRI groups headed by Roberto Campa. For hours, they would use

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 107

loudspeakers to demand an immediate solution to Luis Donaldo Colosio’s assassi-
nation. Once Lozano was replaced by Jorge Madrazo (on December 3, 1996), there
were no further demonstrations of this kind.

To reiterate, the PGR simply lacked credibility. Perhaps one of the most unfor-
tunate incidents that occurred at the beginning of the PAN administration was
the attempt on the life of the director of the Judicial Police, Juan Pablo de Tavira,
on December 23, 1994. De Tavira had made it clear that he would do everything
within his power to eliminate corruption and abuse in the police force and had de-
clared that “the Federal Judicial Police was not incurable.”12 Later, in January 1996,
Attorney General Lozano himself was the target of attempted murder.

Something unheard of in Mexico’s history was the imprisonment of an ex-
president’s brother, in this case, Raul Salinas.” This event, however, increased so-
cietal pressure on the PGR to investigate ex-president Carlos Salinas himself. Col-
lective judgment held the ex-president responsible for the so-called December
error. Therefore, in the public view, if justice was to be done, the ex-president him-
self should be arrested. Finally, in what appeared to be a political agreement be-
tween Zedillo and Salinas, the latter went into self-imposed exile in Ireland.“

Toward the end of 1996, a PGR team headed by the new Special Deputy Attor-
ney General Luis Raul Gonzalez Pérez traveled to Ireland to interrogate ex-presi-
dent Salinas de Gortari on the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio. Another in-
terrogation was scheduled for a few weeks later, this time in connection with the
assassination of Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, which the ex-president’s brother was
accused of plotting. In addition to these events there was a possible motion of un-
constitutionality that Attorney General Lozano could ﬁle against the executive for
a particular article in the Federal Electoral Law. The conjunction of these three fac-
tors appears to have led to Lozano’s removal from ofﬁce in December 1996. But
one should not disregard the impending midterm elections in summer 1997 and
public support for the PAN, which reached around 40 percent in the Federal Dis-
trict by December, and also may have been a factor in Zedillo’s decision.

With this as a sketch of the political context, I shall describe the responsibili-
ties and sphere of competence of the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor (Min-
isterio Publico), which is constitutionally responsible for carrying out the investi-
gation of federal crimes with the assistance of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) and
the support of experts in investigations.

108 Sigrid Arzt

Office of the Attorney General of the Republic

This section describes the functions of the Office of the Public Prosecutor (MP)
as the principal instrument of the attorney general’s office. The law states that the
MP will be assisted in its work by the Federal Judicial Police and by technical ex-
perts, who are subject to the MP3 instructions. In reality this has occurred very
little, largely because since the institution was created the PGR lacked both the
necessary autonomy to act impartially and the professionalism in its police and
experts. Along with this situation, the political regime that was established during
the system’s initial postrevolutionary stage converted the PGR into the natural
niche of authoritarianism, abuse of power, arrogance, impunity, and disrespect
for the rule of law. The PGR has acted in collusion with the political interests of
the ruling elite.

The office of the MP is incorporated into the PGR and is the essential instru-
ment of the federal justice system, representing individuals, society, and the state.
The PGR is supposed to promote and monitor fulﬁllment of the constitutional or-
der and enforce the law within its sphere of competence. It also participates in
crime prevention to ensure public security.

Article 21 of Mexico’s Constitution reads as follows:

The imposition of penalties is exclusive to the judicial authority. The investigation and
prosecution of crimes is the duty of the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor, which shall
be assisted by a police force under its immediate authority and command. It is the duty of
the administrative authority to apply sanctions for infringements of administrative and po-
lice regulations, which shall consist only of a ﬁne or arrest for up to thirty-six hours . . . De-
cisions by the Office of the Public Prosecutor on non-exercise and discontinuance of penal
action may be challenged jurisdictionally in the terms established by the law . . . public se-
curity is a function incumbent upon the Federation, the Federal District, the States and the
Municipalities, in the respective spheres of competence indicated by this Constitution. The
actions of police institutions shall be governed by the principles of legality, efﬁciency, pro-
fessionalism and honesty.15

Federal Code of Penal Proceedings (CFPP)
The CFPP establishes the procedures to guide the public prosecutor’s ofﬁce

with respect to initiating a penal action,15'17 in which case the MP18 should carry

out the investigation. The MP receives the report, accusation, or complaint, which

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 109

may be presented orally or in writing, on the facts that might constitute a legal of-
fense. The MP then should undertake all the pertinent actions for the veriﬁcation
of a crime. In such an event, the MP should demonstrate the probable responsibil-
ity of the accused. It is also the responsibility of the MP to arrest or detain sus-
pects if necessary.

Article Three of the CFPP clearly states that the Federal Judicial Police (PJF)
“will act under the authority and immediate command of the MP.”19 Therefore,
the PJF is subject to the MP’s instructions and orders. The PJF is disqualiﬁed from
receiving statements from suspects or arresting persons other than cases of ﬂa-
grante delicto. These restrictions resulted from the continual abuses committed by
PJF agents with regard to human rights violations, a situation basically stemming
from this police forces lack of adequate professionalization.

What Is a Public Prosecutor?

A public prosecutor (also called an MP) is a law graduate with a professional li-
cense who, after passing a competitive examination, joins the ranks of the attor-
ney general’s office. The MP is in charge of investigating, that is, of initiating a
preliminary investigation, analyzing whether there are facts that prove the law has
been broken, and submitting the evidence to a judge, who is responsible for im-
posing penalties for the offenses committed. It is important to point out that the
office of the public prosecutor is where the complainant presents a complaint that
can lead to an investigation.

What is the great handicap of the MPs who engage in the task of investigating
and prosecuting federal offenses? MPs are recent graduates of law schools and
lack training and professional skills when they join the PGR.2° Even so, the agency
leadership has failed to understand the importance of professionalizing the MP.
This has meant the lack of a comprehensive system of specializations in each of
the federal offenses that the PGR should prosecute. This professionalization can
hardly be expected to be self-taught. A formal academic education does not equip
MPs with a sense of governing authority in the application of law. Furthermore,
they lack the training to maintain command and oversight of an investigation—as
the law stipulates—and therefore lack awareness of the assistance they should re-
ceive from the judicial police and criminal experts.

Prior to the reestablishment of the National Institute of Penal Sciences

110 Sigrid Arzt

(INACIPE), the Training Institute (ICAP) was in charge of training and profession-
alizing public prosecutors and police ofﬁcers together. In the past, however, the
entrance mechanism stipulated that persons wishing to gain access to the institu-
tion had to pass a competitive examination.” This was an oral exam presented be-
fore a ﬁve-person board, but in reality it took place after having entered the insti-
tution. This meant that a person interested in joining the PGR ﬁrst chose what
area of the agency he was going to join and what post he could occupy. Then, after
joining, he took the competitive oral examination to match the required qualiﬁ-
cation as MP.

It was only in 1993 that the Regulations for the Career of Agent of the Federal
Public Prosecutor’s Oﬂice were issued, which made it obligatory for new members
to participate in an initial training course for public prosecutors.” The regula-
tions make up the juridical framework that establishes the legal responsibilities
entrusted to MP agents and outlines procedures for selection, entry, reentry,
training, tenure, promotion, beneﬁts, and sanctions for MPs.

The reestablishment of the INACIPE and the development of a career civil
service aimed to strengthen this institute as the sole means of entry into the PGR
took place only in August1996.‘°*3 As of the 1996 restructuring, professionalization
functions were divided. The INACIPE would train MP agents and the ICAP would
train Federal Judicial Police oﬂicers.“ As of July 2ooo, both institutes lacked inno-
vative leadership capable of constructing the necessary curricula to professional-
ize these operational personnel. Moreover, training continues to be one of the
most neglected areas in the budget of the attorney general’s office.

This neglect stems from the lack of vision that exists in society as a whole with
regard to the need to train, educate, and professionalize individuals as a sure in-
vestment that they will therefore perform their work properly, thus beneﬁting so-
ciety. Mexico lacks a general acceptance of investing in forming a solid academic
body for specialization; training generally stems from individual initiative, not
from institutional support. There is therefore a lack of specialized personnel who
can deal with basic tasks.

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 111

Restructuring of the PGR

The change toward consolidating democracy and the rule of law in Mexico still

confronts some authoritarian vices. There is broad agreement that the cancer of  

corruption hinders the administration of justice as well as the progress in promot-
ing efficiency in an institution such as the PGR. However, during the mid-1990s,
the organizational bases for addressing the challenges of delinquency in Mexico
were laid, and certain juridical reforms were introduced. This section begins with
a brief description of the organization that existed in the PGR prior to these re-
forms.”

To achieve the 1996 reforms, the new leadership undertook a series of internal
consultations with experts in the ﬁeld of law enforcement and with PGR officials.
These resulted in a new approach to the institution’s organization and adminis-
tration, as well as in the establishment of clear standards and regulations for the
operating bodies, a fundamental step in monitoring and evaluating the perform-
ance of MP agents and PJF ofﬁcers. Subsequently, the modernization of the
statutes for the prosecution of federal crimes was carried out by passage of the
Federal Law against Organized Crime.25

At the beginning of Antonio Lozano’s tour of duty, an Administrative Modern-
ization Commission was established that set about analyzing and diagnosing
problem areas within the PGR’s organizational structure. After almost a year, six
major groups of obstacles were identiﬁed: (1) lack of coordination between areas;
(2) absence of controls; (3) lack of institutional balance; (4) insufficient informa-
tion and technological development; (5) deﬁcient administration of material and
human resources; and (6) lack of overall vision of the fUI1CtlOIlS of the PGR.”

In order to address these severe internal institutional deﬁciencies, Attorney
General Lozano and his team adopted the following actions: deﬁning the institu-
tional mission; undertaking a comprehensive change by establishing objectives
and strategies; instilling a sense of commitment to the institution. To achieve the
restructuring, the government amended the Organic Law of the PGR and its regu-
lations.‘°*3 The driving aim behind the process of restructuring was to attain the
rule of law. The main goal was to make the attorney general’s ofﬁce a modern and
honorable institution with the capacity to combat federal crimes, but also to re-

cover society’s conﬁdence and recognition.” The deﬁnitive step in talking of a

112 Sigrid Arzt

Table 5.1 Reorganization of PGR, August 1996

Before the August 1996 reform

After the 1996 reform

General Office of the Deputy Attorney Generala
General Directorate of the Federal

judicial Police”
General Inspector's Office‘
State Delegations

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for
Preliminary Investigations“

Directorate of Preliminary Investigations

General Directorate of Expert Services

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Control
of Proceedings‘*

General Directorate of Control of Proceedings

General Directorate of Amparo (Protective
Injunction)

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for
juridical Affairs‘

General Directorate of juridical Affairs

General Directorate of International
Legal Affairs

Attaché’s Offices

Special Deputy Attorney General’s Office9

Office of the Chief Administrative Officer“

General Directorate of Human Resources

General Directorate of Programming

General Directorate of Control of Confiscated
Goods

General Directorate of Information and
Statistics Systems

General Directorate of Air Services

Office of the Internal Comptroller‘

General Directorate of Supervision and Audit

General Directorate of Protection of Human
Rights

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for General
Coordination and Development

General Directorate of Criminalistic Services

General Directorate of Planning and
Technological Development

General Directorate of Coordination,
Planning and Operation of the PjF

General Directorate of Inter-institutional
Coordination

General Directorate of Promotion of
Ministerial Security

Training Institute

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Penal
Proceedings ”A”

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Penal
Proceedings ”B”

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Penal
Proceedings ”C"

Deputy Attorney General’s Office for
International juridical Affairs

General Directorate of Amparo
(Protective Injunction)

General Directorate of Contentious and
Consultative Matters

General Directorate of Constitutionality

Special Deputy Attorney General’s Office

Office of the Chief Administrative Officer

General Directorate of Human Resources

General Directorate of Programming

General Directorate of Control of Confiscated
Goods

General Directorate of Information and
Statistics Systems

General Directorate of Air Services

Office of the Internal Comptroller
General Directorate‘of Supervision
General Directorate of Audit

General Directorate of Complaints and

Accusations

General Directorate of Human Rights
Performance Evaluation Unit

General Inspector's Office

General Directorate of Inspection
General Directorate of Internal Inspection

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 113

Before the August 7996 reform After the 1996 reform

General Directorate of Media Communicationl General Directorate of Media Communication

General Directorate of Crime Prevention and General Directorate of Crime Prevention
Community Services“ and Community Services

National Institute for the Fight against FEADS - Special Prosecutor's Office for
Drugs (INCD)' Attention to Health Crimes

Training Institute (ICAP)'“ Training Institute (ICAP)

Center Planning for Drug Control (CENDRO) National Institute of Penal Sciences

Special Prosecutor's Office against Special Prosecutor's Office against
Electoral Offenses Electoral Offenses

Sources: Mexico, ”Organic Law of the PGR,” Gaceta Oﬁcial, 1996. Also, organization chart in Antonio F.
Lozano, Compromisos con la /usticia, Informe de Gestién de Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia, Procurador General de
la Republica (Mexico: Epessa, S.A. de C.V., 1998), 232.

Notes: a. The Federal Judicial Police was under the authority of the General Office of the Deputy Attorney
General, as was the Inspector's Office, which could deal with any matter of its interest; it also had an area of
Special Investigations. There was therefore an overlapping of functions and power at the level of internal com-
mand. See "Regulations of the Organic Law of the PGR,” Gaceta Oficial, October 8, 1993. The office was held
by Hiram Escudero Alvarez (PAN).

b. Prior to December 1994, the post was held by Commander Adrian Carrera, who has been linked to
health crimes but is currently facing charges of money laundering only. Subsequently the post was held briefly
by Juan Pablo de Tavira. See Proceso, July 16, 1995. On January 19, Commander Enrique Ga’ndara Chacén was
provisionally appointed to the position, which he held from December 1994 to January 1996. He was replaced
by Américo Flores Nava, who purportedly left when he was unable to solve the murder of agent Isaac Sanchez,
perpetrated in Mexico City in June 1996. He was followed by Commander Emilio lslas Rangel. See SUN, August
15, 1996.

c. Post was held by Trista’n Sanchez Canales, into whose home a grenade was thrown. See La /ornada (Mex-
ico City), July 24, 1996.

d. Post was held by Manuel Galan (PRI) from May 1994 to December 1996.

e. Post was held by Dr. Moisés Moreno (PRI) from December 1994 to 1996.

f. Post was held by Rafael Estrada Samano (PAN).

g. After the entry of Pablo Chapa Benzanilla, it became a Special ‘Deputy Attorney General’s Office with
three prosecutor's offices to deal with the cases of Cardinal Posadas and the assassinations of presidential candi-
date Luis Donaldo Colosio and PRI Secretary General José Francisco Ruiz Massieu.

h. José Antonio Géndara Terrazas (PAN) was appointed to the post.

i. According to regulations, this area came under the authority of the office of the chief administrative offi-
cer, but it operated directly with Attorney General Lozano. The head of the area was Leticia de Anda Munguia.

J. Juan Ignacio Zavala (PAN) was in charge of this office.

k. This directorate was headed by Guillermo Leén Ramirez Pérez (no party affiliation).

I. The head of this institute was René Paz Horta, who was replaced in May 1996 by the ex-attorney general
of the state of Chihuahua, Francisco Molina (PAN).

m. At the beginning of the PAN administration, General Rodolfo Alvarado (retired army officer, with no
party affiliation) headed this institute. He was succeeded by Norma Guido, and when the restructuring was set
in motion, it was headed by Dr. Marco Antonio Besares (PRI).

consolidation of democracy in Mexicds case requires, as a sine qua non, respect for
the law in the fullest sense of the word. This means its impartial enforcement un-
der the existing regulations without detriment to anyone and without excluding
anyone.”

Professionalizatlon

One of the ﬁrst ﬁndings from the internal diagnosis in the PGR was the lack of
a comprehensive system of professionalization for its operational bodies, the MP,

114 Sigrid Arzt

PJF, and investigative experts. Training programs for professionals were far below
the minimum acceptable standards as regards the performance of the office of the
federal public prosecutor and its subsidiary bodies.” There was undoubtedly a
need to place priority on furthering professionalization and specialization in or-
der to improve the capacity to investigate crimes and carry out preliminary inves-
tigations, streamline follow-up of judicial proceedings, and eradicate corruption.
But, similarly, the course of penal proceedings had to be restructured, since the
preliminary investigation was typically handled by one MP while the ﬁnal stages
of the same investigation were handled by another one. The investigative process
was fragmented at various stages, and this typically caused evidence, statements,
and case records to be lost.

Perhaps the clearest example of concentration of power and lack of checks was
the general office of the deputy attorney general, which toward the end of the Sali-
nas administration had become a mini-attorney general’s office within the PGR it-
self.” This concentration of authority was the result of the division between the
different chains of command in the operational bodies. In other words, the attor-
ney general had authority over the public prosecutors and in theory also over the
judicial police, but in fact the latter reported directly to the principal deputy attor-
ney general.”

The restructuring effort became the most far-reaching internal process that the
institution had ever faced. Nevertheless, the backlogs and day-to-day inertia in
many areas slowed the pace of reform to such an extent that the urgent institu-
tional change was not fully consolidated by the time of Lozano’s departure. To
modernize the PGR and make it more efficient, twelve strategic objectives were es-
tablished, the most important being to reduce the crime rate, do away with im-
punity, professionalize public servants, combat drug trafficking and organized
crime, and eliminate corruption. Below we take a closer look at the areas targeted
for reform.

The restructuring model selected required the elimination of the deputy attor-
ney general’s offices for preliminary investigations and for control of proceedings
and brought about the creation of three deputy attorney general’s oﬂices for penal
proceedings (“A,”  and “C”). The main function of the deputy attorney gen-
eral’s offices was to concentrate the entire criminal action proceedings under a sin-

gle command. This meant that the MP in charge of a case would supervise it at

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 115

every stage, without losing control of the preliminary investigation, the follow-up
on the proceedings, and the holding of the accused for trial if so ruled by the judge.

The changes in responsibilities grew out of an effort to balance the workload as
fairly as possible. Certainly one of the most innovative aspects concerned the over-
sight of the PGR’s ﬁeld offices. Each of the states and the Federal District has a
PGR delegation (ﬁeld office) with a subdelegate in charge of the judicial police. In
the new scheme each of the deputy attorney general’s offices would have direct
control over a speciﬁc group of state delegations.“ The distribution of ﬁeld ofﬁces
among the states aims to closely monitor each delegation’s performance in order
to avoid abuses of authority or other shortcomings in handling investigations.
The former general ofﬁce of the deputy attorney general became the deputy attor-
ney general’s office for general coordination and development in the new scheme,
with the aim of taking away the absolute control it had exercised over the institu-
tion’s operations.” This area would also handle coordination and linkage with
state attorney generals’ offices.

Until November 1996, the Federal Judicial Police were directed by a technical
council for planning and coordination of operations whose main function was to
organize and supervise the planning of operations to be carried out by PJF units
under the command of the respective MPs.35 Two areas of counterbalance, con-
trol, and internal supervision were strengthened: the General Inspector's Office
and the Internal Comptroller’s Oﬂice. The General Inspector’s Office acts as a
technical means for supervision and control of the operational bodies, a sort of
“internal affairs” office. The General Inspector’s Ofﬁce became hierarchically de-
pendent on the attorney general, which allowed the head of the MP to have ﬁrst-
hand information on the PGR ofﬁcials’ performance enforcing the law. Of special
interest was the follow-up on Federal Judicial Police officers. Furthermore, the in-
spector would be in charge of a specialized unit dealing in crimes committed by
the PGR’s public servants.

The Comptroller’s Ofﬁce was strengthened in order to audit and supervise the
different internal units and bodies of the PGR. This oﬂice is responsible for the
Ongoing Program for Detection of Narcotics and Psychotropic Drug Consump-
tion.37 It is also responsible for supervising drug incineration, in addition to re-
sponding to the recommendations issued by the National Human Rights Com-
mission. The poor operation and lack of resources and trained personnel to carry

Organized
Crime
81 Democratic

Governability

116 Sigrid Arzt

out the tasks of supervision and monitoring that these areas are responsible for
contributed to the weakening and corruption of the performance of personnel. It
was essential to provide resources and transparent supervision mechanisms to
achieve the internal counterbalances that are required for the functions of the
public prosecutor’s office.

The deputy attorney general’s Ofﬁce for Juridical Affairs was redesignated as
International Juridical Affairs, with the main objective of maintaining close rela-
tions with similar bodies in the ﬁelds of cooperation and extradition treaties and
personnel training at the international level.” This area also has the responsibility
for monitoring the constitutional provisions that assist the attorney general in ex-
amining the disputes that arise in the Federation.” The National Institute to Com-
bat Drugs (INCD)4° was recast in order to undertake specialized work in the
broader ﬁght against organized crime. The INCD sought to strengthen its opera-
tional areas and reduce the administrative work it carried out. With the reorgani-
zation, the INCD would have an MP specializing in the ﬁght against organized
crime, speciﬁcally against drug trafﬁcking.

It should be emphasized that the INCD was created in June 1993 with a serious
defect.“ The person initially appointed to head the institution was not a lawyer, as
required under PGR statutes. The ﬁgure of “commissioner” was therefore created
to satisfy this formality.“ This juridical deﬁciency resulted in the creation of a
speciﬁc directorate of preliminary investigations to deal with health crime investi-
gations initiated in the INCD. This adjustment involved two issues: First, al-
though the commissioner might be informed about an investigation, he was un-
able to act on it dejure. Since the commissioner was not a lawyer, he could not act
as a public prosecutor, and therefore, according to law, he could not investigate.
Second, the creation of the INCD seemed more of a political gesture in response to
U.S. pressures than an effective professionalization project in the ﬁght against
drug trafﬁcking.

Prior to the scandal that prompted the removal in 1997 of General Jesus
Gutiérrez Rebollo as INCD commissioner, Attorney General Jorge Madrazo had
to issue an amendment whereby command decision making by the public prose-
cutor in the INCD was newly eliminated, an adjustment that had already been
rectiﬁed by the PAN administration. Once again, since the commissioner was not

a lawyer, his investigation and prosecution of crimes as a public prosecutor were

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 117

illegal. However, the modiﬁcation did not last long, since in February 1997 Gen-
eral Gutiérrez Rebollo was accused of providing protection for the Juarez Cartel,
headed by Amado Carrillo.

Some months later the INCD was renamed the Special Prosecutor’s Office for
Health Crimes (FEADS). As of 2ooo, the FEADS operates through three major ar-
eas: ﬁrst, the Border Task Forces (BTFs) comprised of Mexican and American law

  enforcement authorities operating in the Mexican border states; second, the Or-

ganized Crime Unit (UCO); and third, an anti—money laundering unit, which was
created in January 1998. All of these units focus on anti—drug traﬂicking opera-
tions. The FEADS and UCO develop operations that range from eradication ef-
forts, to drug interdiction (land, air, and sea), to the application of the Federal
Law against Organized Crime.“

The UCO owes its regulatory and operational framework to the implementa-
tion of the Federal Law against Organized Crime (LFvsCO). Article 8 of the law es-
tablishes the creation of a specialized unit to investigate and prosecute organized
crimes.“ This specialized unit should also have a technical group made up of ex-
perts in methods of interception of private communications. This unit should
have the training to evaluate the intercepted information. The initial effort to
launch this unit was led by Dr. Samuel Gonzalez Ruiz, who also participated
closely in drafting the LFvsCO. Dr. Gonzalez headed the UCO until December
1998, when he accepted an appointment as a consular official in Spain. Gonzalez
was succeeded at the UCO by José Trinidad Larrieta.

FEADS has a Conﬁdence Control Center, an area in charge of investigating in
depth the background of the staff that operate within it. This center works in close
coordination with the FBI and DEA, owing to continued evidence of penetration
by the drug cartels in the structure of the attorney general’s oﬂice.45 Unfortu-
nately, this personnel veriﬁcation appears to have been implemented so far only
in this department. Not surprisingly, it is the area that has the most contact with
U.S. authorities.“

The UCO should be an elite unit. One of the main reasons for this is to have
close control over the officials administering the LFvsCO. The core of these is a
small group of well-trained public prosecutors. Also, the selective recruitment
permits the vetting of the members of the UCO at least every six years by DEA and
FBI authorities in conjunction with their Mexican counterparts.

118 Sigrid Arzt

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the special investigative tools such as
undercover agents, the witness protection program, and wiretapping can be re-
sponsibly applied only by the public prosecutors who have passed the Control
Centers tests and the vetting process mentioned above.

The restructuring of the PGR marked the beginning of a new stage in one part
of the justice apparatus in which the rule of law should prevail above all else. It
should also be pointed out that it is not enough to have the regulatory framework,
or the expression of goodwill," to implement the changes required, but rather a
change must be effected in the bureaucratic culture to make it professional. The
political leadership should also provide sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources and trans-

parent monitoring mechanisms for the proper functioning of the institution.

Federal Judicial Police

As mentioned earlier, one of the most serious matters for the PGR is the lack of
adequate professionalization of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF). This police force
combines corruption and impunity with a lack of professionalism, a lack of con-
trol over the use of resources, and a lack of clear objectives. Efforts have been
made to regulate the PJF’s operations and functions, the ﬁrst of these coming in
March 1993 when the Regulations for the Career of Federal Judicial Police Officer
were created.“ Subsequently, during Attorney General Lozano’s reorganization,
he stated on several occasions that what he found was a force of almost 4,000
agents with incomplete or nonexistent records (Table 5.2) and without the proper
training to perform the functions of police ofﬁcers.

The task of professionalizing this force would be enormous. Formal regulations
were drafted to clearly deﬁne the functioning and responsibilities of the P]F,49 and
from that time onward agents would be closely supervised and trained to deal with
crimes in a professional manner.5° The institution charged exclusively with per-

Table 5.2 Number of ludlcial Police,
1988-1998

7988 7991 1992 1993 7995 1997 7998

900 2900 2200 1500 4500 3200 2900

Source: For the period 1988-1994, see S. Gonzalez et al.,
Seguridad Ptiblica en México, 103. PGR records.

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 119

forming this function is the Training Institute (ICAP) mentioned above. However,
weeding out problem agents, training, and enforcing internal regulations did not
appear to be the only tasks required. Parallel to this effort, a redeﬁnition of the un-
age of the PGR and of the judicial police had to be undertaken. Up to that time,
many of those who joined the PJF did so because they shared the values of abuse of
power and illicit enrichment with their predecessors. Thus, the new recruits were
willingly socialized into the existing, corrupt value structure. Having discovered
this enormous deﬁciency as a result of applying axiological examinations, Attor-
ney General Lozano set about strengthening and applying training courses in
ethics.51 Owing to the factors described above, it appeared that the transformation
of the police would entail an investment of at least ten to twelve years.

As the last step in the appointment process for applicants selected by the PJF,
the PGR should carry out, with the scarce resources and personnel at its disposal,
an in-depth veriﬁcation of the candidates’ documents and records. This veri-
ﬁcation effort requires at a minimum efficient coordination among the Ministry
of Defense, the Ministry of Education—to check the authenticity of the certiﬁcate
of studies—and the Ministry of the Interior.” The lack of automated data banks
and the bureaucratic inertia of each of these institutions make it almost impossi-
ble, or at least very slow, to clear potential full-time PGR employees. This has pro-
vided opportunities for the entry of unreliable candidates or even ones who are al-
ready colluding with organized crime.

Once the training course has been completed, the PJF agent goes on to form
part of the General Directorate of the Federal Judicial Police, which became the
General Directorate of Planning and Operation of the P]F.53 Its director is cur-
rently (]uly zooo) a military officer who performs the following functions: moni-
toring the police; supervising the quality of the formal procedures carried out dur-
ing the preliminary investigation; executing writs of attachment, searches, and
other writs issued by the judicial authority, as well as warrants of arrest; and su-
pervising and evaluating operational results.54

Certainly the above description suggests that at least the basic instruments of
operation, command, coordination, and regulatory framework are in place. Nev-
ertheless, I will suggest a basic issue that is working against strengthening the rule
of law. Having a military ofﬁcer as head of the judicial police breaks the basic func-
tional principle of the backbone of the attorney general’s office. There are two rea-

120 Sigrid Arzt

sons for this: First, the military ofﬁcer does not subordinate himself to the civilian
authority,“ and second, he is not trained for the tasks that the law imposes on the
PJF. I won’t go into further detail, but the presence of military ofﬁcers in key posts
leaves the current attorney general without essential support in performing the
tasks assigned to him by the Constitution. Therefore, once again we have a situa-
tion that violates the law. Now, the logic appears to be that the crisis of rampant
criminality and the penetration and corruption of the police apparatus leave no
alternative. A military officer is appointed under the logic that because of his
training and discipline, he will impose order and resist corruption. But reality has
proven the contrary.“ Members of the army are currently offered large sums of
money to “turn a blind eye” to drug traffickers’ operations.

In addition, and given the increase in drug trafficking for some time now, the
most coveted positions have been those in the north of the country. To obtain
them it is necessary for aspirants to a certain state ﬁeld office to take part in a
p0lla.57 The polla can collect sums as high as $30 million. Contributions for the
polla can range from US$1o,ooo to US$4oo,ooo, depending on the post one
wishes to occupy——that is, delegate, commander, judicial police agent, etc.—and
on the delegation or office one wishes to join.53 Obviously the money is of illicit
origin, and it is the ﬁrst link in the chain of collusion between drug trafﬁckers,
public prosecutors, and police agents. Commanders tend to have a select group of
agents in their conﬁdence who are in charge of collecting the money and transmit-
ting it to the appropriate authorities to ensure an appointment to a particular po-
sition. Recently these positions have been ﬁlled by military oﬂicers, which has ex-
posed them to huge sums of money.

Moreover, the rigorous training of army personnel does not include training in
skills for dealing with society. The military are trained to kill in order to safeguard
the state; police oﬂicers should be trained to protect society. If the appropriate re-
orientation does not occur soon, we will continue to lack adequate operation and
training of the PJF.

Weeding Out the Federal Judicial Po|ice——What Do We Gain?

Toward mid-1996, and in response to the results of the axiological examina-
tions, it was decided to operate on two fronts in the PJF: ﬁrst, to reformulate the

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 121

study plans and requirements-for entry into the PJF, and second, to weed out un-
desirable ofﬁcers.tIn the exercise of his authority, Attorney General Lozano dis-
missed a total of 826 PJF agents, among them 22 of the 33 subdelegates,59 reaching
an overall total of 1,200 during his term of ofﬁce. This was done because the drug
traffickers had inﬁltrated the police force. The action involved joint efforts
throughout the country during which agents’ PJF insignia or badge were collected.
The operation aimed to remove the key instrument of their impunity—the badge,
undoubtedly a symbol of power——which, together with their weapon, enabled
them to act with total impunity. ,

The basis for weeding out was to identify the agents who lacked the ethical
characteristics required to perform their ﬁinctions. The dismissals also resulted
from reports issued by the Ministry of the Comptroller General and Administra-
tive Development, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of the Inte-
rior; these ministries worked together to remove those agents most in collusion
with organized crime and drug trafficking. For example, there were delegations in
which all the agents were removed and the army took over because of the degree
of contamination that existed.“ However, the army’s stay was temporary in View
of the antecedent of the Chihuahua experiment, where they had shown signs of
being corruptible.“ The special forces positioned in Chihuahua had served there
for almost a year, after which they were removed because they were just as con-
taminated as the civilian police by the narco-corruption.

Unfortunately, the P]F’s internal weeding out measures enjoyed little support
and were insuﬂicient in the face of penetration by drug traﬂickers. In fact, society
viewed the measures as theatrics to divert attention, and even as a mechanism to
sidetrack and confuse public opinion so as to forget the overwhelming failures
registered by the administration.” Incredible as it may seem, the clean-up of the
police forces, together with the measure to take an internal census, led to the in-
troduction for the ﬁrst time of a reliable automated data bank within the institu-
tion, containing information on the members of the PJF. Before this time, such in-
formation was incomplete, inaccurate, or simply did not exist. Along with these
actions, the ﬁrst steps were taken to establish a civilian career model in the opera-
tional forces. This model had three basic elements: training public prosecutors
and police officers; supervising and closely monitoring their performance; and
above all, instilling a sense of pride in belonging to the PGR, which would be ac-

122 Sigrid Arzt

companied by expectations of professional development. Furthermore, the police
training model brought to bear national and international norms regulating the
functions that a police officer should perform in society.“

As of 1996, the institutional bases consisted of at least the following elements:
a system of comprehensive academic training accompanied by social recognition;
clear standards of competence and operation; basic principles of behavior, ethical
conduct, and transparent rules on the use of force; and systems of administra-
tion, control, supervision, and evaluation which differentiated the operational
command from the authority for administrative control. Society also had to be
informed about these measures and demand their strict application in order
to share the responsibility for the changes and to monitor the actions under-
taken.

The Professionalization Council of the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor
was established as a result of the restructuring and weeding-out process. The pur-
pose of this collegiate body was to authorize the guidelines for supervision, con-
trol, and evaluation of a civil service career program. As a priority, it would deal
with the area of the Federal Judicial Police. However, the three operational forces
that made up the functions of the PGR were included. The council began its work
in August 1996 and as of mid-2ooo its results, and the progress made in applying
the regulations and strengthening the civil service career, are unknown.

Federal Law against Organized Crime

A third step undertaken by the PAN administration was that of modernizing
the legal framework to attack organized crime, particularly that associated with
drug trafficking. The Federal Law against Organized Crime was passed in Novem-
ber 1996; its incorporation into Mexican law meant a radical change in the legal
framework to combat organized crime.“ However, at the outset the preliminary
draft encountered enormous resistance from constitutional experts, lawyers, aca-
demics, and the public in general.“ The ﬁrst bill, introduced on October 2, 1996,
underwent modiﬁcations to forty-eight of its ﬁfty-four articles prior to its ﬁrst
reading before the Senate on October 26 of that same year.

At present organized crime is accurately perceived as the main cause of public
insecurity, as well as a national security problem. The State has shown itself inca-

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General’s Office 123

pable of effectively enforcing the law and, even worse, appears to be a victim of
the phenomenon. Attorney General Jorge Madrazo recently declared: “The enemy
is within."55 Criminal organizations play a signiﬁcant role in relations with diverse
actors in public life. The press tells of their penetration and the State’s deﬁciencies
in combating them, as well as of their power."

Two positions were adopted with the creation of the Federal Law against Orga-
nized Crime: (1) those who opposed the changes because they believed that the
changes violated civil liberties;58 and (2) those who promoted the reforms under
the essential premise of acquiring a modern, sophisticated legal framework to at-
tack the phenomenon of criminality that had developed in Mexico. The central
features of the Federal Law against Organized Crime are: a deﬁnition of organized
crime as a concept and techniques to investigate those who carry out this activ-
ity—with emphasis on the right to tap private communications, rewards, the use
of undercover agents, and protection for persons who take part in penal proceed-
ings, that is, a witness protection program.”

As of mid-zooo, the investigative activities carried out by the Unit against Or-
ganized Crime suffer from a lack of strong leadership, lack of professionalization,
and insufficient will to take on challenging investigations. A number of internal ri-
valries within the Unit and the departure of key personnel have further hampered
effectiveness. Progress is being made in dismantling criminal organizations,
but-—with one or two exceptions—we have yet to see stiff sentences being handed
down by the Judiciary for this illicit activity. Also, the Executive or Legislative
Branch should promote regulations for the proper enforcement of the Federal Law
against Organized Crime.

Challenges Faced in Modernizing the Attorney General's Office

I shall sum up some of the points and concepts concerning the operations of
the PGR. First, it should be understood that the attorney general is head of the
federal public prosecutor’s office and that the latter is in charge of carrying out in-
vestigations with the assistance of the PJF and crime experts. Second, neither of
the two institutes responsible for training civilian personnel to carry out the func-
tions of criminal investigation and prosecution (INACIPE and ICAP) has suﬂicient
material or human resources available to meet the challenge of professionalizing

124 Sigrid Arzt

Table 5.3 Budget of the Office of the Attorney
General of the Republic (in pesos)

7995 7996 1997 7998

960 million 1.6 billion 2.4 billion 3.556 billion

Source: Lozano, La jornada (1998), 85.

the PGR’s operational bodies. It is not enough to count on technical and training
support from similar agencies of other countries such as the United States, France,
and Israel; it is necessary to establish a permanent, professional technical body,
modern curricula, and a comprehensive training program with real economic re-
sources. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the attorney general’s budget from 1995
through 1998.

Third, there is no overall vision of the operations and professional administra-
tion of the attorney general’s office in the federal government and society as a
whole. The discredit, poor image, lack of professionalism, bureaucratic culture,
and vested interests within the system of justice—partly the result of the eco-
nomic power acquired by drug trafﬁckers--are still the main obstacles to moving
forward with institutional reform. Furthermore, the use of the army to combat
crime has created an impasse in the proper training of the P]F.7° Prosecutors do
not have proper assistance in carrying out investigations. The army has commit-
ted numerous human rights violations. Curiously, Attorney General Madrazo
stated before the National Human Rights Commission that “the Army cannot
carry out police functions.”71 He, like his predecessor, speaks of a temporary army
presence. Society seems to place more trust in the military institution,” but this
may also reﬂect its despair at the rise in crime and the defenseless state in which it
ﬁnds itself. We should note that other experiences show us how the incorporation
of army personnel into police ﬁmctions leaves a wake of impunity and abuses,”
and their involvement does not therefore contribute to strengthening the rule of
law. Their long-term involvement serves as a palliative that acts to the detriment
of the army, because more often than not they do not solve the underlying prob-
lem.

The main challenge is undoubtedly to develop a strategic overall vision to com-

bat public insecurity and strengthen the administration of justice and the rule of

PAN at the Head of the Attorney General's Office 125

law. Above all, this implies removing the prevailing antidemocratic culture in the
exercise of law. The modernization of the attorney general’s oﬂice should be kept
separate from political interests in order to avoid the vestiges of Mexican authori-
tarianism.

It is urgent to eradicate the culture of corruption and impunity, but this re-
quires the participation of society in building transparent mechanisms to monitor
the institutions in charge of providing security.” The absence of a step of this
magnitude endangers not only the progress of Mexican democracy but even the
very survival of the State. On the threshold of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Mexico
must ensure a democratic and impartial system of security and justice based on
law that is capable of protecting society and the State from rampant organized
crime and drug traﬂicking.


Chapter 6

Containing Armed Groups,
Drug Trafficking, and
Organized Crime in Mexico

The Role of the Military

Raul Benitez Manaut

THE MEXICAN TRANSITION taking place at the end of
the twentieth century and into the new millennium has deeply
altered economic, social, political, and international relations at
all levels. Both in civil society and in state and government struc-
tures, these changes have shifted the position of key actors in na-
tional life. In civil society, businesspeople, union leaders, mer-
chants, intellectuals, and journalists have a new role. Some are
becoming stronger in society and in relation to the state; others
are seeing their position diminished. Within the state and the
political system, the actors who traditionally played key roles in
the years of full hegemony of the institutionalized Mexican revo-
lution (from the 19303 to the 19803) are witnessing the deteriora-
tion of their image.

Similarly, the emergence of highly inﬂuential transnational
forces at the end of the century have had an impact on political
change in Mexico. Many of these actors are considered to be new
threats to international security, such as the large drug traffick-
ing maﬁas. All of this creates a diﬂicult scenario for Mexico and
its core state structures. The military, as set forth in the Constitu-
tion, must act as the arm that exercises legitimate violence to face
the risk that negative factors, both internal and external, can en-
danger the nation and its security.

126

The Role of the Military 127

This chapter analyzes the changes in the civilian—military relationship that
stem from the new conditions in the country at the end of the twentieth century. It
ﬁirther examines the missions being given to the armed forces because of un-
governability and instability (both real and potential) in the country. Certain phe-
nomena are reappearing on the social and political scenes in Mexico, including the
growth in drug traﬂicking and organized crime, the emergence of armed groups
such as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN, the Zapatista Na-
tional Liberation Army) and the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR, the Peo-
ple’s Revolutionary Army), the increase in public insecurity, and the great crisis in
the country’s judicial institutions, which are being overwhelmed by these actors.

The Military: History, Doctrine, and Missions

The successful demilitarization of Mexico’s political life coincided with the in—
stallation of its postrevolutionary political system, which is monopolized by a
product of the army-—the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).1 An implicit re-
lationship of cooperation was established between the PRI and the army, in which
the military was officially subordinated, as set forth in the Constitution of 1917, to
the commander in chief of the military, the president of the Republic.” The mili-
tary has ceased to be pivotal for political control and governability and only acts
in times of serious political crisis, when the police forces are overwhelmed. This
has occurred in rural areas with high social and political violence (such as the
State of Guerrero, where guerrillas emerged in the 19703) and at times of great po-

litical crisis, such as to contain the student movement of 1968:

The Mexican army has the grave responsibility of maintaining domestic peace and order,
as set forth in the Constitution, so that our institutions may function, Mexicans may enjoy
the liberty guaranteed by the law, and the country may continue making progress. The way
the army fulﬁlled its commitments [with regard to the student movement of September
and October 1968——RBM] is clear proof that we can trust in its patriotism and its civil and
institutional conviction to reestablish order and immediately return to its normal activi-
ties.3

In terms of military doctrine, the Constitution grants the Mexican military
two missions: defending sovereignty (defending the country from foreigners) un-
der Defense War Plan 1 (DN-I) and maintaining domestic order under Defense

128 Raul Benitez Manaut

War Plan 2 (DN-II).4 Similarly, the Constitution provides for the establishment of
a national guard for DN-11.5 However, that force does not exist because the legisla-
ture has not created it under the corresponding law, which leaves the security
forces to maintain domestic security. Only when those forces are overtaken do the
army and navy take action under plan DN-II. A third war plan was incorporated
into the Organic Law of the Army in the 1970s: Defense War Plan 3 (DN-III),
which consists of assisting the civilian population in support and rescue activities
in times of natural disaster.“

For our purposes, it is the DN-II plan that truly deﬁnes the structure, organiza-
tion, and territorial organization of the army. It dates back to the Mexican Revolu-
tion, when the revolutionary armies were gradually disarmed and subordinated
to centralized civilian leadership, but the army was still deployed to prevent rebel-
lions. Subsequently, owing to the lack of security forces in the countryside, the
army began to act as a rural police: “The rural defense corps concept has been on-
going for many years and primarily provides the army and the government addi-
tional loyal eyes and ears in the countryside. Indications are that plans are being
made to streamline and improve the effectiveness of these forces, which reinforce
the military presence provided by the partida system. These rural defense forces
are drawn from Mexico’s ejido (communal farm) system.”7

Similarly, because of the make-up and structure of the military (see Figure 6.1
and Table 6.1) and its “social” nature, and because of the shortcomings in the in-
stitutional coverage of other units of the federal government, the army uses its de-
ployment in rural areas to carry out civic action programs. In this way it allows the

government to have an institutional presence.

The Mexican army has a rich tradition of rendering assistance to the civilian population,
the foundations of which date back to the early 1920s. The army engaged in such tasks as
building roads, constructing irrigation works, and repairing railroad and telegraph lines.
The 1926 organic law of the armed forces formally made civic action a part of the army’s
overall mission. Article 81 of the law provided for the use of military resources in the con-
struction of communications networks and public works that had some correlation with
the overall needs of the military.8

Up to the present, the army (not the Ministry of Health) has been responsible
for vaccination campaigns in some of the poorest regions in the country and on

many occasions has even been responsible for distributing food staples. These so-

The Role of the Military 129

Figure 6.1. Organization of the Mexican Army, 1997

Secretary of Defense I
Undersecretary of Mexican Air Force _ Commander
Defense (F.A.M.) in Chief of
F.A.M.
I
Air Force
Chief of Staff _ 3 Regions
I 18 Zones
12 Military Regions Defense Ministry's Deputy Air
40 Military Zones Chief of staff Force Cmef
| l of Staff
Deputy Chief for Deputy Chief for
Administration Operations
I I I I I I I I I I
S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5 S-6 S-7 S-8 S-9 S-1 0
Human lntelli- Opera- Material Strategic Program- Public Military Military Anti-
|Resources gence tions |Resources Planning ming & Relations Justice Doctrine Drug

Eva|ua- Traffick-

tion ing Op-

erations

Elaboraciénz Raul Benitez Manuat

cial duties also serve to conduct “preventive intelligence,” although originally they
were not part of any counterinsurgency activities:

Civic action, generally composed of a variety of developmental—type projects, brings the
officer corps in contact with rural poverty and ordinary Mexicans. . . . The military is the
entity representative of the federal government in the hinterland, and in that sense per-
forms a political function for the political leadership. . . . Military civic action did not origi-
nate as counterinsurgency measures but as a component of the armed forces revolutionary
tradition.9

The rural counterinsurgency aspect of the modern Mexican army began with
the ﬁght against the Cristeros (1926-1928) in the center of the country and, subse-
quently, in the 19603 and 19703, to combat leftist guerillas, primarily in the state
of Guerrero.” In this way, the army went from social action that originated in rev-
olutionary ideology (institutional presence, building infrastructure to communi-
cate with the countryside, and support for marginalized rural populations) to a la-

bor of paciﬁcation (rural guard) and containing outbreaks of violence, which at

130 Raul Benitez Manaut

Table 6.1 Military Regions, 1997

l. Military Region

II. Military Region

III. Military Region

IV. Military Region

Federal District
State of Mexico
Morelos

Baja California
Baja California Sur

Sonora
Sinaloa

Nuevo Leén
Tamaulipas
San Luis Potosi

V. Military Region

VI. Military Region

VII. Military Region

Vlll. Military Region

Jalisco

Nayarit
Zacatecas
Colima
Aguascalientes

Puebla
Hidalgoii
Tlaxcala
Veracruz

Chiapas

Oaxaca

IX. Military Region

X. Military Region

XI. Military Region

XII. Military Region

Guerrero

Yucatan
Campeche
Quintana Roo

Coahuila
Chihuahua
Durango

Michoacén
Guanajuato
Querétaro

Source: Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, Mexico, 1997.

their worst were organized into rural leftist guerilla groups in the early 1970s. Put
another way, the ﬁrst postrevolutionary mission was to project the presence of the
federal government, to neutralize the power of local caciques, to integrate the na-
tion’s territory, to carry out work where there was no state infrastructure, and to
integrate the population politically.

Originally, the military’s presence in the war on drug trafficking in the 19403
was also part of the civic action programs, and it supported and/ or replaced the
Office of the Attorney General (PGR) because of its institutional incapacity. From
the 1940s to the 19703, the war on drugs was not an issue of national security but
was focused on destroying marijuana and opium crops.”

Until the 1970s, the military played a functional role for the Mexican state at
various levels; although the political system was demilitarized, in rural areas the
army continued to perform political and police functions (supporting the system
against outbreaks of dissent and maintaining order). In addition, the military col-
laborated with governmental structures that could not cover the entire territory,
in order to fulﬁll their missions (replacing the Ministries of Communications and
Transportation, Education, Health, and Food Distribution [CONASUPO], munic-

ipal police forces, etc.). In this way, the army continuously performed nonmilitary

The Role of the Military 131

missions, many of which were linked to the state’s obligations. In political terms,
this was to beneﬁt and consolidate the regime:

The army has served as a major constitutional instrument for political enforcement during
conﬂicts. Zone commanders remain an important presidential agent for replacing state
governors during crises. The army is frequently used to separate and prevent violence be-
tween rival political factions in provincial areas, while civilian ofﬁcials seek to resolve the
conﬂict. Electoral defense for the PR1 and suppression of political rebels and radicals are
other uses that the army has served. . . . The army has also helped the government to se-
cure control over isolated, unruly rural areas. In this respect, the expansion of a govern-
ment’s politico-administrative control often follows from the extension of economic and
social services to needy peasant populations in isolated areas. Such developments may dis-
turb the traditional forms of local politics, and thus in high conﬂict areas such as Guerrero
the army may become an indispensable participant in the process.”

In this sense, the Mexican army was modernized but not depoliticized.” That
process began later, in the 1980s, when the partisan opposition emerged. None-
theless, it is difficult to claim that this entire time the army was the armed force of
the PR1 (as it was in the 19305). The order of loyalty in the military is to the Consti-
tution and the commander in chief (the president), who is the head of state, head
of government, and, unofficially, the top leader in the PR1. Therefore, it was up to
the president, not the army, to fulﬁll missions to support the PR1; of course the
army applies the standard of “due obedience,” which states that an order from a
superior is not to be questioned, even if it is unconstitutional.“

In Mexico, due obedience is related to impunity. Historically, as one goes up
the chain of command, it is more difficult to punish a person for an illegal order
since that order is linked to the interests of the political authorities, who are them-
selves unaccountable.“ Therefore, in the Mexican army the Code of Military Jus-
tice punishes persons for not following an order,“ without taking into account
whether or not it was unconstitutional or violated a civil law. 17

With regard to military missions, the importance of the DN-11 plan with re-
spect to the real operation of the military (primarily the army) is such that, histor-
ically, the Mexican military functions throughout the territory of the country, and
is in reality carrying out nonmilitary, civic action missions such as the integration
of rural areas, as well as police and political duties. The military’s sole domestic se-
curity mission provided for in the Constitution is the use of the army against

132 Raul Benitez Manaut

armed groups organized explicitly to challenge the military, with the goal of seiz-
ing the state, or when the police forces are unable to exercise containment. In such
cases an executive order is used to reestablish order. These missions are not in-

tended to be permanent:

However, there is also the obligation of supporting the authorities when necessary, prima-
rily in cases of serious upheavals in law and order. . . . This subject has been the cause of se-
rious controversy, since it is argued that the country’s military should never intervene to
suppress the actions of groups of dissenters that in some way alter the proper law and or-
der that must prevail, since this activity is the sole and exclusive responsibility of civilian
authorities, through the preventive police forces, but is never that of federal forces, i.e., the
army, navy, or air force.”

In the 1980s, the political mission of protecting the political leadership of the
government (by supporting the party in power, when necessary) stopped being an
operational mission of the military; however, its territorial deployment continued
unchanged. Therefore, modernization and professionalization occurred at the
same time as gradual depoliticization, and thus the military serves the state and
not the short-term (or partisan) interests of high-level government oﬂicials. Since
the emergence of the political opposition in elections, roughly between 1982 and
1988, an unsuccessful attempt was made to revert to using the army in the tradi-

tional manner. Writing in 1990, Cornelius and Craig observed:

Since 1985, civilian authorities have called on the military to provide highly visible “secu-
rity” for elections. Formerly, troops were deployed only in response to election-related dis-
turbances if they occurred. Now they can be seen before, during, and after the elections,
particularly in states that are strongholds of the opposition parties. The opposition charges
that the huge military presence in these places is intended to intimidate their supporters
from going to the polls and from taking to the streets to protest fraudulent election prac-
tices.19

The continuous growth of the political opposition silently inﬂuenced the army
to cease executing this traditional police function, primarily in rural areas. The
prevention-police-political function was gradually abandoned in the 19905, and
the army became the strategic force of the state and not of the government. There-
fore, subordination to the principles of the Constitution also translated into re-
spect for the sovereignty of the people to elect political authorities (as stated in ar-
ticles 39, 40, and 41).

The Role of the Military 133

However, other missions that had been secondary became essential to the mili-
tary’s operations, primarily because of the crisis in the political system, potential
ungovernability, and the growing ineﬂiciency of civilian government structures.
At the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the military has three missions:

1. Drug trafficking has increased capacity to destabilize law and order, the
economy, and political stability, confronting a weak state that can be easily pene-
trated. Military action against trafficking is not new, but different strategies must
be used. Therefore, the military must allocate more human and economic re-
sources, as well as the use of military combat facilities, to this task.

2. In 1994, the eruption of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) led
the army to deploy resources to contain it.2° Although leftist armed revolutionary
groups are not new in Mexico, the EZLN and, since 1996, the People’s Revolution-
ary Army (EPR),21 have called into question the capacity of the government and
the army to handle the situation.

3. The crisis in the public security system, both prevention and investigations,
throughout the country is causing the army and its members (retired or active) to

assume leadership of the police in the most important cities.

These three problems, which the state and key sectors of society view as issues
of national security, and the fact that the Mexican government lacks efficient civil-
ian structures for resolving them, are pushing political leaders to order the use of
the military. This has unleashed a great controversy over the dangers of using the
military to deal with these problems and has sparked a debate on the militariza-
tion of the country.

Part of this debate concerns constitutional issues. Article 89, subparagraph VI,
of the Constitution states that the president may “dispose of all the permanent
armed forces, army, navy, and air force, for the domestic safety and foreign de-
fense of the federation.”22 This constitutional provision justiﬁes deployment for
the DN-II plan. However, this could contradict article 129 of the Constitution,
which states that “in times of peace none of the military authorities shall exercise
functions other than those bearing direct relation to military discipline. No per-
manent military posts shall be established other than in castles, forts, and arse-
nals dependent directly upon the federal government, or in camps, barracks, or
depots established outside of inhabited places for the stationing of troops.”23

134 Raul Benitez Manaut

The possible contradiction between articles 89 and 129 of the Constitution lies
in what is understood as “time of peace” or “time of war.” In addition, the concept
of “space” must be considered. There are rural regions in the country with a high
incidence of drug traﬂicking and armed groups where the presence of the army is
almost permanent; they would therefore have to be considered war zones in order
to deploy the army in fulﬁllment of the DN-II plan. Logically, politically, no one
wants to assume the risk of considering a region of the country as being at war or
under martial law; therefore, this situation does not legally exist in any region of
the country. But in reality, since the 1980s, the army has had a semipermanent
presence in extensive rural areas, such as Guerrero, Chiapas, Sinaloa, regions of
Hidalgo, Tamaulipas, Sonora, Tabasco, mountainous areas of Veracruz, Jalisco,
and Michoacan.

In the case of the Mexican navy, its missions are focused to a greater extent on
the DN-I plan, and it has important responsibility for controlling illegal ﬁshing
and protecting the environment. Nonetheless, it has prominent functions in the
war against drug trafficking;24 and similar to the army and air force, collaboration
with the United States is key.”

Political Transition: Between Governablllty and Chaos

Political transition is a process that runs parallel to the modernization of the
state and the economic reforms implemented to orient the economy under mar-
ket rules; however, this change process is not balanced.” 27 There is progress at
some levels of the state structure, but there are also large setbacks (the extent of
modernization of the state in the executive, legislature, and judiciary is very un-
equal). This inequality also occurs at the three levels of government (federal, state,
municipal) as well as in the economic structure. Some sectors of the economy are
very well suited for participation in globalized markets and the Free Trade Agree-
ment with the United States and Canada, but some very backward, traditional
economic structures are being reproduced as well. There are similar gaps in cul-
ture and society. Therefore, this is a “dysfunctional” transition.”

The foregoing leads us to afﬁrm that the lag in modernizing the state along

with the existence of great regional, economic, political, cultural, and social differ-

The Role of the Military 135

ences combine to produce conditions that are conducive to criminal activity, par-
ticularly to drug traﬂicking.

Political change in Mexico is leading the country toward a democratic system
of government. However, the nature of the political system is such that traditional
elements continue to be important, thus enabling illegal criminal activity to be
part of the operation of the system: “Our political democracy is not yet born and
is already being combated by very powerful enemies, including, most notably,
state-level caciques, drug trafficking cartels, and those persons that have both big
money and political inﬂuence. . . . There was a time when the police more or less
kept the underworld in check. Today, that very same police force, without leader-
ship, is one of the main sources of criminality.”29

As in any comprehensive transition, the danger lies in the state’s losing control
of the political, economic, social, or international actors conducting these activi-
ties, resulting in conditions of instability or ungovernability. When interpreting
the situation in Mexico in the 1990s, chaos has been mentioned as a trend to be
curbed through militarization.” Others mention that the degree to which crime
has penetrated state structures has reached levels similar to those in Colombia;
therefore, one can speak of “narcodemocracy.”31 In other words, in the Mexican
transition of the 1990s, there are ﬁmctional actors for modernization and democ-
ratization, and there are dysfunctional and disruptive actors that threaten domes-
tic stability, create ungovernability, conduct illegal activities, and even have sub-
stantial capacity to cause international instability, such as organized crime and
drug trafficking. These actors also threaten the future of NAFTA, since much of
the criminal activity is either committed outside Mexico or originates domesti-
cally and quickly has an impact abroad, thus decreasing the possibility of free
trade and positive, transnational economic activities.

Many of the actors that are negative or dysfunctional for the process of democ-
ratization and modernization are in the state machinery, owing to the reproduc-
tion of traditional activities such as “corruption” (which served the single-party
political system) and resistance to losing power.” At the time of crisis in the politi-
cal system, corruption became linked to criminal activity since state institutions
have more controls on the handling of resources. Better administration helps pu-
rify and improve controls on the administration of public money, but this im-

Chapter 1

Introduction

John Bailey and Roy Godson

MEX|CO’S GOVERNABILITY has been put to the test at
several junctures since the mid-19805.1 But for the ﬁrst time in
many decades, there is growing concern about instability in the
U.S.-Mexican borderlands. Not since the Mexican Revolution in
the early 1900s and potential German threats to the underbelly
of the United States in World War I has this sort of attention
been focused on the region by observers on both sides of the bor-
der and in their respective capital cities. The reasons behind this
interest in the region are largely economic and ﬁnancial. They
include the upsurge of bilateral trade spurred in part by the im-
plementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1994; Mexico’s ﬁnancial crisis of 1994-1995; and
rapid industrialization along the Mexican side of the border
which in turn has fed increasing rates of mass migration and
cross-border travel. But much of the interest stems as well from
increased crime and corruption, which have spawned threats to
govemability in Mexico and in parts of the border region. Resi-
dents, tourists, businesspeople, and others with a direct personal
interest in Mexico and the borderlands are concerned about this
problem. But in addition, politicians, journalists, and academic
specialists in Mexico City and Washington, D.C., as well as in
other capitals, have become increasingly concerned about Mex-
ico’s complex transition and its implications for one of the
busiest and more dangerous border zones in the world?

Until recently, crime and corruption in Mexico and the bor-
derlands were viewed as local law enforcement problems. That is

136 Raul Benitez Manaut

provement leads public employees to conduct parallel, illegal activities to generate
income.

For example, when traditional segments of the political system begin to be af-
fected by democratization (traditional politicians lose public posts) and modern-
ization (control of public money, emergence of accountability), they turn to crimi-
nal groups for backing to fund political campaigns or to retain substantial
personal income, in keeping with the standard of living of the elite during the
nondemocratic era of the political system.” Therefore, because of the increased
obstacles to robbing money from the government, and in order to survive, the
link between current and former government ofﬁcials and criminal activity was
strengthened: “A Mexican tradition of accepting money for governmental services
rendered (known in the U.S. and Canada as ‘corruption’) contributes to the ease
of laundering illegal proﬁts, facilitates drug smuggling, and adds to the difﬁculty
of maintaining cordial relations.”34

In short, the challenge is for the leadership of the Mexican state to carry out
the transition without creating ungovernability or instability. Therefore, in order
to neutralize the negative agents and to make effective the positive agents of tran-
sition, the state faces hurdles at two levels: internally, the easy penetration of the
state by maﬁas due to historical corruption, and externally, the limited capacity of
the judicial system and security forces to contain organized crime and drug
trafficking activities. In reality, it can be said that the country is in a gray area
(“where governments are unable to govern”)35 and the state does not have the
credibility to lead change.

Since the 1990s, Mexican politics has faced the crisis of the corporatist-author-
itarian-clientelist system that determined the mechanisms of stability, returning
to the starting point of the political system in the 19205 and 19305. The govern-
ment turns to the strongest state institution—-the army—because of its own
weakness, crisis of inefficiency, and inability to achieve governability. The revalua-
tion of the military stemmed from crisis, as a last resort of upper-level state lead-
ers and not as an institutional project. In this way, the army’s missions are ex-
panded (the missions of the DN-II spread out) despite the fact that the army may
be taking a detour on its path toward modernization and professionalization
(DN-I), with the resulting risk either of inefﬁciency (since its missions are civilian

in nature) or of politicization (using the armed forces for political purposes).

The Role of the Military 137

In the Mexican transition we are witnessing a weakening of the president’s
power, with a rebalancing in favor of the legislature and an unprecedented crisis in
the judiciary. Meanwhile, in the federal system there are proposals to strengthen
state and municipal levels in various ways. One of these is to strengthen the re-
sponsibility of the judicial system and the preventive security forces. This phe-
nomenon, called “new federalism,” may be contradictory, since what is healthy at
the political level (for example, the growing autonomy of municipalities) may en-
danger public security and contribute to drug traﬂicking and other criminal activi-
ties. This is because the municipal police in rural areas and small cities, as well as
the judicial systems (the Office of the Attorney General), are much more suscepti-
ble to corruption and often act in the interest of local groups (caciques) and not
with the necessary impartiality and professionalism. What is good for political de-
mocratization (decentralization) is bad for justice and public safety.

Given the above, the maﬁas take advantage of this state-local autonomy and
the weakness of the judicial systems in carrying out their activities, since they are
more likely to be successful if the systems are decentralized. Making a comparison
with Colombia and Russia, in the case of the former, the strength of the local-rural
powers is the basis for the action and reproduction of the large cartels.“ The
breakdown of centralized Soviet power, disintegrated state mechanisms for con-
trolling the border, and illegal groups—including the largest maﬁas—have cre-
ated an environment of almost total anarchy in Russia.” This should serve as an
example of precisely what to avoid in Mexico. If this phenomenon were to occur,
the modernization of Mexico would take a step backward, and there would follow
the feudalization of power, the privatization of security, and a dismantling of the
state’s capacity to conduct security policies. This would leave public order in the
hands of the caciques, as is occurring in parts of Chiapas, Guerrero, Sinaloa, Hi-
dalgo, Oaxaca, and some northern states.

In the Mexican transition, the dismantling of the nationalist—revolutionary
state is occurring in an unbalanced manner. It is a process in which a modern
democratic state is being born that can impose the rule of law and where the old
oligarchies still exist; therefore, modern structures coexist with traditional ones.
In many parts of the country, this process has produced a vacuum of power that is
often ﬁlled by the maﬁas. In other words, the traditional classes have not been dis-

placed entirely (for example, the caciques), and modern actors have not been able

138 Raﬁl Benitez Manaut

to hold public office. This exempliﬁes the concept of dualpower in the political
structure, in which federal institutions and state and municipal governments are
divided between the traditional “dinosaurs” or cacz'ques—who are generally sup-
ported in the backward structures of the PRI, and the “modern actors,”--who are
anchored in the urban and progressive sectors of the PRI and the opposition, es-
sentially in the PAN and PRD.

This dual power is bolstered by a free-market economy and open international
borders. In other words, in a country with weak governmental structures, interna-
tional organized crime takes advantage of globalization. That is to say, the state
(following Max Weber) has a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence, but
it does not have governmental structures to really impose that monopoly, and pri-
vate actors with speciﬁc, illegal goals replace the state. The government is pene-
trated by these private actors and the officials who support them. Instead of act-
ing for the common good, they pursue personal beneﬁt: “The police stem from
order and disorder that coexist at a particular moment in society. Bandits and po-
lice officers exchange roles and are interchangeable, depending on the circum-
stances.”38

Given the above, the increase or effective containment of crime depends on
two circumstances—the success of the economic, social, and political transition
(structural factors), and the success and generalization of reform, the democrati-
zation, modernization, and professionalization of all the arms of the Mexican
state. Success depends on the process of “institution destruction” of the parts of
the state belonging to the authoritarian model, which generated corruption and
inefﬁciency and must be accompanied by a process of “institution building.” Such
institution building is urgent in the judicial and. crime prevention systems and in
the security forces.

To date, the processes of institution destruction/ reconstruction are not under
way in a comprehensive manner; therefore, the old institutions, with their her-
itage and structures, are being incorporated into modern structures. This contra-
diction foments organized crime. One notable example is the institutional decom-
position of the PGR and the thirty-two offices of the attorney general in each state
of the country, as well as of the respective Federal Judicial Police forces. These are
considered to be the structures most commonly inﬁltrated by organized crime. In

the absence of the political resolve necessary to proceed with institution destruc-

The Role of the Military 139

tion/ reconstruction, the state turns to the military because of the magnitude of
the growth in organized crime, violence, and lack of public security, which is con-
sidered to be a matter of “national security.” Therefore, according to the key na-
tional planning document:

To guarantee the national security of Mexico, it is necessary to:

1. Preserve, according to the law and the international treaties and agreements signed
by Mexico, the integrity of the land, air space, and the territorial seas and those that are the
public domain of the country, in dealing with other states, the threats of international
criminal organizations, the illegal trafficking in arms and persons, and the illegal exploita-
tion of the resources of our seas;

2. Ensure at all times the effective exercise of the rule of law in the national territory and
monitor our borders, always respectful of individuals’ human rights;

3. Update the strategic planning of the Mexican army, air force, and navy; modernize
and consolidate their military, operational, intelligence, and technical capacity and their
ability to immediately respond to emergencies and disasters; strengthen the protection of
vital installations in the country and update the laws thereon to the new circumstances and
challenges;

4. Coordinate the units and entities of the federal public administration and the states
in the federation in their relations with other nations; in particular, ensure unity in the cri-
teria for combating modern threats to national security—drug trafﬁcking, money launder-
ing, illegal arms traﬂicking, and terrorism;

5. Take advantage of international cooperation in the exchange of information on drug

traﬂicking, criminals, and terrorism.”

Since the 1970s, many armed groups have emerged in Mexico, inﬂuenced
partly by the trend of guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. These
groups have included both rural and urban movements: rural ones, in states such
as Guerrero, rising in defense of peasant interests against corrupt local authori-
ties,“ and the urban ones, primarily clandestine groups with little popular sup-
port.“ The army could successfully control the rural movements using traditional
counterinsurgency tactics, and the security forces of the Interior Ministry con-
tained the urban ones.

In 1977, when the government of Jose Lopez Portillo introduced an amnesty,
many of the groups from the 1960s and 1970s lost their military capacity and
merged with newly legalized political parties of the Left, many of which were
linked to the popular movements of the PRI. Other former guerrillas went to Cen-
tral American countries, primarily Nicaragua and El Salvador, to join guerrilla

140 Ratil Benitez Manaut

groups there. Although most analysts claimed that the era of guerrilla movements
had ended in Mexico, on January 1, 1994, the EZLN, descendent of the FLN,“
emerged in the state of Chiapas. This was the ﬁrst time in the history of contem-
porary Mexico that a guerrilla group garnered substantial support and leadership
from important sectors of the population; estimates place sympathizers and com-
batants at more than 2,000 and the range of inﬂuence over more than 200,000
indigenous persons. The Mexican army estimated approximately 5,000 combat-
ants at the start of the conﬂict.

The rise of the EZLN can be traced to two principal coinciding factors. First,
the closed political, social, and economic structures, increasing tensions over land
disputes, and dwindling state capacities prompted peasants to mobilize in order
to protect their interests. As the local authorities and elites reacted with repressive
measures, the mobilization gained even further momentum with the appearance
of radical political leaders. Initial peasant movements, led by groups such as liber-
ation theologists with their ideals of alternative power against the local elites, coa-
lesced into the EZLN. Hence, a process of feudalization occurred in Chiapas, and a
situation of extreme violence ensued as the EZLN confronted the local and state
structures of the PR1.

At the outset, the EZLN declared war on the government and the federal army:
“We issue the present (declaration of war) to the Federal Mexican Army, pillar of
support for the dictatorship under which we suffer, monopolized by the party in
power and headed by the federal executive that today is held by the chief illegiti-
mate leader, Carlos Salinas de Gortari.” The EZLN ordered its military forces to
Mexico City to “advance toward the capital of the country defeating the Federal
Mexican Army.”43 These original demands, initially projected on a national level,
quickly changed, with the ensuing focus on the needs of the indigenous popula-
tion of Chiapas.

The six—year crisis in Chiapas (1994-2000) has been characterized by zig-zag—
ging between the EZLN and the government. This has resulted in the unsuccessful
search for a political solution since military strategies have not been viable for ei-
ther side. We can identify ﬁve distinct phases of the conﬂict in Chiapas. First came
the war from January 1 to 11, 1994, in which the army reacted—-active military
containment—to the EZLN offensive, which resulted in 152 deaths. A cease-ﬁre

and ﬁrst dialogue followed, from January 12, 1994, to February 8, 1995. This sec-

The Role of the Military 141

0nd phase can be subdivided into a period of official dialogue from January to
June 1994, and then an informal cease-ﬁre between the government and the EZLN
until February 1995. The next military phase of the conﬂict, from February 9,
1995, through March 6, 1995, focused on the capture of Subcomandante Marcos
(identiﬁed by the government as Rafael Sebastian Guillén Vicente) with the “Op-
eracion Arco Iris” of the military. A renewed dialogue culminated in the Larr:iin-
zar Accords of February 16, 1996.44 The principal channels of mediation were the
National Commission of Intermediation (CONAI) and the Commission for Peace
of the Congress (COCOPA). The dialogue cooled off and negotiations continued
without military conﬂict as the two sides engaged in a political and philosophical
debate over the Larréinzar Accords and reform of the Constitution.“ On Decem-
ber 22, 1997, when forty—five indigenous people were killed in Acteal by a group of
paramilitaries under the direction of extremists of the PR1, the conﬂict escalated
to another phase.

After the incident at Acteal, the federal government abandoned the political
initiative and transferred the responsibility of “containment” of the EZLN to the
local political elites (what we have established as the feudalization of society).‘“‘
This strategy is based primarily on the harassment of Zapatista sympathizers by
paramilitary groups. Various sources claim that seven of these existing paramili-
tary groups (the Chiapan version of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran death squads
of the 1970s and early 1980s) have caused more than 1,500 deaths and 10,000
forced relocations of indigenous persons since 1995. The feudalization strategy
means that contradictions ﬂourish in the indigenous communities, causing com-
munity members to ﬁght against each other on grounds of religious differences,
land problems, heritage, and so on. Logically, this situation leads to an increased
level of violence, a weakened rule of law and, in the end, a debilitated federal gov-
ernment. .

The army has only taken an active role in containing the EZLN on two occa-
sions: during the initial war phase and then from February 9 to March 5, 1995.
Even though the military has been only a passive force of containment the rest of
the time, it retains approximately 20 percent of its forces (30,000 to 40,000 sol-
diers) in Chiapas on a semipermanent basis. Because of both domestic and inter-
national pressure, both sides in the conﬂict have largely resisted the use of military
force, opting instead for the dialogue that legitimizes the government strategy.

142 Raul Benitez Manaut

Precisely because of its discourse, based on “moral force,” representation of
the indigenous, and the ﬁght for a good and noble cause, the EZLN cannot take
direct armed action easily. Instead of military action, the group relies on its inter-
national “invisible army of militants” or “net of guerrillas” for political force and
inﬂuence. Organized to combat conventional enemies, the Mexican army cannot
respond to this new kind of opponent. Nevertheless, for the ﬁrst time since the
1970s, the military has been accused of human rights violations against the civil-
ian population.“ In political terms, since both the army and the EZLN beneﬁt
from not engaging in armed ﬁghting (the former gaining national and interna-
tional legitimacy for being subordinate to civil authorities and the latter demon-
strating that it is not a fundamentalist group), weapons are used more for dissua-
sion than for combat.

In June 1996, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) emerged in the state of
Guerrero. The EPR takes action in the most violent states in Mexico, primarily
Guerrero and Oaxaca, where local caciques, integrated through “families,” control
the economic, social, and political structures.“ The EPR was formed from four-
teen clandestine groups (principally from the PROCUP) which date back to the
1970s. The group has both urban and rural forces but much less popular support
than the EZLN, with no support from civil society. The government is employing
the same counterinsurgency tactics against the EPR that it used against guerrilla
groups in the 1970s: using the army in rural areas and security forces in urban
zones. There is no sign of any dialogue or negotiation between the government
and the EPR.

There is vast speculation in Mexico about the existence of more armed groups.
Since the explosion of the crisis in Chiapas, there has been talk of numerous
groups that are secretly organizing. One group of ex-guerrillas from the 1970s,
which form the Center for Historic Research of Armed Movements (CIHMA),
claim that there are “at least” fourteen armed movements operating principally in
Puebla, Hidalgo, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Guerrero. Likewise, the CIHMA
maintains that there were “5oo casualties among government officials, soldiers
and guerrillas between 1994 and 1997.”49 Given the dispersion of these groups and
the uncertainty regarding their existence, the army’s action is defensive, preventa-
tive, and intelligence-based.

The Role of the Military 143

Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime

The increasing participation of the Mexican drug maﬁas in the trade and production of ille-
gal drugs gives them increased wealth and more opportunities to take advantage of the in-
grained corruption of the government. Increasingly, they are taking advantage of Mexico’s
largely unregulated ﬁnancial sector as a means of laundering illegal proﬁts. Already a
strong inﬂuence, the maﬁas are a major threat to Mexico’s national security through the
easily corruptible government. Narco-corruption is becoming a serious impediment to
stemming the ﬂow of narcodollars, and remains Mexico’s major challenge, as money laun-
dering is not yet a criminal offense.”

Since the mid-1980s in the United States, this subject began to be considered a
matter of national security and was included in the new doctrine of containment:
low-intensity warfare, which involves “militarizing” the ﬁght against drugs and
considering it a “war.”51 This new conception began with the participation of the
military as an experiment in the Andean countries.” For the United States, the
main weakness in employing this strategy in Mexico is corruption.” However,
there are American analysts who believe that Mexico’s stance of adopting almost
100 percent of the United States’ antidrug policies contributes to corruption, in
addition to “infecting” the United States with this phenomenon: “It is also true
that the costs of current policies—-violence and corruption—fall most heavily on
the Latin American countries, Mexico in particular, even as they infect the United
States as well.”54 The foregoing leads to a pessimistic diagnosis on drug trafficking
as the main activity of organized crime in Mexico. Since the 1980s, the increase in
drug traﬂicking has been one of the main sources of strife between the govern-
ments of the United States and Mexico.55 This friction worsened with the assassi-
nation of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in Guadalajara in 1985.55 At that point,
Mexico began to view the problem as a matter of national security." The govern-
ment ﬁrst classiﬁed it as such in 1987.53

During the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (December 1988-
November 1994) all the institutional and coordination strategies for combating
drugs were reformulated. Unprecedented cooperation also began with the U.S.
government. Mexico’s strategy, in the words of one of its main authors, was not
one of elimination, but rather containment. “The goal of this war is not to destroy

the enemy, because that is impossible, but rather to keep it under control.”59 Rec-

144 Raul Benitez Manaut

ognizing the main vulnerability of the forces of the Mexican government, that of-
ﬁcial stated that “the wars on drugs expose national institutions to increasingly
greater risk of corruption. One of the most frustrating lessons of these campaigns
conducted throughout the world is seeing the institutions responsible for the law
being exposed to corruption by drug barons. Increased contact with traﬂickers,
even as enemies, always increases corruption.”“°

Since 1990, the collaboration between governments and armies has been cov-
ered by the mass media. In June of that year, it was stated that a tactical unit of the
U.S. army had detected aircraft in Mexican air space.“ During President Salinas’
second trip to the United States, in June 1990, agreements were established on the
presence of DEA agents in Mexico and, in November of that year, frameworks of
action for U.S. activities with surveillance aircraft and satellites in the war on
drugs were established.

Among the most important actions carried out during the Salinas administra-
tion were the establishment of the Center for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO)
in 1992, which exercised basic intelligence ﬁinctions; the establishment in that
year of the National Drug Control Program; and, following the assassination of
Cardinal Posadas in Guadalajara on May 24, 1993, the establishment of the Na-
tional Counternarcotics Institute (INCD) as a unit of the PGR.” The INCD was
founded on June 17, 1993 to replace the General Office on Crimes against Health.
The INCD had operational functions with agents of the Federal Judicial Police as-
signed to it.

The outcome of the ﬁght against drugs is contradictory. Official reports indi-
cate very signiﬁcant progress in the war; however, numerous studies claim that
the war is being lost. Between January 1989 and December 1992, 178.91 tons of co-
caine were intercepted (an average of 45 tons per year).53 During Ernesto Zedillo’s
administration, between December 1994 and December 1996, 47 tons were seized;
that is half the amount seized per year during Salinas’ six-year term.“ Cocaine
seizures have also declined in the United States, although not to the same extent
as in Mexico. In 1993, 118 tons of cocaine were seized; 120 in 1994; and 98 in 1995.55

As for other drugs, such as marijuana, during Salinas’s six-year term, an aver-
age of 500 tons were intercepted annually, whereas during the Zedillo administra-
tion, from September 1994 to August 1995, that ﬁgure rose to 6oo tons; and from
September 1995 to August 1996, 878 tons were intercepted. The interception of

The Role of the Military 145

heroin also increased in the Zedillo administration, rising from an average of 160
kilos per year during the Salinas administration to 166 kilos in 1994-1995 and 215
kilos in 1995-1996.“

The war on drugs in the Zedillo administration is guided by the 1995-2000
National Drug Control Program. In this administration, cooperation with the
United States has become closer, beginning with the establishment of the U.S.—
Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control in March 1996.57 This cooper-
ation was strengthened by President Clinton’s visit to Mexico in May 1997, during
which the two presidents signed the Declaration of the Mexican-U.S. Alliance
Against Drugs, which notes shared responsibility in the ﬁght, through a compre-
hensive approach and the establishment of extradition agreements. This docu-
ment states that cooperation “will improve our capacity to interrupt drug ship-
ments by air, land and sea” (with the clear participation of the armed forces of
both countries); training and technical cooperation programs will be established,
and institutional systems for the exchange of information (i.e., intelligence) will
be developed.“

President Clinton subsequently traveled to Central America where he signed a
similar agreement with all the presidents of the Isthmus, following the guidelines
of the strategy for hemispheric cooperation to combat drugs, drawn up by his ad-
ministration:59 “Security issues do arise. Among them are illicit drugs that poison
communities, threaten societies, and undermine national security. Working coop-
eratively on such challenges is an effective and eflicient use of our resources. In the
process, nations and militaries can learn from one another.”7°

In the U.S. strategy for containing narcotics shipments to its territory, Mexico
is the top priority with regard to interception, and Colombia is the priority with
regard to eliminating production. According to General Barry McCaffrey, the U.S.
Drug “Czar,” 70 percent of all cocaine enters the United States through Mexico,
and, according to Mexico’s PGR, proﬁts from narcotics exceed $30 billion." Like-
wise, 8o percent of marijuana and 20-30 percent of heroin enters the U.S.
through Mexico.” In the militarization of the war on drugs, assistance is being
channeled directly to the Mexican army, out of mistrust of the PGR forces.” There
has been a marked increase in educating and training Mexican soldiers in the
United States. Under the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, 293 Mexican soldiers were trained

2 John Bailey and Roy Godson

to say, local criminals were blamed for corrupting certain local officials: police,
customs, and immigration control officers on both sides of the border. Corrup-
tion among local oﬂicials was considered inimical to good governance, but it was
not viewed by national political and economic leaders or by specialists in U.S.-
Mexican relations as a major problem or as a threat to governability on either side
of the border.

This limited perception changed gradually, however, beginning in the late
1980s and increasing in the 19903. What started out as a law enforcement concern
with drug trafficking in the mid-1980s has now come to be viewed as a growing
threat to national security and governability on both sides of the border. This con-
cern has become most pronounced in the high governmental circles of Washing-
ton and Mexico City. Over time successive presidents of both countries have come
to recognize that, while drug trafﬁcking is the major illegal activity, the range of
criminal activities now extends well beyond drugs to include trafficking in arms,
people, vehicles, ﬁnancial instruments, environmentally dangerous substances,
endangered species, and archeological objects, among others.

Moreover, criminal activities have become so large scale, widespread, and lu-
crative that the relevant officials from both capitals meet regularly to consider
criminal threats to the economic, political, and social health of not only the resi-
dents of the border region, but to their countries as a whole.3 In addition to regu-
lar bilateral heads—of-state and ministerial—level meetings, the United States and
Mexico in 1996 created a high-level “Contact Group” to deal with the threat from
organized crime to law enforcement and democratic governability. Key officials
from the relevant agencies involved with intelligence, military, law enforcement,
and ﬁnancial matters meet in closed-door sessions to discuss strategic and tactical
responses to criminality. Apart from these high—level discussions, we are seeing
the proliferation of joint U.S.-Mexican programs to promote military, intelli-
gence, and law enforcement cooperation.

Although few outside government are privy to the speciﬁcs of these programs,
we can glean impressions from the public record as well as from extensive media
reporting on aspects of this cooperation. On occasion, former government
oﬂicials and academic specialists on both sides of the border have written or spo-
ken about the growing threat of organized crime to governability and what they
know of the responses of their respective governments. As a result, we can discern

146 Raul Benitez Manaut

between 1983 and 1988; 821 between 1988 and 1994; and that number rose to 1,910
between 1994 and 1997.74

In 1995, when drug trafﬁcker Héctor Palma was captured, there was evidence
that he had been “protected.” Andres Oppenheimer reported that “the spectacu-
lar circumstances of the June 1995 capture of Sinaloa drug cartel baron Héctor ‘El
Guero’ Palma conﬁrmed what most Mexicans had long known—in Mexico, the
police are for sale, and the criminals are buying. . . . Most members of his heavily
armed entourage were agents of the Federal Judicial Police.”75

U.S. assistance and cooperation have focused on strengthening the informa-
tion systemson aircraft coming from Colombia, supporting the inﬂow of equip-
ment (seventy-three UH-1H helicopters and four C-26 airplanes), and training per-
sonnel (300 soldiers in ﬁscal year 1996 and 1,500 in ﬁscal year 1997) who basically
belong to the Special Forces Air Groups (GAFEs).7“ With regard to cooperation
with the PGR, efforts are being concentrated on institution building (Counter-
drug Institution Building—Law Enforcement Training) through support for the es-
tablishment of the Organized Crime Unit of the PGR, founded on February 1,
1997; through the training of its members; the establishment of Border Task
Forces; and ﬁinding for a new intelligence unit on organized crime in the PGR."

In Mexico, the war on drugs in its various forms (destruction of plots of mari-
juana and poppy and the interception of cocaine) is focusing increasingly on the
military. Even equipment belonging to the PGR was transferred to the army; for
example, eighteen of the PGR’s Bell 206 helicopters were handed over to the Min-
istry of Defense (SEDENA). In addition to the seventy-three UH-1H helicopters
donated by the United States, in 1997 the army purchased sixteen MI-8 and MI-17
helicopters manufactured in Russia. The reform of the structure of the military re-
gions and areas focused on the establishment of a general headquarters and 51
GAFEs. According to the 1996-1997 report on the work of SEDENA, a daily aver-
age of 9,714 persons participated in eradication activities and 10,738 in intercept-
ing drugs, with three civilian casualties, and seven injured, and twenty-one civil-
ian casualties and ten injured, respectively.”

The Paris-based Observatoire géopolitique des drogues notes that Mexico is one of
the axes of the continentalizacién of drug traﬁicking activity. In 1996, it was home
to six large cartels—the Gulf Cartel in Veracruz and Tamaulipas; the Sinaloa Car-

tel in Sinaloa and Guerrero; the Tijuana Cartel in Baja California and Sinaloa; the

The Role of the Military 147

Juarez Cartel, with actions extending to Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, and Chiapas; the
Clemente Coto Cartel in Sonora; and the Emiliano Quintero Cartel in Jalisco. Ac-
cording to the Observatoire, these cartels owe their success to their political and
business ties, connections which are the main hurdle to winning the war on
drugs.”

The largest shake-up to date in the war on drugs in Mexico occurred on Febru-
ary 23, 1997, when it was discovered that the Commissioner of the INCD, the for-
mer commander of the Fifth Military Region (headquartered in Guadalajara),
General Jesus Gutiérrez Rebollo, was conducting activities to support the Juarez
Cartel (headed by Amado Carrillo)?” The myth of the incorruptibility of the mili-
tary broke down, and a conﬂict broke out with the United States. The U.S. Depart-
ment of State was on the verge of not certifying Mexico in the annual spring certi-
ﬁcation process. This myth was refuted even by the Minister of Defense: “The risk
of contamination within the army has always existed. What is new is the willing-
ness to combat those who become involved, regardless of their prestige, rank, or
position held.”81 The Gutiérrez Rebollo case led to a purging of the military, in
which thirty-four soldiers involved in supporting drug cartels were jailed in
1997.32 As for the navy, in 1997, it accused fourteen sailors of drug traﬂicking activ-
ities.33

The binational report on the war on drugs published by the High-Level Con-
tact Group made a direct allusion to the Gutiérrez Rebollo case, when it stated:

Recently, drug-related corruption was discovered at the highest levels of main anti-
narcotics unit in Mexico. The charges of corruption made by the government of Mexico
against high-level officials, including the former director of the INCD, are very serious.
These oﬂicials have been accused of involvement with alarge transnational organization of
drug-traﬂickers that operates in the United States and Mexico. These cases, in addition to
the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico’s dismissal of 1,200 police officers in 1996,
show that corruption has extended to the judicial systems. This problem undermines the
effectiveness of the efforts made to respect the law and decreases the society's conﬁdence
and the credibility of the organizations responsible for protecting public safety and up-
holding the law.34

Drug trafﬁcking is the main activity of organized crime in the world and is bol-
stered by two trends, one of which is sociocultural and the other economic. These
are, respectively, the expansion of alternative culture through the mass media

and the opening of borders, which is the result of the expansion of commerce.

148 Raul Benitez Manaut

Nonetheless, organized, random, and street crime increased markedly in the
1990s in Mexico. This is what is known as increased public insecurity, or social vi-
olence, which has led to the problem being considered an issue of national secu-

rity.

Lack of Public Security

Andres Oppenheimer has written that “according to an internal Interior Min-
istry report, there were an estimated nine hundred armed criminal bands in Mex-
ico, of which more than 50 percent were made up of current or retired members of
law enforcement agencies. And some of the bloodiest gun battles in Mexico’s war
on drugs pitted these_law enforcement—related gangs against each other. ”85

The actions of these gangs have created a widespread sense of insecurity
among the population. The increase in crime can be observed in the increase in
the number of “accused” and “convicted” criminals. Between 1974 and 1981, there
was almost no increase. In 1974, 66,992 persons were considered accused crimi-
nals, of whom 54,725 were convicted; in 1981, there were 76,184 accused criminals,
of whom 65,456 were convicted.“ If we take population growth into account,
there was no increase in crime in relation to the number of inhabitants. However,
in 1994, the number of accused criminals rose to 165,927, with 142,365 convicted."
In 1997, the ﬁgures for Mexico City show that 189,000 crimes were committed (as
reported to the Oﬁice of the Attorney General), which is 8,000 more than in 1996,
despite the militarization of the Ministry of Public Safety (SSP-DDF) of the Fed-
eral District.“ These crimes are a combination of organized crime and common
crime. Figures show the following incidence of cases of: (a) violent home bur-
glary—553; (b) nonviolent home burglary—5,871; (c) violent burglary of a busi-
ness—4,535; (d) nonviolent burglary of a business—9,432; (e) armed bank rob-
bery—59; (f) muggings—24, 533; (g) theft from delivery “trucks-—17,148; (h)
violent auto theft——15,o74; and (i) nonviolent auto theft—-28,110. Also, there were
713 homicides; 1,127 rapes; 18,374 assaults; and 2,o82 robberies.” In addition, one
of the new crimes in the 1990s that merges drug trafficking with organized and
common crime is arms trafficking.

One should also note that the types of crime are proliferating, with the addi-

tion oftwo types that were almost nonexistent prior to the 199os——political

The Role of the Military 149

crimes and the crimes resulting from organized criminal activities (kidnapping,
drug traﬂicking, car theft, bank robbery, kidnapping children, organ trafficking,
and the like). With regard to political crimes, murders and violence have been
manifest since the democratization of the country began at the end of the 1980s.
Between 1989 and 1994, over 400 political leaders died in conﬂicts between the
PRD and the PRI in the state of Michoacan alone. There are also the previously
mentioned deaths of indigenous persons in Chiapas; the increase in political vio-
lence in the state of Guerrero (which culminated in the murder of campesinos in
Aguas Blancas); the increase in numbers of journalists murdered (in 1971-1987,
forty-eight journalists were murdered, or 2.82 per year, whereas between 1988 and
1994, forty were murdered, or 6.6 per year); there were 592 kidnappings in 1995;
and bank robberies rose from 220 in 1981 to 485 in 1996 (from 0.6 to 1.13 per
day).9° Undoubtedly the two political assassinations that had the greatest impact
were those of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI candidate for president, on March 23,
1994, and José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the national leader of the PR1, on Septem-
ber 28 of the same year.”

The government of Mexico itself recognizes the erosion of its image and its
lack of credibility with the people: “One of the clearest and most widespread ex-
pressions of social reaction has been speciﬁcally the lack of credibility of govern-
mental actions in this area, a phenomenon that has been bolstered by the emer-
gence of speciﬁc cases related to acts of corruption or inefficiency in the justice
system.”92

In an effort to address this problem, since 1994 the government has developed
different options for institutional reform, the majority of which have not had the
success anticipated. Reform began with the establishment of the Mexican Public
Safety Office in April 1994.93 The promulgation of the law establishing the Public
Security System was an effort that culminated in changes in criminal laws and
strengthened measures for curbing crime, including the militarization of the po-
lice.94 At the end of 1996, the Federal Law on Organized Crime was passed.”

In the 1990s, the presence of military personnel (the majority of whom are re-
tired or on leave) in federal, state, and municipal security forces increased
throughout the country. The presence of members of the armed forces responds
to a perception that the problem of security should be approached by: (1) stop-

ping corruption, toward which civilians are “more inclined” while the military has

150 Raul Benitez Manaut

more “immunological” mechanisms; (2) restructuring the leadership hierarchy;
(3) strengthening police containment of crime; and (4) professionalizing police ac-
tivity. The employment of soldiers is a nonpartisan matter in the federal, state,
and municipal governments.

This can be observed, for example, in Baja California Norte where the security
forces are made up entirely of military personnel, and where the PAN has gov-
erned for the longest period of time, beginning in 1989. Even the Federal District,
governed by the PRD since December 5, 1997, appointed retired military person-
nel to head the Ministry of Public Security, despite the leaders of the PRD’s very
emphatic criticism of militarization during their 1997 campaign. Statistics also
show that crime does not decrease when there is an opposition government. Of
the four least secure states in the country, three are governed by the PAN-———Baja
California, Chihuahua, and Jalisco. Sinaloa, the fourth state, is governed by the
PRI. Drug trafficking activities, which are a direct factor in increasing public inse-
curity, have not declined in those states either. In other words, the “lack of secu-
rity” and militarization do not depend on the political party in power, and they re-
ﬂect a trend that is determined by national factors, not local, state, or regional
ones.‘’‘5

In 1997, the most important positions in public safety, police, and investigative
institutions were the following: State agents and officials of the Federal Judical P0-
lice of the PGR; INCD agents-—Special Inspector’s Office on Narcotics;97 State Ju-
dicial Police; Municipal Police (with the most important positions in the state cap-
itals and large cities); and airport and port control. In 1997, in Baja California,
Tamaulipas, and the Federal District, there were soldiers in ﬁve such units; in Chi-
huahua, Nuevo Leon, Estado de México, and Quintana Roo, they were in four
units; in Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Coahuila, Jalisco, Hidalgo, and Oax-
aca, they were in three; in Durango, Nayarit, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosi, Ver-
acruz, Tlaxcala, Tabasco, and Yucatan, they were in two; in Zacatecas, Colima, Mi-
choacén, Guerrero, Morelos, Puebla, Chiapas, and Campeche, they were in one;
and there were no soldiers in these institutions in Guanajuato and Querétaro.98

At the end of the 1990s, there were approximately 400,000 preventive police
in the country, organized in the 2,395 municipalities. Of these municipalities,
1,990 have fewer than 100 police oﬂicers on the police force (82.53 percent); in 318
the police force is made up of between 100 and 1,000 officers (13.18 percent); and

The Role of the Military 151

87 have 1,000 oﬁicers or more (4.29 percent).99 In addition, the various federal po-
lice forces total approximately 7,000 members. These include Highway, Tax, Im-
migration, Forest, and Environmental police. The police forces that investigate
crimes are grouped together under the Federal Judicial Police Force which is 7,000
strong, and the State Judicial Police Forces which have 21,000 ofﬁcers.1°°

The greatest challenge for the military in ﬁghting crime was collaborating with
the Department of the Federal District to assume responsibility for the Ministry
of Public Security, beginning on June 8, 1996.1” The most important qualitative
difference wrought by the presence of military personnel in the rest of the institu-
tions in the country is that they took their positions on an individual, rather than

an institutional, basis. However, the appointment of General Enrique Salgado and  

ﬁfteen generals, ﬁfty ﬁeld ofﬁcers, eighteen ofﬁcers, and nineteen sergeants, as
well as the transfer of 2,000 soldiers to replace the police in the Iztapalapa district
(delegacién) and the training of civilian police ofﬁcers in Military Camp N0. 1
(3,500 oﬂicers were trained), is a policy of institutional cooperation.“ The person
ultimately responsible is the president, with active-duty military personnel re-
maining in SEDENA.

The purpose of participation in greater police cooperation in the country is to
banish corruption—which should increase the effectiveness in the ﬁght against
crime——-and to launch an all-out war on crime. The strategy outlined was to locate
criminal groups (bands) and carry out commando raids, using rapid response
groups or special police forces, primarily the Jaguares and Zorros (units especially
trained for urban police functions). This strategy has been criticized for focusing
on street crime, leaving organized crime virtually untouched.

The outcome of the war on crime is contradictory. The Minister of Defense has
stated that one signiﬁcant achievement is that nobody “can accuse the soldiers
that participated in the police force in the Federal District of being dishonest.”1°3
Nonetheless, the harshness of these raids called their legality into question, based
on the events in the Buenos Aires neighborhood (colonia) where a group of six
young criminals captured on September 8, 1997, were later found murdered on
the outskirts of Mexico City. This event led to a serious erosion of the military’s
image and criticism from numerous sectors about human rights violations.1°4 The
results of the investigation led to the arrest of three soldiers (a general, a colonel,

and a lieutenant colonel) and twenty—six police officers (nineteen Jaguares and

152 Raul Benitez Manaut

seven Zorros).1°5 Because of these actions, the Jaguares were broken up.“ The de-
fense of the Jaguares in the statements made by members who participated in the
raid maintained that “we are corrupt, but we are not bullies.”1°7

The change in government in the Federal District on December 5, 1997, did not
bring about a radical transformation in the strategy for confronting crime, since
retired soldiers were again used to head up the SSP.1°3 This pattern leads us to sug-
gest that the opposition parties do not have an alternative strategy for transform-
ing the security forces. Rather, they focus on trying to make the institutions more
efficient by simply eradicating corruption and applying tough policies, but with-
out a different program for modernization or professionalization.

With regard to the militarization of the security forces, one must bear in mind
that Mexico has a crime prevention system similar to that of the United States (de-
centralized police at the municipal level), but this does not take into account the
different social, economic, political, and even cultural conditions in the two coun-
tries. Therefore, the Mexican constitutional system of the “free municipality,”
which includes the capacity of municipalities to have their own police forces, has
led to the deformation of the police forces to such an extent that it is impossible to
professionalize and modernize them. Furthermore, the police respond to political
interests, since they are under the “personal” leadership of the municipal author-
ity. When that municipal authority is linked to economic power groups (legal or
illegal) the police typically protect those interests instead of those of the popula-
tion. That is to say, “persons in authority in Mexico have tended to abuse rather
than govern and steal rather than manage.”1°9 This has caused a crisis in all the
municipalities in the country, from the most backwards and rural ones with one
or two police officers (for example, in Oaxaca), to Mexico City, which has the
largest police force in the country——the SSP—made up of 27,000 officers.

The lack of democracy in the political system causes inefficiency and corrup-
tion to spread because of the way in which the government manages the adminis-
tration of justice. In an authoritarian and vertical political system, public office is
owed to higher authorities, not to the population; therefore, government and jus-
tice are administered to protect the interests of the elite, not of the population.
With the democratization of public office, officials are already corrupted by prac-

tices carried out in the past, which makes the problem endemic:

The Role of the Military 153

However, the main component of the criminality from which we suffer is its organization
and the protection of its interests, which are intricately linked to those of the government
and police; therefore, there will not be a reduction in serious crimes even if the economy
improves markedly. . . . There is a solution to the lack of security, but it requires the elimi-
nation of impunity, thus making the full exercise of the rule of law indispensable, which has
never occurred in the country. Now that the era of the PR1 is starting to wind down, the
possibility of moving forward in this direction is conceivable.11°

Another development that has occurred in the cities—and that goes hand in
hand with the feudalization of security in the countryside-—is the populations ex-
treme distrust of the security forces. This has led to the privatization of security,
which is endangering the state’s capacity to provide “security to the population”
(as deﬁned by Hobbes). In Mexico, in 1997 there were some 917 private security
companies, 587 of which operate in the Federal District. These employ almost
40,000 security guards in the country.“

The limits of the strategy of militarization are clear, since it is a partial action,
and not a comprehensive one. Rather than solving the problem, it merely attacks
visible facets thereof (ﬁghting street crime). It is not able to attack the root of the
problem of common crime and it leaves criminal organizations intact. The danger
lies in enlisting a strategic security force——the army——in a mission that is impossi-
ble if there is no comprehensive strategy aimed at political institutional factors

and not simply at eradicating corruption.

Conclusion

It is important to note that the reemergence of armed groups since 1994 has
reaffirmed the army’s actions as one of the federal government's main forces for
containment and dissuasion. The military is improving its position as a state insti-
tution, and counterinsurgency is once again becoming one of its main missions.
This weakens the path toward modernization aimed at strengthening the DN-I
plan and channels the purchase of equipment, the budget, training, and deploy-
ment throughout the country to the DN-II plan.“

Armed groups can only be neutralized in the long term if political democrati-
zation can effectively contain the power of traditional, basically rural groups, and

if the caciques cease to determine the balance of power; in other words, when the

154 Raul Benitez Manaut

state’s power can be extended throughout the country through modern institu-
tions (political-electoral, social, and judicial institutions). If this does not occur,
rural structural violence will continue, always with the specter of Colombianiza-
tion and the army as an institution of containment-dissuasion.

If the economic, social, and political structures (primarily the rural ones) are
not modernized, the state will continue to be weak and the cacz'ques’s inclination
to conduct illegal and even criminal activities will continue to be very strong. In
other words, maintaining the political system and its traditional mechanisms is
one of the main factors favoring the emergence of armed groups with diverse pur-
poses, ranging from promoting campesino self-defense to protecting the caciques
who conduct criminal activities.

As for drug trafﬁcking, the criticisms of the strategy implemented include evi-
dence that the strategy developed by the United States and adopted in general by
Mexico is not successful. In the United States, some are indicating that the war on
drugs is being lost: “The United States is losing the ‘War on Drugs.’ Since 1989,
when the U.S. military ﬁrst became involved, the harvest of coca, the production
of cocaine, its delivery to the United States, and the use of cocaine within the U.S.
have all gone up. Clearly, the present use of military force is not weakening the
drug industry.”“3

Other analyses lead to the conclusion that in addition to the war being lost, the
spread of corruption includes U.S. governmental structures. There is increased
drug consumption and an overall change in the crime prevention and judicial
forces; therefore, containment and militarization must be radically revised. The
risk is that the Latin American states will become “narco-states” and “narco-
nations,” with the following characteristics: economies in which the dynamism
(capital ﬂows for investment) increasingly comes from drug trafficking; the weak-
ness of the states, which is a result of corruption, begins to produce narco-corrup-
tion. More speciﬁcally, narco-corruption would lead to narco—politics, whereby
groups with political power are linked to drug trafﬁckers; narco-society, wherein
vast sectors of society (businesspeople, politicians, judges, military personnel,
clergy, union leaders, campesinos, and professionals) beneﬁt from drug trafﬁck-
ing and are employed as operatives for cartels; narco-justice, through which court
ofﬁcials sell out and traﬂickers are protected in their structures, and also where
anti-system groups emerge that further weaken the effective exercise of the rule of

The Role of the Military 155

law, such as narco-guerrillas or narco-terrorism.114In Mexico, some of these trends
have emerged in certain regions of the country and have developed links with
some business and political power groups.

Overall, the most radical proposal is the regulated legalization of the consump-
tion and marketing of some drugs in order to prevent this trend. This proposal
comes from analysts in Colombia, where the phenomena of the narco-state have
developed to the greatest extent.“

Mexico’s main weakness in its antidrug strategy is that there is no link between
the identiﬁcation of the problem and its medium- and long-term solution. The
state recognizes the corruption and lack of efficiency in the administration of jus-
tice and the actions of the security forces, but addresses the problems with short-
term strategies and tactics. The state employs the most solid state institutions—
the armed forces——-overloading them with too many missions and distorting their
true functions (DN—I and DN-III). In other words, the fact that the Mexican mili-
tary outlines its essential military operations in the DN-II plan responds to a back-
wards state, with weak civil structures, no professionalization, and a distortion of
the possibility of modernizing justice and public security structures. As for the
population, it is silently challenging the state and is diminishing the state’s basic
mission of providing security, since in practice it does not provide it, and citizens
and businesses must seek out alternative mechanisms to secure their property,
family, and economic livelihood.

In the 1990s, the military was strengthened in terms of personnel and budget
(see tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4) despite cutbacks in the rest of government. Therefore,
many analysts are speaking of militarization.

In this way, the country is witnessing a quantitative growth in armed persons
but a qualitative distortion of their functions because of the aforementioned prob-
lems. If the 435,000 members of the security forces are added to the number of
soldiers, which in 1997 totaled almost 230,000 in the army, air force, and navy,
the total number of armed persons employed by the state is 665,000. With a total
population in the country of approximately 95 million inhabitants, that is one
armed person for every 143 inhabitants. One must also add to this about 40,000
private guards and citizens with arms, whose number is difficult to discern.

For the military, facing these missions poses a serious risk ranging from the
danger of its becoming politicized and falling under the leadership of politicians

Introduction 3

several perspectives or schools of thought about Mexico, the United States, and
the borderlands. It is useful to summarize these views here to provide some pre-

liminary interpretive guideposts. We elaborate them later in the introduction.

Crime and Governability: First Impressions

It is becoming increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnd informed observers who View the
past years through traditional lenses and perceive recent developments as merely
an expanded challenge to local law enforcement. Such “traditionalists” would be-
lieve that by beeﬁng up a police response internally in Mexico and by “hardening”
the border, the problem can be mitigated if not eliminated. From this perspective
crime is an aberration, which implies negligible systemic effect; thus the topic de-
serves little research or systematic multidisciplinary study.

The more mainstream interpretations now View the growth of crime and cor-
ruption in Mexico and the border region as part of a much larger and deeper set
of problems that requires much more detailed study and attention. Proponents of
this view see important systemic effects of criminal-political alliances on the
broader political system and the bilateral relationship. By political—criminal al-
liances we refer to ongoing, complex networks of cooperation and exchange be-
tween criminal groups and political authorities—both elected and appointed——at
different levels of government. Further, those who perceive ongoing criminal-
political alliances see the problem set as rooted in deep-seated economic forces,
institutional arrangements, and political culture that will require far more than
improved law enforcement to effect any real change in the situation}

Among those who believe the problems are deep rooted, we can identify two
schools of thought. What we will call a “centralized-systemic” school sees a coher-
ent, centrally guided system that links Mexico’s political system with organized
crime. In this view, political leaders control the webs of alliances from the top
down. In contrast, a “fragmented-contested” school sees a much more ﬂuid, com-
plex set of relationships between the political system and organized crime. In this
view, criminal-political alliances are dynamic and constantly changing, depending
on a variety of circumstances. Control of the alliances by government officials is
not a given; rather, criminals can take the initiative and assume control as well.

Among those who accept the centralized-systemic view, some perceive ulti-

156 Raul Benitez Manaut

Table 6.2 Gross Domestic Product, Government Expenditures, and Military Expenditures,
1990-1995 (millions of pesos)

1990 1997 1992 1993 1994 1995

GDP 738,897.5 949,147.6 1,125,334.3 1,256,196.0 1,420,150.5 1,792,694.7
GDP ($mi|lions) 250,898.9 309,067.9 361 ,263.0 404,571.9 267,954.6 234,645.9

Total Budgeted 1 80, 744.0 186,565.3 195,253.2 206,987 .2 230,360.6 199,329.9
Government
Expenditure

Armed Forces 3,547.0 4,770.0 5,876.1 7,162.6 9,633.5 10,367.8
Budget

Armed Forces 1,206.4 1,553.2 1,886.1 2,310.5 1,810.8 1,357.0
Budget ($ millions)

% of Armed Forces 0.48% 0.50% 0.52% 0.57% 0.67% 0.57%
Budget with

respect to GDP

% of Armed Forces 1.96% 2.55% 3.00% 3.46% 4.18% 5.20%
Budget with respect

to Government

Expenditure

Exchange rate 2.94 3.07 3.11 3.10 5.32 7.64
Pesos per dollar

Sources: President of Mexico, Segundo Informe de Gobierno (Mexico: Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1996), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce
de Leon, 1996, Anexo; Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Cuenta de la Hacienda Ptiblica Federal 1995 (Mexico:
SHyCP, 1996).

(in an institutional way) to the personnel’s (when retired soldiers or those on leave
are employed) not necessarily serving the interests of the state, the nation, or the
population.

This danger is constant in the three main missions. In counterinsurgency,
there is the danger of meeting the interests of individuals. In Chiapas, Guerrero,
and Oaxaca, the army’s operations are dangerous, since obeying orders may mean
meeting the interests of the local caciques or political forces. In the war against
drug trafficking, the risks range from inefficient functioning to the greatest dan-
ger—protecting political groups or caciques linked to the cartels or going directly
on the payroll of the capos. As for public security, as was the case with the SSP-
DDF, there is considerable danger when the strategies are toughened or milita-
rized without objectively weighing the consequences and their long—term effec-
tiveness.

In the three wars, the outcome for the army has been negative. There is social,

Table 6.3 Size of the Armed Forces, 1986-1995

Increase
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1986-1995
Total Federal 2,242,554 2,219,600 2,752,060 2,783,393 2,301,486 2,405,300 2,275,754 1,549,318 1,609,761 1,601,324
Government
Total Armed 169,746 1 75,960 1 79,305 184,095 192,994 198,955 203,829 210,241 21 7,859 225,200 32.6%

Forces

Army and Air 129,695 133,435 137,350 142,961 151,178 155,218 157,142 162,169 169,689 172,072 32.6%
Forces

Navy 40,051 42,525 41,955 41,134 41,816 43,737 46,687 48,072 48,170 53,128 32.8%
% Armed Forces 7.56 7.92 6.51 6.61 8.3 8.27 8.95 13.56 13.53 14.06
to Total

Government Employees

Source: President of Mexico, Segundo Informe de Gobierno (Mexico: Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1996), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, 1996, Anexo.
Note: Includes Federal Government and Other Government Agencies. After 1992, government decentralization, especially of the Ministry of Education, drastically decreased the num-
ber of people employed by the government.

158 Raul Benitez Manaut

Table 6.4 Members of the Armed Forces, 1990-1995
(Percentage of Total Population)

Percentage
1 990 1995 Change

Population 84,249.6 91,120.4 12.12
(thousands)

Total Armed Forces 192.994 225.200 16.68
Percentage .23% .24%

Source: President of Mexico, Segundo Informe de Gobierno (Mexico: Poder
Ejecutivo Federal, 1996), Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, 1996, Anexo.

political, and even international questioning, and accusations of human rights vi-
olations are beginning to spread (in Chiapas in January 1994; in Mexico City, with
the raid in the Buenos Aires colonia in September 1997). Focusing the military’s ac-
tions in the three end-of—the-century wars in Mexico corresponding to the DN—II
plan even jeopardizes the plan to modernize the military, which seeks to concen-
trate its basic constitutional mission (DN—I) and to develop the operational capac-
ity of its structure, which has wide social and political recognition (DN-III).

Part II

Crime and Governability in

the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands


Chapter 7

The Historical Dynamics of Smuggling
in the U.S.-Mexican Border Region,
1550-1998

Reflections on Markets, Cultures, and Bureaucracies

Louis R. Sadler

SMUGGLING ALONG THE BORDERS ofthe sovereign
nations of the world is an ancient and almost honorable occupa-
tion. Indeed, if prostitution is the world’s oldest profession, then
smuggling and espionage most certainly run a close race for sec-
ond place. From the cigarette smugglers of Andorra—with their
backpacks loaded with cartons of cigarettes, humping their loads
over the Pyrenees Mountains and evading Spanish customs
guards—who are virtually legendary? to the famed rumrunners
of the Prohibition era evading U.S. Coast Guard cutters to bring
hard liquor to thirsty Americans? to gunrunners like the leg-
endary “Earthquake McGoon” (real name: Captain James Mc-
Govern) and his less well known cohort Allen Lawrence Pope in
1954, ﬂying ammunition into the doomed French fortress of Dien
Bien Phu in Vietnam for a then—obscure charter airline called Civil
Air Transport for the ubiquitous Central Intelligence Agency;3 to
the Mexican truck drivers in northeastern Mexico, who for
decades clandestinely transported hundreds of thousands of tons
of chemicals from the United States across the Rio Grande to the
huge industrial complexes in Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n;4 smuggling
has, to a signiﬁcant degree, a patina of romanticism attached to
it, with the signiﬁcant exception of one commodity—drugs.

Unfortunately, there is a relationship between smuggling and

161

162 Louis. R. Sadler

drugs that has grown enormously in recent decades. This chapter will attempt to
sketch the broad outlines of this relationship and the sometimes obscure circum-
stances that brought the United States of America and Los Estados Unidos de
México (the United States of Mexico) to a diﬂicult juncture in 1998.

Therefore, as historians are wont to do, I shall begin in the beginning——the lat-
ter part of the sixteenth century. From approximately 1550 forward, what is today
Mexico——-then the central core of what was Imperial Spain’s incredibly wealthy
Viceroyalty of Nuevé Espaﬁa (New Spain)—grappled with the rigidities of Span-
ish mercantilism. Mercantilism (which was initially developed by the French min-
ister Colbert in the seventeenth century) essentially required that Spain’s colonies
not trade with another country except through the mother country. Given the dis-
tance between Spain and the east coast of Mexico in the days of sail, coupled with
the scarcity of goods produced in the mother country, Spanish mercantilism was
patently unworkable. As a result, smuggling as early as the late sixteenth century
became endemic along the east coast of what is now Mexico. By the time two cen-
turies had passed (the beginning of the nineteenth century), smuggling had be-
come entrenched in the Viceroyalty.5 More important, the economy and ﬁscal sys-
tem of New Spain had been substantially affected by the loss of revenue to a
smuggling industry that had evolved as early as the late seventeenth century not
only in Mexico but throughout Spanish America.

By the dawn of the nineteenth century, the newly independent United States of
America had begun to probe the northernmost outposts of what was euphemisti—
cally called the Spanish borderlands. In actuality the ﬁrst U.S. government official
to visit was a young U.S. Army captain who arrived in 1806 in what is now known
as Santa Fe . The Spanish oﬂicials quite rightly viewed Captain Zebulon M. Pike as
a spy, which of course he was. As a result he was arrested and transported to Chi-
huahua City, where he ultimately was able to win his release.5 But Captain Pike
was only the ﬁrst of a long line of U.S. citizens (some ofﬁcial, some unofﬁcial) who
arrived on the border of northern New Spain (the later ones bearing merchandise
they wished to trade). By the time Mexico acquired its independence in 1821,
smuggling along both its northern and southern borders (plus both coastlines)
had become commonplace-—indeed virtually customary. This was particularly
true both in Santa Fe and Tejas (Texas).

Following the war with Texas in 1835-1836 and the war with the United States

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 163

in 1846-1847, smuggling accelerated in Mexico’s northeastern states (Coahuila,
Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon). By the beginning of the 1850s, it was estimated
that fully two—thirds of the merchandise sold in northeastern Mexico had been
smuggled across the border from the United States. Indeed, by 1850 the situation
had become so serious that the Mexican government, in an attempt to stem the
ﬂood of imported and smuggled goods, created a new customs enforcement bu-
reau—the Contraresguardo dc Gendarmeria Fiscal. But despite the best efforts of
the new customs agents, local Mexican oﬂicials up to and including the governor
of Coahuila, operating in league with Texas merchants (and smugglers), suc-
ceeded rather easily in thwarting the enforcement efforts at the highest levels of
the Mexican government.7 From then until the present, the smuggling that began
along the northeastern Mexican and Texas frontiers continues along the entire
U.S.—Mexican border (some 1,951 miles).

There have been peaks and lulls in the volume of smuggling. Nor has it been
simply a north-south operation; indeed, smugglers in both the Mexican and U.S.
border states have historically adapted to “changing market conditions.” For ex-
ample, during the late 1850s, the so-called Guerra de la Reforma (War of the Re-
form), gunrunning became the premium “activity” as weapons were smuggled
across the Mexican-U.S. border to both sides during this Mexican civil war.

The same thing happened beginning in 1861 with the outbreak of the American
Civil War, except in this case smuggling and gunrunning ran both ways. The Con-
federates smuggled cotton into Mexico to be transshipped to Europe and on occa-
sion received weapons in return. In addition, with the beginning of the so-called
French Intervention, weapons from the United States were smuggled into Mexico
for President Benito Juarez’s troops until 1867, when Emperor Maximilian I was
overthrown.3

During the 1870s, the smuggling of munitions from Texas into northeastern
Mexico was a major industry in furtherance of General Porﬁrio Diaz’s attempts
(ﬁnally crowned with success) to overthrow the Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada admin-
istration.‘’ By the early 1890s two pre-precursor rebellions occurred in northern
Mexico (the so-called Catarino Garza rebellion which was spawned out of south
Texas and northeastern Mexico,” and the Santa Teresa outbreak in northwestern
Chihuahua)“ Both led to a sizable traffic in the smuggling of guns and ammuni-
tion from the United States into Mexico.

164 Louis R. Sadler

But more important, in the late nineteenth century a new product was intro-
duced into the smuggling mix: narcotics. Ironically, it was an import from the
Paciﬁc Rim and was the result of U.S. immigration policy. In the 1880s, the U.S.
Congress slammed the door on Chinese immigration into the United States. But
the Chinese had earlier brought a taste for opium to both Mexico and the United
States. By 1909, the U.S. government had banned the importation of opium. Sub-
sequently opium was smuggled into Mexico and then transsmuggled into the U.S.
border states.”

Coincident with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, opium smug-
gling began to accelerate from the northern tier of Mexican states into the United
States. However, gunrunning became the smugglers’ choice for obvious reasons.
By 1912, one prominent smuggler was musing publicly about using aircraft to
smuggle arms across the border. In the same year, a notorious smuggler and mur-
derer named Victor Ochoa added a new wrinkle to smuggling across the border.
Ochoa, who was responsible for acquiring ammunition for the revolutionary
forces of General Pascual Orozco, Jr., used large black rubber bladders to ﬂoat tens
of thousands of rounds of ammunition across the Rio Grande from El Paso to Ciu-
dad Juarez during the night.” And given the length of the border it was virtually
impossible to seal it completely. Even in June 1916, when war with Mexico seemed
imminent and the entire National Guard of the United States (some 112,000
strong) was called to active duty and sent to the border to back up approximately
40,000 U.S. Army regulars (including 10,500 troops inside Chihuahua chasing
Pancho Villa and his guerrillas) who were deployed from southern California to
the lower Rio Grande valley of Texas, it was not possible to protect the border
completely. Although these thousands of troops slowed the smuggling of guns and
ammunition considerably, it was never completely stopped.“

Before the Mexican Revolution, the smuggling of alcohol (tequila, pulque,
mescal, and rum) from Mexico to the United States without paying for a tax
stamp had been a staple for the smugglers. And it had been comparatively easy
during the Revolution to shift from smuggling alcohol to 7—mm Mauser ammuni-
tion. The Revolution came to an end in the summer of 1920 (although there were
sporadic outbreaks as late as 1929), and the smugglers quickly shifted back to
smuggling alcohol from breweries and distilleries in Mexico into the American
border states.” With Prohibition in full swing, Federal Prohibition Agents and

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 165

Texas Rangers in particular tried in vain to stem the ﬂow of alcohol into the
United States.” Furthermore, by 1924 the U.S. Congress passed the ﬁrst compre-
hensive immigration statute and created the U.S. Border Patrol within the Depart-
ment of]ustice.17 Thus, the traﬂicking in human beings began in Mexico. Some of
the same smugglers in both Mexico and the United States who had smuggled am-
munition during the Mexican Revolution now smuggled people.

In 1934, Prohibition in the United States ﬁnally came to an end, and the smug-
glers again shifted products. Smuggling of various consumer durables began. Au-
tomobiles, refrigerators, and stoves became the smugglers’ items of choice, and
the rise in smuggling of such consumer items began to accelerate. In the coming
decades, the smuggling of small arms from the United States into Mexico became
a staple not for overthrowing governments but for self-protection. In addition, an-
other crop, marijuana, whose popularity had increased during the Mexican Revo-
lution and soon became the drug of choice in the United States during the 1930s,
began to be smuggled across the border in increasing quantities during the 1930s
and 19405.18 However, from the 1940s forward it was unquestionably the smug-
gling of consumer goods that occupied the attention of the Mexican-U.S. smug-
gling industry. High tariffs imposed by the Mexican government on items such as
television and radio sets and microwave ovens (by the 1960s) made smuggling a
large and increasingly proﬁtable industry throughout the post—World War II
decades.” I

There was one World War 11 program that had significant impact on the U.S.-
Mexican border. In 1943, in the midst of the war, the U.S. and Mexican govern-
ments agreed on the terms of the so-called Bracero program in which several hun-
dred thousand Mexican workers would travel to the United States for limited
periods of time to harvest crops. The program was so popular in the U.S. agricul-
tural sector that following the war the program was extended until 1964 (with a
one-year extension to 1965).” With the termination of the program, the smuggling
of indocumentados accelerated at a substantial pace. And during the past third of a
century, so-called coyotes (smugglers who smuggle people) established networks
and safe houses to expedite the smuggling of illegal aliens into the United States.”

At virtually the same time (the decade of the 1960s) there was an explosion
(particularly percentagewise) in the population of the Mexican border states
(Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California).22

4 John Bailey and Roy Godson

mate power to be in the hands of top formal authorities in the central govem—
ment, while others see power shared between formal authorities and a parallel
“shadow government.” Proponents of the model of formal, top-down control em-
phasize that the complex party-government arrangements that became consoli-
dated in Mexico in the 19303 and 1940s permit effective central control over virtu-
ally all signiﬁcant legal and nonlegal activity. Stated simply, the perception is that
the chain of control over crime and corruption runs from the president through
the relevant security ministries downward through state governors’ offices and
justice ministries to connect with intermediaries of professional criminal leaders
outside of government. Criminal organizations take their direction from political
authorities. To win formal office is to assume the right to organize and beneﬁt
from business activity, both legal and illegal.5

A variation on the centralized-systemic perspective posits a shadow parallel
system of government just below the surface, integrated into and run by most of
the same people as the visible system. While the formally elected president retains
ultimate control, the shadow actors exercise substantial power. This shadow par-
allel system, made up of a network of patron-client relationships, is symbiotically
connected to the formal legal system. It controls many of the organized activities
not formally tied to direct government control, including organized criminal ac-
tivities throughout Mexico and in the borderlandsf‘

Proponents of the centralized-systemic perspective argue that high political
leaders, even up to the level of the president, direct the legal, above-ground gov-
ernment as well as the shadow government that controls most organized criminal
activities. The political leadership protects these organizations from both Mexi-
can and foreign law enforcement organizations. These top Mexican leaders man-
age criminal activity in such a way as to reduce friction and instability among the
criminals and between criminals and the Mexican and U.S. governments. They do
this to ensure their personal wealth and the hegemony of the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (PR1), as well as to ensure the relatively smooth functioning of the
Mexican governmental system, even if from time to time ofﬁcials are elected or
appointed from non-PRI parties.

In contrast to the centralized-systemic view, others see multiple fragmented-
contested political-criminal subsystems that threaten security and governability.
Functional coalitions of actors from the political and criminal worlds are assem-

166 Louis R. Sadler

Although some scholars have suggested that the development of the maquiladora
(or twin—plant industry), which was designed in part to provide employment for
bracero workers now unable to come to the United States, accelerated this popula-
tion buildup, in truth the number of maquila plants grew very slowly throughout
the latter part of the 1960s and early 197os.23 What is indisputable is that year-by-
year apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol increased signiﬁcantly beginning in
1966——the ﬁrst year after the close of the Bracero program.“

By 1969, the drug smuggling from Mexico to the United States was also in-
creasing. Scholars of the period will remember that in the fall of 1969, the Nixon
administration launched “Operation Intercept,” which attained much publicity
but very little success. It should be noted parenthetically that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice ofﬁcial responsible for Operation Intercept in what was then the El
Paso Customs District was G. Gordon Liddy, which may explain in part why Oper-
ation Intercept was such an abysmal failure.”

It was during this period that both Washington and Mexico City suddenly dis-
covered the border. For almost one—half of a century (1930-1975), a kind of modus
vivendi was in place on both sides of the border. On the U.S. side, U.S. customs,
backed up by the U.S. Customs Agency Service, had a well-deserved reputation for
eliminating corruption in the Customs Service. Furthermore, U.S. customs ad-
ministrators (particularly district directors and their deputies, along with senior
supervisory customs inspectors) were usually left in place for lengthy tours, some-
times ﬁve years or more, ensuring that they learned the terrain, the people on
both sides of the border, and who the players were. Consequently, customs of-
ﬁcials developed a quid pro quo as a matter of policy and practice.

Was this a quid pro quo with U.S. customs winking at Mexican customs illegal-
ities? Not at all! U.S. customs officials usually were aware of payoffs (including, in
some cases, the speciﬁc sums acquired). Without being speciﬁc (for obvious rea-
sons), one of the smaller of the forty-two ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der yielded to the administrador de aduana during the 197os—198os an estimated
$70,000 per annum in kickbacks for granting permits for imports. Although U.S.
customs was aware of this, it was viewed pragmatically as a Mexican matter and
one that the U.S. government could not and should not be involved in. In reality,
these payoffs were viewed more in the context of “tips” and a throwback to Span-
ish custom in Latin America. As a rule, Spanish ofﬁcials not only in what is now

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 167

Mexico but throughout Latin America were paid, in most cases, only a pittance in
salaries. As a result, the custom of bribing ofﬁcials (tipping them) became almost
customary.” This was particularly true for Mexican aduana officials.

Nonetheless, ranking aduana ofﬁcials (for example port directors who carried
the title of Administrador dc Aduarza) usually knew that the U.S. oiﬁcials had
knowledge of the “tips” but seldom commented on the fact. What U.S. customs
oﬂicials (district directors and their deputies, along with port directors at small
ports of entry) did do was develop relationships with their Mexican counterparts.
Usually this consisted of a luncheon, perhaps weekly, alternating sides at the fa-
vorite restaurant of the host. For example, for years the favorite luncheon location
for Mexican aduarza ofﬁcials in Ciudad Juarez was La Fogata, a traditional restau-
rant/bar located adjacent to the Juarez Hospital, not far from the international
bridges separating the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.”

Usually, the ranking Mexican and U.S. customs officials would exchange home
and private office telephone numbers so that they would be able to communicate
in case of an emergency.” When there was a change in personnel at the top (a new
U.S. district director/ port director/ Mexican administrador, etc.) there usually
would be a hand-over. The outgoing district director would host a luncheon to
which the administrador would be invited. The new U.S. customs ofﬁcial would be
formally introduced. Oftentimes there would be a farewell luncheon or dinner for
the outgoing Mexican/U.S. oﬂicial by their counterpart. In addition, it was some-
thing akin to custom that a farewell party by U.S. customs for the outgoing oﬂicial
would result in an invitation to the Mexican counterpart and that official would
present a gift (perhaps an expensive bottle of tequila or a box of cigars, depending
on the preferences of the recipient). The same party and exchange of gifts were
generally followed by U.S. oﬂicials for their Mexican colleagues.”

This relationship in most cases was not corrupt but highly useﬁil for both
sides. The U.S. customs officials almost always spoke at least basic, sometimes ex-
cellent Spanish and made a habit of speaking Spanish whenever they were in
Mexico. Oftentimes their Mexican aduana colleagues would speak English at the
U.S. meetings with customs officials.”

There also was a clear understanding of the quid pro quo relationship. If a U.S.
customs oﬂicial requested something unusual from his Mexican counterpart, it
was understood that the favor would at some point in the ﬁiture be reciprocated.”

168 Louis R. Sadler

A couple of anecdotes will perhaps illustrate the point. A senior U.S. Customs
Agency Service officer had over a period of several decades developed excellent re-
lationships with a variety of Mexican aduana officials. Although this customs in-
vestigator was fairly senior, he was not a ranking ofﬁcial. But he had accumulated
a fairly extensive collection of veritable “I.O.U.s” with his aduana colleagues.

What triggered the quid pro quo was a frantic phone call U.S. customs re-
ceived at the Laredo Port of Entry. Apparently someone at the U.S Army’s Fort
Sam Houston, in San Antonio, had surplused a Bell (UH-1) helicopter after the last
U.S. Marine had been picked up from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in
April 1975.32 But what initiated a frantic hunt for the helicopter was the belated
discovery that the helicopter had not been stripped of some highly classiﬁed elec-
tronics gear.

When the Customs Agency Service officer (who shall remain unnamed) re-
ceived a panicked call inquiring whether he had seen a U.S. Army helicopter on a
ﬂatbed truck crossing the bridge over the Rio Grande, his reply was, “Yes, a couple
of hours ago.” When asked if he could somehow get the helicopter back from
Mexico, his response was a laconic, “Perhaps.” The officer called in one of his
“I.O.U.s” by contacting one of his friends (a very senior Mexican aduana ofﬁcial
across the river). ‘

Reminding his friend (very gently) that he owed him one, he asked if he could
obtain the return of the U.S. Army surplus helicopter. The Mexican official said he
would see what he could do. The protocol was to never ask something that was
impossible or would get the Mexican ofﬁcial in real trouble. The aduana ofﬁcial
called the checkpoint south of Nuevo Laredo to see if the truck hauling the heli-
copter had passed, which it had a short time earlier. The customs official ordered
an aduana vehicle to drive south, stop the truck, turn it around, and bring it back
to the Nuevo Laredo aduana facility. It was done in a very short time; according to
the U.S. customs agent, in a couple of hours. When the helicopter on the ﬂatbed
truck arrived back at Mexican customs in Nuevo Laredo, the driver was ordered
to drive it back north across the river to the U.S. customs facility in Laredo. The
aduana official called his friend in U.S. customs to inform him that the helicopter
and the truck would arrive momentarily.

The protocol was observed. The U.S. customs investigator thanked his Mexi-
can official friend who reminded him that he owed him a drink, or two, or three.

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 169

The U.S. customs officer agreed that he did and arranged to buy his friend a drink.
When the helicopter on the truck arrived, the U.S. customs agent called his con-
tact at Fort Sam Houston and assured him that the helicopter appeared to be in-
tact and could be picked up in Laredo at U.S. customs, which would guard same
until it could be retrieved.”

Another war story which illustrates the same point, but at another level, oc-
curred a couple of decades ago in Texas. Ever since the Republic of Texas was
formed, many Texans and particularly Texas law enforcement ofﬁcials have never
forgotten that Texas was once a sovereign nation, and to this day still think that it
is. This is particularly true insofar as Mexico is concerned. And although Texas
and Texans generally speaking are hardly revered in Mexico, there is a grudging
respect among many Mexican officials who operate along the Texas border.

This respect extends even to the fabled Texas Rangers, a Texas law enforce-
ment organization that is not particularly beloved either by Mexicans or Mexican-
Americans. A senior Texas Ranger captain related this particular anecdote to me a
few years after the incident had occurred, and he himself was a principal actor in
it. This captain had dealt for a number of years with a senior Mexican customs of-
ﬁcial based in northeastern Mexico. The Ranger captain had learned over time
that some of the so-called grup0s—the family-based industrial combines that con-
trol Monterrey, the capital of the state of Nuevo Le6n——had been smuggling hun-
dreds of thousands of tons of industrial chemicals from plants in Texas to indus-
trial plants in Monterrey, evading Mexican customs. These evasions deprived the
Mexican government of tens of millions of pesos in customs revenue.

In a conversation with the Mexican customs oﬂicial, the Ranger captain said,
in essence, “It’s none of my business, but do you know about the 18-wheel trucks
that evade your customs en route to Monterrey from Texas chemical plants?” The
Ranger provided details of their routes and timetables in case the Mexican cus-
toms oﬂicer was interested. The aduana oﬂicial was very interested; he followed
up on the tip and made a major seizure of a convoy loaded with chemicals. At the
time, Mexican aduana officers received a signiﬁcant percentage of the value of the
shipment as an incentive to seize illegal shipments. The value of the seized ship-
ment exceeded $250,000 (U.S.) and the very happy Mexican customs oﬂicial
called his Texas Ranger friend. Informing him of the seizure, he told the Ranger
captain that he would split the reward with him. However, the Ranger explained

170 Louis R. Sadler

that although he would love to be able to take his share of the reward being prof-
fered, his organization would not allow him to do so. But he was grateful for the
offer and he did have an I.O.U. with his friend the Mexican customs oﬂicial.

Several months later, the Ranger captain indeed had a pressing reason to call
the Mexican customs official. A boyhood friend and private employee of a very
senior Texas state government official had been murdered at a ranch along the
border. It was suspected that a Mexican citizen was responsible for the killing and
the Ranger captain informed his friend that the Rangers were under great pres-
sure to ﬁnd the murderer. He informed the customs official that they had identi-
ﬁed a suspect who was believed to have ﬂed back to his home in northeastern
Mexico. The Ranger captain asked his friend if he could help locate the suspect
and have him arrested, so that he could be extradited to Texas to stand trial. The
Mexican customs oﬂicial said he woulddo what he could.

Two days later, an unmarked black four-door sedan bearing Nuevo Leon state
plates pulled up in front of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) head-
quarters in Austin. Two men jumped out of the vehicle and opened the trunk.
They removed the murder suspect, who was bound and gagged, and laid him on
the front steps of the DPS building.“ There were no lengthy, involved extradition
proceedings between the Mexican Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Department of
State. The matter had been handled unofficially as matters between the two sover-
eign nations were sometimes handled at the border. The I.O.U. had been paid.

To be sure, these two anecdotes illustrate a relationship that existed two dec-
ades ago, but they nonetheless depict a reality that worked, in spite of its short-
comings. Frankly, I believe it is much more desirable than the current situation.

Generally speaking, problems along the U.S.-Mexican border, at least through
the 1970s, were seldom referred to either Mexico City or Washington. Usually they
were solved at the district director or administrador de aduana level, although on
the U.S. side, the regional commissioner of U.S. customs in Houston or Los Ange-
les would nominally be consulted or reassured that the problem was being solved
at the local level.”

Referrals to the U.S. Commissioner of Customs or to the U.S. Department of
State or the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Mexico City were almost never made.
In a sense, both state and foreign relations seldom wanted to know what was hap-
pening on the U.S.-Mexican border. Generally speaking, the local political estab-

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 171

lishments played a major role in the operations of customs/aduana on both sides
of the border. In the case of the United States, the two U.S. senators in each border
state (but particularly in Texas) were usually consulted, and they often inﬂuenced
the selection of district directors of the U.S. customs districtsalong the border.
To a somewhat lesser degree, depending upon seniority and committee assign-
ments, members of the U.S. Congress with districts on the border also played a
role in determining personnel selection and policy. There are a number of Texas
customs districts in which U.S. senators virtually picked the district directors and
had some inﬂuence in the selection of the regional commissioner based in Hous-
ton?“

Institutional politics as always played a role. Historically on the U.S. side of
the border, U.S. Customs was the lead agency, with the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service and Border Patrol being the poor country cousins. In the mid-
1970s, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) worked its way into the bor-
der game and acquired drug enforcement primacy over U.S. Customs/ Customs
Agency Service. In addition, the Border Patrol in the 1980s moved aggressively
into the drug enforcement arena, moving U.S. customs into a distant back seat.”

On the Mexican side of the frontier, the aduana took the visible front seat with
the most powerﬁll Mexican cabinet—level department, Gobernacién, supervising
matters from a discreet distance. The state and federal Policia judicial at various
times played a signiﬁcant role, yet that role tended to ebb and ﬂow depending
upon the politics of a given situation.”

How could U.S. customs suddenly lose primacy at the border? Several things
coincided. First, the border in a sense “blew up” beginning in the 1960s and early
1970s with the explosive population growth in cities like Ciudad Juarez and Ti-
juana.39 But even border villages like Palomas (technically General Rodrigo
Quevedo), Chihuahua, across the border from Columbus, New Mexico, grew from
a population of a few hundred to a few thousand in a span of a decade.“ The same
thing happened in Nogales, Sonora (across the border from Nogales, Arizona).41
But in particular, the cataclysmic growth of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, the two
largest Mexican border cities, unhinged local and state control. Not only did the
local ofﬁcials lose a handle on their respective mum'cipz'os, but they could not pro-
vide the necessary social infrastructure—streets, schools, hospitals, sewer and wa-
ter facilities—as the two cities doubled in population in less than two decades.“

172 Louis R. Sadler

Suddenly, the border had become red hot. The word “border” itself had be-
come “sexy,” and it was—from the U.S. side at least—where the action was. If you
were an upwardly mobile U.S. customs olﬁcial or perhaps a Border Patrol supervi-
sor or a DEA agent with aspirations for advancement, the border was the place to
be. Recall actor Jack Nicholson, whose portrayal of corruption in the U.S. Border
Patrol played out along the west Texas/El Paso border with Juarez was a poor imi-
tation of reality, but it reﬂected at least a perception as seen by Hollywood.“

By the mid-1980s, U.S. customs had lost its way. To be fair, at the working level
even upper-level customs officials were hardly decision makers. Now that the bor-
der was hot, Washington cowboys and Mexico City chilangos were deciding who
did what and where. Senior ofﬁcials (district directors) who did not know Spanish
(and had no inclination to learn even a few courtesy terms—buen0s dias, con mu-
cho gusto, muy bien, gracias) and hated Mexico, Mexicans in general, and Mexican
oﬂicials in particular, suddenly populated most of the major U.S. customs dis-
tricts. No longer were there Hispanic district directors, whose Spanish was ﬂuent
and who developed excellent relations with their Mexican counterparts.“

In addition, corruption in the U.S. Customs Service, which had previously
been negligible, accelerated during the 1980s. Supervisors no longer understood
who the players were, the language they spoke, the terrain, or for that matter al-
most anything about the border. They were there to get promoted—just like offi-
cers going to Vietnam to “get their tickets punched” so they would receive their
next promotion. To be sure, the stunning sums offered by Colombian cocaine
smugglers when they shifted from smuggling into south Florida to the U.S.-Mex-
ico border were extraordinarily tempting, even to the most incorruptible customs
inspectors.“

But that would come in the future. By the 1970s, the driving factor was the
smuggling of consumer goods from the U.S. border region into Mexico. Light
planes loaded with television sets, microwave ovens, and small refrigerators made
virtually daily ﬂights to small airstrips in Coahuila, Sonora, and Chihuahua. The
economic impact of this smuggling in the Arizona/ Texas border counties was so
substantial that sales tax revenues were of a volume similar to cities much larger
than Laredo and Nogales.“

By the mid-1970s, the scale of smuggling of consumer goods had become so
large that it was virtually an industry. It included personnel from both the United

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 173

States and Mexico: department store owners in the United States; ex-Air America
pilots who ﬂew the television sets and similar items into Mexico; the friendly
Mexican neighborhood smugglers who handled the surface smuggling from cities
like El Paso into the interior of Chihuahua; and the Mexican customs ofﬁcials who
were “on the take.”

Two anecdotes will illustrate the situation in the late 1970s. I was standing on
the tarmac at Laredo Municipal Airport (a former U.S. Air Force base) watching a
single-engine light plane packed with microwaves, television sets, and small
portable refrigerators taxiing out on the runway. The pilot was literally ﬂying with
the stick in his stomach because the small plane was so loaded. A U.S. Customs
Air Support pilot was asked where the pilot was heading. He explained that he
was making his daily ﬂight for a large Laredo department store south into the in-
terior of Coahuila. He also stated that the pilot was suspected of not deadheading
back to Laredo but was believed to be ﬂying drugs into Texas on his return ﬂights.
Indeed, the previous year he had been arrested in Mexico on a smuggling ﬂight
and jailed for some weeks for evading Mexican customs before he was ﬁnally re-
leased (apparently the proper authorities had not received the appropriate pay-
ment).47

If arrangements to smuggle capital goods from cities like Laredo and Nogales
were efﬁcient, the system in Chihuahua was the most urbane. A native of Chi-
huahua, who was a member of a wealthy and politically powerful family, de-
scribed how el sistema, as it was sometimes called, worked. Imagine the wife of an
upper-middle—class family living in Chihuahua City who drives to El Paso for a
monthly shopping trip. She heads for her favorite department store (“The Popu-
lar”—long the favorite of Chihuahuans)“ and purchases several thousand dollars
worth of merchandise. It was routine to request that the store deliver the pur-
chases to a nearby hotel (the Hotel Plaza). At the Plaza a Chihuahuan smuggler
would pick up the packages and make the proper arrangements with the Mexican
aduana inspectors on the so-called free bridge (the Bridge of the Americas) and
with the inspectors at the customs checkpoint seventeen kilometers south of Ciu-
dad Juarez.

By the time the shopper had returned to her residence in Chihuahua City, her
purchases would have already arrived at the family residence, where a “reason-
able” fee (including of course the bribes) would have been paid by a family re-

174 Louis R. Sadler

tainer. In this way wives did not have to engage in the distasteful business of nego-
tiating bribes with Mexican customs ofﬁcials. The system, particularly in Chi-
huahua, had evolved since the 1940s and lasted almost four decades.” Similar
scenes with variations were played out throughout the border region. Both the
U.S. and Mexican governments winked at this irregular exporting business which

grew at an enormous rate, particularly during the decade of the 1970s until the

time of the 1982 peso devaluation.”

From the U.S. point of view, this trade was highly lucrative and assisted the
U.S. balance of payments. The matter of bribes was one for the Mexican govern-
ment, not the U.S. government. From the standpoint of the Mexican government,
the smuggling was viewed rather gently. At the time, the Mexican manufacturers
could not satisfy the demand for TV sets, refrigerators, and microwaves, and
smuggling handled a problem the Mexican government had not been able to
solve. Furthermore, the bribes paid supplemented the meager salaries of the cus-
toms inspectors and could simply be ignored.“

No one was unhappy with the status quo; yes, bribes were paid, but American
manufacturers could hardly be unhappy, and neither could the department store
owners in U.S. border towns. The problem of course was that a system that had
lasted for decades would be swept away by the impact of the events of the 1970s
and 19803.52

The Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) embargo against the United States, and the explosion of crude oil
prices beginning in the fall of 1973 had profound effects on Mexico. The discovery
of the great Tabasco heavy crude ﬁelds in the mid-1970s enabled Mexico to begin
exporting crude oil in huge quantities (1.5 million barrels daily) by 1980 and re-
sulted in a huge ﬁnancial windfall (an estimated US$15 billion) for the Mexican
government. However, subsequent oil overproduction coupled with the introduc-
tion of oil conservation measures, particularly in the United States, caused a pre-
cipitous decline in the price of crude oil. By 1982, the administration of President
José Lopez Portillo was forced to devalue the peso. And, by December 1982, when
Lopez Portillo’s chosen successor Miguel de la Madrid assumed the presidency, he
had inherited what could only be characterized as a “godawﬁ1lmess.”53

President de la Madrid stepped into office with the Mexican economy in free
fall. Three years later de la Madrid, who had allowed the peso to ﬂoat downward

The Historic Dynamics of Smuggling 175

to more than one thousand pesos to the dollar, was able by early 1985 to cobble to-
gether a pact between labor and the Mexican private sector, which limited wage
and price increases. He also made a decision in 1986, which in many respects was
more important to the Mexican economy than the later decision to establish the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

President de la Madrid persuaded the economic elites in Mexico (almost all of
whom opposed his decision) that the nation must join GATT (the General Agree-
ment on Tariifs and Trade). In so doing Mexico effectively joined the twentieth
century economically. Economists and friends of Mexico applauded de la Ma-
drid’s political courage in forcing his country into the ranks of GATT.“

Unfortunately, there was an unexpected and unintended consequence of the
president’s decision, one that is barely known even today. By joining GATT, Mex-
ico unconsciously destroyed the smuggling industry on the northern border. Al-
though the import duties on a number of items were phased in over a period of
years, smugglers, who had made at the very least a comfortable living, and the
Mexican customs inspectors, who had their salaries supplemented by bribes paid
by the smugglers importing consumer goods, now faced the reality that their stan-
dard of living had just been reduced in a very substantial way.

In the early 1980s, Mexicans tightened their belts as a result of the precipitous
fall of crude oil prices and a concomitant 60 percent devaluation of the peso.
These combined events forced Mexican customs ofﬁcials and smugglers to adjust
to “changing market conditions” virtually overnight. These events occurred at
precisely the same time as the shift by the Colombian drug cartels from smuggling
cocaine through Florida to the U.S. -Mexican border.

The combination of these factors—an economy in free fall, Mexican and U.S.
smugglers (some of whom had been involved to a limited degree in drug running)
who had lost their source of income as a result of President de la Madrid’s deci-
sion to join GATT, and literally hundreds of Mexican aduana inspectors who had
lost a signiﬁcant percentage of their income from both the devaluation of the peso
and the bribes they had received for allowing capital goods to be imported with-
out paying duty—had an extraordinary impact.

The results of this unlikely combination were a disaster for Mexico, a windfall
for the Colombian cocaine smugglers, and a crack cocaine epidemic in most

American inner cities.55 Obviously, the Mexican customs inspectors, who knew

lntroduction 5

bled at different levels and on a more or less ad hoc basis. Certain types of crimi-
nal activities can operate at a subnational level. This involves local and/ or state ju-
dicial authorities in Mexico and on the U.S. side of the border region. Such act-
ivities include kidnapping, auto theft in the United States or Mexico with trans-
portation across Mexico’s northern or southern borders, and the smuggling of
Mexicans (and also third-country migrants) across the U.S. border. Even in cases
of local drug production (e.g., of locally or regionally produced synthetic drugs) a
coalition could be assembled with the collaboration of police and customs

ofﬁcials at the state and local levels, operating independently from national politi- A

cal control. But as a general rule, the larger the scale and operation of illegal activ-
ity (e.g., smuggling cocaine), the more borders that will need to be crossed (as in
Asian illegal migration through Mexico to the United States). And the more sensi-
tive the commodity (e.g., arms smuggling to Mexico), the more complex, wide-
spread, and higher the level of national involvement is likely to be.7

In this fragmented-contested image, there is no “Mister Big” or ,“Boss of
Bosses” in either the political or the criminal world. Rather, political and govern-
mental leaders at various levels——usually elected or appointed by the PR1-—have
beneﬁted from and supported criminal organizations. Further, the power does
not always ﬂow from the top down or even from the political to the criminal net-
works. Power and inﬂuence have ﬂowed in different directions, depending on par-
ticular circumstances and issues. At times, criminals threaten or coerce political
authorities. At other times, political authorities extort and coerce criminals. Situa-
tional, ﬂuid, ad hoc arrangements are more typical than top-down control.

This fragmented-contested image is consistent with imperfect control by cen-
tral bureaucratic authorities over ﬁeld operations. The image is also consistent
with variable linkages between elected political authorities and organized crime.
A national-level minister or a state governor personally may or may not be di-
rectly linked and beneﬁt materially from police or judicial corruption. He may,
however, beneﬁt politically from local police involvement with and control of
criminals, who may contribute ﬁnancial support and stability in a given locale.

Whether the centralized-systemic or the fragmented-contested pattern of po-
litical-criminal collaboration offers the more accurate model of reality in the
1990s and continuing into the new millennium, it offers little reason for optimism
that law enforcement alone is the principal route to reform. Increased Mexican-

176 Louis R. Sadler

portions of the border like their own backyard and whose legal and illegal income
had been more than cut in half, were a fertile recruiting ground for the Colombian
traffickers and their new Mexican partners. Not only did they know the physical
terrain of the border, but they also knew the ins and outs of smuggling drugs
across the border. Furthermore, they knew the routines—shift changes, rotations,
lane assignments, etc.—and in some cases they knew U.S. customs inspectors.
Some of these oﬂicials also knew individuals who were quite close to U.S. customs
officials and who might be open to a bribe. They also knew which inspectors were
in ﬁnancial trouble or which married inspectors had a mistress or lover on the
side, and thus could be blackmailed?“

As a result, corruption among both Mexican aduana inspectors and U.S. cus-
toms inspectors accelerated to an alarming level beginning in the late 1980s. This
continued through the mid-1990s. Ironically, with some 70 percent of the cocaine
entering the United States in the mid-1990s via the U.S.-Mexican border, the situ-
ation changed dramatically by 1998. By the summer of 1998, DEA officials were es-
timating that only 50 percent of cocaine was being imported via the Mexican bor-
der. It seems the Mexican traffickers were demanding too much of a cut. As a
result, the Colombian cartels have begun shifting their operations back to the
Caribbean and Florida.” Given the volatility of cocaine smuggling, as trafﬁckers
shift routes to thwart U.S. law enforcement, the cocaine cartels will undoubtedly,
at some point in the very near future, be back at full strength on the U.S.—Mexico
border.

What we can be sure of is that the smugglers who operate cooperatively on
both sides of the border will continue, as they have for centuries, to “adjust to
changing market conditions.”

Chapter 8

Organized Crime and
Democratic Governability at the
U.S.—Mexico Border

Border Zone Dynamics

Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

PROBABLY NOWHERE in the world do two countries as
different as Mexico and the United States live side by side. As one
crosses the border into Mexico from, say, El Paso, the contrast is
shocking——from wealth to poverty, from organization to improv-

isation, from artiﬁcial ﬂavoring to pungent spices. But the physi-

cal differences are least important. Probably nowhere in the
world do two neighbors understand each other so little, with dif-
ferences in language, religion, race, philosophy, and history. The
United States is barely two hundred years old and jumping
wholeheartedly into the twenty-ﬁrst century. Mexico is several
thousand years old and is still held back by its past}

If Riding’s reference to the remarkable differences between
the cultures of Mexico and the United States is correct, it is no
less true that the border region has created a distinctive Mexi-
can—American character. This is particularly evident on the Mexi-
can side of the border, which is remarkably different from the
rest of Mexico. The culture, education, and instruction, which
are strongly inﬂuenced by American television and lifestyle; the
relaxed morality of northern Mexico versus the conservative
South; the constant search for opportunities in the hopes of re-
ceiving a penny rather than a peso; and a language intermixed

with anglicisms and pochismos have all contributed to the cre-

177

178 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

ation of a society that expresses its ironic gratitude by saying “So far from God,
but so close to the United States.”

This perception of the border as a place underlined by liberal sentiments and a
sense of freedom from all the evils suffered in Mexico is added to a feeling of pride
border residents feel because they believe they are admired by other Mexicans for
being citizens of the border. In most cases, they show a distinct tendency of feel-
ing, living, speaking, and dressing like Americans. For these reasons, the region’s
inhabitants—at least those of the middle class-——seek ways in which their descen-
dants can enjoy American medical facilities, and, fundamentally, the right to be
citizens of the United States, not by blood, but by birth. In other words, they
strive to have their children born in the neighboring country.

However, this separation from the essence of Mexican culture (mexicanness)
and the liberalism sought by border inhabitants stands in stark contrast with the
norms of southern Mexico: disorder, improvisation, lack of culture, lack of disci-
pline, cynicism, tardiness, and the lackadaisical attitude toward fulﬁlling obliga-
tions. Border inhabitants consider themselves privileged because, by living on the
Mexican side of the border, they enjoy ﬂexibility in discipline and social behavior
while having instant access to the opportunities and satisfactions offered by the
United States.

On the other hand, for border Americans the situation is the same but exactly
the opposite: that is to say, they tend to respect law, work, and discipline. It is an
exception when they cross the border to feel free, to relax.

These are the reasons why the economies on both sides of the border zone be-
long to different worlds. The goods and services offered on the Mexican side are
strongly inﬂuenced by the desire to exploit these liberal values or, in many cases,
these anti—values. Bars, cabarets, and discotheques offer an opportunity for these
prejudices, chained to American conventions, to bloom. On the other hand, cross-
ing illegally into the United States and earning dollars or being hired as a substi-
tute employee, without social security or even the assurance of a stable job, affirm
the Mexicans’ conviction that it is better to live in the border zone than anywhere
else, because the border combines the advantages and conveniences of both sides,
which would not be available anywhere else. The same pattern is repeated across
the border zone, in cities, towns, or ranches, regardless of how far they are from

Border Zone Dynamics 179

their respective capital centers. Worldwide, the Mexican-American border is

unique, as its society is also unique.

Culture and Economy

Mexico’s northern border, which corresponds to the southern border of the
United States, is a vast region that extends over 3,000 kilometers—from Imperial
Beach, California, on the Paciﬁc to Brownsville, Texas, on the Gulf of Mexico on
the American side, and from Tijuana, Baja California, to Matamoros, Tamaulipas,
on the Mexican side—and constitutes a sui generis spatial dimension, full of con-
trasts and contradictions. The border runs from densely populated areas, where
the economy, culture, and development have had unprecedented growth levels for
more than twenty years, to places made uninhabitable by the desert, drought, or
rough terrain. It extends from trenched spaces denoting a mental and political
battle against clandestine migration, where walls, fences, and columns are erected
to prevent people from seeking food and wages in exchange for labor, to places
where the demarcation line is so imperceptible that the chance crosser loses the
sense of being in one country or the other.

All along the border between the United States and Mexico, there are cities
that have a counterpart in the other country, on the other side of the dividing line.
Since the conquest of both countries had different origins and consequently
spawned different cultures and languages, a subculture has developed along the
border resulting from the combination or mestizaje of these two ways of life. A
clear example of this is pochismo, also called “Spanglish,” as it is the combination
of the English and Spanish languages, which permits the use of words in English
and Spanish within the same phrase or sentence. Spanglish creates new anglicized
words, like “parkear” instead of “estacionar,” which is derived from the English
“to park.” This manner of speech is most prominent among persons of Mexican
origin who have moved to the United States, also known as Mexican-Americans.
Similarly, there are innumerable elements that constitute the border subculture,
which encompass not only people’s customs but also invade the political, social,
and economic spheres.

Another important element of the border phenomenon is the type of familial

180 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

relations that exist among the inhabitants of both sides of the border, usually
Mexicans or Mexican-Americans. One could almost assert that there is not an in-
habitant of a Mexican border town who does not have relatives in its twin U.S.
city. Moreover, one could say that there is not a border Mexican who does not
have a relative in Los Angeles, California. As a result, American border states are
populated, in a high percentage, by Mexican-Americans. In fact, the population of
U.S. border cities consists mainly of inhabitants originally from Mexico.

It is practically impossible for a Mexican-American to lose his or her Mexican
customs, including language, which has been spoken jointly with English, even
though there is a clear tendency of late to speak both languages correctly and sep-
arately from the other so as to make the Mexican-Americans completely bilingual.
This effort has been generated by the mass media, who have more recently been
transmitting programs in Spanish.

These factors have given rise to a special economy on the border. The twin
cities along the different settlements on either side of the border share unique
characteristics that are not found at any other border urban settlement. Each pair
of communities is a true set of “twin cities.” For example, the twin-city dynamics
are not the same in Mexicali—Calexico as in Ciudad Juarez-El Paso. In general,
though, the common denominator between the two sister communities is an eco-
nomic interrelationship that would not exist if this twin-city situation did not
exist.

At the beginning of the century, speciﬁcally during the 1920s and 193os—basi-
cally during Prohibition——the main generators of wealth in Ciudad Juarez, Chi-
huahua, Tijuana, Baja California, and Laredo, Tamaulipas, were casino gambling
and horse— and dog-track racing, the sale and open consumption of alcohol, and
organized prostitution. The main consumers were Americans. Simultaneously,
the Mexicans would cross the border to purchase the necessary goods for the
maintenance of these commercial establishments. The source of income was, pre-
cisely, commerce.

With time and policy changes in both countries, Prohibition was abolished in
the United States, while in Mexico gambling was prohibited. These circumstances
changed the sources of wealth for the Mexican population and the dynamics of
American consumption: Prostitution remained legal, while bars and restaurants

frequented by Americans remained open. These locales multiplied in the 1940s

Border Zone Dynamics 181

and 1950s as a result of the increasing number of young military men who would
cross the border to Ciudad Juarez or Tijuana from the military installations lo-
cated in El Paso, Texas (Fort Bliss and Biggs Field), and the naval bases in the San
Diego area, in search of amusement and other distractions.

Another source of income for the Mexicans was quick divorces for foreign cou-
ples, which turned the border into a new attraction. Married couples would travel
from all parts of the United States to the border to obtain a divorce decree in a
matter of hours. In many cases, the divorcing parties would come accompanied
by their new partners, to be remarried with equal speed.

In time, “divorces on the run” were prohibited. In the beginning of the 1960s,
prostitution went out of style as a result of the relaxation of moral values in the
United States. In its place, free love was practiced more generally. The bars and
restaurants also faced very aggressive competition from comparable establish-
ments on the American side of the border. The Mexican side of the border suf-
fered a serious economic collapse. However, the maquiladora industry displaced
this amoral market, bringing a newfound source of wealth to the Mexican border
cities.

Therefore, the border zone, fundamentally in the urban centers, has become a
strong region of accelerated economic growth—more on the Mexican side than
on the American side-—where a unique society has developed. This society is
shaped by rigid as well as ﬂexible value systems, and is full of ample contradic-
tions and ambiguities, going from the modem to the traditional, from opulence to
poverty, from legitimacy to illegality, from propriety to delinquency, from dignity
to denigration. In this “new nation,” communities arise, developing their own
identities, perhaps more independent because of their distance from the capitals
of their respective nations, or perhaps because of their daily struggles to survive in
the neglect of their own capitals.

Border Criminality

In the surreal border zone between Mexico and the United States, as a result of
time and circumstances, in the same fashion that economic and cultural interrela-
tions have been shaped, so too have criminal relations developed in this wide re-
gion. The years of Prohibition left a deep impression that has marked the develop-

182 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

ment of crime in this region. We could say that this was the ﬁrst experience with
organized crime in both countries. Given that in Mexico the production or sale of
alcohol was not prohibited, large centers like Ciudad Juarez turned into impor-
tant alcohol producers———legally and clandestinely. For the most part, this mer-
chandise was sold in the black market in the United States. This activity permitted
the accumulation of great capital, since the producers knew that these products
would violate U.S. law and would be sold illegally in the United States. Of course,
in order to carry out these illicit activities, it was necessary to count on the partici-
pation of corrupt authorities, who were easily bribed with the great quantities of
money handled by the criminal organizations.

In contrast, organized crime in Mexico evolved around the contraband of in-
numerable goods that were not only aimed for border consumption, but also for
sale in other regions in Mexico. Many warehouses were built in El Paso, San
Diego, San Ysidro, Brownsville, Nogales, and Laredo to wholesale goods bought
by contraband salesmen, belonging to well—structured criminal organizations,
who with the aid of corrupt authorities—this time on the Mexican side———
managed to carry out these types of activities.

Later on, in a more direct manner, seduced by the easy earnings and with a
high degree of impunity, the American merchants themselves started participat-
ing in these exchanges. Mexican consumers from all over the country would come
to certain American establishments to purchase the goods they needed. They
would indicate their address in Mexico, and in three or four days, without having
to pay import taxes——instead they bribed the border authorities——they would re-
ceive the requested goods in their homes in Mexico.

Contraband became so institutionalized that the American retail stores had
special departments to serve Mexican clients. Evidently everything was done de
facto since compliance with American laws concerning the receipts and taxes was
documented with precision. One cannot deny the role that contraband played in
promoting the alliance and participation of the merchants and the authorities,
mainly those who had the jurisdiction to prevent the illegal introduction of for-
eign goods into Mexico, without proper permits and payment of import taxes. To
understand this phenomenon, which constitutes the immediate precedent of to-
day’s cross—border criminal organizations, one must point out certain mecha-

nisms that have been in place in the border region and that have allowed huge

Border Zone Dynamics 183

proﬁts from the business of illicit contraband, going back to the years of Prohibi-
tion.

In Mexico, the Resguardo Aduanal (Customs Guard) is in charge of controlling
and supervising the trade of goods across the border, as a department of the Ad-
ministracién General de Aduanas (General Customs Administration, formerly
General Customs Department), under the auspices of the Secretaria de Hacienda
y Crédito Publico (Ministry of Finance). Since customs officers have earned
ridiculously low salaries for decades, it has not been difficult to bribe them in or-
der to avoid paying the taxes corresponding to the merchandise crossing the bor-
der. In many cases, illegal traffic was not solely practiced by professional traffick-
ers but also by the customs ofﬁcers themselves when they went through the
customs procedures.

Even so, corruption in the Mexican customs system was not without rules. An
example of one of those rules is the so-called polla, which designated that all the
money received by each of the officers at a certain checkpoint had to be put in one
basket, and from there it was redistributed, according to hierarchies. The officers
who received the largest portions were the Customs Administrator and then the
tenured oﬂicers of the Administracion General de Aduanas (General Customs Ad-
ministration) in Mexico City.

Similarly, severe punishment was meted out to the merchant who tried to
cross without previously coming to an agreement with the customs authorities.
Once the contraband was discovered, it was impossible for the trafficker to arrive
at an understanding with the customs authorities to avoid the conﬁscation of the
goods and to prevent his consignment to the prison authorities. This punishment
was a deterrent for those who wanted to cross the border without previous
arrangements with the border officials and who thought that in case of discovery
they only had to bribe the customs ofﬁcers. This was a very beneﬁcial rule for the
customs oﬂicers, especially because only those ignorant of the rules would fall,
and because the strict adherence to this unwritten rule allowed the illicit accumu-
lation of wealth by many.

To date, contraband is still a huge illicit business, tolerated and encouraged by
the Mexican authorities. The vested interests created from the illegal traffic of
goods and the lack of will to enforce the law make eradication a difficult task. One
contraband case tells of a customs ofﬁcer in the north—center border who lasted

184 Francisco lavier Molina Ruiz

six years in his post (the longest tenure for that position). He became so wealthy
that he permitted himself to ﬁnance the campaign of the ruling party’s presiden-
tial candidate. In exchange, or as a reward, he was allowed to be the gubernatorial
candidate for the state of Jalisco, in central Mexico. During that time, it was not
difﬁcult for him (or anyone in the ruling party) to win the elections and he was al-
lowed to govern that state for six years, thus adding to his fortune.

Up to the early years of the Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-1994), the
officers of the Customs Guard were, in general, middle-aged, completely corrupt
and cynical, and they were members of an impenetrable union. Faced with this
situation, President Salinas decided to erase the image and put an end to the prac-
tices of this entity by hiring a younger force, mainly from the center and south of
the country, and training them in customs service. He was largely successful at the
beginning of this endeavor. Afterwards, on the 'president’s orders, the Customs
Guard was eliminated, the customs union was dissolved and, in its place, the
Policia Fiscal Federal (Federal Fiscal Police) was created and manned by the same
aforementioned youth.

In the beginning, the project worked pretty well. However, the low salaries and
insufficient training meant that the members of the new Federal Fiscal Police fell
into the same vices as the old Customs Guard. Unfortunately, contraband contin-
ues at this time, as if nothing had changed. Currently, the contraband of Ameri-
can goods has spread throughout the entire country. The substantial proﬁts, the
impunity in which delinquents thrive, corrupt authorities, and the lax laws have
implicated other departments, police organizations, and various officials at differ-
ent levels, not only in terms of border corruption but also for the transportation
and custody of the goods. Thus, we see how bribes, gifts, and other agreements in
general cast the aura of corruption over the agents of the Policia Judicial Federal
(Federal Police), the Policia Federal de Caminos (Highway Police), and the State
and Municipal police forces.

With the passage of international economic treaties like GATT and NAFTA,
border economic activities started evolving. Similarly, organized crime activities
have undergone a comparable metamorphosis, creating, in the last twenty years,
huge, multimillion-dollar criminal organizations, whose principal objective is
drug production and trafficking. This illicit trade has made them different from

Border Zone Dynamics 185

the previous criminal organizations, because, as has been mentioned, previously
illegality was prominent only on one side of the border.

These criminal organizations constitute another phenomenon of the border
zone, and they ﬁnd their distant origins in two fundamental factors:

1. The opportunity for growth inherent in the turmoil of the border zone;

2. The entrenched and proliferating presence of gangs, bands, and delinquent
groups, engendered and multiplied by the daily settlement of scores of frustrated
immigrants who have to settle for living on the border. Because of the speed with
which this phenomenon has occurred, the Mexican State lacks the capacity to of-
fer services or jobs to these settlements, and the inhabitants of the border eventu-
ally become marginalized and, inevitably, delinquent. This inexorable ﬂaw, al-
though not on the same scale or with the same impact, permeates the culture and
environment on the American side and serves as fertile ground for the illegal ac-

tivities of criminal organizations.

The international community no longer perceives organized crime as an occa-
sional or regional delinquency, but rather as a global threat whose dimensions can
jeopardize national security if it is not attended to ﬁrmly and adequately? Since
the criminal organizations of the border zone between Mexico and the United
States are not concerned with geographic demarcations, and because their activi-
ties and operations are so dynamic and their penetration in the social fabric so un-
controlled, it is difficult to disassemble them with traditional and orthodox police
methods.

Structure of Border Criminal Organizations

The ﬁrst and best—known structure of criminal organization that develops in
the border cities is based on the old model of “gangs.” They are deﬁned as a group
of people, normally minors, who, as a result of their proximity to the neighbor-
hood or “the hood,” share the same prejudices, the same rejection by society, and
suffer the same inability of the State to address their problems. Unemployment,
drug addiction, promiscuity, unhygienic lifestyle, and systematic and constant
family problems shape the character and personality of the members of these


6 john Bailey and Roy Godson

U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement cooperation may produce some
apparently positive results, but often these results are intended to deceive Mexi-
cans and Americans who do not grasp the ﬁmdamental realities. Major reforms
should be targeted at the police and judicial system, to be sure, but these will
prove more effective and long lasting if introduced in the context of the broader
modernization of the economic and political systems. Such changes in the
broader context would include an extensive reform of the Mexican state, includ-
ing the introduction of career civil service along with professional ethics into law
enforcement and judicial procedures; and programs of civic education to promote
a culture of legality.

It is unlikely that the transition to such reforms will be a peaceﬁil one. This
long, diﬂicult, and costly reform agenda may initially produce greater violence as
the stability of the old authoritarian order gives way to new institutions and val-
ues. In the long run, however, only systemic changes of these dimensions can
ameliorate the effects of the criminal-political alliances. Also, a substantial reduc-
tion in the demand for illegal drugs in the United States would go a long way to-
ward improving public security in both countries.

This book is an expansion of a previous study on the redeﬁnition of national
security in Mexico and the United States in the post—Cold War period. One of the
conclusions from that book was that crime constituted a serious challenge to secu-
rity and democratic governabilityf‘ Our present purpose is to bring together
scholars and specialists, including current and former government ofﬁcials, from
both sides of the border to determine which if any of the models summarized here
most approximates reality. This chapter deﬁnes terms, places the topic in a con-
text of the dual political and economic transition in Mexico, and summarizes the
contributors’ main arguments with respect to the different images.

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability

The focus here is on the relationship between organized crime and democratic
governability in Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. Organized crime
refers to primarily professional criminals with the following characteristics:9

1. They operate over a period of time. They are not individuals who come to-
gether for one or two “jobs” and then disband.

186 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

groups. They do not have a clear vision of the future, nor have they deﬁned their
goals in life. They lack interest in progress, and they suffer from a deep cultural ig-
norance, lacking values and religion. The gang is the seed that has the potential to
sprout delinquent fruit. Its only teachings relate to the formation, strengths, and
weaknesses of the group; and the search for easy rewards and the practice of crim-
inal activities. Curiously, middle-class values are also adopted by these types of or-
ganizations; treachery, disloyalty, and cowardice are severely punished.

Another type of criminal organization characteristic of the border zone, al-
though more complex, emulates the Maﬁa organizations in the United States. In
order to understand how these Mexican criminal organizations operate, we must
understand the origins and development of the American models. Criminal or-
ganizations in the United States whose structures have been emulated by the Mex-
icans originate in Italian criminal organizations, mainly the Sicilian Maﬁa. In
Italy, different criminal organizations developed from the middle of the nine-
teenth century, especially the Sicilian Maﬁa, the Neapolitan Camorra, the Cal-
abrian ‘Ndrangheta, the Apulean Uniﬁed Sacred Crown. The Sicilian Maﬁa gave
rise to the Cosa Nostra in the United States, which justiﬁed its existence in the
massive immigration of Sicilian Italians toward the end of the nineteenth
century.3

Some people believe that “maﬁa” means in Arabic “place of refuge.” The word
was adopted into the Sicilian dialect when the Muslims controlled the island of
Sicily in the tenth century. The people of Sicily had been under unforgiving op-
pression by the Romans. They were dominated subsequently by the Normans, the
Germans, the Spanish, and the French. The different foreign rulers enslaved the
poor, exploited the work force, abused the women, and assassinated the leaders.
In addition, the Spanish Inquisition called the Sicilians heretics and took their
wealth away.

The Maﬁa arose as a vindictive secret society. For them, the highest virtue was
the so-called omerta, or the rule of silence, because treachery was punishable by
death. In the United States, the protection afforded to newly immigrated Italians
by the Maﬁa was of such magnitude that the Maﬁa controlled the sphere of crimi-
nal organizations from the beginning of the century until the 1960s.

It is important to know this type of organization to understand the widespread
delinquency at the border. It helps to understand how the border organizations

Border Zone Dynamics 187

think and evolve. The Maﬁa and Cosa Nostra were organized in the following
manner:

1. The “family,” composed of the “men of honor,” is at the base.

2. At an intermediate level, one can ﬁnd the jrfe decena, who controls the
armed members of the family.

3. The head of the family is called the “representative,” chosen by a “false”
democratic election, but whose position is really determined by the power rela-
tions he may have.

4. The representative is aided by “counselors.”

5. The association of several “family representatives” is called a “commission.”

Knowing this structure helps us understand how the border criminal organiza-

tions engendered and developed in imitation of the Maﬁa:

1. In the Mexican organizations, the “head” of the “family” is colloquially
called “el capo.”

2. The armed members are called “lieutenants.”

3. Border criminal organizations exist to care for their territory and to form as-

sociations with international delinquents to increase their own power.

Activities of Some Border Criminal Organizations

Imagining the scenario in which border criminal organizations develop, we
can discern the following structures of delinquent organizations that inhabit the
various parts of northern Mexico and the southern United States. Starting in the
United States, according to data reported in the official analysis of the Grupo de
Contacto de Alto Nivel México-Estados Unidos (U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact
Group), criminal organizations are composed of small nuclei called “cells,” which
inhabit the border and extend their illicit operations to various regions of the
United States} These cells are composed of small units, specialized in the execu-
tion of several illegal activities, which together help the survival of the criminal
organization as a whole. Thus, while some specialize in car theft, assaults, abduc-
tions——fund-raising activities for the organization—others focus on arms traffick-
ing, drug trafficking, or the transportation, storage, distribution, and laundering

of money.

188 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

Each unit has only minimal contact with the other units. Units are directed by
a supervisor, who reports to a director. Each cell director, in turn, reports to a re-
gional director, who is responsible for the activities and operations of several cells.
The regional director is in charge of contacting international criminal organiza-
tions in Colombia for the purchase and sale of drugs, in China for the traffic of
arms and document falsiﬁcation, and in Europe for currency smuggling and laun-
dering. The rigorous enforcement of this method of operations isolates the heads
of other cells in case of police raids.

Well-known criminal organizations that have operated in the United States
since the 19703 include the following:5

1. Gangster Disciples, an organization that operates along the Mississippi
River Valley, from Wisconsin to the Gulf of Mexico. This organization operates
with no less than 100 members.

2. Logan Street Gang, who reside in the center of San Diego, California, and
who constitute the foreign armed branch of the criminal organization that oper-
ates in the peninsula of Baja California, headed by the Arellano Félix brothers.

3. Urban gangs like the Crips and the Bloods, motorcycle gangs like Hell’s An-
gels, and the Sarah Bernhard organization, which operate throughout southern
California, and whose size is as yet unknown.

4. In Texas we ﬁnd the Jimmy Jimenez organization, whose reach extends to
Chicago, Detroit, and northern California.

5. Given its level of violence and militancy, we cannot ignore the Universal
Zulu Nation in Philadelphia.

These criminal organizations that are embedded in the social fabric of the
American society engender terror, drugs, murder, and in general criminal activi-
ties that torment the peaceful lifestyle of the most powerful country in the world.
Their criminal doings and their addiction to crime are greater than their fear of
the law or their respect for human life.

On the Mexican side, the criminal gangs embedded in border life are no less
frightening. The inhabitants of the main urban centers like Tijuana, Ciudad
Juarez, Laredo, and Matamoros live under a permanent state of siege and fear of
the frequent public episodes, where the main characters kill, kidnap, and steal

without mercy. For example, as of 1997 more than 287 gangs coexist in Ciudad

Border Zone Dynamics 189

Juarez, thirteen of which are especially dangerous because of the degree of vio-
lence they promote, the type of weapons they carry, and the cruelty with which
they punish their adversaries. Ninety gangs are extremely conﬂictive and are per-
sistently and permanently in opposition to authorities——beyond the assumed dis-
dain for authority that characterizes any gang. Their names and nicknames are ar-
rogant and deﬁant, adopted from the streets or the distinctive criminal behavioral
patterns. Some of the group names are: Camel, K-15, Cadena 16 (Chain 16), Bruno
Traven, El Barrio Lopez (the Lopez Hood), Chaveﬁa Park, Vagos 27, Raza Unida
(United Race), etc.

However, the drug traﬁicking organizations working for the past ﬁfteen years
in the border zone are more sophisticated and certainly more dangerous, violent,
and powerful than these smaller deﬁant gangs. These economically powerful and
internationally linked structures grow and move, leaving terror, violence, and cor-
ruption along their path. The common characteristics of all these organizations
are their high capacity for corruption, the immeasurable amounts of money they
handle, and the violence with which they repress any adversaries. They do not
fear authorities, they are insensitive to the threat of incarceration, and they resist
social re-adaptation.

These organizations owe their existence to Colombian suppliers. Through
their structural and organizational capacity (similar to a legitimate business) and
the cruelty with which they eliminate their enemies, they guarantee handling,
transit, and delivery of the goods. Thus, the Mexican drug trafﬁcking organiza-
tions have such intense, detailed, and sophisticated commercial links with Colom-
bian drug trafﬁcking organizations that would be the envy of legal commerce any-
where. Of course, the greatest difference is that these sorts of commercial
transactions need not meet the bureaucratic requirements of legal imports and ex-
ports.

Some of the Colombian organizations with detected and recognized links to
the border traffickers are as follows:5

Valle del Cauca Cartel
Henao Montoya brothers

Cali Cartel
Helmer “Pancho” Herrera
Rodriguez Orejuela brothers

190 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

José Santacruz Londoﬁo

brothers Jario y Julio Urdiﬁola Grajales

Medellin Cartel
Juan David and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez brothers

In Mexico, the following are well-known organizations with centers of opera-
tion at the border, although this is not their only sphere of action.7

In the West

The brothers Benjamin and Ramon Arellano Félix operate in the Paciﬁc Rim.
Originally from Sinaloa, the Arellano Félix brothers have extended their vast drug
traﬂicking empire to cover the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur,
Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Zacatecas, Nayarit, Jalisco, Michoacan, Chiapas,
Quintana Roo, Puebla, México, and the Federal District. In each of these cities, the
Arellano Félix brothers have a lieutenant who supplies the necessary vehicles and
armed men for the brothers’ secure transit. Usually, the brothers move within a
convoy of four to ﬁve vehicles, one or two of which are armored vehicles, accom-
panied by eighteen to twenty armed men. With a majority of young men (mostly
in their mid-twenties), the organization carries out its activities using two control
mechanisms: (1) generalized violence, regardless of the publicity; and (2) the cor-
ruption of different police structures, including the military and the navy.

Upon the incarceration of the “capo mayor” (head) of the Guadalajara Cartel,
the Arellano Félix brothers inherited the territory including the control and traﬂic
rights from their uncle Jesus Labra Aviles. With a well-trained and armed paramil-
itary force, with training from Lebanese mercenaries, the brothers have commit-
ted collective and spectacular murders using car bombs.

The Arellano Félix brothers are usually received and escorted by authorities.
They transport drugs by land, sea, and air. Drugs are stored in border cities like
Tijuana, Ensenada, Mexicali and San Luis Rio Colorado. Finally, the “merchan-
dise” is transported into the United States. The drugs they transport into the
United States reach far beyond Arizona and California, to New York, New Jersey,
Florida, and Illinois. The brothers pay their associates and even the members of
their organization with those same drugs, making alliances and complicities that
are diﬂicult to break.

Border Zone Dynamics 191

The Arellano Félix brothers have formed ties with professionals, merchants,
socially renowned families, and businesspeople in the cities where they work to
cover their illicit earnings. They have recruited as partners young men from
wealthy families who are interested and willing to participate in a high—proﬁt busi-
ness. They own the latest electronic equipment, which can intercept conventional
telephones, cellular phones, faxes, sky-tel phones and others. Even in government
oﬂices and hotels, they have accomplices capable of installing sophisticated hid-
den microphones to keep them apprised of all activities against them.

In the Center

Just as one can say that the organization of the Arellano Félix brothers is the
most violent, oﬂicial reports highlight the Amado Carrillo group as the most pow-
erful organization in Mexico. Amado Carrillo himself died under mysterious cir-
cumstances related to a plastic surgery operation in July 1997. Recently, Mexican
authorities discovered that the Amado Carrillo group had bought off high-rank-
ing members of the Mexican Army. The mechanisms to obtain the protection of
such a governmental structure indicate the strength or control that this organiza-
tion has throughout the country.

Amado Carrillo, born in Badiraguato, Sinaloa, on December 17, 1954, started
his criminal life in Ojinaga, Chihuahua, under the tutelage of contrabandist Pablo
Acosta Villarreal. Carrillo joined a group led by former head of the Direccién Fed-
eral de Seguridad del Gobierno de México (Federal Security Directorate), Rafael
Aguilar Guajardo, eventually succeeding the latter upon his death in 1993.

Carrillo had direct links with several Colombian “heads,” to whom he catered
lavishly because their satisfaction guaranteed the ﬂow of goods. Since he used
planes of various sizes, capacity, and speed, he was internationally known as “el
senor de los cielos” (the lord of the skies) or “cielito lindo” (pretty heaven) or
“cuervito” (little crow). Carril1o’s organization had developed several methods for
transporting drugs from Colombia to Mexico, using high—capacity turbo-com-
mander planes that can take off and land on short runways and at night, or 727
Boeing planes purchased in San Diego, ﬁt for only one ﬂight. He had the ﬂexibility
to change both his methods of transportation and his routes. In some cases, he
would unload the drug cargo in Belize or Guatemala and transport it by land to
Oaxaca or Puebla. From there, he used small Cessna planes, which ﬂy short dis-

192 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

tances from one clandestine runway to another. Carrillo’s organization moved the
drug shipments using direct routes, stopover routes, and zig-zagging routes.

Carrillo’s informants and corruption permeated the army, police forces, and
even the administrative structures that supplied his planes with fuel and guaran-
teed the success of his business. From 1986 to 1989, Carrillo’s organization alone
introduced more than seventy tons of cocaine into the United States.8 Sources say
that until his death in 1997, 60 percent of the drugs entering the United States
through the southern border could be credited to Amado Carrillo.

The suspicious conditions under which the news of the death of Carrillo was
given at the beginning of 1997 unleashed multiple hypotheses over the fate that
his organization would suffer. Time has clariﬁed some of the circumstances. Look-
ing back, we can see that the events that occurred from August 1997 to late 1998,
in fact, conﬁrmed that Amado Carrillo ceased to be the director-in-chief of the or-
ganization of the Ciudad Juarez Cartel. Nevertheless, it is not known, as of 2000,
who may be capable of replacing him, but beyond that, it is undeniable that
Amado Carrillo’s organization won’t disappear and, moreover, defends its terri-
tory against other organizations that are trying to take over the Juarez Cartel.

An important number of deaths and confrontations have occurred since May
of 1997. At that time, the criminal organizations took over the streets of Ciudad
Juarez, Chihuahua, and used them as battleﬁelds with tragic outcomes that to
date include several dozen dead in exchange for control of the zone and the exter-
mination of their adversaries.

Judging from the characteristics of the dead and their known links to drug traf-
ﬁcking, the coniﬂict for control of Ciudad Juarez is concentrated between two
criminal forces: that which expands the Arellano Félix brothers’ organization and
the remainder of the killers that Amado Carrillo controlled. The Arellanos for
many years had worked through a prominent courier of the zone (Rafael Munoz
Talavera) who played the key role in their relations in this territory; upon his
death (September 10, 1998) the fate of the Ciudad Juarez Cartel and of the control
of drug trafﬁc across the center and southeast of the United States became uncer-
tain, but the odds are in favor of the “heirs” of Amado Carrillo regrouping.

The changes brought by the 1998 elections to the state government of Chi-
huahua and the weak presence of federal police forces in the state offer little hope

Border Zone Dynamics 193

that the authorities will prevail or even will stop the advance of narco-trafﬁcking
in the area.

In the East

Juan Garcia Abrego’s now extinct organization began with his relative and
predecessor, Juan Nepomuceno Guerra, and died, apparently, with the apprehen-
sion of Oscar Malherbe de Leon. Garcia Abrego’s organization, also known as the
Gulf Cartel, at its peak was perhaps the most powerful in terms of traﬂicking and
introducing drugs into the United States. Testimonies from different sources
claim that, until 1995, Garcia Abrego introduced into the United States between
forty and ﬁfty tons of cocaine per year.

Garcia Abrego, currently in a U.S. prison, engaged in business transactions
with the Colombian cartels through a lieutenant known as “el gringo,” who knew
the Colombian maﬁa because of his Colombian wife. The “gringo” paid with his
life for the many mistakes he made. In one year alone he lost ﬁve tons of drugs,
the authorities conﬁscated $12 million from him, and eighteen of his lieutenants
were killed in a prison riot in Tamaulipas.

International networks of repression and the ﬁght against drug trafﬁcking suc-
ceeded in outmaneuvering the capo, who controlled the territory between the Yu-
catén Peninsula and Veracruz in Mexico up to parts of eastern United States, in-
cluding New York, Chicago, and Florida. Striking the bottom ranks of the
organization, anti-drug trafficking maneuvers included arresting the bodyguards,
the lieutenants, money launderers, partners, and front organizations for various
crimes.

After Garcia Abrego’s capture in February 1996, and the apprehension and dis-
appearance of high-ranking members of the organization, the cartel found itself
in dire straits. Toward the end of 1995, the cartel had not been able to introduce
more than a ton and a half of cocaine to the United States. Oscar Malherbe de
Leon, Garcia Abrego’s successor, tried to form an alliance with Amado Carrillo
Fuentes, allowing the latter to introduce several drug shipments into the former’s
territory. However, this temporary partnership was not sufﬁcient to foster the re-
organization of the cartel. In fact, Oscar Malherbe de Leon, who was acute, astute,
and street-smart, was exposed by Amado Carrillo. The National Defense Ministry

194 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

arrested Malherbe de Leon, ending his short-lived career, on the afternoon of
Thursday, February 27, 1997, in Mexico City.

Alternatives to Law Enforcement and the Fight against

Criminal Organizations

The open coexistence of healthy social structures with criminal organizations
at the border is shocking and difﬁcult to understand. Perhaps the healthy social
structures, focused on work, family, and the search for a better future, tolerate but
do not participate in crime and the occasional violence it generates. In other
words, there exists a live-and-let-live attitude. Perhaps the border inhabitants
live in fear, captive to a situation that renders them impotent, leading to a life of
limited social and economic progress, where social and family circles as well as
daily activities are perfectly deﬁned in an attempt to prevent contamination or in-
stability.

Even if this is difﬁcult to understand, whatever the origins of such coexistence,
the inhabitants of the border, owners of a unique culture, live and develop within
a social, political, and economic dynamic of unprecedented speed and growth.
This environment, where winning or losing does not have the same impact as in
other regions given the speedy ability to recoup losses, makes the border inhabi-
tant tolerant of “minor vices,” such as lesser corruption, inﬂuential relations, fa-
voritism, street extortions, and generally all other vices that speed the process of
personal advancement.

The special relevance acquired by authorities becomes clear. Similarly, we un-
derstand the desire to be close to the authorities for licit and illicit activities. This
is particularly evident in the border region, given the legal ambiguities and the
distance from the control and vigilance centers. Authorities and the organizations
cannot refrain from joining in a sort of partnership, because their association fos-
ters shared and leveled growth in the vast and highly unstable goods and services
market.

We mentioned earlier that in previous decades, contraband, organized prosti-
tution, and quick divorces enacted without regard to nationality or just cause oc-
curred on a daily basis, and were accepted by the border culture as necessary for
“daily survival.” However, behind this framework of venal crimes, immoralities of

Border Zone Dynamics 195

greater and deeper roots than the ones visible were brewing. The phenomenon of
corruption, through either gift or association, became institutionalized, absorb-
ing licit activities through the daily motions of corrupting and becoming corrupt.

One of the weapons of delinquents and criminal organizations, one that
strengthens their illicit activities, is the problem of corruption at all levels of the
police forces, from the administrative authorities to mere inspectors.9 Corruption
is an extraordinary weapon of arms trafﬁckers, white slave traders, smugglers,
drug traﬂickers, and carjackers, because it serves their purposes in both direct
and active, or indirect and passive ways. We could say that corruption directly
serves to cover up the illegal action: allowing drug trafﬁc and arms contraband,
revealing the names of police informants, hindering antidrug raids with the pur-
pose of picking up the drugs or the arms and delivering them elsewhere. Indirect
or passive aid to corruption takes place when, for example, organized crime sets
up a network of informants that detects the planned movements of the authorities
or that reveals the authorities’ investigations, allowing criminals to know when or
where the raids will occur.

Propensity toward corruption is generated when a police officer has the discre-
tionary power to choose between fulﬁlling the duties of his public office or charg-
ing for the cost of providing state services. Ordinarily, a police officer will consider
two factors when deciding whether or not to aid the transgressor: (1) his personal
level of decision-making power in relation to the beneﬁt that he is granting; and
(2) the level of risk to his persona or career that offering such beneﬁt implies.
(This aid might take effect through permitting the violation to occur unhindered
or by reducing the ﬁnes of violating the law.) Considering these two variables, the
corrupting act gains value and dimension, and becomes an issue for negotiation,
transaction, or complicity.

The struggle to combat corruption should focus on two fundamental ex-
tremes: (1) increase the risk and cost of the corrupt action to the police officer; and
(2) reduce the incentives for corruption by reducing the discretionary power of
the officer or exerting control and surveillance mechanisms over the oﬂicer’s con-
duct. A major obstacle in dealing with the corruption that facilitates drug traffick-
ing, aside from the complexities of legal prosecution, undoubtedly reﬂects the
dilemma faced by each public servant. In a country such as Mexico, that is in the
midst of transition and crisis, the officer experiences a certain anxiety when trying

lntroduction 7

2. They have an identiﬁable structure and leadership which may vary, but
there is a hierarchy and division of labor among the criminals. The hierarchies
may be centralized with a pyramidal structure, resembling complex private- or
public-sector organizations, or the groups may operate in loosely connected net-
works. At other times groups may operate more or less on their own and establish
cooperative relationships or “nonaggression” pacts with other groups.

3. Their primary purposes are proﬁt from illegal activities. These are activities
that for the most part would be considered illegal in both the United States and
Mexico.

4. They use violence and corruption to protect themselves from state authori-
ties and potential rivals, and to discipline their own comrades as well as those
whom they seek to exploit.

This broad deﬁnition might encompass a wide array of groups and activities,
ranging for example from street gangs of varying size and degrees of aggressive-
ness to bands of cargo hijackers that operate in larger Mexican cities and principal
highways to gangs that concentrate on car theft and smuggling. Implicit in our ap-
proach is a focus on the larger-scale types of organizations, especially the better
organized groups engaged in drug production and trafﬁcking, whose operations
affect more than the immediate locales where they operate. Some of the more im-
portant of these organizations ﬁt the notion of transnational organized crime in
that they operate across national boundaries, affecting both state and private ac-
tors. Their activities also usually include money laundering and other ﬁnancial
crimes such as tax evasion and fraud.” We are concerned primarily with Mexican-
based criminal organizations affecting governability in Mexico or in the United
States, particularly the border region. We are also concerned with U.S.-based
criminal organizations threatening governability in the U.S. border regions or in
Mexico. At this stage, however, we are not primarily concerned with other crimi-
nal organizations operating in the United States or Mexico that have only tangen-
tial effects on governability in either country, for example, Chinese, Russian,
Colombian, or Italian groups.“  

Governability refers to the ability of a government to allocate values over its so-
ciety, to exercise legitimate power in the context of generally accepted rules. It
might be viewed in terms of a continuum. At one extreme are so-called failed
states, which are marked by ungovernability, lawlessness, and even widespread vi-

196 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

to decide whether to fulﬁll his duties as a public servant or to obtain a greater re-
muneration for breaking his oath to compensate for meager salaries and beneﬁts,
while enduring the disrespect of high-ranking authorities. The immeasurable
quantities of money in each transaction dwarf the ranks and functions of these
police ofﬁcers, who in the end are merely victims of circumstance.

In the last few years, according to oﬂicial statistics, corruption techniques have
contaminated U.S. oﬂicers as well, notably in the protection given to drug trans-
ports arriving into the United States and to the contraband of arms that beneﬁts
Mexican delinquents. Between 1995 and 1996, Mexican authorities conﬁscated
23,841 weapons entering through the United States, predominantly through No-
gales, Sonora; Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo in Tamaulipas; Ciudad Juarez, Chi-
huahua; and Piedras Negras, Coahuila.1° All these cities are located on the Mexi-
can side along the Texas border.

However, drug and arms trafficking are not the only visible expressions of or-
ganized crime along the border that involve police forces. Another prominent and
highly lucrative activity is car theft, featuring well-organized groups that steal the
goods on either side of the border and transport them to the other. Evidently, the
dynamic of border delinquency surpasses the ability of the state to control moni-
toring agencies. Not only will it be necessary to ask whether these structures,
which evidently do not correspond to reality, are functioning according to regula-
tion, but it is also necessary to ask if the ﬂexibility, complacency, and tolerance of
corruption has not inﬁltrated the higher echelons of authority. Sources show that
corruption has penetrated the highest levels of the army in Mexico. Publicity
scandals referring to the protection of drug trafﬁckers (in Mexico) underscore the
direct need to review the frailty of these state structures.“

Much remains to be studied, analyzed, and learned about the socioeconomic
and delinquent behavior on the Mexico-U.S. border. Only then will we under-
stand the many worlds that lie beneath the social fabric of this geographic space
marked by contrasts and challenges. The diagnosis of this area will be useful to be-
havioral scientists because the border can be used as a laboratory to understand

isolated phenomena that could appear in different communities worldwide.

Border Zone Dyniamics 197

Conclusion

In short, we may say that the communities on the U.S.-Mexico border belong
to a unique society. Although both sides of the border have different origins and
very distinct traditions, this conglomeration of human beings share a unique set
of problems, full of circumstances that can only be seen and understood by living
there. We ﬁnd a society that thrives on the contradictions that arise from the so-
cial and economic dimensions of the border. Because of these unique characteris-
tics—which have given both countries a chance to share culture, education, as
well as many problems—the border region deserves special attention in the study
of its multiple phenomena and characteristics.

It would be of great interest to this particular project to learn about the links
that exist between the criminal organizations and their impact in democratic gov-
ernments. It would be of utmost interest to ﬁnd more examples of daily life that
could enlighten the study of this phenomenon. Criminal organizations ﬁnd ample
opportunities and fertile ground for their activities in the border region because
the lack of control mechanisms, the dynamics of the borders economy, and the
ﬂexibility of the authorities have created an atmosphere that gives way to the
benefactors and beneﬁciaries. Behavior that is reprehensible in other latitudes has
free reign in the border because of the lax morality.

Not so long ago, the involvement of government agents in these criminal activ-
ities made government agencies exclusive grounds for maﬁa hierarchies. In the oil
sector, for example, in Tamaulipas, the immoral and delinquent relationship be-
tween the oil company and the political leadership was so prominent that its dis-
covery in 1989 provoked not only a crisis in the oil sector, but also the loss of many
electoral ofﬁces. To this day, the government party has not been able to recover
these posts.

Oil union leader Joaquin Hernandez Galicia, also known as La Quina, who was
incarcerated at the beginning of the Salinas administration for sundry crimes, had
established and maintained a true political and economic empire. The govern-
ment, especially the party currently in power, still resents the consecutive elec-
toral losses in several municipalities of Tamaulipas, caused by the withdrawal of
support from Hernandez Galicia’s leadership and the manipulation he used to ex-

ert in previous elections.

198 Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz

Another equally transcendental border phenomenon, toward the Paciﬁc,
shows a different type of criminal organization, which controls common delin-
quency and the police forces in charge of combating common crime. The objec-
tive of these criminal organizations is to secure drug trafficking and other crimes
for their own beneﬁt. Not only do they control the police forces, but also the air-
ports, ports, fuels, judicial agents, and the institutions in charge of preventing and
prosecuting existing crime in this area.

In conclusion, we need to implement solutions that penetrate to the roots of
the problem. In other words, we need effective control and oversight systems to
allow a systematic and continuous inspection of the authorities’ activities. Never-
theless, the strengths of the border zone are greater than the threats and prob-
lems. Little by little, the border society has started to change the criteria by which
they balance, in the medium and long terms, the advantages and privileges they
enjoy against their subjection to the persecution, vigilance, and control of crimi-
nal organizations. The potential and transformation of the maquiladora industry,
the presence of nongovernmental organizations, and the collective conscience
suggest that the development and growth of the region are signs of change. The
questions left to answer are: How much longer will we have to wait until this
change happens? Can the national government understand the socio-politico-
economic problems of this special zone? Can it create a ﬁrm base to ﬁnd the solu-
tion at all three levels of government?

Chapter 9

Mexican Drug syndicates in California

Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

FOR MORE THAN three-quarters of a century, Mexican drug
syndicates have been growing in power, size, and inﬂuence, fu-
eled by their production of illicit narcotics and the smuggling
and sale of those drugs into the United States. The U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has described these syndicates as a
serious threat to the security of the United States. This chapter
examines the organization and methods used by Mexican drug
syndicates to smuggle, sell narcotics, and collect and return to
Mexico proﬁts gained from the sale of drugs within the United
States. The chapter concludes that Mexican drug syndicates, be-
cause of their rigorous organization, massive amount of illicitly
gained money, and brutish tactics, present a signiﬁcant and
growing threat to the law enforcement agencies of the United
States and ultimately to its democratic form of government.

Since the 1920s, a segment of Mexico’s population has been
involved in the production of narcotics and the smuggling of
those drugs into the United States. In the earliest known pattern
of this illicit activity, Mexican-Chinese grew poppies to produce
opium and carried it to the United States for consumption by
Chinese laborers on the West Coast.‘

Few Americans realize that Mexico has a sizable Chinese
population which has been growing since the late 1800s, when
Chinese laborers were brought to the United States to work on
railroad construction throughout the West. Earlier, Chinese pro-
spectors had traveled to America to seek fortunes during Califor-

199

200 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

nia’s 1849 Gold Rush. Although few of them discovered gold, all were victims of
intense racism within the United States. Many ﬂed to Mexico to escape the big-
otry and were able to establish small farms and businesses there. They also
brought with them the custom of smoking opium, and customers for it were plen-
tiful on both sides of the border.

Mexican opium production was ﬁrmly established by the time opium was out-
lawed as a basic ingredient of early patent medicines and adventurous Americans
had discovered and become addicted to its effects. Mexican—produced opium
added to quantities of the drug that were subsequently smuggled into the United
States from Asia and the Middle East? By the late 1920s and early 1930s, however,
Mexicans joined the Mexican-Chinese in growing poppies and processing the
opium gum into a crude heroin that was being sold principally in the low-income
urban Mexican immigrant communities of California. Marijuana was the second
crop that the then small Mexican drug groups were also smuggling into the
United States.3

In Hollywood at that time, the use of heroin was increasing among actors and
musicians within the huge ﬁlm and entertainment industry. Most, however, relied
on the reﬁned drug from either Asia or the Middle East. The crude “Mexican
brown,” so-called because of its color and its low level of purity, was not popular
among that segment of society. Meanwhile, on the U.S. East Coast, heroin from
the Middle East in particular was being distributed by Maﬁa gangs linked to out-
law groups in Sicily.

When World War II erupted, the supply of heroin from Asia and the Middle
East was abruptly cut off. Mobsters in Philadelphia, aware of the crude “Mexican
brown,” decided to substitute it for the reﬁned white powder they had been accus-
tomed to receiving from Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and other Middle East areas.
Delegates from that U.S. criminal syndicate traveled to Mexico to meet with the il-
licit producers of heroin and arranged for delivery of large quantities of the drug.
This was a major development in the growth of Mexico’s criminal drug industry.
Previously, Mexican heroin production was small in relation to production in the
Middle East and Asia. Users were mainly limited to a small segment of California’s
Mexican and black communities.

With an increasing demand for Mexican brown heroin, on both the East and

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 201

West Coasts of the United States, smugglers and dealers from Mexico, working
with the Maﬁa mobs, created a wider demand for their low-priced heroin
throughout the nation. As the war continued, the use of Mexican heroin in the
United States increased, particularly in the nation’s coastal urban areas. This in
turn enriched the Mexican drug syndicates and allowed them to exert criminal in-
ﬂuence throughout Mexico’s poorly trained and paid law enforcement agencies,
which not only were easily bribed into not interfering in their activities but ac-
tively sought payoffs in return for not interfering with the illicit drug activity.

When World War II ended, the Maﬁa syndicates reverted to Asia and the Mid-
dle East as their primary sources for heroin. Subsequently, the demand for Mexi-
can brown in the United States was dramatically reduced, but the increased use of
Mexican brown in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas during the war years had
created a large number of low-income U.S. heroin addicts who depended on the
inexpensive Mexican brown. Since, at that time, there was little emphasis by the
United States on intercepting drugs along the border, it was relatively easy for the
narcotic to be smuggled and delivered to Mexican syndicate dealers in the United
States. They would then use cohorts, also from Mexico but living in the United
States, to cut the heroin to levels that could be used by addicts. Once the dilution
process was completed, the drug was ready for sale to whoever wanted to sell it
on the street. The most plentiful customers were teenagers from within the low-
income African-American and Mexican communities.

This pattern of smuggling and dealing was conﬁned mainly to sales among
low-income Mexican—Americans on the West Coast. In other large cities, particu-
larly those on the East Coast, Maﬁa gang members, who did not have the more re-
ﬁned postwar Middle East or Asian heroin available to them, would travel to Mex-
ico, pay for the drug, and then have it delivered to them in towns along the
U.S.-Mexico border. Mexicali, across from Calexico, California, Tijuana, across
from the busy San Diego area with its thousands of servicemen, and Ciudad
Juarez, across from El Paso, Texas, became important transit points!‘

This pattern of demand, in which addicts who could afford it used the more re-
ﬁned Asian and Middle East heroin while low-income addicts relied on the cruder
Mexican brown, continued for twenty—ﬁve years. During those postwar years,

Mexican dealers and smugglers sought to widen the use of their product, along

202 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

with marijuana. Proﬁts from both drugs were enormous, allowing the Mexican
drug syndicates to further entrench themselves in Mexico’s underworld and solid-
ify their political inﬂuence.

Easing their growth was a U.S. government policy that virtually ignored the
growing drug threat from Mexico and instead concentrated on narcotics being
smuggled in from the Middle East and Asia. Federal drug agents made much of
discovering heroin on ships in major East Coast ports, while making little effort to
stop the enormous amounts of heroin and marijuana that were coming across the
U.S.-Mexico border, carefully concealed in vehicles that ranged from massive
tanker trucks to small family cars.5

Sometime during the late 1960s or early 1970s, Mexican heroin chemists dis-
covered a new method of processing the drug into a gummy, tar-like substance
that had a purity level of 50 percent, far higher than their previous production of
the drug.“ The improved processing was revolutionary for the Mexican drug syn-
dicates. Now that the heroin was in a gummy form instead of a powder, it could
literally be shaped into packets that would hold their forms; they could then be
more easily stuffed in the secret compartments of vehicles or wrapped around the
bodies of persons, thereby allowing them to carry from one to two kilos of the
heroin.7 The high purity levels also meant that the proﬁt from two kilograms of
Mexican goma (the street name for heroin) increased dramatically. Now, the
heroin could be cut as many as six times. Thus, two kilos of heroin of 50 percent
purity would produce ten kilos (nearly twenty pounds) of heroin ready for street
use.“

During this period, French police shattered Marseilles as a major center for
processing heroin destined for the United States. The French center was subse-
quently replaced by Culiacén, a medium-sized farm city in the Mexican state of
Sinaloa. Surrounded by the rugged Sierra Madre mountains where the hot
weather provided an ideal climate for the opium poppies, the region was ideal for
the ever-expanding Mexican heroin industry.9

American drug dealers ﬂew in daily to purchase Mexican goma as well as
methamphetamines, cocaine, and huge amounts of marijuana, and then arrange
for its delivery to the United States. The sale of these drugs was so blatant that two
American undercover narcotics agents in the late 1970s recalled attending a lavish
party provided by one of the Culiacén druglords for his American customers. Bars

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 203

were set up on an immaculately trimmed lawn while buffets provided gourmet
Mexican cuisine and strolling mariachis played and sang Mexican songs. Long ta-
bles, each covered by a white sheet, had been placed in the middle of the lawn.
At a given signal, the sheets were suddenly pulled off, revealing heaping mounds
of cocaine, amphetamines, heroin, methamphetamines, and carefully wrapped
bricks of marijuana. Gang members took positions behind the tables, ready to
take orders from the American customers who sniffed and tasted the narcotics be-
fore placing orders. (What was most extraordinary about the event was that ma-
jor government oﬂicials, including the local police chief, were present at the event.
Their presence provided proof that the syndicates were amassing not only ﬁnan-
cial power but also tremendous political clout that allowed them to operate virtu-
ally freely within the Mexican state.)1°

This was the common method used to obtain Mexican narcotics for consump-
tion by users other than Mexican or Mexican-American immigrants in U.S. cities:
American dealers ﬂew to Mexico and placed orders that were then delivered by
the Mexican syndicates to the U.S. customers. In this manner, smuggling routes
were established that wound their way across the United States from Mexicali,
Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana. The routes from those border cities stretched initially
to San Diego, Los Angeles, Redwood City, Salinas, Bakersﬁeld, Fresno, San Fran-
cisco, Dallas, Ft. Worth, Phoenix, Chicago, and Lake Tahoe. Ultimately, they
would spread to include New York, Philadelphia, Boston, St. Louis, Yakima, Seat-
tle, Tucson, Albuquerque, Des Moines, and Portland.“

These routes were controlled by members of the drug gangs who recruited
Mexican immigrants to help in the delivery of the narcotics shipments.” At this
point we need to emphasize that there is no evidence that Mexican-Americans
have ever been deeply involved in the delivery, distribution, and preparation of
Mexican narcotics or the collection of proﬁts resulting from sale of those drugs.”
To understand this, we must carefully distinguish between Mexican nationals,
Mexican immigrants, and Mexican-Americans, three distinct groups of persons
with ties to Mexico. In too many cases, the public tends to lump all three into a
homogenous category when in fact they are three distinct, separate groups.

Mexican nationals are Mexican citizens who reside in Mexico and may or may
not travel to the United States. Mexican immigrants are Mexican citizens who live
in the United States either legally or illegally. Many members of this group fre-

Z04 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

quently return to Mexico for either brief or prolonged visits. This group is also di-
vided into recently arrived immigrants and those who have lived here for many
years, establishing homes and families. The ﬁnal group is the Mexican-Americans,
many of whom refer to themselves as Chicanos, thus identifying themselves as
having been born of Mexican ancestry in the United States. The families within
this group may trace their roots back for more than eight generations in the
United States.

It is from the low—income group of this segment of persons with Mexican ances-
try that so-called prison gangs were spawned. Initially, the gangs were formed to
protect themselves from attacks by black gangs or racist whites during the 1940s in
Los Angeles. Those attacks were provoked, in many cases, by white bigots who ob-
jected to the style of dress adopted by some Mexican-American youths—the
pachucos, who stood out because of their wide-brimmed hats, long coats, broad
pants with narrow cuffs, and garish ties. Although it was a style of dress peculiar to
only a small part of the vast Mexican-American community in east Los Angeles, it
was enough to evoke the need for Mexican youths to band together in gangs, who
then began battling each other for certain areas of east Los Angeles.

In the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-19803, virtually all of these gangs
turned to drug use, and generation after generation of low—income Mexican-
Americans in east Los Angeles were forced to join the gangs for protection against
other similar gangs seeking to expand their territories, or “turf.” The violence
spawned by these gangs led to numerous arrests, and members were sent to pris-
ons, where bigotry between the blacks and Chicanos was common and led to vi-
cious interracial wars behind bars. There was a need to organize themselves
tightly into gangs that are commonly referred to as the Mexican Maﬁa (it appears
the name was chosen because of their efforts to emulate the highly disciplined
East Coast Maﬁa).

Despite the name, there is little connection between them and the Mexican
drug gangs, who scorn them because of their lack of reliability. Whereas members
of the Mexican Maﬁa may buy narcotics from Mexican gang members, there is lit-
tle evidence that they have even come close to inﬁltrating the lowest levels of Mex-
ican drug syndicate operations within the United States. The reason for their be-
ing shunned is the Mexican Maﬁa’s disposition for open violence in settling

disputes among themselves, their ﬂashy cars and lifestyles, and penchant for

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 205

freely spending money, all of which draw attention to their group. Members of
Mexican drug gangs who operate within the United States avoid those traits at all
costs.“

Additionally, there is an intense dislike toward Mexican—Americans or Chi-
canos among many low-income Mexican immigrants and Mexican nationals. A
large number of Mexican immigrants and Mexican nationals consider Chicanos
ignorant simply because they do not speak Spanish, and they refer to them as
pochos. In their view, Chicanos have abandoned their motherland and are there-
fore subjects to be despised.“

Likewise, Chicanos dislike Mexican immigrants, though we would emphasize
again that this is a common trait among many of those in the low-income bracket
of this speciﬁc ethnic group. (This belief tends to disappear among those Chi-
canos or Mexican immigrants who have successfully entered the economic and so-
cial mainstream of the United States either through education or skilled training.)
Chicanos consider the immigrants ignorant, uneducated, and competitors for
low-paying jobs. This mutual dislike between Chicanos and Mexican immigrants,
again at low-income levels, is so entrenched that youth gangs composed of mem-
bers from each group constantly battle each other, particularly in the low-income
Mexican communities of Los Angeles that are segmented into Mexican immi-
grant and Mexican-American neighborhoods. Drive-by shootings and beatings
occur daily as these gangs ﬁght each other in that area of the city.“

Again, it is for these reasons that the Mexican gangs recruit their members al-
most solely from within Mexico’s extremely large pool of urban and rural poor
(nearly 20 percent of Mexico’s estimated population of 90 million is considered
living in extreme poverty, a quite substantial recruitment pool). Recruiting by the
different Mexican drug organizations is relatively easy. Jobs are not only scarce in
Mexico but are also low paying for poorly educated Mexicans. Young men and
women in this bracket are desperate to get any work and the drug gangs take ad-
vantage of this fact. However, recruitment occurs only within family members of
those who are already working within a syndicate. In this manner, there is no
question of loyalty to the syndicate since it is akin to working for one’s family. Fail-
ure to carry out an assignment would be a disgrace to the family of that particular
gang member. Nor is there any trepidation about the illegality of being part of a
drug syndicate. Those who join syndicates easily shrug off that fact by pointing to

8 lohn Bailey and Roy Godson

olence. At another extreme are polities in which rules and norms are generally un-
derstood and supported by large majorities and where governments perform as-
signed roles effectively. In between there exists a range of cases in which societies
operate at some acceptable level and governments exercise some effective degree
of rule-making and implementation.

There are several fundamental criteria that help us think about the governabil-
ity continuum:

Monopoly of legal coercion. Max Weber emphasizes the monopoly by public au-
thorities of ultimate legitimate coercion in a society. State authorities exercise ulti-
mate physical control over the national territory.” Again this is a relative matter.
Not every square inch of territory will be effectively controlled by the government
all of the time. But private, or extranational, groups cannot physically dispute
control over territory in direct confrontation with the government. The state exer-
cises ultimate monopoly over military force.

Administration of justice. Is law enforcement in the sense of public safety carried
out by public authorities or by private individuals? Is punishment for criminal of-
fenses meted out primarily by public courts or by private tribunals? Governability
implies that rule adjudication in society is exercised by state authorities them-
selves following established rules. To the extent that criminals penetrate and cor-
rupt the judicial process, a key requisite of governability is compromised.

Administrative capacity. To what extent are laws and regulations actually imple-
mented with some degree of agreement with the intentions of policymakers? Or,
are problems of administrative incompetence, lack of resources, or public and pri-
vate corruption so serious as to effectively divorce the stated intentions of public
oﬂicials—assuming these reﬂect real intentions—from bureaucratic behavior? A

weak, poorly resourced public administration, especially one lacking a career civil

service, is especially susceptible to corruption.”

Provision of minimum public goods. Governability can be assessed in part by the
capacity of government to provide the basic services that make society function.
Can government assure adequate roads, schools, health care, water supplies, pub-
lic sanitation, minimum nutrition, and the like? This too is a relative matter, in
the sense that expectations and demands vary from one society to another. Where
the ﬁscal constraints of the dual transition (as discussed below) reduce govern-

206 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

the widespread corruption within Mexico. The sentiment is: Everyone’s doing it,
so I’m going to do it too.

In the mountainous and isolated areas of Sinaloa, Sonora, and Michoacan,
small farmers who are barely eking out an existence from nearly barren soil are
easily talked into growing poppies for opium production. It is an illegal crop that
will provide them a hundredfold in proﬁts in comparison to their usual harvests
of corn and beans.” The children of these farmers can easily be induced to join
drug gangs once they are old enough. It is actually very common for young men to
ask to join the group. In those areas where the organizations operate freely, there
is no stigma attached to working with the gangs. The rationalization is that since
no one is using heroin or smoking large amounts of marijuana in Mexico and the
drugs are destined for the United States, then it is all right. In addition, as men-
tioned previously, there is the other rationalization that corruption is so wide-
spread in Mexico that there is no reason not to engage in criminal activity.

New and usually young members in these rural areas may start as helpers to
gang members who travel from one farm plot to another gathering raw opium or
loose-cut marijuana for delivery to processing centers. Eventually, these members
may move up the ladder to the point where they are helping deliver tractor-trailer
loads of drugs to warehouses along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Another step up the ladder could involve gang members being sent across the
border to ensure delivery of narcotics and perhaps act as couriers returning
money to Mexico. Other recruits from farming areas may be given ﬁrst assign-
ments in which they become “mulas” (mules) who smuggle heroin into the United
States. Still others may be sent to work in border vehicle body shops where so-
phisticated craftsmen devise hidden spaces in vehicles of all sizes, some so ingen-
ious that even dogs trained by U.S. customs agents ﬁnd it diﬂicult to detect the
narcotics hidden inside.

Additional sites for recruiting mules are in the border cities of Mexicali, Ti-
juana, and Ciudad Juarez, where hundreds of thousands of poor Mexicans gather
daily to try to enter the United States illegally by evading the U.S. Border Patrol or
Customs agents. It is fairly easy for members of a smuggling cell, that is, a cell
whose sole job is to smuggle the narcotics into the United States and nothing
more, to mingle among the would-be immigrants and hire numbers of them to
carry narcotics on their bodies as they attempt to cross the border.

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 207

The pay may range from $100 to $200 to carry one or two kilos on themselves
and deliver it to speciﬁc border addresses in the United States. Smugglers for the
gangs may recruit as many as 100 immigrants, load them with a total of 100-200
kilos of heroin or cocaine in plastic packets, then send them across the border sep-
arately. If one of them is caught, the loss is acceptable since the other 99 mules got
through. If a recruited smuggler makes it across and wants to continue working as
a mule, he or she is quickly accepted.”

Still another area of recruitment is in farm labor camps in the United States,
where Mexican immigrants live almost year around. There, an offer to make more
than $100 a day from a relative already involved in a drug gang is bound to be ac-
cepted by a worker who may be willing to replace his backbreaking work with the
easy pay and labor offered by a gang member.”

The work may range from simply being the driver of a car acting as an escort
for a vehicle carrying either drugs or money. The escort’s job is not to interfere but
simply observe if the vehicle carrying a drug cargo is stopped by police and then
to report the occurrence to a gang headquarters in the United States. Other posi-
tions may involve working as a guard at a home or building where drugs are being
stored. Still another job is disposing of dismantled vehicles used to smuggle the
drugs into the United States. These vehicles may range from late-model autos or
trucks to run-down vehicles. The goal is to get rid of them if they cannot be re-
used.” .

Among gang members there is no concern that what they are doing is wrong.
Virtually all of them are poorly educated or have no education at all. The loyalty
patterns are shaped solely by what is needed to ensure that the syndicates operate
eﬂiciently and profitably. Young gang members who have exhibited intelligence
and loyalty are sent to the United States and rank among the most trusted.
Throughout California in the 1980s, for example, the syndicates established spe-
ciﬁc routes that were to be used within the state, drop-off points for collecting
money, producing or diluting narcotics, and delivering drugs. It was the responsi-
bility of the gang members in charge to ensure that they operated in the most
eﬂicient manner. In different U.S. cities, gangs operated these centers using state-
of-the—art technology. They were manned by trusted members who, as previously
stated, had other relatives involved in the operation.

A glimpse of one of these centers illustrates the scope of their operations. In

Z08 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

Oakland, one of our sources was taken to a large, dilapidated house in that city’s
low—income district as part of an attempt to recruit her as a street dealer for one of
the syndicates. As she entered the house she heard a muffled whirring sound com-
ing from behind a closed door. She was led inside and was astonished to see a long
table with approximately twenty to thirty nude Mexican women sitting around it.
Each was wearing only a dust mask and had a blender and small, precision elec-
tronic scales in front of them. The noise she had heard was the now almost deaf-
ening noise from all the blenders operating simultaneously.“

The women were diluting heroin for street sales. At each workplace, there were
bags of undiluted heroin on one side and bowls of diluted heroin ready for pack-
aging on the other. The women used the scales to measure the correct amount of
heroin and lactose (the diluting substance), then emptied the combination into
the blender.” Armed guards stood at the two entrances to the room and carefully
watched the women. The source’s escort explained that the women were nude to
keep them from hiding any of the heroin on themselves. The room, she was told,
operated twenty-four hours a day with different shifts of workers. The source, who
declined the offer to become a street dealer, was told that she would be given free
pounds of already cut heroin to sell. In return she would share the proﬁts with the
distributor. Her escort was a Mexican immigrant who had been recruited by a
gang many years before and now had responsibility for stockpiling the drug.”

The example illustrates the sophistication involved in only one segment or cell
of a syndicate’s activities in the United States. Each point and the responsibility
that goes with it is under the direction of a separate gang member who usually
does not know who is in charge of another segment. By using this method, each
cell operates independently of the other, and in case of arrests his or her ignorance
ensures that the manager or members of another cell will not be revealed. An-
other tactic syndicates use _to keep from attracting attention to themselves is to
maintain two homes—an opulent, lavish house in Mexico and a run-down home
in the United States. To all outward appearances in the United States, gang mem-
bers appear to be simply laborers driving broken-down vehicles that draw little at-
tention from police. They dress simply and so do their families. But behind that
simplicity is an intricate system of code words used to control deliveries of drugs,

complex surveillance procedures when drugs are en route or money is being re-

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 209

turned to Mexico, and two-way radio equipment, all aimed at staying one step
ahead of law enforcement.

It is this combination of complex security procedures plus simplicity that has
allowed the syndicates to escape detection in the United States and vastly expand
their operations. Linked to these patterns is the reluctance to betray other gang
members since most members are related to each other. The family links between
gang members also increase the use of trust to oversee many narcotics operations.
For example, the manager of the dilution operation is obligated to deliver the pur-
chase price of his drugs to a point in the United States where the money is col-
lected and counted. He simply takes his proﬁt and delivers the remainder to the
predetermined location.

Trust, then, is another important component of efﬁciency within the syndi-
cates. Drug wholesalers, once established, do not have to pay at the time the drug
is delivered; they can do so later after they have sold it. Likewise, if a wholesaler
can induce a close friend also to peddle the drug, as in the example cited, and if
that friend is SUCC€SSfUl in his venture, then he simply asks for more of the drugs
from the person who delivers to him. If he has three or four friends whom he is
supporting by providing them with drugs for sales, he then becomes a “major”
drug dealer. Thus, what the news media call a drug ring is created. Every so often,
drug enforcement agencies describe to news agencies how they have broken one
of these rings. Their descriptions are accurate; however, the problem is that an-
other drug ring, perhaps much more cautious than the ﬁrst, will quickly ﬁll the
void left by the ﬁrst group.“

The Mexican points and routes, established to ensure rapid delivery of nar-
cotics, attracted Colombia’s cocaine cartels to Mexico’s drug syndicates in the
early 1980s after U.S. pressure forced the Colombians to move their smuggling
points from Florida to the Southwest. Both groups forged agreements in which
the Colombians would deliver cocaine to Mexico and the syndicates there would
use their networks to smuggle it into the United States. The agreement was so lu-
crative that cargo jets laden with cocaine destined for the United States began to
be detected in Mexico.”

The lure of joining or starting up a drug ring comes, of course, from the im-

mense proﬁts involved, so large, in fact, that many gangs feel no need to mete out

210 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

punishment if a shipment of money is occasionally seized by police. The method
of transporting the money in the United States is simplicity at its best. Couriers in
different U.S. cities are given large, sealed cardboard boxes ﬁlled with dollar bills,
which are usually placed in the trunk of a vehicle. They are then instructed to fol-
low a certain highway route. If for some reason they are stopped, their instruc-
tions are to deny any knowledge of the contents of the box. A courier is told to say
he was paid by a stranger to deliver the box to a certain point and had no knowl-
edge of what was in it. Any ofﬁcer who stops a courier is also told by the courier
that the money can be conﬁscated since the courier has no connection to it.“

If the courier is arrested and the money seized, there is little cause for concern.
Police have little evidence that the courier has done anything wrong. There is usu-
ally no proof that the money was obtained from illegal activity, and it could, in
fact, actually be some eccentric’s life savings. If an arrest is made, the courier, usu-
ally being a ﬁrst offender, is given a light sentence. To the courier, going to jail is of
little concern. He will have three meals a day, a soft bed, and a warm room in
which to sleep. To syndicate members, the seizure is just a small annoyance that
can easily be shrugged oﬂ°.27

A simpler method of transporting money is to stuff a battered cardboard box
with money, wrap it tightly with duct tape, scrawl an address on it, and send it by
bus express package service. Once the money arrives at its destination, it is picked
up, and the bills, easily totaling millions of dollars each month, are counted elec-
tronically, bundled in the different denominations, and reshipped to border
cities. Either couriers or bus express package service are used again to get the
money into Mexico. Crossing the money into Mexico is not a problem, since Mex-
ican customs agents rarely search vehicles entering Mexico. To ensure that the
money is not seized, the Mexican customs agents are usually bribed in advance to
allow the vehicle to enter Mexico freely.

When the money arrives in Mexico, it is quickly laundered and reinvested in
projects that may range from hotels to stocks. The tragic reality of the illicit drug
industry is that there is so much money being earned (amounting to billions of
dollars annually) that there is more than enough for all gang members from the
lowest to the highest. It is an enticing industry that has virtually no ceiling to it
and can make millionaires out of enterprising campesinos who often can neither
read nor write.”

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 211

It is also money that evokes the strongest and most brutal response from the
Mexican drug cartels. If payoffs to the organization are withheld by gang mem-
bers who have been provided drugs on consignment, the response from Mexico
can be brutal. Narcotics agents know of cases where hit men were ﬂown aboard
private aircraft from Mexico into the United States for the purpose of killing an er-
rant gang member. With the murder done, they returned to the airport where the
waiting aircraft quickly whisked them back to Mexico. American police are simply
helpless against this operation.”

Syndicate members know all too well that such will be their fate if they violate
the rules. Yet, unlike the American East Coast mobs, no violence has erupted over
disputes arising from control of speciﬁc regions within the United States. Appar-
ently, there are enough cities, drug addicts, and potential drug addicts for every-
one. Gunplay, however, has broken out within Mexico when a gang has chal-
lenged another for control of the supply of narcotics ﬂowing into the United
States.” Those gang members operating within the United States lead fairly stable
lives and are free from such conﬂicts because they are the recipients of the drug.
Their task is to sell it, then return the proceeds to Mexico. Within the United
States, some members involved with Mexican narcotics, those in lower echelons
of the syndicates, are choosing to stay in America and forego establishing a sec-
ond home in Mexico. They may return to Mexico but only for visits; their perma-
nent home is in the United States. However, by staying in America, they run a
greater risk of being caught in a country where law enforcement agencies cannot
be bribed as easily as they are in Mexico.”

Narcotics agencies believe those members who choose to remain in the United
States are involved in the production of methamphetamines within the country, a
fairly new development by the Mexican syndicates. Up to the early 1990s, the pro-
duction of methamphetamines was largely controlled by U.S. citizens. That pro-
duction has shifted in the late 1990s to Mexican nationals operating in the United
States, speciﬁcally in California.

The production of methamphetamines requires heaters, large amounts of
chemicals——some of them unstable—and precision-made glass laboratory ﬂasks
and tubes. Chemicals are blended and then heated to temperatures that create ex-
tremely poisonous fumes during the preparation of the drug. The production of
these narcotics also requires proper ventilation and isolated areas in which dan-

212 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

gerous by-products can be easily dumped. The result can be serious ground con-
tamination.”

When U.S. citizens were at the forefront of methamphetamine production, the
preparation occurred in trailer homes or garages and the output was normally be-
tween two to ﬁve pounds of the crystalline substance. Meanwhile, production of
methamphetamines was growing in Mexico and it was not uncommon to have il-
legal labs in that country producing up to 100 pounds at a time.

A problem the drug syndicates faced was trying to smuggle the methampheta-
mine across the border in large quantities. Sometime during the past ﬁve years,
one of the syndicates launched an innovative concept: Why not obtain the chemi-
cals in the United States and do the “cooking” of “meth” in that country instead of
producing it in Mexico and facing the task of smuggling it across the border?

A positive factor about methamphetamines is that they do not require lengthy
growing times. Opium poppies, although a hardy plant that grows in hot climates,
must be carefully tended to maturity before a small amount of raw opium can be
obtained from the numerous but small plots in the states of Sinaloa, Sonora,
Jalisco, and Michoacan. Likewise, marijuana requires careful irrigation and a
lengthy growing time in which there is a high risk of having the crop spotted from
the air by government aircraft and subsequently destroyed. The production of
methamphetamine requires only an isolated, well-ventilated site to produce a
highly proﬁtable product within days.

The result is that methamphetamine labs controlled by Mexican drug gangs
are now being raided in the San Joaquin Valley of California. This lush farming re-
gion is ideal for the production of the drug, which requires isolated areas. Many
old and out-of-the-way farmhouses pepper the valley and are being rented by
meth crews as sites for the illegal labs. The danger of meth labs was best demon-
strated when police found four dead persons inside a southern California motel
where an attempt had been made to produce the drug without adequate ventila-
tion. The victims had died almost instantly once the chemicals started getting hot
and began giving off fumes. Outdoor mountain sites have also been discovered in
which the crews lugged in portable generators for the heaters and set up shop
near streams which, while serving as handy dumping sites, carry the contaminant
downstream and endanger wildlife.”

In one case, an outdoor lab was discovered only because the landowner heard

-6-uv

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 213

the sound of generators and, believing cattle rustlers were operating on his Cali-
fornia land, investigated the source of the noise. He discovered a fully equipped
lab operating at the bottom of a slope next to a stream. Tables had been carried in
to support the laboratory equipment and 5o-gallon barrels of chemicals needed to
produce methamphetamine were found at the site. The lab crew was never found.
Government cleanup crews were needed, as they are at all methamphetamine
sites, to make the site safe. When arrests have occurred at meth labs, all the sus-
pects have been Mexican nationals. The labs are now so numerous and produce so
much meth that they have quietly edged out production of the drug by U.S. citi-
zens. The statistics are staggering: Mexican nationals accounted for 17 percent of
the methamphetamine lab crews seized in California, but their operations pro-
vided 73 percent of the seizure of methampetamine in the state. Most of these
highly secretive labs are being found in the California Central Valley region, the
cities of Los Angeles, East Palo Alto, and Stockton, and Orange and San Ber-
nardino counties. In 1997, California narcotics agents seized forty—two labs in the
Fresno, California, area. Statewide, that number soared to 8oo labs.“

Suspects arrested in connection with the labs have told police they were hired
from street corners while seeking day labor jobs. In most cases, a pickup truck
would pull up to the workers, and a Hispanic driver would ask if they wanted to
work. When the answer was aﬂirmative, he would tell a speciﬁc number of them
to climb aboard. The truck would then drive off. En route, the workers would be
told they would be going to an isolated work site where they would earn $500 a
day, a staggering amount to workers used to earning $40 a day. Once at the site,
they were shown the chemicals by an instructor who oversaw production of the
drug. The workers were not given any gloves, masks, or protective clothing to
guard against the dangerous fumes that can cause pneumonia because of the cor-
rosive effect they have on lungs. The entire crew lived and slept in close proximity
to the lab until the batch, which may total 1oo pounds, was ﬁnished.“

The operation, while complex, has become simpliﬁed by the use of careful in-
structions and premeasured, color-coded bags of chemicals. Instructions found
by agents provide step-by—step descriptions, which include statements such as
“when the thermometer reaches this temperature, then add the entire contents of
the blue bag into each ﬂask.”35

Like the development of Mexican heroin tar or goma that increased its potency

214 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

but reduced its size, the strategy of moving methamphetamine labs from Mexico
into the United States poses another unexpected major obstacle to the reduction
of drug use in America. It is almost impossible to stop the widespread establish-
ment of carefully hidden meth labs that produce the drug in large quantities. Po-
lice also run into a virtual stone wall in trying to ﬁnd out who is behind the labs.
The crews, when arrested, maintain the only person they know linked to the lab is
the one who hired them from a street corner or a farm labor camp.”

Still another problem is that the number of lab crew leaders is growing expo-
nentially. In the few times that agents have arrested a crew leader, they discovered
that he had started by being a lab worker and had simply asked his crew leader if
he could set up a lab for himself. There was no problem with the request and he
was quickly supplied with all the equipment and chemicals needed for the
process. The meth that he produced was quickly purchased by the original crew
leader.”

With a near constant supply of poor Mexican national laborers in the United
States and drug syndicates willing to pay them up to $500 per day for the 4-5 days
of actual “cooking” involved in each drug production cycle, it appears narcotics
agents face a daunting task in trying to stop the spread of meth labs. It is also
probably accurate to say that many Mexican national laborers will succumb to
working at the labs because of their desperate search for work.”

The Gerardo Delgado Garibay 1995 case, which was tried in federal court in
Fresno, California,” provides an example of the staggering proﬁts that can be
made from the production of methamphetamines. It is also a major example of
the links that drug producers and smugglers have with Mexico. It took a total of
eighteen different investigations from a variety of southern California law enforce-
ment agencies to amass the evidence needed to convict Garibay, who is now serv-
ing a life sentence in federal prison. At his peak, in 1993, Garibay had six laborato-
ries producing as much as 2,000 pounds of methamphetamine per lab. His
operation was then selling the methamphetamine at $3,500 to $4,000 per pound
for a total of $48 million. He was also able to escape detection from about 1990 to
his arrest in August 1994, allowing him to produce tons of methamphetamine for
distribution throughout the United States. Garibay was just one independent pro-
ducer of methamphetamine among an unknown number who, up to the present,
have eluded police.

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California 215

During Garibay’s trial, agents from California’s Bureau of Narcotics Enforce-
ment and the federal Drug Enforcement Administration provided evidence of
phone calls and travel to Mexico where he used his proﬁts to purchase enormous
amounts of land and other assets. However, Garibay’s apprehension is rare. Nar-
cotics enforcement agents believe there may be dozens of independent drug entre-
preneurs like Garibay operating throughout the United States in addition to those
linked to the powerful drug cartels of Mexico. The ability to detect illegal drug op-
erators who use Mexico as a home base but conduct the production and sale of
drugs in the United States is extremely difficult because of the tight security in-
volved in those small drug gangs.

There is no question that the smuggling of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into
the United States and the Mexican-controlled production of methamphetamine
within America’s borders are major problems that threaten not only the economy
of the country but its constitutional liberties. Despite massive operations, Mexico
has been unable to fully eradicate the drug syndicates’ operations because of gov-
ernment corruption, inefficiency and lack of resources, and the sheer scope of the
problem. The result has been that the Mexican cartels are operating freely in the
United States. It is likely that as the situation deteriorates further in Mexico, and
subsequently in the United States, American citizens may be willing to accept po-
lice tactics that are on the razor’s edge of being unconstitutional, such as allowing
a freer hand in authorizing phone wiretaps that could threaten the right to privacy
as provided by the Constitution. Other areas may involve expanding the parame-
ters that allow police to search vehicles, again infringing upon the individual
rights of a citizen. This would mean that police, instead of gathering evidence or
having a justiﬁable reason to stop and search a vehicle, could simply stop vehicles
because an ofﬁcer had a hunch that a driver may be carrying narcotics. Politicians
may exploit the drug problem, winning elections by voters who are fed up with
drug—related crime, and introduce laws drastically restricting entry and activity by
citizens of another country, Mexico for example, as an effort to bring drug crime
under control.

Already, the federal government has clearly violated long-standing policies by
using military resources in assignments that are the responsibility of civilian law
enforcement agencies. Those acts include the use of Marines and members of
other military forces to guard stretches of the U.S.-Mexico border, an assignment

Introduction 9

ment spending for social services, criminal groups can generate public support,
even a degree of legitimacy, by supporting schools, housing, health care, and the
like in local communities.“

Corzﬂict management. Regardless of the particular form of government, a com-
mon requisite for governability is the capacity of institutions to channel and con-

tain the sorts of conﬂicts and competing demands that are central to modern po-
litical life.“

Our particular interest is in democratic governability. The core dimension of
democracy concerns procedures. Democracy is characterized by periodic elec-
tions—which are freely contested, with the maximum feasible participation of the
citizenry———to select from among competing candidates the groups that will oc-
cupy signiﬁcant policymaking offices. For citizen participation to be effective in
choosing among competing candidates (a process usually structured by party
competition), citizens must be able to exercise basic rights, including freedom of
speech and assembly. In turn, these rights are exercised most effectively when but-
tressed by ﬁmctioning institutions and appropriate values, operating in a sup-
porting civic culture.”

We must look beyond the role of procedures to the importance of institutions
in democracy. Guillermo O’Donnell argues that the minimalist procedural no-
tions can include as democratic what he calls “delegative democracy.” This refers
to a form of democracy in which a strong executive, usually a president elected
through procedures that meet a minimum deﬁnition of democracy, dominates the
political system. This leadership exists to the detriment of creating effective, re-
silient institutions (such as legislatures, judiciaries, independent regulatory agen-
cies, subnational governmental units, and the like) that can promote participa-
tion and accountability. The result is a fragile, brittle policymaking process
marked by volatility and costly policy mistakes. O’Donnel1 sees forms of delega-
tive democracy emerging in several of the recent Latin American examples, in-
cluding Mexico, and in most of the former communist cases." O’Donnell suggests
that delegative democracy usually coexists with severe economic adjustment, as
described below in the “dual transition.” His argument interests us because he
points to ways in which governability is limited by concentration of power in one
actor alongside the relative weakness of other policymaking bodies. But the issue

216 Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

ill-suited to soldiers who are trained for combat and quick reaction but not the
complex task of trying to determine by observation whether a person is simply an
illegal alien trying to cross the border or a smuggler laden with drugs.“

The use of the military resulted from law enforcement agencies’ agreeing that
they have no choice other than to turn to the military for help against a foe that is
better equipped in radio communication gear and transportation and can call on
a vast pool of manpower, namely, Mexico’s poor. Unless there is a dramatic rever-
sal in the drug problem facing the United States, it is likely that within ﬁve to ten
years an outraged American public, intent on stopping the cartels, may demand
enforcement tactics and laws that, while unconstitutional, will go unchallenged in
courts because of public sentiment that they are the only way to stop the drug
problem. The effect of such laws would be minimally noticed by the nation’s non-
Hispanic population, but they could have a strong impact on the Hispanic popula-
tion, speciﬁcally in the Southwest, which would have to bear the brunt of poten-
tially heavy-handed police tactics that could merge antidrug activities with racism
and bigotry.

Another concern is that the economy of the United States could be inﬂuenced
to some degree by ﬁnancial bodies in which there has been heavy investment of
money by drug cartels.“ In Mexico alone, that ﬁgure has been estimated at $2.4
billion per year.“ Virtually all of that money would have come from drug sales in
the United States. The amount has become so critical to Mexico’s economy that if
it were to launch an intensive and eﬂicient crackdown on the drug syndicates, it is
possible that the drug cartels could suddenly yank their billions of dollars of laun-
dered money from large corporations and banks into which it has been invested.
The result could send the Mexican economy into a chaotic tailspin and create seri-
ous repercussions in international ﬁnancial markets. How prolonged the effects

would be is unknown since no one, except the cartels and their ﬁnancial advisors,

knows exactly how much of their money has become a vital part of the economies '

of both the United States and Mexico.

In January 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh testiﬁed before the U.S. Congress
that not only were the Mexican drug syndicates a major threat to the corruption
of public security in the United States, but that the violent acts associated with the
movement of drugs and arms posed a major threat to national security.“

Chapter 10

Conclusion

John Bailey and Roy Godson

GOVERNABILITY, as we have used the term, refers to
the ability of a government to allocate values over its society, to
exercise ultimate authority in the context of generally accepted
rules and procedures. In the Introduction we offered a set of cri-
teria for governability: monopoly of legal coercion, administra-
tion of justice, administrative capacity, provision of minimum
public goods, and conﬂict management. Democratic governabil-
ity adds the notion of procedures and guarantees: freely con-
tested, periodic elections, with maximum feasible participation
of the citizenry, who enjoy basic rights including freedom of
speech and of assembly. In addition to the standard procedural
notions, our approach included Guillermo O’Donnell’s emphasis
on institutions that ensure the accountability of chief executives
to courts and legislatures and that provide the administrative ca-
pacity for governments to carry out basic tasks, such as collect-
ing taxes and enforcing the law.

The chapters herein were prepared by knowledgeable aca-
demic specialists and experienced U.S. and Mexican practition-
ers. We should recognize, however, that there are obstacles to
drawing ﬁrm conclusions. First, the contributors do not always
agree among themselves. Second, there are difﬁculties in obtain-
ing reliable data on criminal organizations and their effects on
the political system. Not only do criminals try to hide their activ-
ities, which is to be expected, but law enforcement authorities
operate largely in secret as well, to protect their crime-control
operations and techniques, to hide their corrupt collusion with

217

218 John Bailey and Roy Godson

criminals, or because of a traditional lack of transparency and oversight. Thus re-
search on organized crime rests on much more tentative theoretical and empirical
grounds than most “orthodox” subjects of analysis, such as public opinion or elec-
tions, and we need to be cautious about framing generalizations.

The research reported here is limited and preliminary, covering a small frac-
tion of the empirical work that remains to be done. Further, most of the contribu-
tors emphasized crime related to drug trafficking, although several included
broader notions as well. Emphasis on drug trafﬁcking is useful in the sense that
such crime generates enormous incomes and is involved in the most egregious
cases of corruption. It has been arguably the most difﬁcult bone of contention be-
tween the United States and Mexico since the mid-1980s. Even so, drug trafﬁcking
is but one of many manifestations of organized crime. The contributors did not
develop at length the many other forms of organized crime (e.g., alien smuggling)
and their various connections with different levels and activities of government.
Finally, the time frame for the studies varied considerably, with most emphasizing
the period from the mid-198os to the mid-199os.

With these caveats noted, the ﬁndings point to the hypothesis that organized
crime has represented a signiﬁcant challenge to democratic governability in Mex-
ico. This is most clearly the case with respect to problems of law enforcement.
There may have been other threats to democratic procedures, as for example with
criminal involvement in campaign ﬁnance, but this is less clear. With regard to
the United States, the threats were focused primarily on border control agencies.
Even here the degree of the threat is unclear.

In the Introduction we sketched six broad images of the criminal-political
nexus in Mexico and the borderlands. In the broadest sense, and with occasionally
conﬂicting ﬁndings, the chapters seem to point toward Image IV (fragmented-con-
tested political-criminal linkages) as a plausible hypothesis to describe the current
relationship between organized crime and democratic governability in Mexico at
least until the mid-199os. With respect to the U.S. side of the borderlands, Image
V (marginal, ad hoc corruption) seems a more useful depiction than Image VI (de-
centralized, targeted corruption), which portrays more intrusive and extensive
forms of criminal penetration of law enforcement and other political institutions.

Beginning with administrative capacity, that is, the ability of government to

implement policies and programs, none of the contributors emphasizes effective

Conclusion 219

central control by the formal national government bureaucratic machinery over
its ﬁeld operations with respect to law enforcement (as suggested by the central-
ized—systemic Images 11 and III). The contributors suggest that important law en-
forcement offices may have been “sold” or “rented” by national-level authorities
on a sort of “franchise” basis (e.g., the plaza system that Pimentel and Arzt de-
scribe) and that lower-level officials funneled payments upward through bureau-
cratic channels. The law enforcement chain of command could work effectively in
certain instances. But this did not necessarily imply effective central control over
ﬁeld operations as a matter of standard practice.

Another image conveyed (e.g., by Molina, Pimentel, Arzt) suggests that poorly
paid and inadequately trained law enforcement officers lacked the support and re-
sources needed to carry out their assigned duties. The image depicts a political
system, undergoing a difficult transition, that had not made the necessary invest-
ments in training and support. The system relied instead on a kind of “self—ﬁnanc-
ing” law enforcement that facilitated corruption and abuse. The picture drawn by
Arzt of the attorney general’s office, where she worked in the mid-1990s, suggests
problems of organization, resources, and procedures that resisted reform efforts.
Nor, as Benitez describes, did the involvement of the military appear to resolve
problems of coordination or efficacy in law enforcement. Arzt suggests that the
military appeared not to subordinate themselves to civilian law enforcement offi-
cials but rather adhered to their established chain of command. Benitez depicts a
military struggling to adapt itself to a political system undergoing important
change and suffering the penetration of corruption that often accompanies an-
tidrug law enforcement.

As to the nature of the criminal organizations and their subordination to polit-
ical authorities, Pimentel suggests a signiﬁcant change in the balance of power:
criminal organizations in the 1990s came to confront law enforcement and politi-
cal authorities, under certain circumstances. Molina, Mexico’s antidrug “czar” in
the mid-1990s, notes the ongoing struggles among drug trafficking gangs in
northern Mexico to control routes and crossing points into the United States. Fur-
ther, though this is implicit, we do not get a sense from Molina’s account of the
northern border area that the alternation from PR1 to PAN governments, as in
Chihuahua or Baja California Norte, made a signiﬁcant difference in combating

criminal organizations.

220 John Bailey and Roy Godson

With regard to the geographic scope of criminal activity, the contributions
were either imprecise about where criminal activities were concentrated or tended
to locate them in the north of the country. Curzio’s chapter, which included a case
study of campaign ﬁnance in the southeastern Gulf state of Tabasco, was an ex-
ception. Astorga and Molina both paint images of mobile criminal groups moving
internally within northern Mexico and connected with criminal organizations in
the United States and South America.

Criminal organizations, the contributors maintain, focus most aggressively on
the ﬁeld operations of law enforcement agencies, the police at various levels, and
the army. However, we lack reliable studies on whether there has been criminal
penetration of other spheres of society, such as business and banking, labor
unions, the church, or the mass media. Especially important to democratic gover-
nance are the vulnerabilities of the judicial system and the effects of money laun-
dering on elections, banking, and business. With regard to the broader political
system, Curzio suggests that electoral competition and campaign ﬁnance are tar-
gets of criminal penetration, and offers the case study of Tabasco to illustrate his
point. But the case itself is ambiguous. We do not know the rationale for the
alleged support by a corrupt banker for the PRI campaign in that state. Was
the support extorted by the party? Was it offered in exchange for anticipated
beneﬁts? Or was the support the result of cronyism, with less concern about the
precise exchanges involved? In his conclusion, Astorga suggests—but does not
support—a scenario in which criminal groups might join in a coalition with hard-
line, antireform PRIistas in order to resist a democratic opening.

Most of the authors suggest that the situation is far from stable. They convey
the sense that the criminal organizations operate on a variety of levels of activity
and of organization and that new organizations are formed to replace those that
are disbanded by government (e.g., Molina’s remarks on the restructuring of the
Juarez Cartel after 1997). This has been the pattern at least since the famous “Op-
eration Condor” of the mid-19703.1 The contributors also describe ways in which
the Mexican government attempted to strengthen its capacity to enforce the law.
The public, however, remains skeptical. Few believe these efforts have yet to make
important advances in controlling organized crime in Mexico. On the other hand,
one could counter that the threats from organized crime could have been worse

without the government’s initiatives, that the results of recent reform efforts have

Conclusion 221

yet to bear fruit, and that society was not yet ready to ally with government to
combat crime and corruption.

Finally, it is also worth noting what the authors do not report. No one suggests
a connection between criminal organizations and guerrilla groups such as the Za-
patista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) or the Popular Revolutionary Army
(ERP). Nor are linkages drawn between criminal groups and difficult political con-
ﬂicts, such as the prolonged student strike at the National University of Mexico
(1999-2000), or with terrorist organizations (in any event a marginal threat in
Mexico’s case). These “nonﬁndings” help put the Mexico case in perspective.
Colombia, in contrast, has suffered much more serious threats from alliances be-
tween criminal organizations, guerrilla armies, and paramilitary forces ﬁghting
for control over extensive territories. Thus, the facile use of the metaphor of the
“Colombianization of Mexico” in the 1990s is mistaken and misleading.

With respect to the U.S. side of the border, impressions are mixed, but the pic-
ture seems to support Image V (“marginal corruption”). Sadler, a veteran ob-
server of the border, suggests that the problems of corruption in the U.S. border
control agencies have been more serious than generally recognized. But he does
not develop or support the point. Molina is also skeptical that the volumes and
values of contraband that have crossed the border do not imply broader and more
systematic corruption of U.S. agencies. But, again, he offers only an impression,
albeit one held by a former attorney general of the State of Chihuahua, former an-
tidrug “czar” at the national level, and a federal senator who chaired the commit-
tee responsible for oversight of Mexico’s public security.

Castillo and Unger depict a situation in California in which the larger opera-
tions of drug trafficking (i.e., smuggling and wholesale distribution) are largely
contained within relatively small groups in the Mexican immigrant and Mexican-
American communities, whose complexity they take pains to clarify. Though their
point will rankle sensibilities among some Mexicans, there is not——-at least to our
knowledge—-independent, scholarly research that puts other actors at the center
of these operations. Their description of the ﬂuidity of organization and ease of
entry into trafﬁcking points more toward dispersed and fragmented criminal or-
ganizations in sporadic contact with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement than to a
broader and more patterned penetration of judicial branches or state and local

governments. At the same time they offer rather thin support for their suggestion

222 John Bailey and Roy Godson

that drug trafﬁcking is reaching levels that may provoke such a harsh law enforce-
ment reaction as to endanger civil liberties in the United States. Also, they do not
provide the data to back up the claim that drug money laundered through the
U.S. or Mexican banking system could provoke ﬁnancial instability. Finally, we
simply do not have a clear picture about whether the situation in the U.S. border-
lands is becoming more or less stable.

In all, the various contributions serve best to point toward interesting hy-
potheses, stated in the form of images. With respect to the nature of the criminal-
political nexus, Image IV seems useful to characterize Mexico in the mid-to-latter
1990s. As described in the Introduction (see Table 1.1), this image depicts seg-
mented, fragmented, and opportunistic cooperation between criminals and some
government oﬂicials (principally in law enforcement) at different levels of govern-
ment and on an opportunistic basis. Image IV suggests incomplete control exer-
cised by central bureaucracies over ﬁeld operations. The complexity and weak
control suggest that elected or appointed officials may or may not have been
linked to criminal corruption. That is, criminal-political networks could have
been “built around” speciﬁc officials. The image also emphasizes the ﬂuidity,
volatility, and conﬂicts that occurred within and between political authorities, law
enforcement forces, and criminal organizations. Thus, in contrast to a central-
ized, hierarchical, and coherent pattern of government control over criminal
groups (as suggested in Images 11 and III), the ﬁndings point more toward frag-
mented-contested political-criminal linkages in the 19803 and 19905.

Image V, marginal corruption, is suggestive for the U.S. borderlands during
that period. As summarized in Table 1.2, the image suggests that criminal penetra-
tion of U.S. law enforcement or judicial agencies was occasional, but there were
U.S. officials in the border region, acting alone or in small groups, collaborating
with Mexican and U.S. criminals. However, corruption was not widespread in law
enforcement or border control agencies and did not reach into the judiciary or lo-
cal elected ofﬁcials, at least in a systematic way.

In sum, the contributors, U.S. and Mexican alike, conclude that organized
crime’s involvement with the political system at various levels signiﬁcantly threat-
ened public security and democratic government in Mexico into the mid-1990s.
They suggest as well that threats to U.S. law enforcement and border control
agencies may have been more serious than generally recognized. The contributors

Conclusion 223

were not asked to couch their studies in policy-relevant terms or to devise “solu-
tions” to the challenges they described and attempted to explain.” But it is reason-
able to conclude from their contributions that they did not believe there was a
“quick ﬁx” to the deep-rooted problems they were addressing. Although they ei-
ther directly or indirectly placed the primary burden of responding to the threat
on the political establishment, and particularly on the central government, it
should not be inferred that they believe that government alone can shoulder the
entire burden. There would appear to be an important role for civil society as well.
Regulatory and law enforcement responses, combined with societal and cultural
change, will not come easily or quickly. Optimists will trust that creative and
courageous leadership on both sides of the border now have recognized the pro-
found nature of the challenge and will promote well-designed institutional and
cultural change. Others may caution that solutions to deeply ingrained problems
require time, resources, political will, and persistence to show significant results.


Notes

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Five events since 1982 put Mexico’s governability to the test: (1)
Mexico’s virtual default on its foreign debt in August 1982 and the subse-
quent prolonged recession; (2) the split in the governing party in 1987
and subsequent electoral fraud in the presidential elections of 1988; (3)
the Zapatista rebellion of January 1994, which projected peasant vio-
lence into a difﬁcult regional and national political situation; (4) a series
of assassinations of high-level political and religious leaders in 1993 and
1994; and (5) the peso crisis of December 1994, which brought the most
severe recession since the Great Depression of the 19303.

2. See, for example, Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1996); Sebastian Rotella, Twilight on the
Line (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); Oscar Martinez, Border People
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994); Carlos Fuentes, The Crystal
Frontier (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1997).

3. Rafael Perl, in “United States Foreign Narcopolicy: Shifting Focus
to International Crime?” Transnational Organized Crime 1:1 (Spring
1995), 38, provides several general reasons for the shift to focus on inter-
national crime: a decline in public concern about drug use, a tendency
to subordinate drugs to other issues, a shift from unilateral to multilat-
eral measures, and an increased focus on drug gangs for nondrug rea-
sons. For a view that suggests that the threat of organized crime has
been exaggerated, see R. T. Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War: The
Search for a New ‘National Security’ Threat,” ibid. 1:4 (Winter 1995),
37-56. In Mexico’s case, the concern about drug trafficking as a national
security matter, which appears in the Miguel de la Madrid administra-
tion (1982-1988) and is formalized in various ways in the Carlos Salinas
government (1988-1994), is expanded under Ernesto Zedillo to encom-
pass organized crime more generally, as seen in his national plan for
1995-2000.

4. Paul Buchanan, for example, notes that “primary to the current
U.S. strategic vision on the hemisphere is a concern with the prevalence
of narcotraﬂicking, arms dealing, and other trans-national criminal en-

225

10 John Bailey and Roy Godson

is not only weak institutional accountability. Without effective judiciaries, law en-
forcement agencies, and regulatory agencies, the very capacity of government to
enforce the law is compromised.

Two other sets of concerns are germane, but their direct connections to the
meaning of democracy and the relationships between crime and governability
take us into terrain too complex to be covered here. These are (1) the degree of in-
equality among citizens and (2) national sovereignty, or the capacity of govern-
ment to mediate between its society and the international system. It seems intu-
itively plausible that in highly unequal societies, such as Mexico’s, the poorest
strata lack sufficient resources (information, money, sense of civic competence) to
operate effectively as citizens within the judicial or regulatory systems. Also, to the
extent that laws or procedures are perceived to be imposed by extranational pow-
ers, the commitment of the citizenry may be reduced.”

Up to this point, we have deﬁned transnational organized crime and conceptu-
alized governability as a set of conditions along a continuum and have suggested
corresponding criteria and “thresholds.” Democratic governability refers to key
procedures and the requisites that make them work. Among these requisites we
have noted especially political accountability and administrative capacity. With
these general considerations in mind, we can assess the criminal-political nexus in

a context of rapid political and economic change in Mexico.

Dual Transition, Crime, and Governability: The Case of Mexico

The optic of the dual transition is useful in viewing the case of Mexico. The
dual transition can be divided into two broad stages.” In Stage I, macroeconomic
adjustment policies aim at reducing inﬂation and balance-of-payments deﬁcits. In
politics, attention focuses on the break from authoritarianism and the beginning
stages of liberalization and democratization. In many cases, Stage I passes rela-
tively quickly, often in a matter of months. With macroeconomic stability under
way, Stage II emphasizes microeconomic measures designed to strengthen market
forces, including policy measures, for example, to increase labor productivity and
promote internal savings. Social welfare policies are also redesigned to target re-
sources more effectively.

With the installation of democratically elected governments in Stage I, politi-

226 Notes to pages 4-8

terprise, as well as the larger socioeconomic problems that are the root causes of national
instability. . . . More insidiously, from a long-term perspective, these [criminal] organiza-
tions are increasingly capable of exercising a dominant voice in national and regional poli-
tics.” Paul Buchanan, “Chameleon, Tortoise, or Toad: The Changing U.S. Security Role in
Contemporary Latin America,” in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., International Security and Diplo-
macy: Latin American and the Caribbean in the Post- Cold War Era (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 274.

5. See Peter A. Lupsha, “Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Fo-
cus on Mexico,” Transnational Organized Crime 1:1 (Spring 1995), 84-101.

6. Shadow government interpretations are a staple of Mexican fiction. See, for example,
Hector Aguilar Camin, Morir en el golfo (Barcelona: Circe, 1988); and Carlos Fuentes, The
Hydrahead (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1978).

7. This image broadly coincides with the interpretation offered by the Instituto Mexi-
cano de Estudios de la Criminalidad Organizada, Todo lo que deberia saber sobre el crimen or-
ganizado en Mexico (Mexico, D.F.: Oceano, 1998).

8. See John Bailey and Sergio Aguayo, eds., Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Rela-
tions: Beyond the Cold War (University of California-San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies, 1996). A third project is under way to consider the policy implications of crime and
insecurity for Mexico and the United States.

9. The deﬁnition draws on Roy Godson and William J. Olson, International Organized
Crime: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information
Center, 1993), 4; Phil Williams, “The Nature of Drug Trafﬁcking Networks,” Current History
(April 1998), 154-59.

10. Peter A. Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime and the Nation-State,” Transna-
tional Organized Crime 2:1 (Spring 1996), 21, “prefers the capstone term, ‘Transnational Or-
ganized Crime,’ which not only stresses the cross—national jurisdictional and ‘organized’
nature of modern crime groups, but also the transnational character of their activities.”

11. Jorge Fernandez Menendez, Narcotraﬁco y poder (Mexico, D.F.: Rayuela, 1999), 43-48
and passim, discusses third country—based organized crime groups operating in Mexico
and the United States.

12. This notion of legitimate coercion ﬁts in Weber’s category of “legal domination.” See
Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books,
1962), 290-97.

13. Regulatory effectiveness is a key component of administrative capacity. To what ex-
tent are market transactions regulated by public law? One might argue that gray markets or
the informal economy can be functional for govemability in a variety of ways, e.g., by pro-
viding employment at wages that do not meet the legal minimum or by providing short-
cuts around burdensome regulations. But at some point the growth of the informal econ-
omy can undermine govemability in a number of ways: e.g., tax income is lost, unsafe
practices go unchecked, incentives for legitimate businesses to pay taxes and obey regula-
tions are reduced, informal markets provide large-scale outlets to sell stolen or smuggled

Notes to pages 9-13 227

merchandise. Market transactions also require notions of property, titles, and contracts en-
forced by public agencies in ways that are predictable. A weak regulatory regime foments
criminal activity.

14. For an interesting discussion of how criminal groups can challenge and even sup-
plant legal authorities see Elizabeth Leeds, “Cocaine and Parallel Polities in the Brazilian
Urban Periphery: Constraints on Local-Level Democratization,” Latin American Research
Review 31:3 (1996), 47-83.

15. The reader will note the obvious inﬂuence here of Samuel Huntington, Political Or-
der in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), in which institutions
play a central role, and of Max Weber's discussion of legitimacy formulas as cited in note 12
above.

16. Samuel Huntington, “The Modest Meaning of Democracy,” in Robert Pastor, ed.,
Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), 11-28.

17. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” journal of Democracy 5:1 (January
1994), 55-69. Cases that ﬁt O’Donnell’s notion of delegative democracy might include Ar-
gentina under Menem, Peru under Fujimori, Russia under Yeltsin, Brazil under Collor, and
Mexico under Salinas.

18. Lorenzo Meyer discusses these issues in a dissent to Huntington’s “modest mean-
ing” of democracy. See Lorenzo Meyer, “Democracy from Three Latin American Perspec-
tives,” in Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas, 29-38.

19. This paragraph draws on Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “The Chal-
lenges of Consolidation,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Rrform
and Democracy (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 1-12.

20. A good discussion is found in Moises Naim, “Latin America: The Second Stage of
Reform,” in Diamond & Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy, 28-44.

21. Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA at Three: A Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1997) provides a useful recent assessment of economic
reforms.

22. The literature on Mexico’s dual transition is extensive. Maria L. Cook et al., eds., The
Politics of Economic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in Mexico (La
Jolla, California: UCSD Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994) is a useful collection. For a
discussion of the reform agenda in the wake of the 1997 midterm elections, see John Bailey
and Arturo Valenzuela, “Mexico’s New Politics: The Shape of the Future,” Journal of Democ-
racy 8:4 (October 1997).

23. Sergio Zermeﬁo, La sociedad derrotada: el desorden mexicano delﬁn de siglo (Mexico,
D.F.: Siglo XXI, 1996), 11 and passim.

24. Secretaria de Gobemacién, Public Security and the New Strategy against Drug-Traﬁick-
ing (Mimeograph, February 15, 1999), 1.

25. Rafael Ruiz Harrell, “Seguridad Publica: La impunidad y la ineptitud,” Reforma (En-

foque), March 29, 1999 (Internet edition).

26. Ibid. In 1996, only 2.46 percent of the crimes reported resulted in convictions.

228 Notes to pages 14-17

27. “Alarmantes indices de criminalidad en el pais; 5,700 delitos diariamente: ALDF,”
Excelsior, April 2, 1997 (Internet).

28. Reports of armed battles between criminals and police are not infrequent. In the
northwestern state of Durango, for example, drug traffickers reportedly attacked the city
hall of San Dimas, then occupied the town for a week and fought off state police, retreating
only when the Mexican army arrived. The mayor and a state legislator declared, “Today no-
body wants to serve as chief of police or city councillor in this area because of fear of vio-
lence.” Ten persons had been murdered in the town in drug-related crimes in the ﬁrst two
months of 1999. “Regarding the wave of assaults and robberies against persons and institu-
tions (six armed robberies of Diconsa [a government food agency] and three kidnappings),
they noted that insecurity permeates the lives of the 200,000 people in the area.” “Narco-
traﬁcantes Ocuparon Durante Toda una Semana un Pueblo en Durango,” Excelsior, Febru-
ary 20, 1999 (Internet edition).

29. Former Mexican Attorney General Antonio Lozano Gracia has given several esti-
mates of the seriousness of corruption in the Federal Judicial Police. In a talk at George-
town University on April 14, 1998, he stated that corruption affected approximately 70 per-
cent of the officers. Tim Golden provides an extensive report on corruption in the army,
“US. Officials Say Mexican Military Aids Drug Traffic,” New York Times, March 26, 1998,
A1, 6.

30. An important test of administrative control over police came with the arrival of the
opposition-party government of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the Federal District in December
1998. Cardenas had campaigned on an anticrime platform and for civilian control over the
police. The response was a kind of “police strike” and a marked upsurge of crime. See Julia
Preston, “In Deﬁance of Reforms, Crime Rises in Mexico City,” New York Times, November
17, 1998 (Internet edition). The new civilian police chief, Alejandro Gertz, subsequently
struggled to gain control through a kind of emergency program. See Jose Galan, “Aplica la
SSP plan de emergencia para el control de 37 mil policias,” La Jornada, March 2, 1999 (In-
ternet edition). For a useful policy-oriented discussion of the judiciary, see Hector Fix
Fierro, ed., A la puerta de la ley: El estado de derecho en Mexico (Mexico City: Cal y Arena,
1994). As to criminal impunity, a recent study of the Federal District estimated that the per-
centage chances of delinquents actually being detained for an offense in 1997 was approxi-
mately 0.0128, or about 13 detentions for every 1,000 crimes. See Guillermo Zepeda
Lecuona, “Delincuencia: Fachada reformadora y los sotanos de la impunidad,” Revista del
Senado de la Republica 4:11 (abril—junio 1998), 6.

31. Interior secretary Fernando Labastida requested a 1999 appropriation of just over
8.2 billion pesos (about U.S.$891 million at the April 1999 exchange rate), or 320 percent
over the 1998 level. “Piden cuadruplicar gasto en seguridad,” Reforma, November 15, 1998
(Internet edition).

32. This is because the electorate’s main concern—as reﬂected in opinion surveys—is
street-level insecurity, and a democratic response to public opinion might focus police and

Notes to pages 17-33 229

judicial efforts against common crime, leaving larger-scale, organized crime relatively unaf-
fected.

33. “Encuesta/Narcotraﬁco: Importante, no prioritario,” Reforma, March 10, 1998 (In-
ternet edition). A more perverse implication may be that organized criminal groups might
foment common crime (or even insurrection) to deﬂect attention from their own activities.
Or, alternatively, the larger, better-organized criminal groups might assist police in control-
ling street crime as part of a tacit or explicit pact of mutual support.

34. This sort of hierarchical division of labor is depicted in the case of the border by
Rotella, Twilight on the Line.

35. See Fernandez Menendez, Narcotraﬁco y poder, 49; IMECO, Todo lo que deberia saber,
63-64; Sergio Aguayo, “Intelligence Services and the Transition to Democracy in Mexico,”
in Bailey and Aguayo Quezada, eds., Strategy and Security in US. -Mexican Relations, 145-48.

36. IMECO, Todo lo que deheria saber, can be read as an elaboration of Image IV.

37. To illustrate Image V, an anticorruption task force involving federal, state, and local
agencies arrested three agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Based
in Nogales, Arizona, the three were accused of accepting bribes to help smuggle some 20
tons of cocaine into Arizona. Pertinent to Image V, “Authorities said the border inspectors
operated independently and apparently were unaware of each other’s activities.” Dennis
Wagner, “Bribes Snare Border Agents,” The Arizona Republic, February 3, 1999, 1.

38. “Crackdown on Corruption,” Washington Post, April 5, 1999, A15, reports: “The U.S.
Customs Service, faced with concerns that its inspectors are increasingly vulnerable to
bribes by drug smugglers, plans to make the ﬁght against corruption a priority for agency
officials. . . . A recent Treasury Department review found no evidence of systematic corrup-
tion in the Customs Service but said ‘individual acts of corruption have occurred and con-
tinue to occur.’”

39. U.S. police emphasize the role of foreign-based criminal organizations and ethnic
ties among drug distribution groups within the United States. DEA Administrator Thomas
Constantine recently stated, “Unlike the American organized crime leaders, organized
crime ﬁgures in Mexico have at their disposal an army of personnel, an arsenal of weapons
and the ﬁnest technology that money can buy. They literally run transportation and ﬁnan-
cial empires, and an insight into how they conduct their day-to-day business leads even the
casual observer to the conclusion that the United States is facing a threat of unprecedented
proportions and gravity.” Remarks before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control regarding United States and Mexico Counterdrug Efforts, Washington, D.C., Feb-
ruary 24, 1999. A

Chapter 2: The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico

1. I wish to express my gratitude to Peter A. Lupsha, Professor Emeritus, University of
New Mexico, for the theoretical framework employed here. I would also like to thank many
current and former members of the Mexican government, who do not wish to be identi-

230 Notes to pages 35-42

ﬂed, and who gave of their time and expertise to assist in this project. I have relied particu-
larly on three sources in this chapter who have provided reliable information in the past,
and are well placed in the system. To the extent possible, their information has been cor-
roborated by others.

2. A. Curtis Wilgus and Raul D’Eca, Latin American History (New York: Barnes & Noble,
1963). 3.

3. Ibid., 67. To this day, many of Mexico’s government agencies continue to have a “visi-
tor-general,” a sort of “inspector general,” to report irregularities to the cabinet mini-
ster; but sometimes the person in this position acts more like the hatchet man for the
superior.

4. Ibid., 67-73.

5. Ibid., 115.

6. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962),
300-302.

7. Ibid., 372-73.

8. Roberto Blum, “Corruption and Complicity: Mortar of Mexico’s Political System?”
(Institute for Contemporary Studies, National Strategy Information Center, Hacienda San
Antonio, Mexico, 1997), 8.

9. Demetrio Sodi de la Tijera, “1997, The Year of the Democratic Change,” El Universal
(Mexico City), January 3, 1997. (Unless otherwise noted, I am responsible for all transla-
tions from Spanish.)

10. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 91.

11. Ibid., 95.

12. Ibid., 77.

13. Peter A. Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State” in
Transnational Organized Crime 2:1 (Spring 1996), 21-48. Also see chapter appendix for a fur-
ther comparison of these two models of organized crime provided by Lupsha.

14. Peter A. Lupsha and Stanley A. Pimentel, Political-Criminal Nexus (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, National Strategy Information Center, Hacienda
San Antonio, Mexico, 1997).

15. Ibid., 8-9.

16. Ibid., 9-10.

17. Yolanda Figueroa, El Capo del Golfo (Mexico D. F.: Editorial Grijalbo, 1997), 71.

18. Riding, 27.

19. Luis Astorga, “Crimen Organizado y Organizacion del Crimen” (Mexico D.F.: Insti-
tuto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1998),
6-7.

20. Luis Astorga, El Siglo de las Drogas (Mexico D.F., Espasa-Calpe, 1996), 81.

21. Peter A. Lupsha, “Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption: The Players Change but the
Game Continues,” Reprinted from War on Drugs (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 179;

Notes to pages 44-62 231

quoting Terrance E. Poppa, Drug Lord: The Life and Death of a Mexican Kingpin (New York:
Pharos Books, 1990), 41-42.

22. Luis Astorga, El Siglo, 161.

23. Peter Lupsha, “Drug Lords,” 180, quoting from Proceso, a Mexico City weekly maga-
zine.

24. Ibid., 180-81, quoting from Proceso (August 5, 1985) and Penthouse magazine (De-
cember 1989).

25. Ibid., 183; quoting from Rogelio Hernandez, Zorrilla: El Imperio del Crimen (Mexico
City: Editorial Planeta, 1989).

26. Ibid., 188.

27. Carlos Marin, “Military Intelligence Documents Entangle High Ranking Chiefs,
Officers and Army Troops in Narcotics Traﬂicking," Proceso, no. 1082 (July 27, 1997), 19.

28. Figueroa, 69.

29. The commander was ﬁred by Attorney General F. Antonio Lozano Gracia in Sep-
tember 1996. J

30. Figueroa, 137.

31. Astorga, El Siglo, 166.

32. Lupsha, “Drug Lords,” 182.

33. Astorga, “Crimen Organizado,” 8.

34. Peter H. Smith, Drug Traﬁfeking in Mexico (Washington D.C.: Institute for Contem-
porary Studies, National Strategy Information Center, 1996), 14-16.

35. J. Jesus Blancornelas, Una Vez, Nada Mas (Mexico D. F.: Editorial Oceano, 1997), 143.

36. Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1996), 301.

37. Riding, 114.

38. Blum, 12.

39. Sodi de la Tijera, “Power Vacuum,” El Universal (Mexico City), January 2, 1998.

40. This legislation was passed as the Federal Law against Organized Crime in Novem-
ber 1996.

41. This program was launched as the “National Crusade against Delinquency” in Octo-
ber 1998, including legislation establishing the Federal Preventive Police.

42. Oppenheimer, 318.

Chapter 3: Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime

1. Louis J. Freeh, Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommit-
tee on Foreign Operations, Hearing on International Crime, March 12, 1996; Federal Law
against Organized Crime, Oﬁicialjournal, November 7, 1996.

2. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.114
Narcotics/ 12-22, U.S. National Archives 11, College Park, Maryland; Joseph Richard
Werne, “Esteban Cantu y la soberania mexicana en Baja California,” in Historia Mexicana
117:30, (July-September 1980), 1-32.

232 Notes to pages 63-69

3. Daniel D. Arreola and James R. Curtis, The Mexican Border Cities (Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1993), 102.

4. Report by Dr. Bernardo Batiz, Health Officer in Baja California, to Dr. Rafael Silva,
head of Department of Public Health, Mexicali, B.C., May 18, 1931, in the Archives of the
Secretariat of Health (ASS), Public Health Fund (FSP), Legal Services Section (SSJ), Box 26,
File 16.

5. Letter from Dr. Rafael Silva, head of Department of Health, to Carlos Trejo y Lerdo de
Tejada, Governor of the Northern District of Baja California, Mexico City, July 13, 1931, in
ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 8.

6. Conﬁdential memorandum sent by Francisco Vazquez Pérez, head of Legal Services
of Department of Health, to Dr. Rafael Silva, head of Department of Health, Mexico City,
September 4, 1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 28.

7. Report by Dr. Bernardo Batiz B., health officer in Baja California, to Dr. Demetrio
Lépez, head of Service of Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals of the Department of Health,
Mexicali, B.C., August 19, 1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 8.

8. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade
(Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991).

9. Novedades, May 14, 1962.

10. Harry J. Anslinger and William F. Tompkins, The Traﬁic in Narcotics (New York:
Arno Press, 1981), 152-53; El Diario de Culiaccin, April 1, 1949; La Voz de Sinaloa, November
23, 1951; El Universal, March 18, 1958. For a more detailed account of the relationship be-
tween Siegel and Virginia Hill and their role in drug trafficking in Mexico, see Ed Reid, La
Bella y la Maﬁa (Mexico: Editorial Diana, 1973).

11. Letter to General D. Eulogio Ortiz, head of Operations of the State of Chihuahua, un-
dated, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

12. Report of Juan N. Requena to the head of Department of Public Health, Mexico City,
July 20, 1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

13. Letter sent by Dr. Alberto Jacqueminot, federal health officer, to General Enrique
Zertuche Gonzalez, Jefe de la Guarnicién de la Plaza, Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, May 28,
1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

14. Telegram from Dr. Ulises Valdés, Secretary General of Health, to Juan N. Requena,
Mexico City, June 2, 1931: Letter 25/ 12348 sent by Dr. Demetrio Lopez, head of the Service
of Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals, to Juan N. Requena, Mexico City, June 4, 1931, in ASS,
FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

15. Conﬁdential memorandum, Department of Public Health, Mexico City, June 16,
1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

16. Report by Juan N. Requena to the head of Department of Public Health, Mexico
City, July 2o, 1931, in ASS, FSP, SSJ, Box 28, File 6.

17. Ibid.

18. El Universal Grcﬁco (evening edition), December 16, 1937.

19. La Prensa, May 9, 1936.

Notes to pages 69-78 233

20. El Universal Graﬁco (evening edition), November 9, 17, 23, 1937; December 14, 16, 27,
1937; January 13, 26, 1938.

21. El Universal, February 28, 1937.

22. Excélsior, November 14, 1947; El Universal, November 16, 1947; Ultimas Noticias, No-
vember 17-19, 1947; December 26, 1947.

23. Luis Astorga, El siglo de las drogas (Mexico: Espasa-Calpe Mexicana, 1996), 68-79.

24. La Vaz de Sinaloa, November 8, 10, 1947; Excélsior, November 8-12, 1947.

25. La Voz de Sinaloa, February 12, 1948; June 19, 1948.

26. General Records of the Department of State, “Report of the Assistant Military At-
taché on the National Security Police of Mexico” (conﬁdential no. 4543), Embassy of the
United States of America, Mexico City, September 4, 1947. Record Group 59, 812.1o5/
9-447, U.S. National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

27. Elaine Shannon, Desperados (New York: Viking, 1988), 186-88. Operation Condor
oﬂicially began in mid-January 1977; however, it began unofﬁcially at the beginning of 1975.
It was announced as “the largest raid ever on drug traﬂicking in Mexico (Northwest), with
the participation of 10,000 soldiers.” It was headed by General José Heméndez Toledo of
the army and Carlos Aguilar Garza, of the PGR. The general was a veteran of the Tlatelolco
student massacres in 1968 and the crackdown on universities, such as UNAM, Nicolaita in
Morelia, and the University of Sonora in Hermosillo. Aguilar later had a stormy career as a
drug trafﬁcker, until his assassination in 1993. The results of the military raids include the
destruction of drug plantations using nonecological chemical defoliants, the exodus of
mountain-dwelling campesinos to the cities, human rights violations, and the temporary
displacement of crops and trafﬁckers to other regions of the country (see Luis Astorga, El
siglo, 119-26).

28. “America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime,” President’s
Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, chap. 3, part 1; Mora Stephens, “Global Organized
Crime,” Woodrow Wilson School Policy Conference 4o1A, Intelligence Reform in the
Post—Cold War Era, January 6, 1996.

29. La Voz de Sinaloa, June 11, 12, 18, 1969, July 8, 1969; Noroeste, March 3, 26, 1977.

30. Manuel Lazcano Ochoa, Una vida en la Vida sinaloense (Los Mochis, Sinaloa: Talleres
Graﬁcos de la Universidad de Occidente, 1992, 226.

31. Terrence E. Poppa, El zar de la droga (Mexico: Selector, 1990).

32. Ibid., 277-94.

33. Shannon, Desperados, 418-19.

34. La jornada, September 23, 1994, March 29, 1995; Proceso, March 13, 1995.

35. Eduardo Valle, El segundo disparo (Mexico: Océano, 1995), 131.

36. La jornada, January 18, 1996.

37. La lornada, February 19, 1997.

38. Roy Godson, “Threats to U.S.-Mexican Border Security.” Testimony before the
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, U.S. House of
Representatives, April 23, 1997, 5.

234 Notes to pages 39-84

39. Rcforma, July 8, 11, 15, 1997; El Financiero, July 6, 1997; Miami Herald, September 9,
1997-

40. In the end of 1995, a little more than a month after U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Perry’s visit to Mexico, and his announcement (which he later denied) that the armies of
both countries would work together, a plan to replace the police forces with the military was
instituted in Chihuaha. More than 100 military troops were incorporated into the Federal
Judicial Police (PJF) based in Chihuahua. On December 13, 1996, the head of PGR, Jorge
Madrazo, named Generals Guillermo Alvarz Nara and Tito Valencia Ortiz as directors of
the PJF and of the Planning Center to Combat Drugs (CENDRO), respectively. Days before,
General Jesus Gutiérrez had been named to direct the National Institute to Combat Drugs
(INCD). The justiﬁcation was that the honor and discipline of the military would impede
the dangerous relations developing between federal agents and trafﬁckers. Francisco
Molina Ruiz, head of the INCD from March to December of 1996, summed up the situation
in an interview: “The Army, in an assault, captured the PGR, the INCD, the CENDRO, 23 of
the 35 national airports and all of regional oﬂices of the PGR on the Northern border.” Pro-
ceso, January 8, 1996; June 12, 1997; August 3, 1997; La fornada, December 14, 1996.

Chapter 4: Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance in Mexico

1. Klaus Von Beyme, La clase politica en el Estado de Partidos (Madrid: Alianza Universi-
dad, 1995), 63H.

2. See, e.g., Khaygam Z. Paltiel, “Financiacién de partidos politico,” in Enciclopedia
(Blakwell) de las instituciones politicas (1991); Michael J. Malbin, Parties, Interest Groups and
Campaign Finance Laws (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1980). In these two texts, ranging from a general article to a detailed debate in
the North American case, the possibility of inﬁltration of organized crime in campaign ﬁ-
nancing is not contemplated.

3. The ﬁrst experience with public ﬁnancing of political parties was the Puerto Rican of
1957 and had as its main objective to preclude the possibility of disloyal competition from
candidates supported by powerful interest groups from the sugar industry. See Manuel
Barquin, “El ﬁnanciamiento de los partidos politicos en México en la reforma de 1993,” in
La voz de los votos: Un ana’lisis critico de las elecciones de 1994, eds. German Perez, Arturo Al-
varado, and Arturo Sanchez (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrua-FLACSO, 1995).

4. Peter Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation State,” in Transna-
tional Organized Crime Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 21—48. Quote is from pp. 23-24.

5. Even in countries where the traditional link between organized crime and the politi-
cal system exists, the political-criminal nexus tends to remain invisible. See Letizia Paoli,
“The Political-Criminal Nexus in Italy or Maﬁa and Politics in Italy” (mimeograph), 1997.

6. The ﬁrst statistic is from Information technologies for the control of money laundering
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, 1995).
The second (US$500 billion) is suggested by William McLucas, “Global Financial Systems

Notes to pages 84-86 235

under Assault: Countering the 500 Billion Conspiracy,” in Global Organized Crime (Wash-
ington, D.C.: CSIS, 1994), 15.

7. Robert S. Leiken, “Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic,” in Foreign Policy,
No. 105 (December 1996-1997), 55-73.

8. Jean Marie Pontaut, “L’argent du crime,” in L’Express, October 7, 1997, 42-45.

9. Eduardo Valle, El segundo disparo: La narcodemocracia mexicana (Mexico City:
Oceéno, 1995).

10. Silvano Paternostro, “Mexico as a narcodemocracy,” World Policy journal, Vol. 12,
No. 1 (Spring 1995), 41-47. The article was reprinted in Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 1,
No. 1 (Fall 1995), 33.

11. Executive Ofﬁce of the President, Oflice of National Drug Control Policy, “United
States and Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation: Report to Congress,” Washington, D.C., Sep-
tember 1997. Also see Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues, Atlas Mondial des Drogues
(Paris: PUF, 1996), 84-86.

12. In the strategies and action plans proposed by Ernesto Zedillo to guarantee Mexico's
national security: “To coordinate the departments and agencies under federal Public Ad-
ministration and those of the states of the Federation in their relations with other nations.
In particular, to ensure the unity of criteria in the ﬁght against modern threats to national
security: drug trafficking, money laundering, arms-trafﬁcking and terrorism.” Poder Ejacu-
tivo Federal, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000,” Mexico City, 1995, 10.

13. In his third Informe de Gobierno, Ernesto Zedillo explained the situation in the fol-
lowing manner: “The Government of Mexico attributes special importance to international
cooperation in the ﬁght against narco-traﬁicking since it is a phenomenon with global
reach . . . In the multilateral environment, Mexico subscribed to the Twentieth Century
Anti-narcotics Strategy in the framework of the OAS-CICAD. Likewise, Mexico promoted
the calling of an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in
1998, to examine and promote a global focus against narco-traﬂicking, which represents a
grave danger for humanity at the end of the twentieth century.” Poder Ejecutivo Federal,
“Tercer Informe de Gobierno,” Mexico City, 1997, 31.

14. Reforma, February 16, 1998, 1. In political terms, other governors of the state of
Jalisco have also been implicated in situations somehow related to narco-trafficking. Such
is the case of Guillermo Cosio Vidaurri. See the statements of the PAN Representative, Fer-
nando Pérez Noriega, who, incidentally, headed the Justice Commission in the Chamber of
Deputies (Comisién de Justicia de la Cémara de Diputados) in the case of the ex-governor.
El Financiero, January 11, 1996, 38.

15. For an overview of the period, see Jorge Chabat, “Seguridad nacional y narcotréﬁco:
Vinculos reales e imaginarios,” in Politica y Gobierno, 1:1 (Mexico City: CIDE, 1994).

16. Roy Godson and W. Olson, International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US. Se-
curity (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1993), 29.

17. Jorge Tello Peon, “El control del narcotréﬁco: operaciones estratégicas e intereses na-
cionales de México y Estados Unidos en el periodo posterior a la guerra fria,” in Sergio

Introduction 11

cal reform begins its shift to longer-term issues in the consolidation of democracy.
Often summed up in terms of “reform of the state,” emphasis in Stage II turns to
strengthening legislative, judicial, and administrative capacities, thus allowing
these agencies to assume new roles, for example, in regulation. Administrative
decentralization is often promoted and a variety of measures to cultivate a demo-
cratic political culture are undertaken. Advances in consolidation depend ulti-
mately on strengthening the rule of law and on the transparency and predictabil-
ity of administrative and judicial processes. It is important to note that Stage I
reforms can show quick results, whereas the reforms in Stage II can take years,
decades, even generations to accomplish, assuming there is no regression to eco-
nomic populism and political authoritarianism?“

The Mexican government introduced Stage I-type macroeconomic changes be-
ginning in the mid-1980s. On the external side, Mexico joined the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 and began a series of reforms to liberalize trade
and investment, culminating in January 1994 in the North American Free Trade
Agreement with the United States and Canada. On the internal side, reforms em-
phasized anti-inﬂationary monetary and ﬁscal policies, the privatization of the
nationalized banks and numerous public corporations, and the deregulation of a
variety of business transactions.“

Political reforms in Mexico came about more slowly, although in the realm of
electoral politics important advances had been achieved by the early 1990s. The
Stage I-type break from authoritarianism came incrementally, in a series of elec-
toral negotiations at the state and local levels. The presidential elections of 1994
were viewed by many as a clear breakthrough; they were substantially cleaner—
although not necessarily fairer—than any preceding national election. The 1997
congressional elections conﬁrmed the trend toward electoral credibility and
opened the way to a new agenda of Stage II-type reforms.”

Mexico's transition to Stage II-type reforms was seriously disrupted, however,
by the peso crisis of 1994-1995, which brought on the country’s deepest recession
since the Great Depression of the 19305. President Ernesto Zedillo’s campaign
agenda of proceeding from macro- to microeconomic reforms was quickly shelved
in order to refocus on macroeconomic stabilization. His Stage II political agenda
of decentralization, judicial reform, and administrative modernization was re-

tained in principle but its implementation was substantially weakened. Some

236 Notes to pages 87-90

Aguayo and John Bailey, eds., Las seguridades de México y Estados Unidos en un momenta dc
transicién (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1997), 169.

18. “Entrevista de Francisco Garfias, con Jorge Carpizo,” Excelsior, March 21, 1997, 1.

19. See the investigation by José Alberto Villasana, “Caso Posadas: Las injerencias del
FBI,” Reforma, February 7, 1998, 6.

20. In the cited report on the bilateral battle against drugs, the North American Anti-
Narcotics Ofﬁce presented the case of Raul Salinas in the following manner: “Hacienda has
announced that it has opened 27 money laundering cases since May 1997, and the Govern-
ment of Mexico presented one complaint under the 1996 money laundering law against
Ra1’1l Salinas. Unfortunately the Salinas case was dismissed, raising further concerns re-
garding the status of prosecutions in Mexico. In the Salinas case a federal judge ruled that
the money laundering charges could not be brought against Salinas without his ﬁrst being
convicted for the underlying predicate offense, in this case illicit enrichment.” Executive
Office of the President, Ofﬁce of National Drug Control Policy, “United States and Mexico
Counterdrug Cooperation. Report to Congress.” Washington, D.C., September 1997, 34.

21. Representing the Mexican government, Jorge Madrazo, Attorney General of the Re-
public (Procurador General de la Repablica), announced, in ofﬁcial communique number,
PGR 335/95, dated May 29, 1997, to the Ministry of Justice and Grace (Ministerio de Justi-
cia y Gracia) of Costa Rica that Carlos Hank Gonzalez was not the subject of any investiga-
tion in Mexico. The letter was the answer that the Mexican Attorney General gave to the re-
quest from Fairid Beiurute Brenes, the Attorney General of Costa Rica, which stated: “El
Gobierno de la Repablica de Costa Rica, a través de su Ministro de Justicia y Gracia, Licdo.
Juan Diego Castro Fernandez, ha solicitado a esta representacion estatal interponer sus oﬁ-
cios ante su excelentisima autoridad, con el propésito de que se proporcione a la Procu-
raduria General de nuestro pais [Costa Rica] toda la informacién que tramita su despacho
relativa al ciudadano mexicano Carlos Hank Gonzalez.” See the report by Celia Garcia Flo-
res that reproduces the fascimiles of the letters in El Financiero, June 14, 1997, 20-21.

22. El Economista, June 25, 1997.

23. Keep in mind, as a complementary detail, that Costa Rica is known as one of the
money laundering paradises. André Chauvett, La experiencia francesa y la movilizacién inter-
nacional en la lucha contra el lavado dc dinero (Mexico City: Servicio de cooperacién técnica
internacional de la Policia francesa en México, 1996), 248.

24. El Financiero, June 14, 1997, 1, 20. In the Costa Rican press, various accounts ap-
peared which linked Hank with illegal activities. See the Costa Rican daily La Naci0’n, June
28, 1997, 8a.

25. Rcforma, June 17, 1997. _

26. Jorge Chabat, “Seguridad nacional y narcotraﬁco.”

27. The absence of fairness in the electoral process was the primary focus in the debate
over the elections in 1994. According to top-level internal advisors at IFE, it was without a
doubt “that the presidential election of August 21, 1994 was profoundly inequitable.” La

jornada, April 8, 1995.

Notes to pages 90-94 237

28. Oscar Hinojosa, “Partidos politicos, ﬁnanciamiento publico, privado y secreto,” in
Jorge Alcocer and Rodrigo Morales, coordinators, La organizacion de las elecciones (Mexico
City: CIIH-Miguel Angel Porrua, 1994), 80.

29. The change in power is producing detailed information about the support that the
PRI secretly received from the government. A recent example is that in the Federal District,
the PRI occupied 23 buildings that were property of the district government. In March
1997, when the polls favored Cuauhtémoc Cardenas of the PRD, the district government es-
tablished a legal institution called temporary loan, revokable after 10 years. However, in re-
ality, the PRI has occupied the buildings for many years. Reforma, February 9, 1998, B-1.

3o. Jaime Rivera, “Michoacén 92: La historia sin ﬁn,” in Jorge Alonso and Jorge Tamayo,
Elecciones con alternativas (Mexico: CIIH-La Jornada, 1994), 153.

31. Instituto Federal Electoral, Memoria del proceso electoral federal (Mexico City: IFE,
1994). 233-48.

32. Martin Moreno, “Los dineros de PRI,” Epoca, August 24, 1995, 10.

33. Ibid.

34. Andrés Oppenheimer, México en la frontera del caos (Mexico City: Javier Vergara,
1996). See the chapter titled “El banquete,” 95-121. See also Rafael de Rodriguez Castaﬁeda,
“Borrego, 29 magnates y el Presidente de la Repﬁblica . . .” in Proceso, No. 853 (March 8,
1993), 6-9.

35. Octavio Paz, “Reestablecer la credibilidad,” in Proceso, No. 854 (March 15, 1993), 7.

36. Author’s interview with Porﬁrio Muﬁoz Ledo. Mexico, D.F., May 15, 1997.

37. Andrés Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and
Mexico’s Road to Prosperity (Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Co., 1996), 87-88.

38. Pedro Pérez, “Del neoliberalismo al neoclientelismo: Cambio econémico y transfor-
macién politica en México in Joan Alcaizar and Nuria Tabanera,” Historia y presente en
América Latina (Valencia: Bancaixa, Fundacién, 1996), 86.

39. A study of this electoral process can be found in Leonardo Curzio, “Las elecciones de
1995 en Tabasco 0 al comedia de las equivocaciones,” in El Cotidiano, UAM, No. 60, 1995.

40. Lopez Obrador refuses to reveal how he received the controversial boxes. In his lat-
est book, he leaves the subject in the dark, suggesting that the boxes arrived anonymously.
Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, Entre la historia y la esperanza. Corrupcion y lucha
democrcitica en Tabasco (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1995).

41. The complaint was also filed against former governor Manuel Gurria Ordoﬁez and
leaders of the PRI State Directorate.

42. Those cited were: Hugo Alejandro Zuﬁiga Rojas (Director of Administration at
CDE), Oscar Saenz Jurado (Secretary of Finance), Floricel Medina Pérez Nieto (Coordina-
tor of the Vote Promotion Program), Angel Augusto Buendia Tirado (Coordinator of
Roberto Madrazo’s campaign), Feliciano Calzada Padrén (Secretary General of CDE of
PR1), Carlos Alejandro Martinez Santiago (Permanent Program in Defense of the Vote),
Jesus Alamilla Padrén (Administrative Coordinator of the program), and Pedro Jiménez
Leon (Secretary of Organization and President of the CE of PRI Tabasco).

238 Notes to pages 94-101

43. In other documents he appears with the name William. El caso Tabasco (Mexico
City: Barra Nacional de Abogados, 1997), 13.

44. Procuraduria General de la Republica, “Boletin de Prensa nﬁmero 536/96,” Mexico,
D.F., June 6, 1996.

45. See the report by Puig about Carlos Cabal in Proceso, No. 932, September 12, 1994,
6-14.

46. Roberto Madrazo, “Precisiones,” El Financiero, June 18, 1996, 46.

47. Proceso, No. 971 (June 12, 1995), 21.

48. Statements of Javier Nuﬁez Lopez, legal advisor of CODEHUTAB. La jomada, June
14, 1995, 11.

49. La jornada, June 10, 1995, 3.

50. The reason he was removed from his post was “that an investigative commission of
the management agency (organismo patronal) proved that Madrazo Cadena had beneﬁted
from PR1 funds during the campaign of his relative.” Proceso, No. 982 (August 28, 1995), 30.

51. La jornada, August 26, 1995, 6.

52. German Dehesa, “Gaceta del angel,” Rcforma, June 13, 1995.

53. Crénica, July 16, 1996, 9.

54. Cro’m'ca, September 22, 1997,12.

55. Two of the most important political concessions made to advance the negotiations
on political reform were the resignation of the governor of Chiapas, Eduardo Villaseﬁor,
and the reversal, through political negotiation, of the triumph of the Priista mayor in Hue-
jotzingo, Puebla.

56. See Article 49 of the Cédigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos electorales (Mex-
ico City: IFE, 1996).

57. See Article 41, Constitucién Politica de las Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

58. The development of the constitutional debate is outlined in José Barragan, “Democ-
racia: ﬁnanciamiento a partidos,” in Crénica Legislativa, Organo de Informacién de la LVI
Legislatura, Camara de diputados, No. 14, April—May 1997, 11-20.

59. See Article 49, Part V., Cédigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos electorales
(Mexico City: IFE, 1996).

60. IFE, Proceso electoral federal 1997. Informacién basica.

61. Statement of November 16, 1996, at the closing of the National Industrialists Con-
vention (Convencién Nacional de Industriales). E1 Gobierno de México, Crénica Mensual,
No. 24, November 1996, 48.

62. Author’s interview with Porﬁrio Muﬁoz Ledo, May 15, 1997.

63. Praceso, No. 965 (May 1, 1995).

64. Proceso, No. 966 (May 8, 1995).

65. Peter A. Lupsha, “Transnational Narco-corruption and Narco-investment: A focus
on Mexico,” at the website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/
readings/lupsha.html, Spring 1995.

66. National Defense University, Strategic Assessment1997, Washington, D.C., 201.

Notes to pages 104-107 239

Chapter 5: Scope and Limits of an Act of Good Faith: The PAN’s Experience at the
Head of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic

1. I refer to the murders of Cardinal Posadas, Luis Donaldo Colosio, and José Francisco
Ruiz Massieu. During President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s six-year term, the chronological
order of attorneys general was: Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, Ignacio Morales Lechuga, Dr.
Jorge Carpizo, Dr. Diego Valadez, Humberto Benitez Treviﬁo.

2. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, four extradition requests were brought
against Mario Ruiz Massieu, none of which were deemed admissible on the part of the
United States. Mario Ruiz Massieu committed suicide in early 2ooo. The U.S. Department
of Justice sought to investigate him for the crime of money laundering. Additional proceed-
ings were instituted in Mexico for drug trafﬁcking as a result of declarations made by the
ex-director of the Federal Judicial Police, Adrian Carrera.

3. Samuel Gonzalez, Ernesto Lopez Portillo, and Arturo Yéﬁez, Seguridad Pziblica en
México: problemas, perspectivas y propuestas (Mexico City: UNAM, Serie Justicia, 1994), 17.

4. That is, a police officer would obey his superior, regardless of the legality of an order,
with the understanding that he would not be held accountable. Antonio F. Lozano, Com-
promisos con la justicia, Informe de Gestién dc Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia, Procurador
General de la Repziblica (Mexico City: Epessa, S.A. de C.V., 1998), 3.

5. Carpizo encountered an institution in an advanced state of internal decomposition
for which the passing of laws and regulations was not enough. Most of the changes he
made focused on two areas: electoral offenses, and the creation of new areas within the
structure of the PGR. As discussed below, the main result was to concentrate the operating
power of the Federal Judicial Police under a single command but without real internal su-
pervisory balances or efﬁcient coordination of resources.

6. Speech by Ernesto Zedillo as president-elect of the Institutional Revolutionary Party
in Guadalajara, Jal., July 14, 1994.

7. Antonio F. Lozano, Compromisos can lajusticia, 70.

8. Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, interview, Proceso, July 9, 1995.

9. Antonio F. Lozano, Compromisos con lajusticia, 70.

10. A clear example was the continual references to Lozano as “the PAN Attorney Gen-
eral,” which politicized law enforcement.

11. President Zedillo’s state of the union address, September 1, 1995.

12. Proceso, July 16, 1995.

13. President Salinas’s brother was accused on February 28, 1995 of plotting the assassi-
nation of his ex-brother-in-law, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. As the investigation pro-
gressed he was also charged with illicit enrichment, money laundering, and even the
murder of Muﬁoz Rocha, a key actor in the death of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. As of late
1998 he was being held in Almoloya (a high-security prison) only for murder. The other
charges were gradually rejected by the judge owing to lack of evidence on the part of the
PGR.

240 Notes to pages 107-114

14. “December error” refers to a mishandled devaluation of the peso that resulted in a
major ﬁnancial crisis. Mexico has no extradition treaty with the Irish government, so if
Salinas were found guilty, any future attempt to extradite him would be very difficult. Fur-
thermore, it has always been denied that there is any investigation under way against him.

15. Constitucién Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Coleccién juridica (Mexico City:
Esﬁnge, 1997).

16. Published in the Gaceta Oﬁcial de la Federacién on August 30, 1934. Amended most
recently, according to the 52nd edition of Coleccién Porrua, by decrees published on Janu-
ary 10 and July 22, 1994, May 13 and November 7, 1996.

17. Mexico: Federal Code of Penal Proceedings (CFPP), Coleccién Porriia (1997), Prelimi-
nary Title.

18. CFPP, 1997, Article 2, Preliminary Title.

19. CFPP, 1997, 17.

20. Gonzalez et al., Seguridad Ptiblica, 100.

21. Mexico: “Organic Law of the PGR,” Article 17, Gaceta Oﬁcial, 1993.

22. “Regulations for the Career of Agent of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office,” Gae-
eta Oﬁcial, May 18, 1993; Gonzalez et al., Seguridad Pziblica, 100.

23. Gaceta Oﬁcial, April 11, 1996. The INACIPE had been dissolved three years previ-
ously owing to differences between academics and politicians of the Institute of Juridical
Research regarding its management. As of 1993, the Training Institute took over the re-
sponsibility of promoting generations of agents and public prosecutors, thus overloading
its operation and efficiency.

24. As of late 1998, the average monthly wage for an MP agent was around US$850, and
for Federal Judicial Police officers, around US$750.

25. Gaceta Oﬁcial, May 10, 1996.

26. Gaceta Oﬁcial, November 7, 1996.

27. Lozano, Compromisas con lajustica, 39-50, chapters 2 and 5.

28. “Organic Law of the Oﬂice of the Attorney General of the Republic,” published in
the Gaceta Oﬁcial, May 10, 1996, and “Regulations of the Organic Law of the Oﬂice of the
Attorney General of the Republic,” August 27, 1996.

29. According to a published survey, 60% of those surveyed had more conﬁdence in the
military and 70% considered the judicial police to be more corrupt. Reforma (Mexico City),
May 3, 1997. These results are not very different from the surveys carried out during
L0zano’s term of office.

30. For a theoretical discussion of the concept of “Rule of Law,” see Guillermo O’Don-
nell, Polyarchies and the (Un) Rule of Law in Latin America: The Rule of Law and the Underpriv-
ileged in Latin America. Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 254,
1998.

31. Gonzalez et al., Seguridad Pziblica, chapter 4.

32. See the Gaceta Oﬁcial for the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of
the Republic and its regulations, and the evolution of its amendments from 1985 to 1994.

Notes to pages 114-1 16 241

33. Toward the end of the Salinas administration, the principal deputy attorney general
was Mario Ruiz Massieu, who subsequently ﬂed to the United States. The PGR initiated a
ﬁfth charge against him after an ex-subordinate of his, Commander Adrian Carrera, former
head of the Federal Judicial Police, joined a plea-bargain program under the Federal Law
Against Organized Crime and declared, as reported in the press, that he turned over drug
trafficking money to his boss, the general deputy attorney general. Adrian Carrera faced
charges of money laundering, whereas an investigation was opened against Mario Ruiz
Massieu concerning drug trafficking.

34. Deputy attorney general’s oﬂice “A” is in charge of the state delegations of Aguas-
calientes, Campeche, Durango, the Federal District, Guerrero, Morelos, Nuevo Leon,
Sonora, State of Mexico, and Veracruz. “B” is in charge of the state delegations of Baja Cali-
fornia Sur, Chihuahua, Colima, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Tamauli-
pas, Yucatén, and Zacatecas. “C” directs the state delegations of Baja California, Chiapas,
Coahuila, Michoacan, Nayarit, Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa,
and Tlaxcala.

35. PGR, “Las 29 preguntas.”

36. Gaceta Oﬁcial, May 1o, 1996, article 27, section I.

37. The department carried out random tests on 1,422 public servants, with the follow-
ing results: 92 employees tested positive, among them some 20 agents of the Public Prose-
cutor’s Office. One year earlier 63 positive cases had been detected, 34 of which were PJF of-
ﬁcers. Excelsior, August 5, 1996.

38. The Deputy Attorney General’s Office for Juridical Affairs has a General Directorate
of International Legal Affairs which, in addition to coordinating with the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, is in charge of implementing international efforts and commitments to which
Mexico adheres in the ﬁght against organized crime and drug trafficking. To that end, in
accordance with Article 50 of the Regulations of the Organic Law of the PGR, published in
the Gaceta Oﬁcial on August 27, 1996, there are currently attachés’ offices at border points
between Mexico and the United States. There is also a representation in Madrid, Spain, to
deal with affairs in that region.

39. For example, disputes among states, or between states and the federal government.
Constitucién Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Articles 102 and 105.

40. As of April 30, 1997, Attorney General Jorge Madrazo dissolved the INCD and cre-
ated the Special Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce for Attention‘ to Health Crimes (FEADS). Gaceta
Oﬁcial, April 30, 1997. However, we refer to this Institute because under the direction of
Commissioner Francisco Molina, the restructuring and transformation implemented by
Madrazo had been envisaged prior to the removal of Attorney General Antonio Lozano.

41. The INCD was created following the assassination of Cardinal Posadas. Prior to this
it was the Deputy Attorney General’s Office against Drug Trafﬁcking and was headed by
Javier Coello Trejo, known as the “Iron Prosecutor.”

42. Some of the commissioners of the INCD since its establishment have been: Jorge
Carrillo Olea (June 1993—May 1994), Rene Paz Horta (May 1994—March 1996), Francisco

242 Notes to pages 117-120

Molina Ruiz (March 1996—December 1996), General Jesus Gutiérrez Rebollo (December
1996—February 1997). In March 1997 Mariano Herran Salvatti took office and in May that
year it changed from the Institute to the Special Public Prosecutor's Office.

43. Gaceta @‘icial, November 7, 1996.

44. There are eleven crimes that the OCU should investigate and prosecute: terrorism,
arms trafficking, drug traﬂicking, money laundering, aliens, body parts trafficking, kidnap-
ping, stolen cars, chemicals precursors, trafficking of minors, and assault. See Article 2 of
the Federal Law against Organized Crime.

45. According to an anonymous oﬂicial, more veriﬁcation mechanisms are needed. Re-
cently a “super” agent had to be returned to Mexico after he was discovered stealing a pair
of tennis shoes. This agent had passed all the exams in Mexico and the United States.

46. The application of lie-detector tests and psychological, ﬁnancial, and intelligence
exams on Prosecutor Mariano Herrén and the attorney general were publicized. However,
according to U.S. reports, some staff members have not taken the exams, or have failed
them, and continue to collaborate in FEADS. On this last point see GAO Drug Control: U.S.-
Mexican Counternarcotics E_/forts Face Diﬁicult Challenges, June 1998 (GAO/NSIAD-98-154),
16.

47. Excélsior (Mexico City), December 10, 1997. President Zedillo announces constitu-
tional amendments to confront insecurity.

48. Gaceta Oﬁcial, March 26, 1993.

49. According to the Organic Law of the PGR, Article 23 states that to join and serve as
an agent of the Federal Judicial Police, the following is required: full Mexican citizenship;
good conduct without legal conviction or formal accusation; no abuse of psychotropic sub-
stances, narcotics, or other charges, and no alcohol abuse; and no prior suspensions or dis-
missals from public service.

50. Article 2 of the Regulations states that “the Federal Judicial Police is a direct auxil-
iary organ of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office which acts under the latter’s authority
and direct command in the prosecution of federal crimes.”

51. Axiological examinations attempt to probe values and beliefs. “Regulations for the
Career of Federal Judicial Police Ofﬁcer,” Chapter 1, Article 2, Gaceta Oﬁcial, March 26,
1993-

52. The creation of the National Public Safety Council in December 1995 sought to ex-
pedite this task, but its results are as yet unknown.

53. Gaceta Oﬁcial, August 27, 1996. During the administrations prior to the one in ques-
tion, the training course lasted four months. Lozano extended it to nine months for the
ﬁrst generation, then to one year four months, and ﬁnally to one year six months.

54. Constitucién Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Article 16 of the Constitu-
tion, Paragraph 5.

55. Members of the army interviewed about the appointment of military ofﬁcers in the
PGR said: “Members of the Army will always respond to their military superior, and to no
one else.” La fomada (Mexico City), December 8, 1996.

Notes to pages 120-123 243

56. See, for example, Servicio Universal de Noticias (SUN), “The Military in Sonora, 10%
of military-police forces contaminated by drug trafficking,” January 27, 1998; SUN, “Sol-
diers arraigned, SEDENA,” January 8, 1998; Carlos Fazio, “Mexico, the case of the narco-
general,” April 29, 1998, http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/drogas, 1-17; Gustavo Castillo,
“Twelve members of the army involved with the Juarez Cartel,” La jomada (Mexico City),
March 13, 1998.

57. The word polla describes the accumulation by various police agents and public pros-
ecutors of a particular sum of money to secure an appointment as a police commander or
delegate. Most often this occurs for the appointment of commanders of the Federal Judicial
Police.

58. SUN, June 16, 1996.

59. El Universal (Mexico City), August 21, 1996. Subdelegates are in charge of supervis-
ing and controlling judicial police agents in each PGR state ﬁeld office. They tend to be the
ﬁrst to be the most exposed for collusion with drug traffickers because it is they who coor-
dinate raids and inspections in each state.

60. This was the case in Baja California, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, and Sonora. For example,
in the Tamaulipas delegation, a total of 25 PJF agents tested positive in the anti-doping tests
carried out by the army, and they were therefore arrested. In the state of Sinaloa the total
number of agents was 27, including some INCD agents. Nonetheless, the reaction of the
population was one of fear that the purge would produce a rise in violence and more delin-
quents on the streets.

61. From October 1995 to August 1996. The GAFE were later replaced because they were
corrupt. “The border is militarized,” Reforma (Mexico City), May 15, 1996.

62. Excelsior (Mexico City), September 10, 1996.

63. F. Antonio Lozano, “La Seguridad Pﬁblica en América Latina," Enciclopedia
Britcinica, 1996.

64. Gaceta Qicial, November 7, 1996.

65. Proceso, October 30, 1995.

66. Patricia Zugayde, “El enemigo, adentro,” El Universal (Mexico City), September 11,
1997-

67. See the Mexico City press from January to April 1998, in which a complete account
appears of the events related to oﬂicials’ links to activities such as extortion, kidnapping,
and drug traﬂicking in the state of Morelos. Another interesting example is the collusion
between different actors in the so-called maxiproceedings resulting from investigations of
the Juarez Cartel.

68. According to specialist Ernesto Lopez Portillo, in a recent radio program broadcast
by Radio UNAM, 1998.

69. Organized crime occurs when three or more people carry out, in an ongoing man-
ner or repeatedly, the following offenses: terrorism, health crimes, counterfeiting, money
laundering, arms trafﬁcking, trafficking in undocumented migrants, organs, and minors,
kidnapping, and vehicle hold-up or robbery.

244 Notes to pages 124-128

70. The number of army personnel recently taking courses abroad is larger than that of
the police. It seems that the executive has decided that this is the best solution for the mo-
ment. From 1983 to 1997, more than 3,000 army personnel were trained. Rcforma (Mexico
City), November 7, 1997.

71. Matilde Pérez, “El Ejercito no debe ser policia,” La jornada (Mexico City), April 14,
1996.

72. See a recent opinion poll in which people perceived the army as being less corrupt
(4%) and had 60% more trust in it, as opposed to the mistrust expressed for the Federal Ju-
dicial Police. Rcforma (Mexico City), May 3, 1997.

73. Rachel Garst, “The Guatemalan National Civilian Police: A Problematic Beginning,”
WOLA Brieﬁng Series, Washington, D.C., 1997; Rachel Neil, “Police Reforming in Haiti:
The Challenge of Demilitarizing Public Order and Establishing the Rule of Law,” WOLA,
November 1996; and “The Colombian National Police, Human Rights, and US Drug Pol-
icy,” WOLA, Washington, D.C., May 1993.

74. This means insistence upon transparency governing the activities carried out not
only by attorney general’s ofﬁces, the judiciary, and the armed forces, but also by the Min—
istry of the Interior and state governments. In short, accountability requires bringing the
actions undertaken by the State in the area of security and intelligence under public
scrutiny.

Chapter 6: Containing Armed Groups, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime in
Mexico: The Role of the Military

1. The term “military" includes the army, navy, and air force. Mexico has two military
ministries: the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA), and the Ministry of the Navy—the Navy of
Mexico. The army and air force are under SEDENA. In Mexico there are no general head-
quarters, joint chiefs, or civilian Ministry of Defense. In 1938, the National Revolutionary
Party (PNR) became the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), which included a mili-
tary-corporate branch; in 1946 the PRM became the PRI in order to nominate a civilian for
president. The military branch of the PRM disappeared in 1940.

2. Subparagraphs IV, V, VI, and VII of Article 89 of the Constitution of the United Mexi-
can States sets out the military powers of the president, which include the appointment of
all military oﬂicers and the declaration of war. See Renato de J. Bermﬁdez, Compendio de
derecho militar mexicano (Mexico City: Ediciones Porrua, 1996), 74.

3. President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Informe de Gobierno 1969, quoted in Luis Garfias
Magaﬁa, “El ejército mexicano actual,” in El ejército mexicano. Historia desde sus origenes
hasta nuestros dias (Mexico: Secretariat of Defense, 1979), 526.

4. The legal regulations in force are the Organic Law of the Mexican Army and Air Force
(December 26, 1986, version) and the Organic Law of the Mexican Navy (December 24,
1993, version).

Notes to pages 128-131 245

5. On the subject of the National Guard, see Bermudez, Compendio de derecho militar
mexicano, 76.

6. Plan DN-III, in force since 1966, has three phases: prevention, rescue, and recovery.
DN-III is in force daily between July and November (hurricane season). Politically, one of
the most controversial times for implementing DN-III was during and after the earth-
quakes of September 19 and 20, 1985. The president did not declare martial law on that oc-
casion, and rescue efforts were led by civilians (the mayor of Mexico City). Following the
1985 earthquakes, the National System for Civilian Protection was established under the
Ministry of the Interior, to which the army, air force, and navy are subordinated. See Gen.
Alvaro Vallarta Ceceﬁa, “Plan DN—III-III-E,” Reforma (Mexico City), October 27, 1997.

7. Alden Cunningham, “Mexico’s National Security in the 198os—199os,” in The Modern
Mexican Military: A Reassessment, ed. David Ronfeldt (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S. Mexi-
can Studies, 1984), 175.

8. Stephen J. Wager, “The Mexican Army, 1940-1982: The Country Comes First” (Ph.D.
diss., Stanford University, 1992), 216.

9. Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 84-85.

10. See José Luis Piﬁeyro, Ejército y sociedad en Mexico: pasado y presente (Mexico City:
Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana, 1985), 90-108.

11. Richard B. Craig, “La Campaﬁa Permanente: Mexico’s Antidrug Campaign,” fournal
oflnteramerican Studies and World Aﬂairs 20, no. 2 (May 1978), pp. 345-63.

12. David Ronfeldt, “The Mexican Army and Political Order since 1940,” in The Modern
Mexican Military: A Reassessment, 69-70.

13. The politicization of the army was maintained owing to the link between the objec-
tives of the Mexican revolution, the state, and the PRI and therefore their identiﬁcation
with those of the army. One of the most inﬂuential generals identiﬁed the political and his-
torical link of the army by equating “the interests of Mexico” with those of the “Mexican

3’ (G

revolution. If we want our action to have higher goals, if we want to fulﬁll our mission as
protectors of Mexico, we must be true to the purposes that led to the establishment of our
army. The Mexican revolution is an inexhaustible source of ideals. If we strongly adhere to
them and ensure that its principles are carried out, . . . if we work in this way, our actions
will be perfectly moral.” Alfonso Corona del Rosal, Moral military civismo (Mexico City:
Secretariat of Defense, 1991), 216-17.

14. In Mexican political opposition literature there is much evidence that the army's
work supported the PR1 in elections, primarily in rural areas, and also of the family and
partnership ties of high-ranking ofﬁcers with high-level leaders in the PRI. This is logical if
one assumes that the Mexican political system is the product of the revolutionary soldiers
and developed a corporatist-clientelist system.

15. “In martial institutions, there is an inalterable principle stating that orders given
must be followed immediately without question; given this, subordinates must do only

12 John Bailey and Roy Godson

progress was recorded in decentralization (e.g., in education, health, and revenue
sharing) but relatively little was accomplished with respect to judicial reform or
administrative modernization.

Transitions of such profound breadth and depth, often originating in eco-
nomic or political crises, create extraordinary societal turbulence and magnify the
signiﬁcance of criminality for the political system. The depth and suddenness of
Mexico's economic and political reforms and the peso crisis produced profound
shocks that exacerbated longstanding structural tensions such as unemployment
and extreme maldistribution of wealth. Sergio Zermeﬁo, a noted Mexican sociolo-
gist, has emphasized the pulverizing and pauperizing impacts of globalization, ac-
celerated by neoliberal reforms, in creating the conditions for extensive social dis-
order. He notes that actors such as labor unions, producer associations, peasant
organizations, and political parties have been profoundly disoriented and weak-
ened by the effects of economic restructuring, which have reduced the actors’ ca-
pacity to represent interests and manage relations with the government.” Crimi-
nality and public insecurity increased dramatically in the wake of the peso crisis of
1994-1995-

To illustrate the gravity of the problems of crime and public insecurity, Mex-
ico’s ministry of interior noted that between 1991 and 1997, crime rates increased
at a faster annual pace than population growth, rising from 809,000 reported
crimes to 1,490,000. Of the nearly 1.5 million crimes reported in 1997, the min-
istry suggested that probably an equal number went unreported. Further, “Crime
has become increasingly violent and better organized. Criminal activities such as
arms trafficking, hold-ups, kidnappings, vehicle thefts, and drug-trafficking have
increased.” State and local governments, which have jurisdiction over nearly 95
percent of all crimes, lack the resources to enforce the law.“

However, noted criminologist Rafael Ruiz Harrell raised important caveats
about official assertions based on crime data provided by the government’s statis-
tics agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograﬁa e Informatica (IN-
EGI). First, Ruiz noted that the official crime data from 1994 and 1995 were useless
because they were incomplete and based on diverse categories. The 1997 ﬁgures
were still incomplete by March 1999, the time of his analysis. The most recent
complete year available to him was 1996, but these data contained gaps and incon-

246 Notes to pages 131-135

what they are ordered to do by a superior. With this standard of conduct, at no level in the
hierarchy is a person authorized to question whether or not an order is to be followed,
since subordination requires strict compliance with a command given.” Bermudez, Com-
pendio de derecho militar mexicano, 192.

16. See Military Code of Justice, Section 9, chap. 3, “Disobedience,” Codigo de Iusticia
Militar, vol. 1 (Mexico City: Secretariat of Defense, 1984), 109-11.

17. In the 1990s, a debate began on “due obedience” and the violation of the constitu-
tion and civil laws, for example, over human rights, as will be examined further on.

18. Bermfidez, Compendio de derecho militar mexicano, 86.

19. Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann L. Craig, The Mexican Political System in Transition (La
Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.—Mexican Studies, 1991), 94.

20. This chapter does not intend to examine the army’s actions to confront the EZLN in
Chiapas. See Raul Benitez Manaut, “México. El desafio de las guerrillas,” Nueva Sociedad,
no. 130 (March-April 1994), 24-32; Stephen J. Wager and Donald E. Schulz, The Awakening:
The Zapatista Revolt and Its Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Mexico
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1994).

21. Raul Benitez Manaut, “Guerrilla. Civilizarse o morir,” Rdorma-Enfoque (Mexico
City), January 5, 1997, 13-14.

22. “Constitution of the United Mexican States” (Mexico City: Federal Electoral Insti-
tute, 1996).

23. Ibid., 141.

24. Ernesto Zedillo, Primer Informe de Gohierno, Mexico City, September 1, 1995, Office
of the President, 98-100.

25. Navy Captain Benjamin Pineda Gomez, Ancilisis y prospectiva de los acuerdos bilat-
erales Mexico-Estados Unidos de América en el cimbito naval (Graduate thesis for the “Course
on Advanced Leadership and National Security,” Center for Superior Naval Studies, Secre-
tariat of the Navy, Mexico City, 1996).

26. Since the beginning of the 1980s, authors on both sides of the border have stated
that Mexico is nearing chaos. At that time, Mexico was compared to Iran. John Horton,
“Mexico, the Way of Iran?” International journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no.
2, pp. 21-30; Brian Latell, “Mexico at the Crossroads: The Many Crises of the Political Sys-
tem,” in Hoover Monograph Series, no. 6 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1986); Jorge G. Cas-
taﬁeda, México:elﬁ1turo en juego (Mexico City: Joaquin Mortiz-Planeta, 1987).

27. See Blanca Heredia, “Estructura politica y reforma econémicaz el caso de México,”
and José Antonio Crespo, “PR1: de la hegemonia revolucionaria a la dominacién
democrética,” in Politica y gohierno 1, no. 1 (January—June 1994), pp. 5-46; 47-77.

28. “Mexic0’s Dysfunctional Neoliberalism,” North-South Focus IV, no. 1 (Miami: Uni-
versity of Miami, 1995).

29. Lorenzo Meyer, Liberalismo autoritario. Las contradicciones del sistema politico mexi-
cano (Mexico City: Océano, 1995), 229, 231.

30. Carlos Fazio, El tercer vinculo. Dela teoria del was a la teoria de la militarizacion (Mex-

Notes to pages 135-142 247

ico City: Joaquin Mortiz, 1996); Donald E. Schulz, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The
United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army
War College, June 24, 1997).

31. Richard Craig maintains that in some states in Mexico, drug trafficking has very
deeply penetrated the political elite since the 1980s, such as in Sinaloa, Durango, Chi-
huahua, Guerrero, Veracruz, and Oaxaca. See Richard Craig, “Mexican Narcotics Traffic:
Binational Security Implications,” in The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National
Security, ed. Donald Mabry (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 31.

32. Stephen Morris, Corrupcién y politica en el Mexico contemporeineo (Mexico City: Siglo
XXI, 1992).

33. Fernando Escalante, “Sobre el signiﬁcado politico de la corrupcién,” Politica y gob-
ierno 1, no. 1.

34. Strategic Assessment: 1997 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 71.

35. Max G. Manwaring, ed., Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), xiv.

36. Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, Atlas mondial des drogues (Paris: PUF, 1996),
87-96.

37. Yuriy A. Voronin, “The Emerging Criminal State: Economic and Political Aspects of
Organized Crime in Russia,” in Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 2-3, (Summer/
Autumn 1996).

38. Paul Vanderwood, Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), Preface.

39. Federal Executive Branch, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000 (Mexico City: Sec-
retariat of the Treasury and Public Credit, 1995), 9-10.

40. Carlos Montemayor, Guerra en elparaiso (México: Diana, 1991).

41. These modern guerrillas, in pursuit of socialism, first emerged in Chihuahua in
1964. See Jaime Lépez, Diez aﬁos de guerrillas en Mexico (Mexico City: Posada, 1974), for an
extended discussion of the various guerilla forces.

42. CarlosTello, La Rehelion de Ias Caﬁadas (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1995), 60-85.

43. “Declaracién de la Selva Lacandona, 2 de enero de 1994,” in EZLN. Documentos y Co- _

municados, vol. 1 (Mexico City: ERA, 1995), 34.

44. “Accords on the indigenous rights and culture arrived at by the EZLN and Federal
Government delegations in the ﬁrst part of the plenary session of the Diélogos de San An-
drés Sacamch’en,” in Chiapas, vol. 2 (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Econémicas,
1996).

45. Luis Hernandez Navarro, “Entre la memoria y el olvido: guerrillas, movimiento indi-
gena y reformas legales en la hora del EZLN,” in Chiapas, vol. 4 (Mexico City: Instituto de
Investigaciones Econémicas, 1997).

46. Claudia Guerrero, “Una guerra paralela,” Reforma (Mexico City), December 8, 1997,
4-A.

47. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Mexico. The New Year Rebellion: Violations of Hu-

248 Notes to pages 142-145

man Rights and Humanitarian Law During the Armed Revolt in Chiapas, vol. 6, no. 3, Wash-
ington, March 1, 1994.

48. The most powerful “family” of caciques in Guerrero is that of Ruben Figueroa. In
this case, it is diﬂicult to distinguish the power structure through the “families” between
Guerrero and Sicily, Italy.

49. La lornada y Reforma (Mexico City), December 24, 1997.

50. Strategic Assessment: 1997, 74-75.

51. See Paul Henze, “Organized Crime and Drug Linkages”; Charles Frost, “Drug Traf-
ﬁcking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism: The International Cash Connection”; and Sam
Sakesian, “Defensive Responses,” in Hydra of Carnage. International Linkages of Terrorism.
The Witnesses Speak, ed. Uri Ra’anan et al. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

52. Bruce M. Bagley, Myths of Militarization: The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs
in the Americas (Miami: North-South Center, 1991).

53. Kate Doyle, “The Militarization of the Drug War in Mexico,” Current History 92, no.
571 (February 1993).

54. Gregory F. Treverton, “Narcotics in U.S.-Mexican Relations” in Mexico and the
United States: Managing the Relationship, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1988), 220.

55. Samuel del Villar, “The Illicit U.S.-Mexico Drug Market: Failure of Policy and an Al-
ternative,” in Mexico and the United States, ed. Riordan Roett.

56. Jorge Chabat, “Seguridad nacional y narcotraﬁco: vinculos reales e imaginarios,” in
Politica y gohierno 1, no. 1, (January-June 1994), pp. 97-123.

57. William 0. Walker III, “After Camarena,” in Drug Traﬂicking in the Americas, ed.
Bruce M. Bagley and William 0. Walker III (Miami: North-South Center, 1996).

58. Maria Celia Toro, “Drug Trafficking from a National Security Perspective,” in Mex-
ico: in Search of Security, ed. Sergio Aguayo and Bruce Bagley (Miami: North-South Center,
1993), 324.

59. Jorge Carrillo Olea, “El control de drogas: situacién y perspectiva,” Lajornada (Mex-
ico City), October 15, 1993, 23.

60. Ibid.

61. Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1990, A—16.

62. Federal Executive Branch, El control de drogas en Mexico. Programa Nacional
1989-1994. Evaluacien y seguimiento (Mexico City: General Attorney Oﬂice, February 1993),
11.

63. El control de drogas en Mexico. Programa Nacional1989—1994. Evaluacion y seguimiento,
155.

64. Mexico y Estados Unidos ante el problema de las drogas. Estudio diagnestico conjunto,
Mexico City (Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, May 1997), III.

65. Ibid., 56.

66. El control de drogas en Mexico. Programa Nacional1989—1994. Evaluacien y seguimiento,

Notes to pages 145-148 249

155; and Federal Executive Branch, Segundo Informe de Gohierno, Mexico City, September 1,
1996, 29.

67. Ibid., Presentation.

68. Ernesto Zedillo and William Clinton, “The Declaration of the Mexican-U.S. Alliance
Against Drugs,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 12, 1997, 664-65.

69. “Declaracién de San José,” Rcforma (Mexico City), May 9, 1997, international page.

70. William Perry, “Good Bridges Make Good Neighbors,” in joint Force Quarterly 11
(Spring 1996, Special edition “The Security of the Americas”), 41.

71. Barry R. McCaffrey, “A Former CINC Looks at Latin America,” in Joint Force Quar-
terly 11 (Spring 1996, Special edition: “The Security of the Americas”), 41.

72. Schulz, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 6.

73. Reluctant Recruits: The US. Military and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Wash-
ington Oﬂice on Latin America, August 1997), 19.

74. Jorge Luis Sierra, “Hechos en México. Entrenados en Estados Unidos,” Reforma
(Mexico City), November 7, 1997, 4-A.

75. Andrés Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos: Guerillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and
Mexico’s Road to Prosperity (Boston: Little, Brown and C0., 1996), 298.

76. U.S.-Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation, Washington, Office of National Drug Control
Strategy, Report to Congress, September 1997 (Washington D.C.), 20. The U.S. Congress
stipulates that the delivery of military equipment is for use exclusively in the war on drugs
and explicitly prohibits its use in the army’s activities against armed groups in Chiapas or
Guerrero.

77. Ibid., 18.

78. Informe de Labores 1996-1997 (Mexico City: SEDENA, September 1997), 10-11.

79. Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, Atlas mondial des drogues. 1996 (Paris: PUF,
1997), 85-86.

80. Raul Benitez Manaut, “Narcotréﬁcoz desaﬁos para el ejército,” Novedades, Mexico
City, February 26, 1997.

81. Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, Secretary of Defense, press interview, Rq"orma (Mexico
City), November 12, 1997, 4-A.

82. “Entrega el ejército a 34 narcomilitares,” Rq‘orma, July 28, 1997, 1. Research on in-
mates in military prisons indicates that in the main prison, located on Military Camp No.
1, there are 402 prisoners, 53 of whom are in for “crimes against health” (drug traﬂicking),
29 were in the navy and were detained in April 1990 when a large scandal led to the resigna-
tion of the Secretary of the Navy. Reforma (Mexico City), August 1, 1997.

83. Statements made by the Secretary of the Navy, José Ramon Lorenzo Franco, Excel-
sior (Mexico City), sec. 2, 1.

84. Mexico y Estados Unidos ante el problerna de las drogas. Estudio diagnostico conjunto,
121-22.

85. Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, 301.

250 Notes to pages 148-151

86. México Social. Indicadores Selecciorzados 1985-1986 (Mexico City: BANAMEX, 1987),
315-

87. Carpeta Informativa. Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pziblica, no. 1 (Mexico City: Sis-
tema Nacional de Seguridad Pﬁblica, October 1997), 36.

88. “lnforme de la Procuraduria General de Justicia del Distrito Federal,” La jomada
(Mexico City), December 31, 1997, 53.

89. Ibid.

90. “La violencia en México,” El Cotidiano, no. 82 (Mexico City: UAM-Azcapotzalco,
March—April 1997).

91. There have been over 20 hypotheses on the assassination of Colosio, ranging from a
dru.g traﬂicking conspiracy to a single assassin——which is the one currently being accepted
in the courts. Regarding Ruiz Massieu, the hypotheses state that Manuel Muﬁoz Rocha, a
politician very close to Raul Salinas de Gortari and linked to the Gulf Cartel, masterminded
the assassination. See Caso Ruiz Massieu. Informe sobre la primera etapa de las investigaciorzes
y resultados, Mexico City, PGR, November 1994.

92. Catpeta Informativa. Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pziblica, no. 1 (Mexico City: Na-
tional Public Security System, October 1997), II.

93. “Acuerdo por el que se crea la Coordinacién de Seguridad Pﬁblica de la Nacién,” Di-
ario Q/icial (Mexico City), April 26, 1994. This unit was established in response to the gov-
ernment being called into question on numerous occasions, beginning with the outbreak
of the crisis in Chiapas, but also as public insecurity increased with the assassination of
Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 1994, and the kidnapping of Alfredo Harp, one of the
richest men in Mexico.

94. “The National Public Security System Bill,” September 18, 1995. This bill includes
coordination of the different levels (federal, state, municipal), units (military, PGR, state
governments), and security systems to prevent inefﬁciency stemming from the scattering
of a large number of security forces.

95. Diario Oﬁcial de la Federacién (Mexico City), November 7, 1996.

96. “Militarizacién en 29 estad0s,” La Jornada (Mexico City), August 30, 1997.

97. In February 1997, following the Gutiérrez Rebollo scandal, the INCD changed its
name to “Special Inspect0r’s Office on Narcotics.”

98. My compilation of statistics.

99. In approximately 300 municipalities, which are the smallest and most backwards
and basically the indigenous communities, there is no municipal police.

100. Carpeta Informativa. Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pziblica, no. 1, 31 (Mexico City:
Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pﬁblica, October 1997).

101. General Enrique Salgad0,Informe de 100 dias de trabajo en la Secretaria de Seguridad
Ptiblica (SSP-DDF), Mexico City, September 1996.

102. Rgforma (Mexico City), September 24, 1997.

103. Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, Secretary of Defense, press interview, Rzforma (Mexico
City) November 12, 1997, 4-A.

Notes to pages 151-161 251

104. See the complete statement of the Office of the Attorney General in El Nacional
(Mexico City), 19 November 1997. Also see the statement of General Salgado in the Assem-
bly of Representatives of the Federal District of September 23, 1997. See Reforma (Mexico
City), September 24, 1997.

105. Reforma (Mexico City), November 19, 1997.

106. The official name of the Jaguares is the Special Dissuasion Group. It was dissolved
on October 17, 1997. La jornada (Mexico City), October 18, 1997.

107. Reforma (Mexico City), sec. B, 1, October 19, 1997.

108. Even the military personnel appointed by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the SSP have
experience working in the SSP and other institutions in the country. Retired Lieutenant
Colonel Rodolfo Debernardi was appointed to head the SSP, and nine of the ten general di-
rectors of the SSP-DDF that be appointed were retired soldiers, including a major general,
ﬁve brigadier generals, and a lieutenant colonel. Reforma (Mexico City), sec. B, 2-B, De-
cember 7, 1997.

109. Luis Rubio, “La inseguridad publica y el Estado,” Rqrorma (Mexico City), Novem-
ber 16, 1997, 11-A.

110. Ibid.

111. Fernando del Collado, “El reto de las policias. Seguridad publica, primera caida,”
Enfoque-Reforma, no. 188 (Mexico City), August 17, 1997, 13-14.

112. This is examined in detail in José Luis Pifieyro, “Las fuerzas armadas en la transi-
cién politica mexicana,” Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 59, no. 1 (January-March 1997), pp.
163-189.

113. Lt. Com. Wayne G. Shear Jr., “The Drug War: Applying the Lessons of Vietnam,”
Naval War College Review (Summer 1994): 110-11.

114. See “2.Rumbo al narcoestado?” El Financiero, Special Report (Mexico City), August
17, 1997-

115. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, “Apuntes para un debate nuevo sobre las drogas,” La [or-
nada (Mexico City), October 15, 1993; and Gustavo de Greilf Restrepo, “Estrategias para
combatir las drogas psicotropicas. Pros y contras,” in Relaciones de México, América Latina y
la Union Europea, ed. Patricia Galeana (Mexico City: AMEI-UNAM, 1997).

Chapter 7: The Historical Dynamics of Smuggling in the U.S.-Mexican Border
Region, 1550-1998: Reﬂections on Markets, Cultures, and Bureaucracies

1. Gordon Gaskill, “Smuggler’s Paradise,” American Magazine 143: 4 (April 1947), 32-33,
154-56.

2. For example, see Everett S. Allen, The Black Ships: Rumrunners (y‘Prohihition (Boston:
Little Brown and Co., 1979); and Allen S. Everest, Rum Across the Border: The Prohibition Era
in Northern New York (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1978).

3. See Gannett News Service story on Captain James McGovern ]r., in the El Paso Times,
June 9, 1998. For Allen Lawrence Pope, see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible

252 Notes to pages 161-164

Government (New York: Random House, 1964), 145-56; and Thomas Powers, The Man Who
Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Knopf, 1979), 103.

4. Private communication. Like most historians, I am skeptical of footnotes like this
one. However, I do not wish to violate what I consider to be a conﬁdential communication.
My source (who is identiﬁed in footnote 35 below by his organization and rank) was in a
position to have knowledge of what he conveyed to me and, in my judgment, was providing
highly accurate information. I was able to verify most of the information he conveyed to me
from several independent sources.

5. For example, see Colin M. MacLachlan, Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of
Ideas in Institutional and Social Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988),
76-78.

6. For Pike’s own account of his adventures, see An Account of Expeditions to the Sources of
the Mississippi and Through the Western Parts of Louisiana, 1810 . . . (Philadelphia: C. & A.
Conrad and Co., 1810). To describe Pike as a spy might seem something of a misnomer.
There, of course, was not a U.S. military or civilian organization in the ﬁrst decade of the
nineteenth century that could be identiﬁed as an intelligence agency. However, President
Thomas Jefferson utilized army personnel (Captains Meriweather Lewis and William
Clark), for example, to carry out what could only be called an intelligence gathering and
mapping operation. They simply did not utilize that terminology at the time. See also
Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of US. Intelligence (New York: Paragon
House, 1989), 66-67; and Frank J. Rafalko, ed., American Revolution to World War 11, vol. I of
A Counterintelligence Reader (McLean, Va.: National Counterintelligence Center, 1997), 41.

7. For an excellent description of smuggling along the U.S.—Mexico border during this
era, see Jorge A. Hernandez, “Trading Across the Border: National Customs Guards in
Nuevo Leon,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 100:4 (April 1997), 433-50.

8. See Robert Ryall Miller, Arms Across the Border: United States Aid to Juarez During the
French Intervention in Mexico (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1973), 7, 32, 38.

9. For an excellent account of Gen. Diaz’s successful overthrow of the Lerdo de Tejada
administration, see John Mason Hart’s Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the
Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 120-28.

10. Unfortunately, the Catarino Garza rebellion has yet to ﬁnd a historian. See Daniel
Cosio Villegas et al., Historia Moderna de Mexico vol. 4, pt. 2 (Mexico City: Editorial Her-
mes, 1963), 324-26.

11. Paul Vanderwood has produced a classic account of the Santa Teresa rebellion in
northwestern Chihuahua. See The Power of God Against the Guns of Government: Religious
Upheaval in Mexico at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998). For an earlier account by a Mexican scholar, see Francisco R. Almada, La Rehe-
lio’n de Tomochi (Chihuahua: Talleres Linotipogréﬁcos del Gobierno del Estado, 1938).

12. The Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, Statutes at Large, 35 (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1909), 275.

13. See the El Paso reports, March—May 1912, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Old Mexi-

Notes to pages 164-168 253

can 232, Reel 2, Record Group 65 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Ser-
vice). Also see Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, Bastion on the Border: Fort Bliss,
1854-1943 (El Paso, Tex.: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center, 1994), 29-30.

14. Harris and Sadler, Fort Bliss, 71-84.

15. Oscar Martinez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad judrez Since 1848 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1978), 64-66.

16. Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense, 2d ed.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), 554-57.

17. Unfortunately, no worthwhile history exists of the U.S. Border Patrol. Typical stud-
ies of the Border Patrol include John Myers, The Border Wardens (Englewood Cliffs, N.]..:
Prentice Hall, 1971).

18. See William O. Walker III, Drug Control in the Americas (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1981) 11, 81-82, 99-112.

19. Donald W. Baerresen, “Economic Overview,” in Borderlands Sourcebook: A Guide to
the Literature on Northern Mexico and the American Southwest, eds. Ellwyn R. Stoddard,
Richard L. Nostrand, and Jonathan P. West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983),
122-23. Although now dated, the Borderlands Sourcebook remains a useful publication for
students of the U.S.—Mexico border.

20. For example, see Stoddard, “Mexican Migration and Illegal Immigration,” in Bor-
derlands Sourcebook, 204-8. For the bracero program, see Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Pro-
gram: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971).

21. Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973: Conflict and Coexistence
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 219.

22. See C. Daniel Dillman, “Border Urbanization,” in Borderlands Sourcebook, 237-40.

23. Ibid., 144-52.

24. Schmitt, Mexico, 218-19.

25. G. Gordon Liddy, The Autohigraphy of G. Gordon Liddy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 1980), 133-35.

26. This is based on my personal knowledge (for example, if one wished to clear the
Mexican aduana at a small port of entry quickly in the 1970s and 1980s, placing a couple of
dollar bills inside one’s passport always speeded up the process).

27. Personal observation; on a number of occasions I had lunch with Mexican customs
and municipal oﬂicials, often in the company of U.S. customs oﬂicials. Regrettably, the
restaurant is currently closed for reasons that are too lengthy to describe here.

28. Personal knowledge.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. This point vis—a-vis quid pro quo was implicitly emphasized to me by a number of
U.S. customs oﬂicials. '

32. The Bell UH—1 was the workhorse helicopter of the U.S. Army during most of the
Vietnam War. In the latter stages of the war, the so-called Huey Cobra, a variant of the UH-l,

254 Notes to pages 169-172

replaced it. The helicopter referred to here was a UH-1 with a variety of electronics installed.

33. This particular anecdote was told to me by the Customs Agency Service investigator
who was responsible for retrieving the helicopter from Mexico. The story was conﬁrmed by
several other U.S. government ofﬁcials. Although the individual has been retired for a
number of years, I have chosen not to further identify him.

34. Beyond identifying the source as a senior Texas Ranger captain (see footnote 4
above), I am unwilling to further identify the officer in question. The time frame is the late
1970s and the location of my interview was Austin, Texas. Although the precise date of the
interview is known, using it would ﬁlrther identify the source.

35. This footnote and subsequent ones are my personal opinion. These statements are
derived from approximately a quarter of a century worth of research on the U.S.-Mexican
border. For the record, I served as the state of New Mexico’s representative on the District
Director, U.S. Customs, El Paso, advisory board for several years. In addition, during the
past two decades I interviewed dozens of U.S. customs oﬂicials from Brownsville to San
Diego at ranks from inspector to regional commissioner and up. In addition, I have inter-
viewed customs brokers, Mexican administradores de aduana at a variety of ports, and vari-
ous presidentes municipales. A number of senior U.S. customs officials (now retired) who no
longer feel constrained about revealing problems were interviewed. A number of congres-
sional staffers and several congressmen and two U.S. senators discussed border problems
with me during this time frame. A decade ago I organized for the governor of New Mexico
(the host governor) the December 1987 U.S.-Mexico Border Governors Conference, which
was attended by governors of the states of California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico
along with the governors of the six Mexican border states, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico,
and the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, as well as a variety of other Mexican
and U.S. diplomatic personnel.

36. See footnote 35 above. These statements are my personal opinions. They are derived
from discussions with U.S. customs ofﬁcials, congressional staffers, and a variety of U.S.
diplomats (including several who had retired) who had Mexican responsibilities during the
past quarter century.

37. For example, see Richard B. Craig, “Illegal Drug Trafﬁc,” in Borderlands Sourcebook,
209-13. For an analysis of the DEA takeover, see Patricia Rachal, Federal Narcotics Enforce-
ment: Reorganization and Reform (Boston: Auburn House Publishing Co., 1982).

38. This statement is derived from discussions with both Mexican and U.S. law enforce-
ment oﬂicials over an extended period of time.

39. For example, see Dillman, “Border Urbanization,” in Borderlands Sourcebook, A

238-40, 242.
40. Ibid. The growth in population of the small border town of Palomas is derived from
my own research.
41. Dillman, “Border Urbanization,” in Borderlands Sourcebook, 239-40.
42. Ibid., 239.
43. See the 1982 Universal Pictures ﬁlm, The Border, which was ﬁlmed in El Paso.

Notes to pages 172-177 255

44. This is derived from my own observation. In one notorious case, a port director
who had been a port director in Alaska and knew absolutely nothing about Mexico-—had
never been based on the border—and spoke not a word of Spanish was assigned as the dis-
trict director in Laredo, the busiest commercial port on the entire border. He was a disas-
ter. See, for example, The Economist, February 28, 1998, 32.

45. For details on corruption in U.S. customs on the southern border, see an outstand-
ing series in the Albuquerque journal, October 22-24, 1995, by the joumal’s chief investiga-
tive reporter, Mike Gallagher.

46. See Donald Baerresen, “Economic Overview,” in Borderlands Sourcebook, 121-24.

47. As described in the text, this anecdote is derived from my conversations with a U.S.
Customs Air Support pilot (tragically now deceased) with whom I ﬂew on a number of oc-
casions along the U.S.-Mexico border. I was able to conﬁrm the story from other customs
investigators.

48. Unfortunately, The Popular department store of El Paso shuttered its doors in 1997,
in signiﬁcant part because of the peso devaluation of the 1990s.

49. This account is derived from a native Chihuahuanese who is a distinguished Mexi-
can historian. The method described was the one utilized by the historian’s mother and
aunt for decades when they shopped in El Paso. I have redundant conﬁrmation from rank-
ing U.S. customs officials

50. Ibid.

51. This statement is supported by personal observations made over a two-decade time
span, particularly along the Texas border.

52. See Baerresen, “Economic Overview,” Borderland Sourcebook, 124; conclusions of the
author.

53. For a good contemporary description of the Lopez Portillo administration and the
beginning years of the de la Madrid administration, see Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A
Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Knopf, 1984), 210-22.

54. Perhaps the best description of the importance of Mexico joining GATT is found in
Sidney Weintraub’s A Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between the United States and Mex-
ico (New York: Oxford University Press/Twentieth Century Fund, 1990), 69-93.

55. Personal conclusions.

56. Telephone interview with Mike Gallagher, Albuquerque journal, July 8, 1998; per-
sonal conclusions.

57. See Tracey Eaton, Havana, Cuba, dateline as it appeared in Albuquerque Journal, June
17, 1988.

Chapter 8: Organized Crime and Democratic Governability at the
U.S.-Mexico Border: Border Zone Dynamics

1. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors, A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1984; reprint, New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989), xi.

Introduction 13

sistencies with numbers reported by state justice ministries. He concluded that
the margin of error in the oﬂicial data reached nearly 17 percent.”

Recognizing serious problems with the data, Ruiz offered interesting observa-
tions nonetheless. Calculated on a per capita basis, Mexic0’s crime rate showed a
42 percent increase in 1995 over 1993, but the rate seemed to stabilize subse-
quently. More interestingly, the 1,671 crimes per 100,000 population reported in
Mexico in 1996 equaled only about 29 and 33 percent of the European and U.S.
rates respectively. If one shifts to public opinion surveys to correct for possible un-
derreporting, quarterly surveys in the Federal District in 1996 showed that about
35 percent of the respondents reported having suffered from a criminal act. But
this ﬁgure, Ruiz argued, is more or less in line with comparable surveys in Europe
and the United States. Rather than claiming a national security threat, the more
accurate generalization may be that crime in Mexico was especially prevalent in
the Federal District and four other states, and that certain cities, such as the Fed-
eral District, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez, had serious problems of insecurity. In
Ruiz’s view, rather than the crime rate itself the more serious issue was the lack of
law enforcement, which resulted in criminal impunity throughout the country.“
That is, in terms of impacts of crime on governability, the key concern is a wide-
spread view that government is incapable and/ or unwilling to provide citizen se-
curity within legal, democratic procedures.

The Mexico City metropolitan area is by far the subregion most seriously af-
ﬂicted by crime in the country. The Committee on Public Security of the Federal
District’s Legislative Assembly reported in 1997 that in Mexico City some 240 citi-
zens were assaulted, murdered, or robbed every hour. Furthermore, in the Federal
District robbery of vehicles or persons increased between 200 and 300 percent
between 1989 and 1996. Automobile theft was surpassed only by drug trafficking
in terms of its proﬁtability for criminals. Problems of public security had reached
the point that citizens were resorting to self-help by closing off streets to public
traffic and carrying handguns. The C0mmittee’s data do not agree with the inte-
rior ministry’s, however. The Committee reported that in 1996, at the national
level some 2.1 million crimes were reported, and the estimate was that this num-
ber would increase some 7 to 10 percent in 1997. Mexico City was especially af-

fected, with nearly 250,000 crimes reported in 1996 and the possibility of increas-

256 Notes to pages 185-202

2. Serge Antoni and Daniel Ripoll, El combate contra el crimen organizado en Francia y en
la Union Europea (Mexico, D.F.: PGR, 1990); and Procuraduria General de la Republica (At-
torney General’s Oﬂice), La lucha contra el crimen organizado: la experiencia de Geovanni Fal-
cone (Mexico, D.F.: PGR, 1995).

3. Mario Puzo, Salvatore Guiliano. El Siciliano (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Grijalvo, 1984).

4. High Level Contact Group, México y Estados Unidos ante elproblema de las drogas: Es-
tudio-diagnostico conjunto (Mexico and the United States with Regard to the Drug Problem:
A Joint Diagnostic Study: Mexico D.F., 1997).

5. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), File information (United States: FBI, 1996).

6. Policia Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Police), File information (Bo-
gota, Colombia: Policia Nacional de Colombia, 1996).

7. Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas (National Institute to Combat
Drugs), File information (Mexico: PGR, 1996).

8. The estimate is based on DEA reports. The DEA has stated that the three most pow-
erful criminal organizations of the past ten years—the well-known Paciﬁc cartel (the Arel-
lano brothers), the Juarez cartel (Amado Carrillo), and the Gulf cartel (Juan Garcia
Abrego)—engaged in intense competition to introduce cocaine to the United States. There
are two sources, one documented and the other oral (both in the author’s possession), stat-
ing that, on one hand, Juan Garcia Abrego, one year before his persecution and arrest, in-
troduced around 6o tons of cocaine to the United States, and that, on the other hand, the
Arellano brothers, before the so-called “war of the cartels,” introduced between 1 and 1.5
tons per week into the California area. While neither refers directly to Amado Carrillo, in-
tense competition led DEA oﬂicials to conclude that his was an equally p0W€I‘ﬁJl cartel.

9. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Cures.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See especially chapter 11, pp. 198-223.

10. The information concerning arms trafﬁcking is contained in the joint diagnostic
study produced by the Mexico-U.S. High Level Contact Group, México y Estados Unidos ante
el problema de las drogas (Mexico: Grupo de Contacto de Alto Nivel, 1997), 133. It refers to
chapter 5, “Traﬁco Ilicito de Armas Entre los Dos Paises.”

11. Informal conversations with officials of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

Chapter 9: Mexican Drug Syndicates in California

1. Drug Enforcement Administration (hereafter DEA), “The Early Years,” Drug Enforce-
ment (December 1980), 26—65; Report, Subcommittee on Narcotics Traﬂicking, California
Senate Committee on Judiciary, July 14, 1976. Also, interviews with various narcotics agents
who wish to remain anonymous.

2. DEA, “The Early Years.”

3. The following paragraphs draw on DEA, “The Early Years.”

4. Interviews with Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement agents in San Diego, Los Angeles,
San Jose, and Sacramento, California, 1974-1988.

5. Ibid.

Notes to pages 202-211 257

6. Elias Castillo, “Powerful Heroin Fuels Fears of Mexican Drug Rings,” San lose News,
September 16, 1982, 1B; “Heroin Deaths,” Associated Press, August 26, 1986 (Internet edi-
tion). '

7. Interview with Henry Lopez, acting Bureau Chief, Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement,
San Jose, California, May 1979.

8. Ibid.

9. DEA, “The Early Years.”

10. Interview with anonymous narcotics agents, June 1980.

11. Interview with Don Meyers, Western States Information Network, Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia, June 24, 1997.

12. Remarks by Donnie Marshall, Chief of Operations, DEA, before the House Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, regarding Border Security and
Alien Smuggling, April 23, 1997, 7; interview with members of San Diego Police border
team, 1976-1980.

13. Interview with Joseph Doane, Chief, California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforce-
ment, Sacramento, California, June 1997.

14. Interviews with California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement agents, San Jose,
Sacramento, and Los Angeles, 1979-1986.

15. Interviews with Los Angeles Police gang squad members, Los Angeles, California,
1977“1934-

16. Ibid.

17. Peter A. Lupsha and Kip Schlegal, “The Political Economy of Drug Trafficking: The
Herrera Organization (Mexico and the United States)” (Alburquerque, N.M.: Latin Ameri-
can Institute, University of New Mexico, 1980).

18. Interviews with U.S. DEA and California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement
agents, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, and Salinas, California, and
Washington, D.C., 1976-1984.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Interview with street source, San Jose, 1981.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Interview with Wil Cid, Bureau Chief, California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforce-
ment, Fresno, California, June 13, 1997.

25. DEA, “Mexico, Status in International Drug Traﬂicking,” DEA Intelligence Bulletin,
April 1997, 1-3.

26. Interview with Wil Cid (see note 24 above).

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Interviews with Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s narcotics detectives, 1977; remarks by
Donnie Marshall, 13 (see note 12 above).

258 Notes to pages 211-223

30. “Mexican Narcotics Related Killings,” Associated Press, September 24, 1997.

31. Interview with California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement agent Joe Vasquez,
Los Angeles, June 23, 1997.

32. Interview with Wil Cid (see note 24 above); also, remarks by Thomas Constantine,
Administrator of the DEA, before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
House International Relations Committee regarding drug control in the Western Hemi-
sphere, June 6, 1996, 6.

33. Interview with Wil Cid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Interview with Robert Pennal, Special Agent, Clandestine Laboratory Investiga-
tions, California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, Fresno, California, June 24, 1997.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. US v. Garibay, C.R.F. 94-5011 OWW, U.S. District Court, Fresno, California, 1994.

41. This was an unfortunate incident of a U.S. Marine on border patrol who shot and
killed a Mexican national. Reuters News Agency, June 24, 1997 (Internet edition).

42. “Investiga la PGR 22 denuncias de la SHCP por lavado; 21 mas, concluidas,” La Jor-
nada (Mexico City), April 16, 1998; “Flood of Stories Spotlight Mexico Drug Laundering,”
Reuters News Agency, March 20, 1998 (Internet edition).

43. “Flood of Stories Spotlight Mexico Drug Laundering,” Reuters News Agency, March
20, 1998.

44. “La mayor amenaza para EU, los narcos mexicanos: FBI,” La jornada (Mexico City),
January 29, 1998.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

1. “Operation Condor” was a major effort by the Mexican and U.S. governments to
eradicate opium poppy cultivation in the “critical triangle” of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chi-
huahua. “Nothing before or since has so impacted the Mexican drug scene and so pleased
the United States.” Richard Craig, “U.S. Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for
the Bilateral Relationship,” in Guadalupe Gonzales and Marta Tienda, eds., The Drug Con-
nection in U.S.-Mexican Relations (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of
California, San Diego, 1989), 74.

2. A project directed by John Bailey and Jorge Chabat, a researcher at the Center for
Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE) in Mexico City, is currently assembling policy-
oriented studies on police organizations, courts, intelligence systems, interorganizational
and intergovernmental behavior, public education, and public opinion about insecurity in
Mexico and the borderlands with the United States.

About the Contributors

SIGRID ARZT served in the Technical Secretariat of former
Attorney General Antonio Lozano (1994-1996) and as a research
associate at the Center for Research and Teaching Economics
(CIDE, Centro de Investigacién y Docencia Economicas, A.C.) in
Mexico City. In 1998 she was a visiting scholar of the Woodrow
Wilson Center and at Georgetown University. Her research fo-
cuses on issues of national security in U.S.—Mexican relations.
She received a Master’s degree in Political Science from the Uni-
versity of Notre Dame and is currently a doctoral candidate in in-
ternational relations at the University of Miami.

LUIS ASTORGA is a researcher at the Institute for Social Re-
search at the National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM). He has written numerous articles and books on socio-
logical and cultural aspects of drug trafficking in Mexico. Dr. As-
torga received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Paris
in 1982.

[OH N BAILEY is Professor of Government and Director of the
Mexico Project at Georgetown University, where he has taught
since 1970. He has written a book and numerous articles on Mex-
ican politics and policy making and co-edited a volume on
U.S.—Mexican security issues in the post—Cold War era. He di-
rected the Mexico Seminar at the U.S. State Department’s For-
eign Service Institute in 1980-91. He received a Ph.D. in Political

Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

259

260 About the Contributors

RAU L BEN I’TEz MANAUT is researcher at the Center for Multidisciplinary Re-
search in Sciences and Humanities at the National Autonomous University of
Mexico (UNAM). He was a fellow of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1998 and is a member of the Peace
and Security in the Americas Program. Dr. Benitez has published numerous
books, essays, and articles on peace processes, geopolitics, armed forces, and
Mexico’s national security. He received a Ph.D. in Latin American studies from
UNAM.

ELIAS CASTILLO is a journalist who now works with Linkage International
Consulting. He has written extensive analyses regarding Mexican economics and
politics that have appeared in outlets throughout the United States. He has won
numerous journalism awards, including three Pulitzer Prize nominations. He has
lectured widely on Mexico and has taught journalism courses at San Jose State

University (SJSU), where he also did undergraduate and graduate work.

LEONARDO cu RZIO c UTI ERREZ teaches at the Faculty of Political Science at
the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and is visiting professor
in the Contemporary History Program at the University of Valencia. He is author
of various books and articles. In addition, he is a research associate in the Center
for Multidisciplinary Research in Science and Humanities at UNAM. He holds a
Ph.D. in history from the University of Valencia.

ROY GODSON is Professor of Government at Georgetown University and di-
rects the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C. He has pub-
lished extensively on issues of trans-state relations, security studies, and strategic
approaches to countering transnational organized crime. He has served as a con-
sultant to the United Nations and the U.S. and other governments and is currently
developing societal/ cultural approaches to complement law enforcement and reg-
ulatory approaches to preventing crime and corruption. He holds a Ph.D. from
Columbia University.

FRANCISCO |AVlER MOLINA RUIZ served as a Senator (National Action
Party) in Mexico’s Federal Congress and Chairman of the Senate’s Oversight Com-

About the Contributors 261

mittee on Public Security. He is former Commissioner of the National Institute for
the Fight against Drugs and a member of the High Level Contact Group for Drug
Enforcement. Mr. Molina received his law and M.B.A. degrees from the Au-
tonomous University of Chihuahua.

STAN LEY PIM ENTEL is a former FBI Legal Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City where he was responsible for managing the Bureau’s largest overseas
office. His thirty-year career with the Bureau included several tours in Latin Amer-
ica. Among his service awards, he received the FBI Director’s Award for Outstand-
ing Investigation. Mr. Pimentel holds a Master’s degree in criminal justice from
the Inter-American University in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

LOUIS SADLER is a specialist on the U.S.—Mexico border and the department
head of the Department of History at New Mexico State University. Dr. Sadler is a
former chairman of the New Mexico Border Commission. He has also chaired the
Governor’s Commission on Integrity and Accountability in Government and
served for more than a decade (1978-1989) as the director of the Joint Border Re-
search Institute at New Mexico State University. Dr. Sadler received his Ph.D. at
the University of South Carolina.

P ET E R U N SIN G E R is Professor of Criminal Justice at San Jose State University.
He has written numerous books and articles on arms trafficking, law enforce-
ment, and illegal maritime immigration and has taught courses on organized
crime, white collar crime, intelligence, terrorism, and management. A former po-
lice oﬂicer, Dr. Unsinger has traveled extensively in training missions to Australia,
Taiwan, Brunei, Korea, and Singapore. He received his Ph.D. in political science
from the University of Idaho.


Index

Acosta, Pablo, 76-77

administrador se aduana (Mexican customs of-
ﬁcial), 166-71, 175-76

administration: after revolution, 36; under colo-
nialism, 35-36; by revolutionaries, 62

administration of justice: in deﬁnition of gov-
ernability, 8; overload of judicial system, 14,
26; spread of inefficiency and corruption
due to, 152; weakness of agents for, 52-53.
See also justice system

Aguilar Guajardo, Rafael, 46

alcohol: sales during U.S. Prohibition, 180, 182;
smuggling of, 164-165

Alemén, Miguel, 43, 91; antidrug campaign un-
der, 70-71, 73

Anslinger, Harry, 70

antidrug efforts, 17, 71, 87, 114; under Aleman,
70-71; authority over, 72-73, 79, 86; civil
liberties curtailed in, 215-16; by Depart-
ment of Health, 66-67, 69; involvement of
antidrug oﬂicials in traﬂicking, 48-49; mili-
tary in, 78, 81-82, 130, 133-34, 146, 154; re-
sults of, 144-145, 154-155; under Salinas,
48-49, 86, 143-45; by U.S., 80, 145-46, 166;
U.S. pressure on Mexico for, 76; U.S.-
Mexico collaboration on, 89, 117. See also
National Institute to Combat Drugs
(INCD); Special Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce for
Health Crimes (FEADS)

Aragon, Rodolfo Leon, 44

Arellano Félix brothers organization, 41, 48,
78, 190-91; rivalry with Carrillo, 44, 78,
192

arms traﬂicking, 14, 196; history of, 163-65

army. See military

attorneys general. See Office of the Attorney
General (PGR)

authoritarianism, Mexico’s: under colonialism,
35-36; consequences of, 24, 33, 136; and
PGR, 108, 125; of presidentialism, 37-38;
transition to democracy from , 10-11, 27,
52‘53. 111. 133-39

Baja California, 150, 165; drug trafficking in,
62-66, 146

Baja California Norte, crime rate in, 150

banking, changes needed to combat organized
crime, 54

Bartlett, Manuel, 86

Bétiz, Deputy, 64-65

Bétiz B., Bernardo, 63

Beltrones, Manlio Fabio, 88

Benitez, Raul, 26-27

Border Patrol, U.S., 22, 165-66; corruption in,
28-29, 221; subordinate to U.S. customs
along the border, 171-72

Border Task Forces (of PGR), 117, 146

borderlands: corruption in, 27-28; crime in,
181-85; culture of, 28-29, 177-79, 194-96;
difficulties in, 1, 170; economic codepen-
dence in, 180-81; images of political-crimi-
nal linkages in, 21-22, 28-29; organized
crime in, 184-96; population explosion in,
165, 185; smuggling in, 27-28, 162-63,
182-85; U.S.-Mexican relations among cus-
toms oﬂicials, 166-70

Bracero program (Mexicans coming to U.S. to
harvest crops), 165-66

Buendia, Manuel, 45-46

bureaucracy, 14; relation to organized crime,
15-22. See also Civil Service Officials

Bush, George, 86

business leaders, campaign donations from,
91-92, 96

Cabal Peniche, Carlos, 85, 94-95
caciques (local inﬂuence groups), 137-38; power
oﬁ 142. 153-54
Calderon, Alfonso G., 76
Calderoni, Guillermo Gonzalez, 77
Cali Cartel, 100-1, 189
Calles, Plutarco Elias, 36-37
Camarena Salazar, Enrique, 45, 76, 80, 143
Campa, Roberto, 106-7
campaign ﬁnance, 83-85, 90, 136
Cantu, Esteban, 62

263

264 Index

car theft, 5, 13, 196

Cardenas, Lazaro (President), 73

Carpizo, Jorge, 85, 87, 104

Carrillo Fuentes, Amado, 41, 51, 76, 191-93; and
Arellano Félix brothers, 44, 78, 192; protec-
tion by Gutiérrez Rebollo, 44, 78, 117

Carrillo Olea, Jorge, 88

casinos, 62-63

Castillo, Elias, 29

Catarino Garza rebellion, 163

Catholic Church, 35, 37

caudillos, 36

Center for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO),
144

Central America: guerilla movements in, 139;
U.S. collaborations with, against drugs, 145

Centralized-systemic criminal—political image
(Image II), 3-4, 17-18, 22-23, 219, 222

Centralized-systemic criminal—political image
(with shadow) (Image III), 18-19, 23-24,
222

Chiapas, 134, 140-141, 147

Chicanos. See Mexican-Americans

Chihuahua, 150; corruption of military in, 121;
drug traﬂicking in, 66-69, 73, 147; smug-
gling in, 173-74

Chinese: cultivation and production of opium,
68, 199-200; U.S. limits on immigration of,
164. See also Mexican-Chinese

CIA, involvement with drug trafﬁcking, 65

civil liberties: curtailed in ﬁght against drugs,
215-16; and objections to Federal Law
against Organized Crime, 123

civil service: career, 6, 8, 52; PGR’s goal to pro-
fessionalize, 114; problems with, 14

civil wars, gunrunning during, 163

class, social, under colonialism, 35

Clemente Coto Cartel, 147

clientelism: stability through, 136. See also pa-
tron-client networks

Clinton, Bill, 145

Coahuila, 165; drug trafficking in, 66-69

CODEHUTAB, and campaign ﬁnance scandal
in Tabasco, 96

Cohen, Mickey, 65

Colombia, 137, 155; differences from organized
crime in Mexico, 221; U.S. priority for elimi-
nating drug production in, 145

Colombian drug traffickers: smuggling cocaine
through Mexico, 175-176; ties to Mexican
traffickers, 74, 189, 191, 103, 209

colonialism: effect on Mexico’s culture, 34-36;
smuggling under, 162

Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 80, 107

Conﬁdence Control Center, of FEADS, 117-18

conﬂicts, institutions’ ability to manage, 9, 15

Constitution of 1917, 36; amendments to , 98,
105; military in, 126-28, 131-34; and
Zedillo’s pledge to combat crime through
reform, 55, 105

consumer goods, smuggled into Mexico, 165,
172-74, 182-84

Contact Group (U.S.-Mexico). See High Level
Contact Group for Drug Control,
U.S.-Mexico

contained corruption, image of bureaucracy’s
relation to organized crime, 16-17

contraband, 59, seizure and sale of, by agen-
cies, 42-43; warehouses for, in border-
lands, 182

COPARMEX, and campaign ﬁnance scandal in
Tabasco, 96

corporatism, stability through, 136

corruption, 220; causes of, 34-36, 84, 152-53;
difficulty eliminating, 105, 107; from drug
trafficking, 143-45, 191-92; effects of, 14,
135-36; institutionalized, 53, 182-83, 195; in
judicial system, 14; in law enforcement, 26,
45, 52-53, 151; in Mexican customs service,
163, 173-74, 182-84; in Mexican govern-
ment, 4, 25, 33-34, 41-42, 48, 69; under
Mexico’s presidential system, 38-39; in mil-
itary, 26-27, 37-38, 43, 120-121, 147; of
PGR, 43-44, 48-49; PGR’s attempts to
eliminate, 114-16; and political parties, 25,
33-34; rationalizations for involvement in,
206; and smuggling, 27-28; struggle
against, 149-51, 195-96; susceptibility to, 8,
137; in theories of criminal—political al-
liances, 3-5, 15-22, 25, 39-42; tolerance of,
1-2, 102; of U.S. ofﬁcials, 21-22, 154, 166,
172, 176, 196; Zedillo’s pledge to combat,
34"35, 55

Cortes, Hernando, 41

Cossman, Max, 65-66

Costa Rica, ties to Hank Gonzalez, 88

counterinsurgency, by army, 129-30, 139-42,
153, 156

creoles, in administration, 35-36

crime, 2, 151, 153; in borderlands, 181-85; by
ﬁred police ofﬁcers, 52; opportunities for,
135-38. See also organized crime

crime rates, 5, 12-14; factors inﬂuencing, 13, 138;
increase of, 148; PGR’s goal to reduce, 114;
for political crimes, 148-49

criminal-political alliances, 74, 87; break up of,
47-48, 65, 80-81; and arrests or deaths,
47-48; effects of, 3, 53; and governability,

218-19; Lupsha’s theory on, 39-40; politi-
cians’ control over criminals in, 3-5, 50, 69

culture, 6; of borderlands, 28-29, 177-78,
194"95

Curizo, Leonardo, 25

customs, Mexican, 210; relations with U.S. cus-
toms agents, 166-70; Salinas replacing cor-
rupt agents in, 184; and smuggling of con-
sumer goods, 182-84

Customs Service, U.S., 22; corruption in, 172,
176, 196; primacy along the border, 171-72;
relations with Mexican customs agents,
166-70

de la Madrid, Miguel, 46, 174-75

de Provoisin, Gerardo, 91

de Tavira, Juan Pablo, 107

“December error,” devaluation of peso, 106-7

decentralization: effects on law enforcement,
27, 152; and increased opportunities for
crime, 137-38; in Mexico's dual transition,
11-12

decentralized sustained corruption (image of
political-criminal linkages in), 28, 218

Declaration of the Mexican-U.S. Alliance
Against Drugs, 145

delegative democracy, 9

democracy, Mexico’s: consolidation of, 10-12,
111, 113; delegative, 9; governability under,
9-10; increasing demand for, 34, 55; obsta-
cles to, 33, 36, 81; transition from authori-
tarianism to, 52-53, 55, 91-93, 101-2,
134‘33. 149, 152'53

Department of Health: in antidrug campaign,
79; concerns of, about drug trafficking, 66,
69, 72-73; concerns of, about drugs, 63-64

deputy attorney general ofﬁces: in restructuring
of PGR, 114-16; selling PGR/PJF oﬂices,
43"49

DFS. See Federal Security Directorate

Diarte, Enrique, 65

Diaz, Porﬁrio, 36, 163

dictatorships, after revolution, 33, 36

drug cartels: Cali Cartel, 100-1, 189; investing
proﬁts in economy, 216; Juarez Cartel,
146-47, 192; in Mexico, 146-47

Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. (DEA), 73; in-
ﬂuence of, along border, 171-72; murder of
agents of, 19, 24, 45, 76; work in Mexico of,
88, 117, 144

drug production, 206; in Colombia, 145; cultiva-
tion for, 47, 60-61, 72-73; destruction of
plants, 79, 130; of heroin, 200-2, 208; of
methamphetamines, 211-15

Index 265

l

drug traffickers: squeezed for money by law en-
forcement, 43-44; political signiﬁcance of,
46, 51-52. See also Colombian drug traffick-
ers.

drug trafficking, 6, 23-42, 154; Colombians
smuggling cocaine through Mexico, 175-76;
and corruption, 2, 93, 120-21, 172; in crimi-
nal—political alliances, 20, 40-41, 80-81; ef-
fects of, 2, 135-38, 216; growth of, 127, 147;
history of, 164-66, 199-203; incentives for,
28-29, 72-73; law enforcement involvement
in, 45-46; Mexico's policies toward, 60-62,
143-45; and military, 133-34; ofﬁcials’ in-
volvement in, 44, 46, 48-50, 63, 104; organ-
ization of, 29, 66-69, 76-79, 146-47,
189-94; organized crime in, 76-79, 147,
184-85, 202-3, 218; and PGR, 104, 114; pub-
lic attitudes toward, 17, 63; rationalizations
for involvement in, 60, 206-7; and smug-
gling, 41-42; sociohistory of, 61, 79; U.S.
policies toward, 145-46; violence in, 74-76,
78-79. See also antidrug efforts

drugs, 212; antidrug agents paid in, 72; of
methamphetamines, 211-15; prohibitions
against, 69-70; seizures of, 42, 144-46; so-
ciohistory of, 58-61; U.S. demand for, 6, 79,
154

dual transition, Mexico's, 8-12, 24-25

Duhart, Salvatore, 65

Durazo, Arturo, 86

economy, Mexico’s: of borderlands, 1, 180-81;
development of middle class, 53; in dual
transition, 10-12, 134; effects of drug money
in, 216; and ﬁnancing for political parties,
98-99; and involvement, 28, 205-6, 213-14;
problems in, 106-7, 174-75

education, federal government investment in,
15

efficiency, in contained corruption image,
16-17; in hierarchical crime image, 18

election, 9, 11; army's role in, 132; emergence of
opposition in, 131-132; and political-crimi-
nal linkages, 22, 25. See also campaign ﬁ-
nance.

electoral reform: and campaign ﬁnance, 90, 97;
debate over, 97-101; and fear of organized
crime, 85

elite-exploitation model, of organized crime,
22'?-3, 39"41. 55'57

elites: in administration, 35; maintaining power,
108, 137-38; protecting peasant interests
against, 139-41

Emiliano Quintero Cartel, 147

14 John Bailey and Roy Godson

ing to as many as 280,000 in 1997. As did the interior ministry, the Committee
emphasized that these numbers refer to reported crimes, with the probability that
the real number of crimes is substantially larger.”

Problems of crime and public insecurity threaten Mexico’s governability, ac-
cording to the criteria we have suggested.

Monopoly of legal coercion. Two types of developments are problematic. First,
arms trafﬁcking and the proliferation of well-ﬁnanced and aggressive gangs have
led to an increasing incidence of confrontations between criminal gangs and be-
tween these and state authorities.” Second, corruption among the police at all lev-
els, and especially in the Federal Judicial Police, has severely reduced their effec-
tiveness. Even more serious is the specter of the penetration and corruption of the
Mexican army.”

Administration of justice. Mexico’s complex judicial system is suffering from
acute overload due to the upsurge of crime since the mid-1990s. Justice depart-
ments at the national and state levels are understaffed, with serious gaps in re-
sources and training. Policy officials apparently lack effective control over police
oﬂicers. Key problems include impunity from prosecution in real terms and
ineﬂiciency and corruption in the court system.”

Administrative capacity. Mexico’s federal bureaucracy has long suffered from
several key problems. The bureaucracy lacks a career service (with the exceptions
of the military, foreign service, and Bank of Mexico) and served for years as a
source of employment, especially for urban, educated youth. It was overburdened
with programs to promote growth and provide social services, to the point that its
complexity rendered it nearly incoherent. Some progress has been made in regu-
latory effectiveness at the national level. For example, tax administration has been
substantially improved, although much remains to be done. In other areas, how-
ever, regulatory effectiveness is limited, as is the case with banking regulation, for
example. Regulation at the state and local levels is weak or even nonexistent. The
peso crisis of 1994-1995 effectively shelved efforts to modernize the administra-
tion. The key point is that political authorities lack reliable instruments through
which to implement decisions.

Provision of minimum public goods. Federal government budgets have been cut
back substantially since the mid-1980s and depressed world oil prices have re-

duced revenues in 1998-1999. Public investment has been reduced much more

266 Index

EPR. See Popiiiar Revolutionary Army (EPR)

ethnicity, and social strata, 36

EZLN. See Zapatista National Liberation Army
(EZLN)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): on Mexi-
can drug syndicates in U.S., 199; and
FEADS Conﬁdence Control Center, 117

Federal Code of Penal Proceedings (CFPP),
108-9

Federal District, 43; crime rate in, 13, 150

Federal Fiscal Police, 184

Federal Judicial Police (PJF), 151; corruption of,
14, 48-49, 77, 138; involvement with organ-
ized crime, 44, 46; problems with, 26, 42,
104; professionalization of, 110, 114, 118-22;
protection of criminals by, 49-50, 146; role
of, 108-9, 115, 144

Federal Law against Organized Crime (FlvsOC),
111, 117, 122-23, 149

federal public prosecutors (MPs). See public
prosecutors (MP3)

Federal Security Directorate (DFS), 19, 38; in an-
tidrug campaign, 79; corruption within, 45;
dissolved, 46; excessive powers of, 72; role
in drug trafficking, 61, 73-74; ties to organ-
ized crime, 44, 46, 86

Félix Gallardo, Miguel Angel, 74, 76-77

Fernandez, Antonio, 68

’ Fernandez, Enrique, 68

Fernandez, Simon, 68

Fernandez Puerta, Enrique, 69, 74
feudalization of society, 141

Fierro, Roberto, 69

Figueroa, Yolanda, 48

ﬁnancial crimes, by transnational organized

crime, 7
Fonseca, Ernesto, 76
Fragmented-contested political-criminal link-
ages (Image IV), 3-5, 19-21, 23-27, 218, 222

French Intervention, gunrunning during, 163
Fuentes, Adrian Carrera, 44

Gallardo, Miguel Angel Felix, 41

gangs: of Mexican-Americans, 204-5; as struc-
ture of organized crime, 185-86

Garcia Abrego, Juan, 41, 51; drug trafﬁcking or-
ganization of, 76-79, 193-94; Mexican offi-
cials protecting from U.S. agents, 48

Gardoqui, Arevalo, 86

Garibay, Gerardo Delgado, 214-15

Garoqui, Juan Arevalo, 46

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 11, 175, 184

Gil, Emilio Portes, 36-37

globalization, effects of, 12, 34

Gonzalez Pérez, Luis Raﬁl, 107

Gonzales Ruiz, Samuel, 117

governability, 217; deﬁnition of, 7-9; demo-

. cratic, 9-10; effects of crime on, 13-14, 218;

requirements for, 2-6, 136

government, 80, 149; ability to provide services,
8-9, 14-15; corruption in, 2, 49-50, 86; ef-
fectiveness in battling organized crime,
220-21; federal, 4, 14-15, 36, 66, 94, 128-30,
140-42; ﬁnancing political parties, 98-100;
inequality between levels of, 134, 137-38;
power of president over, 37-38, 51-53, 80;
PRI’s symbiosis with, 90-92; state and lo-
cal, 12, 86, 94, 137

governors, 46, 51, 69; control of drug traffickers
by, 62, 76; ties to drug traﬂickers, 46-48,
63-64, 67-68, 70-72, 81, 88

Guadalajara region, 24, 45

Guerra de la Reforma, gunrunning during,
163

Guerrero, 134, 142, 146

guerillas, 45, 129-30, 139-42; in Mexico, 221

Gulf Cartel, 146, 193-94. See also Garcia Abrego,
Juan

gunrunning. See arms trafficking

Gutiérrez, Daniel (“El Chiquito”), 68

Gutiérrez,Jes1’1s Garzia, 67

Gutiérrez Rebollo,Jes1’1s, 78, 89; protecting Car-
rillo Fuentes, 44, 116-117, 146-47

Hank Gonzalez, Carlos, 38-39, 88

Hank Rhon, Jorge, 88

Harrison Narcotic Act (1914), 60

health department. See Department of Health
health programs, federal investment in, 15
Henao Montoya brothers, 189

Hernandez, José, 68

Hernandez Galicia, Joaquin, 197

Hernandez Jeronimo, Auldarico, 94

Herrera, Helmer “Pancho”, 189

Herrera family, 41, 77

Hidalgo, army presence in, 134

High Level Contact Group for Drug Control,

U.S.-Mexico, 2, 145, 147

Hill, Virginia, 65

Holden, Maurice C., 72

human rights: and increasing demand for

democracy, 34; violations of, 109, 124, 142,
151-52

ICAP. See Training Institute (ICAP)
immigrants, 205; Mexicans in drug trafficking,

29, 203-4, 206-8; smuggling of illegal, 5,
165-66; U.S. limits on Chinese, 164
INACIPE. See National Institute of Penal Sci-
ences
INCD. See National Countemarcotics Institute
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). See Par-
tido Revolucionario Institucional
institutions, state, 136; ability to manage con-
ﬂicts, 9, 15; changes needed to combat or-
ganized crime, 54-55, 89; importance of, 9,
154; reform to improve image of state, 149;
in state modernization, 138-139; strength-
ening of, 34-35, 89, 146; weakness of, 38,
42-43. 51“53
International Opium Convention (1912), 60
Inurreta, Marcelino, 72

Jacqueminot, Alberto, 67

Jalisco, 24, 134, 147, 150

Jiménez Leon, Pedro, 94

Juarez, Benito, 36, 163

Juarez Cartel, 146-47, 192. See also Carrillo
Fuentes, Amado

justice system, 8; changes needed in, 54, 138;
corruption of, 22, 86; problems in, 14, 88,
127; reform of, 6, 10, 34-35, 102, 106; roles
of public prosecutor and PGR in, 108-9

Karam Kassab, Paul, 94
kidnappings, 52, 149

La Copa (passing the hat), 43, 45

La Cosa Nostra, 39, 186-87

Landavazo, Francisco, 71

Larrziinzar Accords, 141

Latin America: in danger of becoming narco-
states, 154; delegative democracies in, 9;
guerrilla movements in, 139

law, rule of, 113, 119, 125, 154-55

law enforcement, 88, 203; corruption in, 15-22,
28, 41-42, 45, 86, 137, 184, 219; difficulty
gathering information on, 217-18; efforts
against drugs by, 71, 75, 87, 117, 215-16; fac-
tors in corruptibility of, 52-53, 195-96; fed-
eral government investment in, 15; govern-
ment effectiveness at, 220-21; and
political—crirninal linkages, 21-22; inade-
quacy of, 2, 34, 52-53; involvement of, in
drug trafficking, 40-42, 63-64, 76, 79; in-
volvement of, with organized crime, 15-22,
50, 84; lack of resources for, 12, 42-43, 52,
55; lack of support for, 52-53; local, 1-3,
150-52; members in criminal bands, 52,
148; by military, 26-27, 124, 128, 130,

Index 267

132-33, 149-53, 151-52; problems with, 49,
219; providing protection for drug traffick-
ers, 47-48, 80; public mistrust of security
forces, 153, 155; reforms needed in, 5-6,
54-55, 113, 150. See also antidrug efforts

Lechuga, Ignacio Morales, 87

legal coercion, 8, 14

Legal Counsel for the Presidency, 106

legislation, needed against organized crime,
54"55

Leon, Luis, 68

Lerdo de Tejada, Sebastian, 163

liberalism, of borderlands, 177-78, 181, 195

Liddy, G. Gordon, 166

Lopez Obrador, Andrés Manuel, 93

Lopez Portillo, José, 139, 174-75

Lozano Gracia, Antonio, 26, 107; as PAN attor-
ney general, 103, 105-106; professionaliza—
tion of PJF under, 118-119, 121; removal as
attorney general, 107; restructuring of PGR
under, 111, 114, 122

Lupsha, Peter A., 22-23, 39-40, 56-57, 100-1

Macias Valenzuela, Pablo, 70-71

Madrazo, Jorge, 107, 116, 123-24

Madrazo Cadena, Carlos, 96

Madrazo Pintado, Roberto, 85, 93-97
Madrigal Sanchez, Andrés, 94

Maﬁa, 186-87, 200-1, 204-5

maﬁas (political cliques), 38

Magoral, Manuel, 72

Malherbe de Leon, Oscar, 193-94

Mancera, Salvador Martinez, 69

marginal ad hoc corruption (image of political-

criminal linkages in), 29, 218-219, 222

Maximilian 1, Emperor, 163

mayors, 46, 51

McCaffrey, Barry, 145

Medellin Cartel, 190

media, 2, 51, 88, 144; campaign scandals in,

91-92; co-opted by PR1, 37-38; exaggerated
stories of success against drug trafficking
in, 64-65, 78; stories about officials’ ties to
drug traffickers in, 45, 69-71, 88-89

Meltzer, Harold “Happy”, 65

mercantilism, Spanish, 162

mestizos, in administration, 35-36

Mexican army. See military

Mexican Maﬁa, 204-5

Mexican nationals, 29, 203-5, 211-15
Mexican People's Party, 45

Mexican Public Safety Office, 149

Mexican Revolution, 24, 36, 127-30, 164-65
Mexican-Americans, 179-80, 203-5

268 Index

Mexican-Chinese, in Mexican drug trafficking,
61, 67-68, 199-200

Michocan, army presence in, 134

middle class, 34, 52-53

military, 44, 136, 155; in antidrug campaign, 73,
75-76, 78-79, 81-82, 144-46, 154; civic ac-
tion by, 128-31; corruption in, 14, 43,
120-21, 147, 191; EZLN declaring war on,
140-42; human rights violations by, 124,
151-52; involvement with drug trafficking,
43-44, 46-47; law enforcement by, 25-27,
119-21, 124, 139, 149-53, 219; protection for
drug trafficking, 47-50, 80; relations with
PRI, 37-38, 127; role of, 126-34, 139, 153-58;
U.S., 5-6, 145-46, 180-81, 215-16

Ministry of Defense, law enforcement by, 26

Ministry of the Interior, 38, 121, 139

Ministry of National Defense, 121

Ministry of the Treasury, 42-43

Moctezuma, relations with Cortes, 41

modernization, 134-35, 154

Molina, Francisco, 27-29

money laundering, 7, 84, 85-86, 92, 117, 210

Moreno, J. Dolores, 71

Moreno, Juan Esparagoza, 46

MPs. See public prosecutors

municipalities, 137, 150-52, 171

Muﬁoz Ledo, Porﬁrio, 92, 100

murders/ assassinations: in disruption of crimi-
nal-political alliances, 52, 87, 107; by para-
military death squads, 141; political, 104,
106, 149

narco-democracy, 85, 135

narco-politic, 84-85, 89

National Action Party (PAN), 150; attorney gen-
eral from, 103, 105-6; electoral victories of,
51, 80, 107

National Commission on Human Rights, 43

National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD),
144

National Drug Control Program, 86, 144-45

National Human Rights Commission, 115

National Institute of Penal Sciences (INACIPE),
109-10, 123

National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD),
44, 78, 116-17, See also Special Prosecutor's
Office for Health Crimes (FEADS)

National Revolutionary Civic Association
(ACNR), 45

national security, 139, 148; crime as threat to, 53,
122-23, 185; drug trafficking as threat to,
80, 85-86, 143-45, 216; role of military in,
126-28, 133, 139

national sovereignty, 10

navy, 134, 147

new federalism, 137

Nixon, Richard, 79, 166

North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 11, 34, 135; effects on border-
lands, 1, 184 .

northeastern Mexico, smuggling in, 162-63

northern Mexico: drug trafficking in, 72. See
also borderlands

Nuevo Leon, population explosion in, 165

Obregon, Alvaro, 36

Ochoa, Victor, 164

Ochoa Vasquez, Juan David and Jorge Luis, 190

O'Donnell, Guillermo, 9

Office of the Attorney General (PGR), 115; in an-
tidrug efforts, 44, 73, 79, autonomy of,
105-6, 108-9, 125; challenges to moderniz-
ing, 123-25; corruption in, 48-49, 138; im-
provements in, 105-6, 138, 146; inadequa-
cies of, 42-43, 110; investigating PRI
campaign ﬁnance scandal, 93-97; law en-
forcement by, 25-26; Lozano Gracia as, 103,
107; poor image of, 104-5, 107, 119, 145;
problems in, 104, 219; professionalism of,
108-10, 113-14, 117-18, 121-22; restructur-
ing of, 111-18; role of drug trafficking,
49-50, 61, 104

officials, 62, 105, 198, 203; involvement of, in
drug trafficking, 43-44, 63, 67-69, 71-72,
76, 79-81, 86-89, 210; low pay and tempta-
tion to corruption, 166-67, 174, 195-96; re-
lations with organized crime, 46, 50, 69. See
also customs

Olivares, Oscar Lopez (“El Profe”), 47

Operation Condor, 73, 79

Operation Intercept, 79, 166

opium: control of, 58, 60, 164; cultivation of
poppies for, 60, 62, 65, 68, 70-71; Mexican-
Chinese production and sale of, 199-200;
production of, 68, 206; Sinaloa as center of
trade in, 70-71. See also drug production;
drug trafficking

organizational coherence, 15

’ organized crime, 6-7, 44, 85, 221; activities of,

147, 187-94; in borderlands, 184-96; cor-
ruption by, 4, 45-47, 121; difﬁculty gather-
ing information on, 217-18; drug trafficking
by, 76-79, 147, 184-85, 202-3, 218; efforts to
combat, 49, 54-55,114, 117, 219; ﬁnancing
political campaigns by, 84, 99-102; history
of, 59, 87-89, 127, 182; inﬂuence of, 4,
87-89, 202-3; international, 65-66, 138;

lack of control over, 43, 52, 81; Mexican
drug gangs, 205-9; models of, 15-22, 39-41,
56-57; relations to government, 15-22,
46-47; relations with law enforcement,
42-44, 49-50; relations with PRI, 33-34,
45-46; structure of, 76-79, 208-9; threats
of, 2-6, 81, 99-102, 149, 222-23

Organized Crime Unit (UCO) within FEADS,
26, 117-18, 123, 146

Orozco, Pascual, Jr., 164

Ortiz, Eulogio, 66

Ortiz Garza, Francisco, 67

Ortiz Garza, Nazario, 67

Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 66

Paez, Juan Quintero, 46

Palma, Héctor, 146

PAN. See National Action Party

Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), 36-37.
See also Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional (PRI)

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 36,
51, 97; campaign expenses of, 91-99; cor-
ruption in, 4, 48-50; and ﬁnancing, 90,
92-93; links to crime, 33-34, 81; links to
drug trafficking, 46-47, 49; losing political
power, 51, 80, 102, 131-32; and Lozano Gra-
cia as attorney general, 103, 106-7; power
of, 37-38, 90-93; relations with army, 127;
resistance to change, 55, 105; and violence,
80-81, 141

Party of the Poor, 45

Patron—client networks, 18-19, 35-38, 47

Paz, Octavio, 55

peasants: guerilla movements to protect inter-
est of, 139-40; weakening of organizations,
12

People’s Revolutionary Army, the (EPR), 127

Pérez, Francisco (Paco), 68

Pérez, Pedro, 93

PGR. See Ofﬁce of the Attorney General

PGR Ministerio Publico Federal (MPF), 43-44

philanthropy, by drug traffickers, 51

Pike, Zebulon, 162

PJF. See Federal Judicial Police

plaza holders, 42-43, 46, 49-50

pochismos (“Spanglish”), 177, 179

policy implementation, in deﬁnition of govern-
ability, 8

political parties, 12, 25, 139; and crime rates,
150, 152; ﬁnancing for, 89-93, 97-101. See
also campaign ﬁnance; speciﬁc parties

political system, and criminal-political al-
liances. 3-5, 33-34

Index 269

political-criminal alliances. See criminal-politi-
cal alliances

politicians. See ofﬁcials

politics: civic action by army strengthening
regime, 131-32; and crime rates, 150, 152; ﬁ-
nancing political parties, 89-93; in Mexico’s
dual transition, 10-12; over attorney gen-
eral, 105-6, 108; over electoral reform,
97-101; rise of leftist guerillas, 139-42; in
theory of political-criminal relationships,
39-40. See also campaign ﬁnance

Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), 133, 142

Posadas Ocampo, Cardinal Jesus, 78, 80, 87

PRD. See Revolutionary Democratic Party

presidentialism, Mexico's, 37-38, 51-53, 80

presidents, 44; army supporting regime of,
131-32; power of, 37-38, 51-52, 104, 137

PR1. See Partido Revolucionario Institucional

prison system, U.S., 22

privatization of security, 153, 155

producer associations, 12

Prohibition, U.S.: comparisons of drug traffick-
ing violence to, 74-76; increased crime re-
sulting from, 164-65, 181-82; proﬁts in
Mexico during, 63, 180

protection: for Carrillo gang, 78, 191; for drug
trafficking, 46, 47-48, 68-69, 71, 80, 86; for
Héctor Palma, 146; for organized crime, 84,
89

public insecurity: effects of, 12; increase of, 127,
148; mistrust of security forces, 153, 155;
sources of, 122-23, 148, 188-89; and
Zedillo’s pledge to improve justice system,
34-35

public prosecutors (MPs): functions of, 108-10,
in restructuring of PGR, 105-6, 111-16

Quevedo brothers, 69
Quintero, Caro, 76
Quintero, Rafael Caro, 41, 46

Reagan, Ronald, 80

recession, 1994-1995, 11

reforms: economic, 134; effects of, 24, 27, 53;
and fear of organized crime, 55, 85, 123; in-
stitutional, 149; of justice system, 6, 102,
106; in Mexico's dual transition, 10-12;
needed, 6, 54; of PGR, 26, 105, 111, 114; of
police, 6

regional differences, in crime rates, 13

republic, Mexico’s self-rule as, 36

Requena, Juan, 66-67

Restoration, 36

revolution. See Mexican Revolution

270 Index

revolutionaries, public administration by, 62
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), 51, 93,
150

Reyes Curiel, Alfredo, 75

Rodriguez, Abelardo L., 62-63, 71
Rodriguez, Miguel Angel, 88

Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, 189

Romero, Flavio, 86

Ruffo, Ernesto, 80

Ruiz Harrell, Rafael, 12-13

Ruiz Massieu, José Francisco, 80, 104, 107
Ruiz Massieu Mario, 44, 88, 104

Russia, decentralization in, 137

Sadler, Luis Ray, 27-28

Salcido, Manuel, 46

Salgado, Enrique, 151

Salinas de Gortari, Carlos: antidrug efforts un-
der, 48-49, 86, 143-45; attorney general’s
office under, 104-5, 114; campaign expenses
of, 91-92; and corruption, 46, 184; and
drug traffickers, 44, 49, 77, 87; self-exile of,
107

Salinas de Gortari, Raul: crimes of, 88, 107;
links to drug trafﬁcking, 77, 84, 87-88

Samano, Gustavo, 75

Sanchez Celis, Leopoldo, 74, 75

Santa Teresa outbreak, 163

Santacruz Londoﬁo, José, 190

Second Shot: Mexican Narco-Dictionary, The
(Valle), 85

secretary of defense, 46

secretary of interior, 46, 50

Serrano, Carlos 1., 72

Shanghai Conference on Opium Control (1909),
58

Sheleske, Mauricio, 87

Siegel, Benjamin (“Bugsy”), 65

Silva, Rafael, 63-64

Sinaloa: army presence in, 134; crime rate in,
150; drug production in, 73; drug traﬂicking
in, 23-24, 70-71, 76-78, 146

Sinaloa Cartel, 146

Siurob, Jose, 69

slush fund, from drug trafﬁckers, 44

smuggling, 22, 61; of consumer goods, 182-84;
and corruption, 27-28; history of, 161-76;
of illegal aliens, 5, 165-66; by organized
crime, 41-41. See also drug trafficking

Sonora: army presence in, 134; drug traﬂicking
in, 71, 147; population explosion in, 165

Soto, Jaime Figueroa, 46

Spain, effects of colonialism by, 34-36

Special Prosecutor's Oﬁice for Health Crimes

(FEADS), 117-18. See also National Institute
to Combat Drugs (INCD)
Stage-evolutionary model, of political-criminal
relationships, 39-40, 56-57
state: reform of, 11; replaced by private actors
when weak, 137-38. See also government

Tabasco: army presence in, 134; PRI campaign
ﬁnance scandal in, 93-97

Tamaulipas: army presence in, 134; drug cartels
in, 146-47; oil company scandal in, 197;
population explosion in, 165

Teran Uribe, Vicente, 88-89

Tijuana, crime rate in, 13

Tijuana Cartel, 146

trade: and GATT, 11, 175, 184; and NAFTA, 1, 11,
34,135,134

Training Institute (ICAP), 110, 119, 123

transnational organized crime, 7

Trejo y Lerdo de Tejada, Carlos, 63-65

Trinidad Larrieta, José, 117

unions, weakening of, 12

United States, 1-2; border relations with Mex-
ico, 166-70; collaborations with Mexico
against drugs, 73, 77, 89, 117, 144-46; collab-
orations with Mexican army, 134, 145-46;
corruption in, 172, 176, 196, 221-22; de-
mand for drugs, 6, 79, 154; drug use in, 70,
200-1; effects of drug trafﬁcking, 72, 88;
Mexico-related drug syndicates in, 29, 199,
211-15; mutual inﬂuences with Mexico on
drug trafficking, 49, 76, 80; as prohibition-
ist inﬂuence on drugs, 58, 60-61; relations
with Mexico, 143, 164; and smuggling,
162-66

Unsinger, Peter, 29

upward mobility, 37, 39

Urdiﬁola Grajales, Jario and Julio, 190

Uriarte, Miguel Urias, 71

U.S.-Mexican joint programs, 2

U.S.—Mexico High Level Contact Group for
Drug Control, 2, 145, 147

Valdez, Rodolfo (“El Gitano”), 66

Valle, Eduardo (“The Owl”), 85

Valle del Cauca Cartel, 189

Veracruz, 134, 146

violence, 55; by criminal gangs, 188-89; and
deﬁnition of governability, 7-8; in disrup-
tion of criminal—political alliance, 34, 87;
by drug traffickers, 74-76, 78-79, 190-91,
192, 211; of EZLN, 140-42; between law
enforcement-related gangs, 148; by Mexi-

can-American gangs, 204; political, 6,
149
Virrueta Cruz, Ramon, 75

war of reform, 36

Weber, Max, 8

White Brigade (La Brigada Blanca), 45
Wong Yin, Antonio, 67-68

World War 11, effects on drug use, 200-1

Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN),

127. 133. 139-4?-
Zavala, Alfredo, 76, 80

Index 271

Zedillo, Ernesto, 77, 89; antidrug efforts under,
144-45; effects of recession on reforms of,
11-12; and Lozano Gracia as attorney gen-
eral, 105-7; pledge to combat crime, 53, 55;
pledge to improve justice system, 34-35;
speculation of campaign donations from
drug traﬂickers, 85, 100-11; support for
electoral reform, 99-101

Zermeﬁo, Sergio, 12

Zertuche Gonzalez, Enrique, 67

Zorilla Pérez, Jose Antonio, 45-46

Zuno Arce, Ruben, 46-47





Introduction 15

than current spending, in part to maintain essential services and to preserve em-
ployment. Even though education and health programs receive priority funding,
they have barely kept pace with population growth. The ﬁscal situation of state
and local governments is even more precarious. Even so, the federal government
has substantially increased its investment in police and law enforcement.”

Conﬂict management. Much of the success in conﬂict management to date has
been due to elite and mass commitment to an institutional, democratic route of
transition, as seen especially in electoral reform and relatively clean elections. Al-
though the commitment to a democratic route appears ﬁrm, the challenge here is
to assure that criminal inﬂuence does not penetrate key actors (such as political
parties or news media) and processes (such as candidate selection or elections
themselves).

As noted, the dynamics of crime and public insecurity vary from one national
setting to another. Mexico offers contrasting interpretations. On the one hand,
the country has been governed by a highly centralized, hegemonic party system
since the 1930s, which suggests the possibility that the political-criminal nexus op-
erates in systemic fashion, managed more by government officials than by crimi-
nals. On the other hand, the country’s size and complexity and the government’s
impressive bureaucratic inefﬁciency suggest the likelihood of lack of central con-
trol over, or even awareness of, the realities of law enforcement in the ﬁeld. To
simplify: (1) Are national-level political authorities inclined to combat criminality
but effectively blocked because of bureaucratic incapacity? (2) Does the criminal-
political nexus operate in a systemic fashion, bottom to top, or is it relatively
conﬁned to the security and judicial apparatus of state and local governments and
to the ﬁeld offices of national-level military and law enforcement agencies?

Contendlng Images of Criminal-Political Relationships

To sharpen the discussion and note the signiﬁcance of the contributions by the
chapter authors in this text, in this section we elaborate four contending images of
the crime-governance relationships in Mexico and two other images relevant to
the borderland regions of the United States. We summarize these images in Table
1.1. The key dimensions of the images are the degree of organizational coherence

of both the criminal groups and the government; and the geographic and func-



PITT LATIN AMERICAN SERIES

The United States—Mexico border zone is one of the busiest and most dan-
gerous in the world. NAFTA and rapid industrialization on the Mexican side
have brought trade, travel, migration, and consequently, organized crime and
corruption to the region on an unprecedented scale. Until recently, crime at
the border was viewed as a local law enforcement problem with drug traffick-
ing—a matter of “beefing up” police and “hardening” the border. That limited
perception must change. A

‘‘While the majority of the texts on this topic prescribe judicial and legal
reform as well as improvements on police policies, this book forcefully
argues in favor of preserving the political system and its governability in the
face of the threat of organized crime. If this condition is not met, all efforts on
other institutional areas (such as judicial reform) will be useless.”

—GuiIIermo Zepeda, Center of Research for Development (CIDAC)

“The notion of the political-criminal nexus is elucidated with great skill and _
offers profound insights into the challenges that the new government in 1
Mexico has to confront. The editors have done an excellent job in compiling
chapters that highlight individual issues and the overall situation, while the
distinctive mix of contributors from Mexico and the United States offers con-
trasting yet complementary perspectives. For students of Mexico and for spe-
cialists in organized crime and drug trafficking this is essential reading.”
—PhiI Williams, Director, Flidgway Center for International Security Studies

John Bailey is a professor of government and director of the Mexico Project
at Georgetown University. Roy Godson is a professor of government at
Georgetown University and directs the National Strategy Information Center
in Washington, D.C.

CONTRIBUTORS: Sigrid Arzt, University of Miami; Luis Astorga, National
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM); Raul Benitez Manaut, UNAM;
Elias Castillo, Linkage International Consulting; Leonardo Curzio Gutierrez,
UNAM; Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz, Senator in Mexico’s Federal Congress;
Stanley Pimentel, former FBI Legal Attache in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico
City; Louis Sadler, New Mexico State University; Peter Unsinger, San Jose
State University

University of Pittsburgh Press

 Ilililllllilllililililll
www.pitt.edu/~press

9 780822 957584

ISBN 0-8229-5758-2

   

Organized
Crime
81 Democratic

Governability

16 John Bailey and Roy Godson

Table 1.1 Mexico: Images of the Political-Criminal Nexus

Bureaucratic Nature of Criminal Scope of
Efficacy Organizations Criminal Activity
l. Contained Limited central control; real Dispersed, Subnational,
Corruption control at subnational level fragmented; local; focused
of field offices, state, and local subordinated to an enforcement
government government
Law enforcement variably
effective (by police and military)
ll. Centralized- Effective central control by Complex, Transnational;
Systemic (Formal) formal national government hierarchical, focused on
machinery disciplined; enforcement,
subordinated to regulation, and
Coherent, efficient law government other societal
enforcement (by police and actors
military)
lll. Centralized- Effective shared central control Complex, Transnational;
Systemic (Formal by formal national machinery hierarchical, focused on
and Shadow) and shadow groups disciplined; enforcement,
subordinated to regulation, and
Coherent, efficient law government other societal
enforcement (by police and actors
military)
IV. Fragmented- Weak, ineffective central Dispersed, Transnational;
Contested control; bureaucratic infighting fragmented, focused on law
competitive; enforcement
Law enforcement variably variably with sporadic
effective (by police and subordinate and involvement
military) superior with other societal

actors

tional extensions of activity. (The latter considers whether the criminal activity is

regionally focused or nationwide and reaching into the borderlands and whether

it is limited to law enforcement or penetrates other spheres of political life.)

Mexico—Image I: Contained Corruption

Image 1 serves as a null hypothesis. It suggests that the linkage between organ-

ized crime and the political system in Mexico is primarily contained within the

lower-level spheres of law enforcement and judicial administration, with only inci-

dental spillovers into the broader political system. That is, criminal groups oper-

ate eﬂiciently to apply corruption in order to neutralize police forces, including

Introduction 17

military units when these act as police forces. If that minimum level of effort is in-
sufficient to avoid arrest or disruption of the illegal activity, corruption may be ex-
tended to include the judiciary. It is an unnecessary expense to attempt to in-
ﬂuence other offices within the executive or legislative branches as it also is to
inﬂuence the broader political system, including political parties, interest groups,
media, or public opinion. Such “contained corruption” in this image would ex-
tend upward along effective lines of command within law enforcement bureaucra-
cies to the points where real control is exercised over actual forces in the ﬁeld, as
opposed to reaching the highest levels of the organizations or to their formal po-
litically elected or appointed overseers. That is, corruption would focus on neu-
tralizing (or enlisting the support of) those operational forces that can physically
impede or facilitate the acquisition and movement of illegal merchandise across
some given geography.

The contained corruption image draws attention to the efficiency orientation
of criminal groups (i.e., why spend more than necessary?) and the severely limited
administrative capacity of government at all levels. Regardless of whether na-
tional top-level elected or appointed officials are aware of organized criminal ac-
tivity, their ability to affect such activity is negated by bureaucratic incapacity
(e.g., lack of trained career civil services) and-—possibly—by lack of public pres-
sures, as exercised through elections for example.” We are not aware of an in-
depth study of opinion on this matter, but a leading Mexico City daily newspaper
reports that although majorities of Mexicans consistently cite drug trafficking as a
serious issue, only a small percentage list it as a priority concern. Surveys in Sep-
tember and December 1998, for example, showed that drug traﬂicking was men-
tioned by only 1 percent as the priority issue, while 31 percent mentioned the eco-
nomic crisis, 15 percent cited unemployment, and 13 percent listed insecurity
(street crime) as their main concern.”

Mexico—Image II: Centralized-Systemic Criminal-Political Linkages (Formal)

This image depicts the integration of relatively coherent criminal organiza-
tions with a relatively coherent governmental system. Top government officials
detect criminal organizations and then subordinate them to their control. The
simplest version of Image 11 is a chain of control and corruption that runs from
the national presidency through key ministries (defense, interior, justice), through

18 john Bailey and Roy C-odson

the ﬁeld oﬂices of the national bureaucracies located in the states, through state
and local governments, and through judiciaries to connect with intermediaries of
criminal organizations, who in turn exchange money and/ or services for protec-
tion. The connecting linkages are formal government control supplemented by
party discipline and by webs of patron-client ties. Consistent with this image is
the “hierarchization of crime.” That means that the most complex, extensive, and
lucrative criminal activities (e.g., heroin trafficking) are organized by national-
level authorities; intermediate sorts of criminal activities (e.g., auto theft, kidnap-
ping) are managed by state authorities; and relatively minor activities (e.g., prosti-
tution) are relegated to municipal authorities.“

In this image, the president as the key actor (either directly or by delegation to
subordinates) appoints the relevant oﬂicers in the key law enforcement agencies,
such as the justice ministry (PGR), the ministry of defense, and the interior min-
istry, who then make ﬁeld assignments of the pertinent officials in the states.
These oﬂicers in turn organize and/ or manage the more important criminal activ-
ities in their jurisdictions. Rather than creating and managing one criminal organ-
ization, the political leadership works with multiple groups, giving it additional
leverage over the gangs and taking advantage of the complexity and spontaneity
of the appearance and alliance formation among groups. Control and coercion
ﬂow downward; money and services ﬂow upward. Similar types of linkages are es-
tablished in other key ministries, with the president (through subordinates) ap-
pointing key ofﬁcials, who in turn manage processes that link government
ofﬁcials to criminal groups and activities. The image assumes that enforcement
bureaucracies operate efﬁciently and are effectively coordinated from above to
prevent accidental conﬂicts among them in ﬁeld operations. Further, it assumes
that the bureaucratic linkages actually work to connect national political leader-
ship in the capital to ﬁeld offices and that these in turn can actually regulate activi-
ties on the ground. Political authorities can employ resources from corrupt ex-
changes to further their political aims, whether personal, factional, or systemic.

Mexico—Image III: Centralized-Systemic Criminal-Political
Linkages (Formal plus Shadow)
Like Image II, this image posits relatively coherent criminal organizations inte-

grated with a relatively coherent government. In addition to the formal version,

lntroduction 19

however, this image posits the existence of a shadow parallel structure made up of
a network of patrons and clients that takes shape at some point within the govern-
ment apparatus and subsequently operates alongside of, but functionally con-
nected with, the formal bureaucracy. Powerful ofﬁcials at some time and at some
location high enough up in the law enforcement—security apparatus construct a
network of agents that operates within and outside of formal bureaucracy to con-
nect with criminal gangs in selected areas of the country to regulate the more
signiﬁcant political/ criminal activities. The controllers of the shadow parallel gov-
ernment negotiate with the incumbent president and relevant formal political au-
thorities at the various levels in order to regulate criminal organizations.

A recurring version of Image III explains the origins of these criminal-political
networks. It emphasizes the role of an operational arm of the interior ministry’s
intelligence service, the Federal Security Directorate (Direccion Federal de Seguri—
dad, DFS). Acting against leftist subversive groups (e.g., in Jalisco) in the 1970s,
the DFS was granted virtual impunity. Some DFS officers allegedly formed al-
liances with criminals, including drug traffickers, to carry out their anti-leftist
mission. The criminal-political networks thus created operated more or less co-
herently until the mid-198os, when the DFS was disbanded in the wake of scan-
dals surrounding the torture-murder of a DEA agent and his Mexican pilot.”

The shared characteristic of Images II and III is the coherence and discipline of
both the criminal organizations and the government agents. Image III is a more
complicated notion, in the sense that formal and informal networks interact. Fur-
ther, both images build on the hierarchical, patron-client nature of the Mexican
political system. That is, loyalties in the system are based on strong personal ties
between leaders and followers that reach from the local to national levels. Both
images locate the center of power in a single ﬁgure, the president, or a limited
number of actors, the president and the shadow manager(s). Resources acquired
from corruption are available for both personal and political purposes.

Mexico——Image IV: Fragmented-Contested Political-Criminal Linkages

This image depicts segmented, fragmented, and opportunistic criminal-politi-
cal cooperation at various levels. These coalitions are assembled at the initiative of
government officials or of criminal leaders at different levels of government and

on an ad hoc basis. The coalitions vary by types of criminal activity. Some activi-

20 john Bailey and Roy Godson

ties can operate in a fairly decentralized and ad hoc form, involving local and/ or
state police and judicial authorities. Activities of such groups might include bank
robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, auto theft, prostitution, or the smuggling of un-
documented migrants. As the scale of activity increases in terms of actors, geo-
graphic extension, and money involved, the higher up within government resides
the level of oﬂicial protection. Drug trafficking implies more complex coalitions
with higher-level involvement, but even this is variable. In cases that involve mari-
juana or synthetic drugs (locally or regionally produced), coalitions could be as-
sembled with combinations of police at state and local levels in coordination with
federal police, but possibly operating independently from national-level political
control. Trafficking in heroin and cocaine (the latter foreign produced) implies
complex transnational communications and transport, which suggests protection
(or tolerance) from national- and international—level police, military, and trans-
portation authorities.

Image IV is consistent with incomplete control exercised by central bureaucra-
cies over ﬁeld operations. The image is also consistent with variable linkages be-
tween elected political authorities and organized crime; that is, political authori-
ties on their own volition may or may not be linked to police-judicial-criminal
corruption. It is also a dynamic image, suggesting ongoing coalition making
among oﬂicials at various levels. It is consistent as well with coalitions that in-
clude extra-governmental actors (e.g., former government officials). It can ac-
count for patterns of relative stability (coalitions put in place by actors early in a
presidential or gubernatorial cycle and buttressed by extra-governmental webs of
patron-client linkages), as well as instability (coalitions put under pressure by
presidential or gubernatorial successions). The image also ﬁts with our under-
standing of the disruptions and dislocations brought on by the dual transition,
discussed above. Image IV allows the possibility that speciﬁc governmental actors
at any level may be disconnected from criminal operations. That is, criminal-polit-
ical networks can be “built around” speciﬁc ofﬁcials. Also, the image suggests the
ﬂuidity and incoherence that permits accidental or intentional clashes among
criminal groups and among government agencies. Criminal activity also takes on
a more ﬂuid geographic mobility, taking advantage of particular actors in differ-
ent parts of the country. Finally, in contrast to Images II and III, Image IV is

Introduction 21

volatile and evolving and it allows the possibility that criminal leaders may gain
the upper hand over government officials under certain circumstances.“

U.S. Borderlands—Image V: Marginal, Ad Hoc Corruption

Differences in political institutions and law enforcement capacity create a dif-
ferent context to develop images for the U.S. borderlands. Two such images are
summarized in Table 1.2. Image V suggests that the penetration of U.S. law en-
forcement or judicial agencies by organized criminal groups is limited to occa-
sional, isolated instances involving ofﬁcials who are acting alone or in small
groups. Criminals seek to insulate themselves as much as possible from law en-
forcement and submerge themselves in particular ethnic or racial subcommuni-
ties. Border control oﬂicers or law enforcement officers in the counties and munic-
ipalities along the border who are acting as individuals may commit corrupt acts
on an ad hoc basis. Maverick law enforcement oﬂicers in the interior communities
may commit corrupt acts in isolated incidences. But corruption is not ongoing or
widespread in law enforcement agencies and does not reach into the judiciary.

The main assumptions underlying Image V are that U.S. law enforcement is
relatively professionalized, the kinds of bureaucratic checks and controls em-

ployed by modern bureaucracies are relatively widespread, competitive and pro-

Table 1.2 Borderlands: Images of the Political-Criminal Nexus

Nature of Criminal Scope of Criminal
Bureaucratic Efficacy Organizations Activity
V. Marginal Effective federal and Dispersed, fragmented; Transnational,
Corruption state supervision sporadic contact with subnational,
of field offices law enforcement; local; limited to police
subordinate to and border control .
Effective border government forces
control forces and
state-local police
VI. Decentralized, Ineffective federal Patterned and Transnational,
Targeted and state supervision continuous activity; subnational,
Corruption of field offices subordinate to local; affects police,
government border control, judiciary
Ineffective internal and local government
checks on border of field offices

control forces and
police

22 John Bailey and Roy Godson

fessionalized media maintain a degree of surveillance, and the electorate punishes
corruption (which builds in automatic electoral checks). Also implied in Image V
is that the borderlands regions offer the privacy and freedom of movement with

which criminal groups can operate relatively unobserved by law enforcement.”

U.S. Borderlands—Image VI: Decentralized, Targeted Corruption

Transiting the U.S.-Mexican border is the main hurdle for criminals. Orga-
nized smuggling bands target officials in U.S. border control agencies. U.S. Cus-
toms Service officers at points of entry are a priority target, as are U.S. Border Pa-
trol ofﬁcers, who police the territories between points of entry.” Also, state and
local police in the counties along the border can be targets. The corruption may
involve individual officers or teams of officers and may be complex and sustained
over a period of time. Contributions by criminals to the election campaigns of
county police chiefs may project corruption into the broader political arena, but
at a local level. In the interior communities of the borderlands, criminal gangs
may target law enforcement officers on a sustained basis. Corruption may pene-
trate the judicial system as well, on either an ad hoc or sustained basis. Penetra-

tion of the prison system may also be extensive and sustained.

Previewing the Findings: An Overview of the Chapters

How do our ﬁndings relate to the images? The chapters that follow proceed
from broad overviews of the political—criminal nexus in Mexico to discussions of
partial aspects of the phenomenon, speciﬁcally campaign ﬁnance and key law en-
forcement agencies such as the attorney general’s oﬂice and the Mexican army.
These discussions are followed by chapters on the borderlands, with two contri-
butions providing Mexican and U.S. perspectives on the border itself, followed by
a discussion of the political-criminal nexus in the State of California.

Working from his twenty-nine years of service with the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (ﬁve of these assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City), Stanley Pi-
mentel attempts a broad synthesis of the criminal-political nexus in Mexico,
drawing on the theoretical work by Peter Lupsha. According to Lupsha, Mexico’s
mature authoritarian system of the 19503-19803 resembles what he calls the “elite-

exploitative” model, one in which political authorities systematically use criminal

Introduction 23

groups for their personal gain as well as to acquire resources for the ﬁinctioning of
the political system. In such a system, political authorities identify successﬁil
criminals and subordinate them to political control through police or military in-
struments. Then the criminals, according to Pimentel, are “milked” like “cash
cows” as long as they are useﬁil. Once they are no longer useful, the criminals are
prosecuted or liquidated.

Through conﬁdential interviews with senior Mexican law enforcement of-
ﬁcials who have ﬁrsthand experience, Pimentel provides detailed descriptions of
the mechanisms by which control is exercised by political authorities and corrupt
exchanges are carried out between criminals and law enforcement officials. Pi—
mentel’s descriptions of the mature system most closely resemble our Image II, a
coherent, competent government bureaucracy that operates through key min-
istries from the very top downward to systematically organize and exploit crimi-
nal organizations. He also reports the possible signiﬁcance of an Image III-type
“shadow manager,” a former senior government oﬂicial, but does not develop the
point. Pimentel emphasizes the important changes brought about by the demo-
cratic transition of the 19903, which——in its early stages—has resulted in the
breakdown of traditional controls and practices but without the construction of
modern police and legal institutions. In this setting, which resembles Image IV,
police are ineffectual and largely corrupt and criminal groups have become more
violent and aggressive, leaving “no one in control.” Pimentel offers an agenda of
political and administrative reforms that are needed to confront the growing
problems of criminality.

Luis Astorga, a researcher at the Institute for Social Research of the National
Autonomous University of Mexico, uses a sociological-historical perspective to de-
velop the following arguments: (1) Political—criminal cooperation in drug traffick-
ing dates from the early twentieth century; it was concentrated in Mexico’s North-
west (especially Sinaloa), and the dominant pattern of trafficking typically
involved high government officials’ taking the lead to organize criminal activities.
(2) The changes brought by the Miguel Aleman administration (1946-1952)
strengthened national-level involvement by police and military intermediaries in
drug traﬂicking, creating a system that remained more or less intact until the ac-
celeration of democratic reforms in the late 1980s.

Whereas Pimentel emphasizes culture to account for behavior, Astorga points

24 john Bailey and Roy Godson

more toward structural and institutional variables. He suggests that criminality is
a socially constructed category and thus subject to change over time and to ma-
nipulation that reﬂects the relative power of ‘different actors. The Harrison Nar-
cotics Act of 1914 criminalized trafficking in opiates in the United States for the
ﬁrst time, and perceptions of criminality by U.S. officials have typically been
forced onto Mexico over the years. Similarly, perceptions about drugs and gang-
sters have changed over time, as has the view of criminal-governmental alliances.

Astorga’s historical perspective brings out the importance of key coincidences.
The Mexican Revolution brought disorder and ungovernability to northern Mex-
ico at about the same time that drug traﬂicking was outlawed in the United States.
The consolidation of power by victorious groups in Mexico’s north coincided with
Prohibition in the United States (roughly 1920-1935), which laid the foundations
for criminal-political cooperation in Mexico and the border region. The institu-
tionalization of Mexico’s civilian authoritarian regime in the 1940s and 1950s,
abetted by the U.S. Cold War outlook, in effect nationalized what had been re-
gional patterns of politically controlled criminal enterprises. The Cold War out-
looks also contributed to a permissive environment for the interior ministry’s
DFS. The breakdown of the authoritarian system since the mid—198os in turn coin-
cided with the upsurge of cocaine smuggling and the dramatic accumulation of
power by drug traffickers, creating possibilities for the ﬁrst time that criminal
gangs could gain the initiativeover government.

Astorga describes a kind of “double diaspora” of criminal families from the
northwestern state of Sinaloa. The major antidrug operations by the army and po-
lice in the late 1970s may have been successful, but they also had the effect of scat-
tering gang leaders from Sinaloa to other states, notably Jalisco (Guadalajara).
Subsequently, the scandals surrounding the murder of a U.S. DEA agent in
Guadalajara in 1985 traumatized U.S.-Mexican relations and resulted in another
scattering of criminals into other northern states, thus contributing to the forma-
tion of still more criminal organizations, most notoriously the Arellano Felix gang
in Baja California. Like Pimentel, Astorga sees a watershed in the democratic tran-
sition of the late 1980s and posits a troubling scenario of possible alliances be-
tween criminal groups and hard-line, authoritarian politicians. In all, Astorga’s
account points to a centralized-coherent interpretation (Image III), giving way to
a contested—fragmented perspective (Image IV) with the democratic reform.

lntroduction 25

Moving from general to partial views, Leonardo Curzio, of the Center for Inter-
disciplinary Research in Sciences and Humanities of Mexico’s National University,
investigates links between criminals and the broader political system by looking
at sources of party and campaign ﬁnance. Like Astorga, he notes the importance
of coincidences. Increased ﬂows of money from drug trafficking in the mid—198os
coincide with the dual transition. The expanded costs of political campaigns re-
sult, in part, from heightened electoral competitiveness. This in turn is a conse-
quence of cleaner elections as well as President Zedillo’s decision to reduce gov-
ernment support for the ofﬁcial party, both of which grow out of the democratic
transition.

Curzio weaves an argument from a series of hypotheses based on little solid
empirical evidence, which he readily acknowledges as an inherent limitation in
this sort of inquiry. His argument is based for the most part on examples, anec-
dotes, and public statements. He draws extensively on the case of the 1994 guber-
natorial campaign in the southeastern state of Tabasco. That case, which—like
several others—was never satisfactorily resolved, was exposed and documented
by opposition party leaders. The Tabasco case, and Curzio’s analysis more gener-
ally, might be interpreted as support for our contested-fragmented image (IV), in
the sense that a particular alliance of state—level PRI officials allegedly was formed
with business and criminal groups, joined—possibly—to a broader, national-level
coalition of party officials to fund a national campaign. He also argues plausibly
that the 1996 national campaign reform law, which emphasized generous public
funding for parties and campaigns, was propelled in no small measure by Presi-
dent Zedillo’s stated concern about the potential for criminal inﬁltration of par-
ties and elections.

Curzio’s discussion suggests the hypothesis that democratic reform that leads
to a more effective, responsive, and participatory form of government may have
the paradoxical effect of inducing criminal organizations to expand their targets
of corruption and penetration to include electoral campaigns and legislative
ofﬁces. That is, democratic governance that ﬁts our minimalist procedural deﬁni-
tion is no sure antidote to criminal inﬂuence; such inﬂuence may even expand in
the early stages of the transition.

Important to the effort to assess political will and governmental capacity is the
administrative efﬁciency of key national agencies, especially the Ofﬁce of the At-

Pitt Latin American Series

Billie R. Dewalt, General Editor

26 John Bailey and Roy Godson

torney General (PGR) and—given the militarization of law enforcement in the
199os—the Ministry of Defense. Based on personal observation from her service
on the attorney general’s staff, Sigrid Arzt, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of
Miami, sketches the political context surrounding the appointment of Antonio
Lozano, a leader in the center—right opposition National Action Party, as attorney
general at the outset of the Zedillo administration in December 1994. She analyzes
the ambitious reform project that Lozano attempted, unsuccessﬁilly, to imple-
ment during his tour in oﬂice (1994-1996). Arzt documents the organizational
and operational deﬁciencies of the attorney general’s office, highlighting two im-
portant themes.

First, training and professionalizationhave been badly neglected in what she
calls the agency’s “operational forces,” that is, the Federal Judicial Police, the pub-
lic prosecutors, and the technical experts. The lack of training necessarily under-
mined the administrative reforms undertaken. Second, the growing reliance in
the 1990s on the military to assume law enforcement duties, although under-
standable given the dire situation of criminality and lack of adequate civilian po-
lice, produced important negative consequences. The military were unprepared
for police roles, and their involvement in law enforcement created problems of
human rights abuses and circumvention of legal procedures, which together viti-
ated efforts to promote a culture of legality. Also, some military officers proved
susceptible to corruption in much the same way as civilian police. Like Pimentel,
Arzt describes patterns of corrupt exchanges that affected the assignment of PGR
ofﬁcials to key regional posts. Arzt’s picture is not completely negative, however.
She suggests that the creation of the Organized Crime Unit within the attorney
general’s ofﬁce in 1996 was an important advance.

For our purposes, though, Arzt’s analysis clearly demonstrates the problem of
administrative incapacity. That is, the quality of personnel, organizational capac-
ity, and resources are lacking to connect effectively the political guidance at the
top with effective police operations in the ﬁeld. In this sense, her ﬁndings cast
doubt on an image of governmental coherence and, although we get glimpses of
systematic patterns of corruption, they seem to point more toward Image IV (frag-
mented-contested) than either III or II.

Raul Benitez, a prominent scholar of civic-military relations based at the Cen-

ter for Interdisciplinary Research in Sciences and Humanities of the National Uni-

Introduction 27

versity, analyzes the Mexican army in a context in which it has been assigned ex-
tensive roles in law enforcement while simultaneously confronting signiﬁcant
guerrilla operations in various regions of the country. At the same time, the army
is buffeted by broad forces of democratic change, including electoral transpar-
ency, alternation in power, and defense of human rights. Like Arzt, Benitez notes
that the army’s police role triggered constitutional and legal debates and compli-
cated the army’s doctrinal guidelines to preserve public order. Ultimately, the
recognition that criminal activity does threaten public order and that the civilian
police are completely inadequate, along with the army’s strong institutional disci-
pline to presidential and, increasingly, constitutional control, provides sufficient
justiﬁcation for involvement. Even so, Benitez maintains that the law enforcement
roles have damaged the army’s image in public opinion, as a result of human
rights abuses and allegations of extensive corruption, and such criticisms have
created tensions in the ofﬁcer corps.

Benitez brings to light some of the contradictions of political reform for the
improvement of law enforcement. For example, he argues that decentralization,
however important for democratization, actually undermines governmental ca-
pacity to enforce the law. He notes as well the practical problem of how reforms
introduced into an established authoritarian system often have the perverse effect
of corrupting the new elements rather than reforming the old system, a point that
Francisco Molina also makes with respect to the customs police. Victories by op-
position parties have not led to important advances in law enforcement, as
demonstrated by the cases of Baja California, where PAN has governed since 1989,
or Chihuahua, where Partido Accién Nacional (PAN) governed in 1991-1997, or in
the Federal District under a Partido de la Revolucién Democratica (PRD) adminis-
tration.

In all, Benitez’s analysis suggests that an army is not an answer to confronting
criminality, especially organized crime, and that continued reliance on the army
runs the risk of drawing the military into alliances with political and criminal
groups. Though not unambiguous, Benitez seems to draw a picture that is consis-
tent with a fragmented-contested image (IV). y

Luis Ray Sadler and Francisco Molina offer complementary views of the bor-
der from U.S. and Mexican perspectives. The views complement one another in

recognizing that smuggling and the corruption in which it thrives are deeply

28 John Bailey and Roy Godson

rooted in a series of structural, cultural, and institutional conditions. Sadler is a
historian by training, with lengthy practical experience on border-related boards
and commissions and head of the Department of History at New Mexico State
University; he notes that smuggling has thrived since colonial times and gained
impetus virtually from the time a border was established between the United
States and Mexico in the 18203. Market dynamics is the main variable to account
for the volume and direction of goods and services smuggled, whether these be
munitions, people, export crops, drugs, or consumer durables. Changes in laws
primarily affect the proﬁtability of smuggling, as was the case with the outlawing
of opiates in the United States in 1909, Prohibition in the 1920s, and the stricter
criminalization of drug traﬂicking and illegal migration in subsequent years. This
was the case as well with the adoption of high tariffs for consumer durables by
Mexico in the 19303, which strongly spurred southbound smuggling.

Sadler describes customs of informal cooperation by Mexican and U.S. law en-
forcement agencies from the 1920s to the 1970s, cooperation that gave way to bu-
reaucratic rigidity, especially on the U.S. side, as the border gained greater na-
tional attention from the 1970s to the present. He is skeptical about U.S. efforts to
control the border through bureaucratic means. He asserts but does not docu-
ment the point that corruption in U.S. border control agencies is a growing prob-
lem, thus suggesting support for our borderlands Image VI (decentralized sus-
tained corruption). But Sadler’s main point is that markets rule. One implication
is that as long as the Mexican economy shows slow growth or even recession and
the U.S. economy and laws generate robust demand, smuggling and associated il-
legality will continue to thrive along the border.

Francisco Molina, a native of Chihuahua, served as director of Mexico’s na-
tional antidrug institute during 1994 to 1996. He describes the border region as
distinct from both Mexican and U.S. societies, with its own peculiar vocabulary
and outlooks and with extensive webs of family ties that reach across national
boundaries. Molina points out that U.S. markets for prohibited goods and serv-
ices have long fueled illicit activities along the Mexican border, as has been the
case with liquor, drugs, and prostitution. The long history of smuggling created
experienced organized crime groups that readily turned their talents to drug
trafﬁcking. Molina emphasizes aspects of border culture that create a facilitating

climate of tolerance for criminal activities and he describes the structure and be-

Introduction 29

havior of varieties of criminal gangs, ranging from street corner delinquents to
complexly organized polycrime organizations. The picture he draws includes
gangs that resemble the Sicilian Maﬁa in their hierarchy and discipline.

Molina also provides clues about the mechanisms through which international
connections are forged between Mexican and Colombian gangs. He notes the cor-
ruption of the Mexican border police and within the Mexican army, and he also
questions whether corruption of U.S. border control agencies is a factor in the fa-
cility with which both drugs and weapons so easily transit the border. The com-
plexity and dynamism of the gang structure that Molina describes seem most con-
sistent with our Image IV.

Elias Castillo, winner of journalism awards, including Pulitzer Prize nomina-
tions, and president of the Mexico Group in Palo Alto, and Peter Unsinger, profes-
sor of criminology at San Jose State University, describe dynamics of Mexico-
related drug smuggling and distribution gangs in California. They depict an ex-
tensive network of Mexican-origin and recent-immigrant gangs that they suggest
operate largely in isolation from mainstream California society, disconnected
from the political system. This is a point of some controversy to those Mexican
critics who are skeptical that U.S.-based, American-dominated criminal groups
would allow such immensely proﬁtable operations to be run by Mexicans.”
Castillo and Unsinger describe how shifts in market supply and demand account
for changes in patterns of drug smuggling from Mexico. U.S. criminals were the
critical middlemen in supplying the U.S. drug market until the 1970s, when tech-
nological changes in heroin processing increased both the purity and ease of
smuggling of Mexican “brown” heroin. At that time, Mexican smugglers increas-
ingly dominated drug distribution, at least within the western and midwestern
United States. The authors describe differences among Hispanic groups and em-
phasize that drug smuggling and distribution is handled not by Mexican Ameri-
cans (those who have resided in the United States for generations) but rather by
Mexican nationals and recent Mexican immigrants. They suggest that family and
regional ties help to provide the trust necessary for complex, decentralized trans-
actions. Their description of gang structure in the drug trade suggests segmented,
small-scale operations largely acting independently in a cell structure that resists
easy dismantling by police. By emphasizing gang isolation from society, the au-
thors support our borderlands Image V—marginal, ad hoc corruption.


Part I

Crime and Governability

in Mexico


Chapter 2

The Nexus of Organized Crime and

Politics in Mexico

Stanley A. Pimentel‘

THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES the associations between
organized crime and politics in Mexico from the 1960s to the
mid-19903. In order to understand how this nexus evolved, I
must ﬁrst consider the relevant historical and cultural contexts.
Following this, I examine how the organized political and crimi-
nal elements came together in the contemporary period to work
in a collaborative pattern and how organized crime was, for a pe-
riod of time, controlled and managed by the political authorities.
A theoretical framework developed by Peter A. Lupsha is particu-
larly helpful in interpreting the Mexican case.

My argument is that three centuries of occupation, exploita-
tion, and civic neglect by Spain, and a century of local dictator-
ships by revolutionary leaders, could not then allow a demo-
cratic civic society to evolve overnight. An agreement by several
ﬁghting factions to put aside their weapons and to come under
the rule of one political umbrella, beneﬁcial to all, began with the
formation of an official party in 1929 that has now become the
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PR1). The PR1, a political
monopoly, has been a “patron-client,” authoritarian type of sys-
tem for seven decades and has used its social control forces (mili-
tary, police, and internal security agencies) to control, tax, and
extort the organized criminal elements. The political authorities
provided immunity from prosecution for the criminal groups
while obtaining money for development, investment, and cam-

paign funding for the party, as well as for personal enrichment.

33

34 Stanley A. Pimentel

The criminals were expected to pay and obey the authorities, and if they became a
liability or could no longer produce, they were either “liquidated” or incarcerated.

Over time, however, the relationship between political officials and criminal
groups was dramatically altered. By the late 1980s, changes such as the advent of
concern for human rights, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
global communications, a more educated middle class demanding democracy,
and the opposition parties winning important positions made it virtually impossi-
ble for the political authorities in power to control the organized criminal ele-
ments. As a result, the criminals began ﬁghting back by killing anyone they be-
lieved opposed them, including law enforcement officials and prosecutors. With
no professional law enforcement and no effective system of laws capable of com-
bating these criminals, the results are disastrous for the Mexican society. Drastic
measures must be taken by the Mexican government to combat these organized
criminal elements and to successfully destroy the political-criminal nexus that has
remained. Creating an elite professional law enforcement task force to work with a
national criminal intelligence clearinghouse is a beginning. Empowering mem-
bers of such a task force with the proper tools, equipment, and laws so that this
elite group can actively pursue the criminal organizations is also needed. Their
task will be to identify and attack the weaknesses of these organized criminals and
their partners, such as seizure of their assets and imposition of lengthy prison sen-
tences, in order to break the cycle of the political-criminal nexus.

Historical Legacies of Authoritarianism and Instability

Speaking at a Bankers’ Convention at Cancun, Quintana Roo, Mexico, on Feb-
ruary 7, 1997, President Ernesto Zedillo promised to make Mexico a “country of
laws” and to build public conﬁdence in the justice system. He stressed that one of
his top goals was to shore up Mexico’s democratic institutions. He went on to
state that “we do not have conditions now guaranteeing our security nor have we
achieved the full state of law that is required for Mexico’s development." In an in-
terview with the Chicago Tribune published on July 20, 1997, President Zedillo
spoke of the urgent need to introduce a “government of the rule of law” and ex-
pressed his desire to free the country of official corruption. He went on to state

that “corruption is not a phenomenon that came about a few years ago but, unfor-

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 35

tunately, has been around since the colonial times within our cultural traditions
and certain practices.”

The Mexican political system, “New Spain,” evolved out of three centuries of
occupation, exploitation, and civic neglect by the European colonial powers and a
century of local dictatorships. The basic fact is that Mexico was under the “pater-
nalistic and repressive control of Spain, which discouraged political self-govem-
ment, stiﬂed individual economic initiative and suppressed intellectual ambi-
tion.”2 Spain was interested in souls, gold, and silver, but not necessarily in that
order. For generations, Mexico was ruled by a Viceroy who governed the colony as
the personal representative of the Spanish Crown: “He lived in a palace, main-
tained a court and all forms of royal pomp and prestige, and appointed all ofﬁcials
with the king’s authority, and supervised the economic, religious, intellectual, and
social affairs of the colony. The Viceroy headed the Colonial Government, was
supreme judge and made and enforced the laws. To see that he functioned hon-
estly and eﬂiciently, the Viceroy was often spied upon by a ‘Visitor General’ sent
by the Crown to report on colonial matters.”3

The Spanish colonials became the propertied class, along with the Catholic
Church, whose mission system provided the means of administration and social
control in the outlying areas. While the Viceroy and governorships were initially in
the hands of Iberian-born, then local, creole elites (those born in Spanish America
of European parents), administrative units, town and city councils, and magis-
trates were run by mestizo (mixed indigenous—European) elites. Limited and weak
administrative control by Spain, the harsh topography, and slow communications
allowed for local autonomy and upward mobility among the mestizo leadership,
as well as the evasion of royal edicts and taxes. In spite of all the Spanish laws im-
posed on New Spain, “political corruption ﬂourished, especially when the Span-
ish Crown, after the sixteenth century, decreed that public oﬂices could be sold at
auction to the highest bidder. In this way, many incompetent and corrupt individ-
uals got into colonial ofﬁces.”4  

At the same time, local corruption and the sale of offices allowed the landed
oligarchy to gain control over the rural administrative offices as access to higher
positions. Once entrenched there, nepotism and graft extended into the patron-
client system, which became the embedded norm, and the motto “Obedezco pero
no cumplo” (I obey but do riot comply) became the operating code of the leaders






Organized

Cri me

Democratic

Governability


VlexL,k anJ 'he L .
Mexican Borderle.indr:


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36 Stanley A. Pimentel

of New Spain. As a result of these systems of control, the “inevitable outcome of
three centuries of exploitation and repression by the Spanish, was revolution,
which stirred Mexico to its foundation and resulted in the severing of ties” to the
motherland.5 Four centuries of authoritarian rule could not be transformed into a
democratic civic culture overnight. It is a struggle that still confronts and con-
ﬁgures Mexico today.

Its “beginnings as an independent nation in 1821, when she cut her last ties to
Spain, were inauspicious. Because of the lack of self-rule under Spain, the general
poverty and illiteracy of the inert masses, and the preponderant economic and po-
litical powers of the army, the Church, Mexicans were not prepared to rule their
own house. The shift from a colony to a republic meant only a change of rulers for
the common man . . . the tensions merely shifted” from the Spanish born to the
creole and from the creole to the mestizof‘ Roughly a century of instability, for-
eign invasion, dictatorship, and revolution followed Mexico’s independence in
1821. First came a “war of reform” that led to nationalist rule by Benito Juarez, fol-
lowed by a brief period under the European-imposed ruler, Maximilian (1864-
1867). After this came ]uarez’s efforts to implement liberal laws in a period called
the Restoration (1867-1876), which was followed by the dictatorship of Porﬁrio
Diaz (1876-1910), who fortiﬁed Mexican unity. Unity collapsed into revolutionary
convulsions (1910-1920), during which time a succession of caudillos (strongmen)
fought for control of the national government and the promulgation of the 1917
Constitution. Out of this instability came the creation in 1929 of the ruling party,
initially known as the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary
Party, PNR), the forerunner of today’s PR1.

The current political system in Mexico was begun in 1928-1929 after the assas-
sination of Alvaro Obregon, the revolution’s victor, its strongman, and president.
The incumbent president, Plutarco Elias Calles, and his successor, Emilio Portes
Gil (1928-1930), worked together to convene “all political factions into one impos-
ing party, the PNR, which was ﬁnanced by a ‘kickback’ from the pay envelope of
every government employee.”

Calles recognized the historic opportunity and his unique responsibility to achieve a com-
prehensive political agreement, create the new political institutions for a modern Mexico,
and leave behind the raw violence that had characterized personal politics . . . to establish
and maintain control over the main forces and actors in Mexican politics. To achieve it, all

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 37

the accesses to decision—making centers and all the roads to economic, social and political
mobility passed through the party, the formal and operating structure of the 1929 political
agreement. The party became the only gatekeeper of access to power, closed and out of
reach to those on the outside who would never enter. A monopoly of access to power was
created.3

And so for the next seven decades, the PR1, operating under a patron—client hi-
erarchy, has distributed patronage, contracts, jobs, educational opportunities, so-
cial services, and other beneﬁts to its loyal adherents via its governors, trade
unions, and occupational associations. Various power centers, cliques, and al-
liance systems within the oligarchy would vary positions and offices in alternate
administrations, all with a strong “trickle down” to the people. Upward mobility,
education, and opportunities for economic success were available to the loyal,
when they attached themselves to the right patron and were able to stay in the
stream of rising party stars.

Presidential control over his successor and inﬂuence over gubernatorial selec-
tions and state ﬁnancing, along with what was basically a “rubber-stamp” legisla-
ture and judiciary, centralized power in the PR1 and Los Pinos (the presidential
residence). The presidential clique and the party leadership, together with the se-
curity apparatus (formal security agencies, the police, the attorney general’s ofﬁce,
and the military), possessed both the power and capacity to make their collective
will felt throughout the country. Presidentialism, a term frequently used to de-
scribe Mexico’s political system,
has caused so much harm tothe country, particularly in the last few sexenios (six-year presi-
dential terms) and is a product of the control the President of the Republic has exercised
over PR1 congressmen and senators. The authoritarianism, the discriminatory application

of the law, the centralism, the corruption and the impunity are all products of placing all
the state power in one solitary person: the President of the Republic.9

During the PRI’s monopoly of power, actors such as the media and the Catho-
lic Church have been co-opted and become a part of the political system. Early on,
the PR1 removed the Mexican military from the center of power by promising
great rewards, exercising civilian oversight over their food and supplies, and rotat-
ing the zone commanders every two to three years. “Senior officers were encour-
aged to enrich themselves with assorted business opportunities, sinecures and

favors, and even illicit activities, such as contraband, drug trafﬁcking and prosti-

38 Stanley A. Pimentel

tution, were tolerated. . . . At the same time, the government protected the armed
forces from media criticism,” making the military a “sacred cow.”1°

Also at the disposal of the president was the Secretaria de Gobernacién (Min-
istry of Government, or Interior), the second most powerful position next to the
presidency, “with its broad responsibility for preserving the country’s political
stability . . . in charge of managing the political arena where both the opposition
and the PRI perform.”“ Within this ministry was the Federal Security Directorate
(DFS), which was responsible for investigating matters affecting national security
and other duties as directed by the president. The DFS, which was staffed by the
elite Presidential Military Staff Guards (Estado Mayor Presidencial, EMP) and by
paramilitary experts, was at the ready to do as the president commanded or to use
the president’s name when it suited their purpose.

With these tools at their disposal, and with their many coalitions of interest
groups and alliances with other powerﬁil institutions, the president and the PRI
leadership enjoyed virtually absolute power. “Myriad pyramids of power are thus
superimposed on the larger hierarchical pyramid: everyone except the President is
both boss and servant . . . (where) the process spawns political cliques—known as
maﬁas——that are loyal to the President but compete ﬁercely with each other.
Without them, the system of loyalties could not work.”12 As a result of these loyal-
ties to bosses and ultimately to the president, institutions have not become pro-
fessionalized, nor can there be any checks and balances to offset the corruption
and complicity ingrained in this system. The PR1 has successfully permeated the
entire system of living in Mexico so that everyone—-the police oﬂicer on the
street, the mayor of the city, the governor of the state, the Minister of Finance, or
the attorney general of the nation—are all indebted to the party bosses, and ulti-
mately to the president. No controversial action could be taken by one patron
without checking with his or her patron, and on up the line. Many decisions that
normally would be made by a deputy secretary would be referred to the president,
who appointed that individual, for the ﬁnal say. And since there is “No Re-
election” of the president, governors, mayors, congressmen, and senators, every-
one must “make hay while the sun shines” to ensure a larger nest egg when they
are no longer in a position to obtain the beneﬁts of ofﬁce. Carlos Hank Gonzalez,

former Secretary of Agriculture in the Carlos Salinas administration, former

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 39

mayor of Mexico City, and a well-respected PRI stalwart, probably said it best
when asked about his accumulation of wealth and his status as one of Mexico’s
richest: “A politician who is poor, is a poor politician.”

The Political-Criminal Nexus: Theory and Practice

Peter A. Lupsha has developed a theory that helps interpret political-criminal
relationships in the Mexican case. He posits two basic patterns of criminal-politi-
cal relationships: the “stage-evolutionary model” and the “elite-exploitation
model.” According to Lupsha’s stage-evolutionary model, the most common pro-
gression in the relationships between organized crime and the political system is
that most organized crime groups tend to evolve through three stages: the preda-
tory, the parasitical, and the symbiotic. In the predatory stage, the criminal group
is usually a street gang or group rooted in a particular territory or neighborhood,
such as the gangs in Los Angeles, Chicago, or New York. Criminal gangs evolving
from the predatory stage into the parasitical stage have developed a corruptive in-
teraction with the legitimate power centers, such as occurred with La Cosa Nostra
in the United States during the alcohol prohibition days of the 19203. Political cor-
ruption, which accompanies the provision of illicit goods and services, provides
the essential glue that binds the legitimate sectors with the underworld criminal
organization. The third, or symbiotic, stage evolves when the relationship be-
tween the criminal organization and the political system becomes one of mutual-
ity, where the political and economic systems become dependent upon and sub-
ject to many of the services the criminal organizations have to offer. The mob’s
control of the Fulton ﬁsh market, the construction industry, and the sanitation de-
partment in New York City are prime examples of this stage.”

This dynamic evolution of organized crime in the stage-evolutionary model is
one in which the criminals follow an illicit parallel ladder of upward mobility and
over time seek to legitimize their wealth and status for themselves and their chil-
dren. These criminals actively seek niches in the interstices of the law where they
can enrich themselves and at the same time buy into the political and economic
systems to minimize risks of arrest and loss of wealth. From governmental and cit-

izen perspectives these organized criminal enterprises provide desired economic

40 Stanley A. Pimentel

services, such as gambling, prostitution, illicit alcohol and drugs, yet are part of
an underworld that is accepted but not catered to.“

Lupsha’s second model of organized crime, the elite-exploitative model, is one
in which the organized crime enterprises are not treated as useﬁil or necessary
evils but rather as “cash cows,” to be manipulated and exploited by political au-
thorities. This model most accurately describes what we observe in Mexico, where
organized crime becomes a source of funding and illicit enrichment for the politi-
cal elite and their social control agents. Drug trafﬁckers in these settings, after
achieving some entrepreneurial successes, are sought out by the system and taxed
and disciplined into their role within the system. Although corruption is a key fac-
tor in both of these models, in the stage—evolutionary model it is initiated by
traffickers in pursuit of insurance and protection. The legitimate social control ac-
tors in this model may accept payoffs and even seek them, but they rarely become
the initiators of trafficking or its reinforcers.“

In the elite-exploitative model, the traﬂickers are under pressure from the le-
gitimate social control agents—indeed they are forced—to accept and sell loads
of seized drugs, and they are constantly threatened and taxed by those agents,
who are passing percentages of this tax to higher-level officials. These criminals
are rarely permitted to retire from the game; they are either killed or imprisoned
and other family members are allowed to take over. In this model, the organized
criminal system is called upon to support the oligarchy. Control and initiation
come from the top, from the so-called legitimate power holders and their social
control agents, and the drug lords, like good “cash cows,” are protected, milked
(taxed), and when no longer useful, imprisoned or sent to the slaughter, to con-
tinue the analogy.” “Nevertheless, these groups continue to work with renewed
efforts, which demonstrate that, contrary to common belief, the drug trafﬁcker’s
power is limited; they are disposable pieces, and as part of the unwritten rules, are
utilized for convenience, either by the State or their real bosses.”17

We see in the case of Mexico a more or less clear representation of the elite-
exploitative model. Political authorities used social control agents to organize and
regulate drug trafficking. Trafﬁckers were manipulated and disposed of to suit
the needs of political officials. Over time, however, traffickers grew more powerful
and the political system became more pluralistic, but not institutionalized.

In these circumstances, drug traffickers gained greater autonomy of action-

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 41

and grew more violent and aggressive in their dealings with both state and soci-
ety.

A case can probably be made that the first association between an organized
criminal group and a politician in Mexico occurred when Hernan Cortes and his
marauding band of soldiers from Spain marched into Tenochtitlan (current Mex-
ico City) and captured the Aztec capital and its emperor, Moctezuma. Despite the
fact that Moctezuma had previously offered Cortes and his organization gifts of
gold, silver, and jade in hopes that they would leave, Cortes is said to have re-
marked, “The Spaniards are troubled with a disease of the heart for which gold is
a speciﬁc remedy.”18 For our purposes, however, the ﬁrst time that one can truly
observe in Mexico the evolution of the criminal-political nexus is during the early
19oos, when the United States attempted to put a stop to the contraband of drugs,
whiskey, and arms with its Mexican neighbor.

The business was so lucrative that it raised the attention of several powerﬁil politicians
such as Colonel Esteban Cantu, Governor of the Territory of Baja California Norte from
1914 to 1920. In customs reports from Los Angeles in 1916 sent to the Department of the
Treasury, he was mentioned as one who gave out concessions to exploit the opium trade in
exchange for important sums of money. The cost of a concession was $45,000 (U.S. dollars)
and the monthly rent was between 10,000 to 11,000 dollars.”

As long as there has been a United States—Mexican border, there has been
smuggling between both countries. Goods smuggled out of Mexico into the
United States have included marijuana, heroin, and more recently, cocaine, while
refrigerators, televisions, automobiles, and weapons have -come into Mexico.
Many of these goods were purchased by the average citizen; however, the great
bulk were smuggled by organized crime elements who have had family-run busi-
nesses for generations. These families have produced all the major organized
crime ﬁgures, such as Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo, Rafael Caro Quintero, Juan
Garcia Abrego, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the Herrera family, and the Arellano Felix
brothers of the present day. Most of these had their humble beginnings in the
1960s in the drug trade.

In the 1960s and 1970s, opium poppy and marijuana were grown in abundance
in the western parts of Mexico, where “politicians, business people, police and
peasants all knew who was planting poppy seed. . . . The police knew who were
the producers. . . . The Chief of Police was the one who controlled the ‘percentage’

42 Stanley A. Pimentel

in exchange for tolerating (the trade) or for support. . . . Knowing the Chief of P0-
lice meant closeness to the Governor.”2° What began with a local, home-grown or-
ganization paying off the officials of the local “plaza” (informal police jurisdiction)
grew into a national organized crime organization paying off high-level political
authorities. Originally, under the concept of the plaza, the drug traﬂicker or smug-
gler bought his or her “license” to operate from the local police chief, military com-
mander, mayor, or the individual who had been given authority in that area by the
PRI: “Payments went to locals who passed part of it up to the patrons they owed
their positions to. Should a trafﬁcker have a major business success with resulting
notoriety, he would then likely be visited by the ‘judiciales’ (state level agents of law
enforcement) and later by federales’ (agents of national police agencies) and oper-
ating ‘franchises’ would have to be also purchased directly from these agencies.”
One of the sources I interviewed for this chapter reported that the Mexican
government, particularly the Ministry of the Treasury (Hacienda), has not pro-
vided a budget to other government institutions, such as the Mexican Attorney
General’s Oﬂice (PGR) or the Federal Judicial Police (PJF), and these agencies have
had to ﬁnd their own way to obtain operating funds. For many years, these agen-
cies have assigned their personnel to their offices (plazas) throughout Mexico, ex-
pecting them to perform their duties with honor, while providing little or no fund-
ing to do so. These ofﬁcials arrive at their new posts and must ﬁnd ways to “earn”
money so that they can pay their personnel, pay for their oﬂice expenditures, and
survive on their meager salaries. According to Source “A” it was generally through
the arrests of organized crime ﬁgures and the seizures of their contraband goods
(such as stolen cars, drugs, weapons, or television sets) that these individuals were
sent to jail and their goods conﬁscated and turned over to Hacienda. The drugs
would be turned over to the prosecutor for destruction, while Hacienda would sell
the contraband items and give 40 percent of the proﬁts of these sales to the fed-
eral law enforcement oﬂicials. It was in this manner that the police survived.
Source “A” indicated that very often the police ofﬁcial in charge of the area would
simply conﬁscate contraband from the crime ﬁgure and submit the goods to Ha-
cienda for a payment; the oﬂicial would then require the crime ﬁgure to sign over
the deed or title of his house or car to the law enforcement official or a relative. “A”
blamed the Mexican government for not providing the law enforcement officials
with much-needed funds, training, and equipment to perform their duties in an

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 43

honorable fashion. According to “A” the hierarchy has looked the other way,
knowing its personnel were extorting monies, properties, and gifts to administer
justice while illegally enriching themselves. I,

“A” further observed that, since the PGR/PJF hierarchy in Mexico City was not
in a position to earna decent wage, the commanders in the ﬁeld would donate to
La Copa (essentially passing the hat around), by which a percentage of the ﬁeld
proﬁts was sent to superiors in Mexico City, usually on a monthly basis. “A” ex-
plained that since Mexico City was declared a free zone (not controlled by any-
one), the hierarchy in the Federal District relied upon donations from theﬁeld
commanders to supplement their incomes. This tradition had been carried on for
decades and it was not until approximately the mid-1980s, with the establishment
of the National Commission on Human Rights and with the complaints of the
criminals lodged against the PGR/PJF oﬂicials, that the custom changed. “A” indi-
cated that until this time, the police or military had dictated the terms of the
plazas to the organized crime ﬁgures and had exerted control over them. How-
ever, with the new concern about human rights, the police and military com-
manders could no longer exert control over the criminals, and many of the experi-
enced commanders resigned for fear of going to prison. Thus, many plaza holders
became servants to the crime ﬁgures and literally became part of the organized
crime scheme, rather than attempting to control or prosecute the criminals.

“A” noted that in the late 1940s, President Miguel Aleman “devalued the Mexi-
can Generals” by creating 300 when there had been only 20, thereby having 300-
plus generals looking to share “the spoils” of the country. As has previously been
stated, military zone commanders obtained monies and gifts from drug traffick-
ers and other organized criminals within their zones in exchange for protection
and/ or immunity from prosecution. The zone commanders have generally coor-
dinated through intermediaries with the PGR/PJF ofﬁcials on the “levies of funds”
to be obtained from organized crime.

A second informed source, “B,” told me that the PGR Ministerio Pliblico Fed-
eral (Federal Prosecutor, MPF), who is typically assigned to one location from four
to six years, is generally the intermediary between the drug trafﬁcker, the
PGR/PJF hierarchy, and the military. This arrangement is usually made through
the attorneys working for the drug traffickers or organized criminals. Rarely are

the senior government executives involved in the negotiations with criminals.

44 Stanley A. Pimentel

Suitcases ﬁlled with money are passed from the criminals through their lawyers to
the MPF. He then passes it to his superiors, who in turn pass it on to their superi-
ors as far away as Mexico City. Both “A” and “B” advised that while the PJF was di-
rected by Rodolfo Leon Aragon and Adrian Carrera Fuentes (1990-1994), they
regularly sent their immediate subordinates in ofﬁcial PGR aircraft to pick up the
suitcases ﬁlled with money and gifts obtained from the organized crime elements
by the PGR/PJF plaza holders throughout Mexico. These suitcases were later dis-
bursed among Aragén and Fuentes, to their superiors in the PGR/PJF, and ulti-
mately to Los Pinos (the presidential residence) to a “slush fund” account.

Details of this slush fund were brought out during the extradition hearings of
former PGR Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu in U.S. District Court,
Newark, New Jersey, in 1996. When questioned about the source of money in a
seized Houston bank account, Ruiz Massieu claimed that he had received a num-
ber of bonuses from President Salinas, the largest being 800,000 pesos (approxi-
mately $240,000 at the 1993 exchange rate). Documents presented at the extradi-
tion hearing by the PGR attested to the presidential accounts and the awarding of
bonuses to PRI members.

“A” asserted that many believe the Mexican military has been exempt from act-
ing in complicity with organized crime. However, evidence to the contrary is the
February 1997 arrest of the former division commander, and former commissioner
of the PGR’s National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD), General Jesus Gutierrez
Rebollo, who was charged with protecting a major drug cartel leader, Amado Car-
rillo Fuentes, and his organization. Allegedly, in exchange for gifts such as luxury
apartments, vehicles, jewelry, and money, Gutiérrez provided protection to the
Carrillo Fuentes organization while attempting to dismantle the rival Arellano Fe-
lix drug trafﬁcking organization of Tijuana. Witnesses have testiﬁed at the Gutier-
rez Rebollo hearings that drug traﬂicker Amado Carrillo Fuentes was in possession
of PGR credentials allegedly provided by Gutiérrez Rebollo. (Carrillo Fuentes died
at a clinic in Mexico City on July 4, 1997, after undergoing surgery to alter his ap-
pearance.) The role played by the PJF and former DFS agents with organized crime
has been abundantly portrayed in the media. However, “the information about the
military collusion with drug trafﬁckers is less known . . . and surely, their partici-
pation is more than what has been ‘ﬁltered’ by the media. . . . The ‘generals’ are
not necessarily those who are the visible heads.”22

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 45

Source “A” advised that La Copa had been a traditional means of corruption
within the law-enforcement institutions of Mexico. However, in the mid-1970s to
the early 1980s, the DES, in the name of national security and with total license
granted by the presidential oﬁice to attack the enemies of the system, took corrup-
tion to a new level with its greed and dictatorial powers. “DFS’s primary mission
in the 1960s was as an anti-guerrilla force to combat the National Revolutionary
Civic Association (ACNR), and later the Party of the Poor and the Mexican Peo-
ple’s Party. As the guerrilla organizations mobilized in the cities, DFS formed the
White Brigade (La Brigada Blanca) . . . to neutralize them . . . The White Brigade
is said to have tortured, killed and ‘disappeared’ hundreds of Mexicans consid-
ered threats to the regime.”23 While getting rid of the guerrilla threat to the coun-
try, the DFS personnel with their “death squads” combined their counterinsur-
gency activities with active participation in the drug trade, particularly in the

Guadalajara region.

From its inception, DFS had interactions with drug traﬂickers. . . . Atonio Zorrilla (Direc-
tor of the DFS in the 1980s) signed the DES and Gobernacién Agent Identiﬁcation cards
that Rafael Caro Quintero and other members of the Guadalajara cartel were carrying
when they were arrested. According to the revelations of the Camarena (DEA Agent kid-
napped, tortured and killed by drug traffickers in 1985) trials, DFS Comandantes and ex-
Comandantes even became participants and investors in the Guadalajara cartel’s planta-
tions and trafﬁcking ventures.“

Once the guerrilla movement was stopped by the DFS, the complicity between
the drug traﬂickers and the DES reached unprecedented levels in the mid-19803.
Mexican newspaper reporter Manuel Buendia was killed in May 1984, and DEA
agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and his pilot were kidnapped, tortured, and
killed by traﬂickers the following year. Buendia allegedly came into possession of
a videotape showing high-ranking government oﬂicials meeting with drug traf-
ﬁckers. Buendia was ordered killed by his friend and conﬁdant, Jose Antonio Zor-
rilla Pérez, who at the time was head of the DFS. Zorrilla Pérez was said to have
political ties to the interior minister when Buendia began publishing details in a
Mexican newspaper of the drug traﬁickers’ connections to high-level police,
politicians, and businessmen.”

Source “A” noted that Zorrilla’s predecessors had been from military back-
grounds, and therefore disciplined, and had held in check the many organized

The chapter by Stanley A. Pimental was first published in Trends in Organized Crime, Volume
4, Number 3, Spring 1999. Copyright © National Strategy Information Center, 1999.

Copyright © 2000, University of Pittsburgh Press
All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America
Printed on acid-free paper

10987654321

Library of Congress Cataloging—in—Publication Data

Organized crime and democratic governability : Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican border-
lands / edited by John Bailey and Roy Godson.
p. cm. —— (Pitt Latin American series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8229-4146-5 (cloth) — ISBN 0-8229-5758-2 (paper)

1. Organized crime——Mexico. 2. Organized crime——-Political aspects—-Mexico.
3. Organized crime—Mexican-American Border Region. 4. Mexico—Politics and
government-1988- I. Bailey, John J. 11. Godson, Roy, 1942- 111. Series.
HV6812 .074 2000
364.1'06'0972—dc21

00-011649

46 Stanley A. Pimentel

crime ﬁgures. According to this source, Zorrilla, as head of the DFS and a career
politician, believed he was all—powerful and an untouchable executive of the PRI.
He ordered the assassination of Buendia and was even rewarded by the Interior
Ministry and designated a candidate for a PRI federal deputy position. However,
“A” advised that public opinion subsequently led to a decision in 1990 by then-
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari that Zorrilla be tried for the Buendia murder.
Zorrilla was sentenced to forty years in prison.

As a result of these two well-publicized events and at a time when the media
were linking governors, military oﬂicers, and even President Miguel de la Madrid
to drug traffickers, de la Madrid ordered the dissolution of the DFS in late 1985.
As a result, several ex-DFS commanders continued their involvement in drugs. In
particular, Rafael Aguilar Guajardo would become a major drug cartel leader in
the Juarez, Mexico, area until his murder in 1993 in Cancun.

Source “B” stated that until approximately the mid-19803, the local plaza dealt
with the organized criminal elements in the region, and these in turn dealt only
with the authorities of that area. The plaza holder generally received instructions
from Mexico City, either through the mayor or the governor or from the director
of the PJF or DFS. The ﬁnancial terms would be dictated to the organized crime
ﬁgures. However, Rafael Caro Quintero, head of the Guadalajara drug cartel,
broke all the rules of the “game” by personally approaching the secretaries of de-
fense and interior. According to  until this time, no organized crime ﬁgure
had ever dared approach a high-level government ofﬁcial, as all negotiations be-
tween Mexico City and the plaza had always been through intermediaries of the
region. “A 1988 District Court aﬂidavit in the State of Arizona states that in 1984
an informant told the DEA that a consortium of traﬂickers including Rafael Caro
Quintero, Juan Esparagoza Moreno, Jaime Figueroa Soto, Manuel Salcido and
Juan Quintero Paez paid ten million dollars to the Mexican Secretary of Defense,
General Juan Arevalo Gardoqui, for protection.”25 A note from the Second Section
(Intelligence Section—Mexican Army) to the secretary of defense, dated March 4,
1997, lists persons linked to drug trafﬁckers in the 15th Military Zone, Guadala-
jara, Jalisco. During an investigation carried out by the military in 1991, Ruben
Zuno Arce, the former brother-in-law of former President Luis Echeverria, was
found to have been involved with drug traﬂickers.

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 47

General Juan Felix Tapia, formerly in charge of the 15th Military Zone, now retired, was an
associate and protector of Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, alias Don Neto, and has received
monies and gifts directly from him or through the intermediary, Lt. Colonel Jorge Garma
Diaz (ﬁred), or through another drug trafﬁcker, Roberto Orozco. It is said that Rafael Caro
Quintero gave him (General Felix Tapia) a dark red Grand Marquis and another to Colonel
Beltran Guerra. It has also been noted that General Arévalo ordered that Garma Diaz be
given access to a car and driver, and that Felix Tapia was closely associated with Ruben
Zuno Arce.”

Zuno Arce is presently incarcerated in the United States, following a 1990 con-
viction by a federal court in Los Angeles for complicity in Camarena’s murder.

A third informed source, “C,” advised that for approximately the past thirty
years, the seeding, cultivation, and sales of marijuana and heroin and the smug-
gling of cocaine have been carried out by reputed Mexican drug traffickers. How-
ever, all of these traﬂickers were acting in concert with the governing powers of
the state, namely the governors, the military, and the police forces, and these in
turn collaborated with their patrons in the hierarchy of the PRI. “C” emphasized
that no one can act without protectors (nadie sin protectores) in the patron-client re-
lationships, which have existed within the PR1 for the past seventy years. “C”
noted that for the past thirty years, politicians and organized crime have worked
hand in hand———the politicians providing criminal organizations with protection
from prosecution or competition from rivals in exchange for money and gifts. Os-
car Lopez Olivares, alias El Profe, a lieutenant of former drug kingpin Garcia
Abrego, stated:

Drug traﬂicking . . . is a matter completely handled by the government, from the protec-
tion that is given to the marijuana cultivations, everything is duly controlled, ﬁrst by the
Army, next by the Federal Judicial Police, and even the fumigators of the PGR . . . there is
no doubt that police agencies have been the protective arm of the principal drug
barons. . . . At the same time, these (barons) have received protection from high level
politicians.” *

“C” noted that those who step out of line or are not in agreement with the gov-
erning forces are jailed or killed, while new clients are found to provide the protec-
tors with the necessary cash and gifts. “C” went on to say that nothing happens in
Mexico that is not known by the protectors; therefore, when a government official

denies knowing the location of a badly wanted ﬁigitive, he is lying.

48 Stanley A. Pimentel

As an example, all three informed sources agreed that certain ofﬁcials within
the Mexican government were aware of the whereabouts of the Gulf Cartel leader
and former FBI top ten fugitive, Juan Garcia Abrego, in the 1990s, and could have
detained him when he was being sought by U.S. authorities. However, these
ofﬁcials chose not to cause his arrest inasmuch as they were being paid directly or
indirectly by Garcia Abrego and he had not as yet become expendable. It was only
after Garcia Abrego had in fact become a liability to the Mexican government that
he was allowed to be captured and turned over to the U.S. government in January
1996. PGR officials familiar with the capture of Juan Garcia Abrego allege that the
PJF commander in charge of the Garcia Abrego investigation received $500,000
and a new bullet—proof Grand Marquis vehicle from another major cartel leader
for arresting Garcia Abrego. Source “B” reported that this PJF commander was as-
signed to Tijuana after the arrest and expulsion of Garcia Abrego, with orders to
prosecute the Arellano Felix drug traﬂicking organization. Instead, he received
several million dollars from them to allow them to continue their operations in Ti-
juana.” Based on her study of the Garcia Abrego organization, Yolanda Figueroa
asserts that “no one doubts that the Gulf Cartel (Garcia Abrego) is a part of the
power group. It is impossible to move tons of cocaine, launder thousands of mil-
lions of dollars, maintain a clandestine organization of several hundred armed
persons, without a system of political and police protection . . . [It is] a clear ex-
ample of how a criminal organization interrelates with a power group.”3°

The three informed sources separately corroborated that the sale of offices
within the PGR/PJF has been done generally through a deputy attorney general,
who was purposely selected by the PRI hierarchy and named by the president.
(One Mexican attorney general stated that President Salinas did not allow him to
select his own deputy attorney general.) In addition, one former PGR delegate
(much like a U.S. attorney for a district) informed me that a deputy attorney gen-
eral told him that the plaza he was taking over cost $3 million, plus a payment of
$1 million per month rent, and that he should pay up front. The delegate said he
told the deputy attorney general that since he had been selected by the president,
he was not going to pay.

Two of the informed sources pointed out that during his tenure former Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas selected three individuals to coordinate Mexico’s counterdrug
efforts. The three have been reportedly linked to drug traffickers by the media.

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 49

Important positions such as the PGR delegate or deputy delegate in Tijuana or
Juarez could cost up to $3 million for the concession. The delegate in turn would
pay $1 million per month, payments to be made to the PGR hierarchy, and ulti-
mately to Los Pinos. These monies were provided, of course, by the organized
crime elements. Source “C” conﬁrmed that portions of the payments collected
during the Salinas administration by the PJF directors would ultimately reach
President Salinas’ private secretary, where the monies would be placed in secret
accounts to be used as the president or the PR1 hierarchy saw ﬁt. Positions in
other non—drug producing/ less populated states cost only $30,000 for the conces-
sion and a few thousand dollars per month payments to the higher authorities.
Sources “A” and “B” report that the sale of offices continues to this day (August
1998) in the PGR/PJF.

Two of the informed sources corroborated that selective law enforcement of
organized crime activities took place during the past thirty years. Organized
crime ﬁgures went to prison only after much hue and cry from the United States;
when that individual became a liability to the Mexican government, such as in the
case of Garcia Abrego; or if the political situation warranted a “sacriﬁcial lamb” to
appease the U.S. government, such as during the weeks prior to the “certiﬁcation
process” by the U.S. Congress in March of each year. The sources reported that as
long as the criminals maintained a low proﬁle, paid their dues each month, and
did not create any problems for the police, the law enforcement authorities would
not prosecute them. “In Mexico, control was in the hands of the State . . . which in
determined circumstances . . . especially when there are political pressures from
the United States . . . (Mexico has been) obligated to sacriﬁce laborers (who are)
easily replaced, but without weakening the drug organization to the point of plac-
ing its existence in danger. ”31

Two sources stated that 1992 marked the beginning of the “limousine service"
in which the military, the PGR/PJF, and state judicial police oﬂicials began pro-
viding protection for drug shipments to the border area. Most often, the road
blocks implemented in an area by the military, the PGR, PJF, or the local authori-
ties are to safeguard the passage of the drug shipments and not necessarily for the
detection of contraband. Through intermediaries, the plaza holder will be
notiﬁed when a drug shipment is expected and is instructed to set up the check-

points. The sources indicated that one plaza holder will not necessarily know that

50 Stanley A. Pimentel

another plaza holder in another state or region has coordinated the shipment of
drugs to the next area. To facilitate smooth operations, orders will come from
Mexico City to the appropriate “jefe” (boss) in the plaza to supervise and ensure
the safe transhipment of the merchandise through his or her area.

The sources went on to explain that not only was organized crime expected to
consistently pay, but they had to continually keep the plaza informed of their ac-
tivities, their associates, and their rivals—particularly those who were not paying
or had not received the authority from the plaza to operate. The three sources
stated that once a productive relationship had been developed between the organ-
ized crime ﬁgure and the plaza, the crime ﬁgure would try to keep that ofﬁcial in
place for a long period by making the plaza holder look good to his superiors.
“The trafﬁcker was expected to assist the police and the political system by pro-
viding grist for the judicial mill (i.e., pinpoint or inform on rival trafﬁckers) as
well as public relations materials to give the U.S. drug enforcers. Thus, while the
trafﬁcker could gain protection and warning information, the police could gain
credit, praise, and promotions; the political system gained campaign monies and
control; and the U.S. obtained statistics, to justify a job well done.”32

“B” advised that many organized crime ﬁgures are marrying police ofﬁcers or
prosecutors to ﬁirther protect themselves from persecution and prosecution. The
three sources noted that organized crime leaders have insulated themselves fur-
ther by recruiting family members, trusted friends, and others through intimida-
tion exerted by their attorneys and enforcers to carry out their trade. “B” and “C”
advised that most of the organized crime ﬁgures’ money does not leave Mexico,
but rather is invested in real estate, apartments, houses, ﬁnancial markets, con-
struction and road building ﬁrms, drugstores, tourism projects, and, of course,
paying for protection.

The question is then asked, if the Mexican government has been a patron-
client type of system, who is the ultimate patron? One informed source has stated
that the person manipulating or orchestrating the PRI hierarchy behind the
scenes, much like a puppeteer, is a former secretary of interior who has main-
tained extremely powerﬁil control over the principal members of the PR1 through
favors, promotions, and blackmail. This individual has been able to manipulate
and control the PRI hierarchy for so many years because of his astute ability to
play one political interest against the other and yet maintain the loyalties of the

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 51

players. Other sources agree that this individual is powerful; however, they sug-
gest that a select few long-time, central ﬁgures of the PR1 have also exerted control
over its members for the past forty years.

We have examined how organized crime evolved in Mexico and how the or-
ganized crime elements were utilized by the political system. “In other words,
traffickers have been perceived as creatures used by the dominant political class to
do its dirty work, (and) not as independent social agents or barbarians trying to
take by force the strength of the State through corrupt strategies directed at un-
polluted officials at different levels.”33 Organized crime ﬁgures are in business for
the money. The more money they can make, the more they can legitimize their
status in the community, the region, and the nation. The Mexican drug traﬂickers
are known to have built roads, churches, schools, and medical centers in their
communities. Others, like Garcia Abrego, sent their children to the United States

to be educated. In this manner they can legitimize their status in the region at the

same time they obtain protection and immunity from the authorities. According
to the informed sources, these organized crime ﬁgures have not sought political
positions nor do they seek publicity in the media. Cartel leaders such as Garcia
Abrego and Carrillo Fuentes bought newspaper and magazine businesses to try to
keep their names out of the press. PGR officials advised that they have established
that many newspaper persons receive salaries from organized criminals in order
to keep their names out of the paper, just as the PR1 has “purchased” newspaper
reporters to publish stories favorable to that party.

Disorder in the Political-Criminal Nexus

July 6, 1997, began a new era for the country of Mexico. For the ﬁrst time in al-
most seventy years, the PR1 was no longer a majority in the chamber of delegates
and it had lost two additional governorships to the opposition PAN (the National
Action Party) and the mayoralty of Mexico City to the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD). For the ﬁrst time, the PR1 would have to learn how to share legisla-
tive powers with the opposing parties and not be a “rubber-stamp” to the presi-
dent as it had been for so long. At the same time, Mexico has undergone

signiﬁcant erosion of institutional authority. There is less power at the center, even in the
presidency, than there used to be. . . . In effect, Mexico has been witnessing political disin-

52 Stanley A. Pimentel

tegration at two distinct levels—among its uppermost institutions, and within the political
class. These developments intersect with each other and multiply their mutual effects. In
this fashion, they set the scene for the ascendancy of the country's new-age drug barons. . . .
The deterioration of Mexico’s long-standing system tends to magnify the political
signiﬁcance of drug traffickers, since they face relatively few constraints on their action.34

Bluntly put, at the present time no one is in charge. The traditional methods of
control from the president down through the PR1 hierarchy, and through the so-
cial control agents over organized crime, have deteriorated to the point where
criminality is rampant, a number of political murders have not been resolved, and
kidnappings for extremely large ransoms have gone unresolved for years. The
transition taking place from authoritarianism to democracy in the last ﬁve years
has been extremely difﬁcult to navigate. The organized crime ﬁgures, realizing
this lack of control, know that they will not be touched by lawful authorities and
therefore are going after their competitors and assassinating the police oﬂicers
and prosecutors who are serious enough to go after them. And so, “no one is con-
fronting the maﬁas or serious crime for one simple reason; everyone, in whatever
police agency, knows who is killing whom and why. But they will not investigate
for one simple reason: It is better to delay it (investigating) or face assassination
by one’s own police comrades.”35

The mass ﬁrings of federal, state, and local police in the 1990s aggravated the
situation by placing more individuals on the street who were hungry to make ends
meet at any cost and have joined the criminals or banded together to form their
own enterprises. “By 1995, according to an internal Interior Ministry report, there
were an estimated 900 armed criminal bands in Mexico of which over 50 percent
were made up of current and retired members of law enforcement agencies.”36

Because of the well-established patron—client systems that ruled Mexico for so
many years and kept major crime in check, there was no perceived need for a ca-
reer civil service system. Therefore, with the exceptions of the army, foreign serv-
ice, and Bank of Mexico, no professional government institution exists today.
That lack of a professional career and a civil service system for the police and judi-
cial services has placed an unfair burden on these groups to administer justice.
The lack of training, the lack of a decent wage or possibility of promotion, and the
institution’s inability to provide the necessary tools for an investigation (i.e., cars,

phones, gas, per diem, as well as adequate laws) leads to corruption on the part of

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 53

the institution. When the institution does not provide the tools for the oiﬁcial to
carry out his or her duties, then that ofﬁcial must seek out ways, generally through
corrupt practices, to pay for services to the public institution.

In addition, through intimidation, coercion, and bribery of judges, major
criminals are having serious charges dismissed, allowing them back on the street
to continue their criminal activities. The authorities at the state and national lev-
els are “outgunned, outmanned” and undercut by the corruption and intimida-
tion by the criminals. President Zedillo has repeatedly stated that criminals pres-
ent the number one threat to the national security of Mexico. In addition,
urbanization, multinational corporations, global communications, international-
ization of ﬁnance and ﬁnancial controls, the North America Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), and the creation of an educated and viable middle class with dem-
ocratic expectations have all contributed toward weakening the authoritarian
system of governance in Mexico.

For almost seven decades, “corruption enables the system to function, provid-
ing the ‘oil’ that makes the wheels of the bureaucratic machine turn and the ‘glue’
that seals political alliances”37 and brought Mexico relative calm. From the forego-
ing, it would appear that:

Corruption and complicity appear to have been carefully organized. If this is so, they have
to be considered as institutions serving precise and speciﬁc goals of the existing Mexican
political system. . . . They integrate the political elite, reward loyalty to the Presidency,
serve as a real and permanent threat for those not conforming to the rules and provide a ve-
hicle for economic and social mobility. However, the set of institutions created in 1929 no
longer respond to the needs of a society in the process of modernization. Many of the insti-
tutions that had» functioned in the past, have become dysﬁmctional and now threaten to
thwart Mexico's further development.”

Indeed, the change from authoritarianism to democracy will be a difficult chal-
lenge for Mexico and there could be a period of ungovernability as we are witness-
ing today. A recent newspaper article aptly stated, “There currently exists in Mex-
ico an alarming political vacuum. We are trapped in the midst of a transition from
a presidentialist and centralist system that no longer functions, toward a plural
democratic system that has not been consolidated. The violence, the insecurity,
the lack of dialog, and the permanent political tension that we live are all products

of that power vacuum and from the lack of a profound democratic reform.”39

54 Stanley A. Pimentel

For Mexico to regain its streets and the conﬁdence of the public, drastic judi-
cial and law enforcement changes must be implemented, ﬁrst by professionalizing
the social control agencies and the judiciary, and second by modifying the laws to
be able to attack the organized crime problems effectively and efﬁciently. At the
helm of the PGR, PJF, and other national law enforcement agencies must be
strong, honest, and experienced individuals and an equally strong and honest
staff with experience in law enforcement who will remain in place for many years.
The professionalization of law enforcement is critical, and to achieve this the re-
cruitment, selection, and training processes must be upgraded and maintained,
with better salaries, incentive programs, and career opportunities. These institu-
tions must operate with checks and balances to ensure that the performance and
integrity of the public oﬂicials will be above board and open to public scrutiny. An
impartial device for monitoring the performances of public officials, with the
power to discipline and punish offenders of the public trust, must be established.
Legislative oversight must be implemented to ensure compliance, public scrutiny,
and continuity in the professionalization of police and law enforcement. The op-
erations of law enforcement must be transparent and coordinated to address the
major crime problems of the community. Task forces must be established to at-
tack organized crime elements, gather intelligence on corrupt organizations, and
dismantle these by seizing their assets and incarcerating their members. Proﬁts
realized from the seizure of assets should be returned to the police to augment its
budget for training and equipment. Judicial reform is a must in order to attack or-
ganized crime. Passage of legislation to utilize undercover agents, informants,
electronic monitoring devices, and effective witness protection programs and
funding for such initiatives is required. Banking laws must be strengthened to
make money laundering and frauds serious criminal offenses.“

There is no respect for law enforcement authorities in Mexico. There is a need
to instill in the community a sense of trust by which each citizen can expect re-
spect, honesty, and integrity from public servants. The institutions must work
with the community to improve relations and to instill a sense of trust toward the
police. On the other hand, the police and the prosecutors must gain the public’s
trust by not accepting or demanding bribes, by being professional and courteous,
respecting the civil rights of each citizen, and working with the community to

make it a safer environment. Extensive crime prevention programs sponsored by

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 55

the government and the private sector should be implemented and should ad-
dress all age groups.

President Ernesto Zedillo, in an address to the nation on November 30, 1997,
stated that he shared the nation’s indignation over rising crime and pledged to
crack down on organized criminals and police corruption. He promised to send
draft legislation to the Congress that would reform the Constitution and Mexico's
antiquated laws to stiffen penalties against criminals and to make it more difficult
for criminals to avoid judicial actions. He intended to launch a nationwide cru-
sade against crime and violence by: (1) legislating rigorous laws to punish the
criminals; (2) profoundly transforming the law enforcement institutions and their
personnel; (3) greatly increasing the economic resources for law enforcement ef-
forts; (4) mobilizing society toward a culture of lawfulness; and (5) instilling in so-
ciety an awareness that all crimes must be punished, whether at the local, state, or
national levels.“

The future of Mexico is full of perils, with many competing interests. On the
one hand, there are those who want democratic change with equal participation
of all political parties; then there are the so-called dinosaurs of the PRI who do not
want change under any circumstances and who will ﬁght change with their known
methods of corruption and complicity. Also resisting change are the organized
criminals, competing among themselves for ﬁefdoms through kidnappings and
murders. Finally we have those caught in the middle of all the above, the majority
of hard-working and honest Mexican citizens striving for tranquility and justice.
As Mexico’s Nobel Laureate, Octavio Paz, said:

We are witnessing the end of the PRI system, which could pave the way to a multiparty sys-
tem; but if we don’t achieve that, if the different forces don’t succeed in agreeing on a
peaceful transition toward a new political situation, we will have demonstrations, possible
violence in the countryside and the cities, internal ﬁghting, or something like that . . . in
the long run, the forces of openness, modernization, and democracy will prevail, but it will
be a very painful, very diﬂicult road.“

Contents

PART I

List of Tables and Illustrations / vii

Acknowledgments / ix

Introduction / 1
john Bailey and Roy Godson

Crime and Governability in Mexico

The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics
in Mexico / 33
Stanley A. Pimentel

Organized Crime and the Organization
of Crime / 58
Luis Astorga

Organized Crime and Political Campaign
Finance in Mexico / 83
Leonardo Curzio

Scope and Limits of an Act of Good Faith: The
PAN’s Experience at the Head of the Office of
the Attorney General of the Republic / 103
Sigrid Arzt

Containing Armed Groups, Drug Trafﬁcking,
and Organized Crime in Mexico: The Role

of the Military / 126

Razil Benitez Manaut

56 Stanley A. Pimentel

Appendix: Comparative Models of Organized Crime*

Model One: The Stage-Evolutionary Model of Organized Crime

1. The Predatory Stage
Examples: Street gangs; outlaw motorcycle gangs (early period); Vietnamese gangs.

II. The Parasitical Stage
Examples: Italian American organized crime in general; many Colombian organiza-
tions; many Bosnian groups.

III. The Symbiotic Stage

Examples: Italian American organized crime in private sanitation, Fulton ﬁsh market,
and construction industry in New York City; certain labor unions; Japanese Yakuza; Chi-
nese triad organizations in Southeast Asia; Cali cartel in Valle de Cauca.

Model Two: The Elite-Exploitation Model of Organized Crime

1. Entrenched Dominant Elites
Dominant political party, military, political-economic, security apparatus. Russian
Nomenklatura; key regime actors; serious criminal communities.

11. Tax and Extort
Major national, transnational, and regional organized crime groups and drug traffick-
ers.

III. For Hard Currency, Internal Development and Investment, Campaign Funding, and
Personal Enrichment

This system is controlled by operators and collusion at the top. Examples include
Burma, Mexico, Pakistan, and Russia.

Some Indicators of the Elite-Exploitation (E-E) Model Compared with the
Stage-Evolutionary Model of Organized Crime

0 Organized crime entrepreneurs are viewed as “cash cows” to be “taxed, exploited, and
manipulated by the political system’s agents and institutions of social control.”

0 Organized criminals are rarely permitted to retire from the game. If they are, other
family members take their place in the system.

0 The children of organized criminals rarely establish legitimate careers totally sepa-
rated from the business of crime. Money laundering fronts are about as far as they get.

0 The agents of state institutions of social control plan and initiate criminal acts rang-
ing from sale of seized drugs to murder.

0 Extrajudicial acts and actors are a basic part of the system.

*The above models and indicators were developed by Professor Peter A. Lupsha.

Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico 57

- Seized drugs and other contraband tend to be used and sold, not destroyed, despite
“Potemkin-like" displays of destruction.

0 When elites change, organized crime group leaders tend to be replaced, and the for-
mer leader is arrested, extradited, or killed.

0 When contraband seizures are made, generally no arrests are made.

0 When arrests are made, these are generally the lowest level of personnel of the crimi-
nal organization.

- Oﬂices (positions) are sold, especially those in lucrative ports of entry in drug/ contra-
band/ import areas.

0 The elites’ willingness to commit crimes and use threats and torture creates a conspir-
acy of silence among organized criminals even after arrest or extradition.

- There are embedded expectations of kickbacks and payments up the chain of com-
mand. Thus, extortionist behaviors permeate every level of organization and spread across
the system.

Little of the above is commonplace in the stage-evolutionary model.

Chapter 3

Organized Crime and the

Organization of Crime

Luis Astorga

Introduction

AS A METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE, the study ofa
subject should begin with critical examination of the sociohistor-
ical origin of inherited categories and patterns of perception. Do-
ing otherwise limits One’s understanding of the subject. In the
case of illicit drugs and drug traffickers, the current prevailing
discourse can make uncritical thinkers believe that what is said
is true and has always been true and that the future is already
laid out. People talk about the war on drugs, drug traﬂicking,
drug traﬂickers, cartels, federation, Colombianization, organ-
ized crime, national security, and the like as if these categories
had meaning in themselves. All of these categories of perception
are sociohistorical constructions or intellectual creations that
have been successfully imposed by those who invented them.
This is so not because they provide better explanations, but to a
great extent because of those persons’ social status and their abil-
ity to make their perceptions take precedence over those of their
competitors. The universe of thought in which these categories
gain their meaning began to become more clearly deﬁned at the
beginning of the twentieth century with the birth of the new
modern prohibitionist era, which was actively promoted by dif-
ferent U.S. administrations. The Shanghai Conference on Opium
Control in 1909 was the starting point for this.

58

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 59

Over time, drugs, the social agents who deal them, and their activities have
been conceptualized in various ways. The current prevailing discourse includes
categories of perception that have been established at different times and in differ-
ent places. Curiously, heterogeneous realities have led to a trend toward the ho-
mogenization of concepts, making them universal, and toward a type of concep-
tual imperialism. Historical analysis of each individual situation makes it possible
to determine the social uses of different drugs over time and the perceptions peo-
ple have of those drugs and their users. Such analysis also helps identify the words
that have been invented to designate the substances, social agents, and conceptual
patterns that have served as reference points in understanding the relationship
among users. It also allows for the observation of changes and external inﬂuences
on the determination of categories and patterns of perception in concrete cases.

As for organized crime, one must research both the sociohistorical process
that made it possible at a given time to criminalize activities that were previously
legal as well as the social agents who—depending on the location and time, from
outside or inside legitimate power structures——organized those activities using a
business rationale without regard for conventional ethical concerns. Regarding il-
licit drug trafﬁcking, in each instance one must study the skill and ethical willing-
ness of certain social groups, inside and outside the state or the hegemonic politi-
cal power, to directly or indirectly organize and control this activity that has been
outlawed since the beginning of the twentieth century. Organized crime is a cate-
gory that encompasses several factors: (1) the number of participants and per-
ceived scale of illicit operations; (2) the level of business development and organi-
zation attributed to the social agents who live off of the illegal business or who at
some point participate in that business; and (3) the danger these participants may
pose in speciﬁc situations for the existence or effective exercise of the rule of law}

The clandestine production of and demand for prohibited goods are two as-
pects of a complementary relationship. Contraband is a strategy of selling illegal
or legal goods through fraudulent means. When this trade takes place between
countries with different laws——one that prohibits certain goods and another that
does not—there are legal repercussions. So in a sense, prohibition creates the
crime and the criminal. As for the sale of drugs, it can either be a legitimate com-
mercial activity with goods made proﬁtable by demand, or it can be illegal when

the goods and those who trade them cross the border between countries with dif-

60 Luis Astorga

ferent legal codes to conduct their business. What is criminal on one side is legal
on the other.

In the face of this contradiction, the more powerful country will try to impose
its vision of the phenomenon and change the laws of the weaker country accord-
ingly. That was the situation that began to emerge between Mexico and the
United States after the U.S. Congress passed the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914,
which imposed certain controls and restrictions on the production of opium for
smoking; there were no similar measures in Mexico. Another example, but of the
opposite circumstance—that is, of free trade, was the situation that forced China
to surrender to the interests of English opium traders in the nineteenth century.

There may be preexisting ignorance when conducting this business, that is, so-
cial agents are neither perfectly rational nor perfectly informed. When the act is
voluntary and agents have prior knowledge of the legal implications, there can be
multiple reasons for engaging in it. These may range from deeming illegal drug
trade to be an economic activity like any other to viewing it as a means for survival
or a ﬁill-time profession, thus making it worthwhile to risk one’s freedom or even
one’s life. The person is aware of the risk; however, the nonconformity of the es-
tablished measures, the expected proﬁts, and the hope for success outweigh the
negatives.

There are various reasons why prohibitionist laws are passed in a given society,
including the perceived need by decision makers—which is not necessarily shared
by the rest of society——to establish strict controls on certain behaviors and prac-
tices of some inhabitants, which they oppose. Other reasons include the existence
of a widespread conviction that such laws are necessary, internal social pressure
stimulated by inﬂuential groups, and external political pressure, among others.

The prohibitionist measures that began in 1909 continued on their course in
other forums, such as the International Opium Convention that was held in The
Hague in 1912. The U.S. government passed the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914
with the same intentions. The Mexican government began to participate in these
international forums in 1912, adopting the proposed measures. Opium poppy was
cultivated in Mexico and large amounts of opium were imported for medicinal
use. Nonetheless, the prohibitionist mentality was not as developed in Mexico as
it was in the United States; the consumption of opiates was not as extensive in

Mexico and thus was not a cause for great concern. In addition, the country was

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 61

in the middle of a revolution. It simply did not have laws similar to those of its
neighbor to the north, and preparing such laws was not an urgent matter among
the political forces battling for power. National prohibition of the cultivation and
marketing of marijuana did not occur until 1920, and for opium poppy it was not
until 1926. Smugglers immediately saw the chance to do business and did not
deny themselves that opportunity. Those most involved in this trade at that time
were Mexican residents of Chinese origin, although they were not the only ones.
The northern part of the country became a strategic zone for the production of
and traﬂic in drugs.

The goal of this chapter is to present some signiﬁcant cases that illustrate the
particular features of this historic process in Mexico. I develop two main points.
First, contrary to the conventional wisdom that now considers drug trafficking in
Mexico as relatively recent and illegitimate from the start, research in archives
and newspapers shows how long it has existed and some of the sociohistoric con-
ditions that made it possible to transform a legitimate business into a prohibited
one. It also shows that in Mexico there are well—founded reasons for thinking that
this business originally ﬂourished because of the boost it was given from within
the regional power structures in production and trafficking areas, starting pre-
cisely at the time when the United States outlawed opium. The monopoly of polit-
ical power beginning in the 1920s by the victorious revolutionary forces, and the
lax ethics of some of its representatives and heirs in public administration in sub-
sequent decades, facilitated the success of the business.

Second, the mechanisms used by those in political office to control the busi-
ness changed in the 1940s with the arrival of civilians in power. From that time on,
the National Security Police (DFS) and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR)
were the main institutions responsible for combating drug traﬁic, for regulating
it, and for serving as a structural intermediary between traﬂickers and those in
political power. The traﬂickers, who were historically subordinated to the hege-
monic political power, showed greater relative autonomy only when the old power
structure began to show signs of deterioration in the 1980s and 1990s as the politi-
cal opposition gained ground.

62 Luis Astorga

Baja California

In the 1910s, the dealing of contraband illicit drugs was already sufficiently
proﬁtable to attract the attention of powerful politicians, such as Colonel Esteban
Cantu, Governor of Baja California (1914-1920). In reports from customs authori-
ties in Los Angeles (1916) to the Department of the Treasury and the Department
of State, he is named as having granted leases for opium trafficking in the region
he governed in exchange for large sums of money. The price of a lease was $45,000
and the monthly rent for trafﬁcking ranged between $10,000 and $11,000 (U.S.
dollars). He is also said to have been addicted to morphine. Gambling and prosti-
tution were other sources of revenue for his government and for Cantu himself. In
1917, an amendment to section XVI of article 73 of the Constitution was approved,
giving Congress the authority to dictate laws in ﬁelds like public health. One of
the main concerns was the sale of substances that “degenerated the Mexican
race,” such as opium, morphine, cocaine, ether, and marijuana. According to cus-
toms sources in Los Angeles, what Cantu seized he subsequently sold in the
United States with the help of his father-in-law’s family?

Governor Cantu (judge and jury) was a pioneer of the tradition between revo-
lutionary politicians and those who succeeded them of conducting private busi-
ness from public oﬂice, regardless of moral considerations and the illegal nature
of the activities. Opium trafﬁcking was simply one more business that his political
power and ethical disposition allowed him to conduct with greater chances of suc-
cess and impunity than other persons. Those who wanted to deal in the big league
had to do so with him. In other words, the trafﬁckers’ power was subordinate to
the political power of the governor. Technically, Cantu was a trafﬁcker only from
the U.S. point of view because poppy culture and its illegal commerce were not
prohibited in Mexico until 1926.

Displaced by the victorious revolutionaries from Sonora, Cantu was replaced
by General Abelardo L. Rodriguez, who was put in charge of military operations.
Rodriguez was subsequently made governor and some years later served as acting
president of Mexico (1932-1934) and then as governor of Sonora in the 19403.
General Rodriguez owned the Casino Agua Caliente in Tijuana, which at that time
was frequented by ﬁgures such as Babe Ruth, Charles Chaplin, Rita Hayworth,

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 63

and even Al Capone, and he took advantage of his position during the years of
prohibition in the United States to make his fortune.3

The possible conﬂict between organized crime and governability——a recent
concern in Mexico—was nulliﬁed by those in political power who controlled the
largest illegal business. From that time on, the “usual suspects” in wholesale drug
dealing were prominent politicians, particularly the governors of northern states
and persons close to them and members of their government or of police agencies.
The majority of inﬂuential traffickers who were not members of the political class
were political protégés, not the politician’s godfathers or controllers. In other
words, the traffickers were perceived as being used by the dominant political class
to do their dirty work, not as independent social agents above that class, nor were
they viewed as barbarians trying to seize the power of the state by force or through
corruption strategies aimed at ofﬁcials at different levels who were clean.

It is useful to take a closer look at some other early examples from the fringe
area of a history of suspicion that goes on today, the history of the ongoing ten-
sion between the spirit of the law and the spirit of deceit.

On May 18, 1931, Dr. Bernardo Bétiz B., a health officer in Baja California
Norte, sent a report to the head of the Department of Health in Mexico City, in
which he mentioned the talks he had held with U.S. authorities in Los Angeles on
the “lamentable traffic in opiates” in the border region. He stated that he had
reached the conclusion that the direction of the trafﬁcking was more from the
United States to Mexico than vice versa and that both he and narcotics supervisor
Harvey Smith thought that the large-scale trafﬁckers resided north of the border.
They were also suspicious of the behavior of veteran health workers in both coun-
tries. He noted that Governor Carlos Trejo y Lerdo de Tejada had told him
conﬁdentially that “the Mexican police were accomplices of the drug traffickers.”
He suggested “credible, energetic, and on-going action” to remove the “inclination
to judge with disdain the actions of Mexican authorities on drug issues.”4 Dr. Ba-
tiz’s curious concern was surprising, since he himself chose to reveal the gover-
nor’s conﬁdential information.

Almost two months later, on July 13, 1931, Dr. Rafael Silva, head of the Depart-
ment of Health, wrote a letter to Governor Trejo deﬁning his position on state-

ments allegedly made by personnel from his ofﬁce, saying that the governor was

64 Luis Astorga

named as someone who promoted “narcotics trafficking” or who did not help to
pursue traffickers. Dr. Silva was surprised by the news and stated that he and the
governor had known each other and been friends for some time. He assured the
governor that no one from his office had made public or conﬁdential statements
to that end. He also overrode “any lower-ranking employee who may have stated
an opinion not only without having ﬁill knowledge of the facts, but also without
having the jurisdiction and competence to do so on this subject.” He informed the
governor that investigation had begun into “lower-level narcotics employees,” in
search of proof to take legal action against whomever was found responsible for
the accusations against the governor.5

A conﬁdential memorandum (dated September 4, 1931) to Dr. Silva from Fran-
cisco Vazquez Pérez, head of Legal Services of the Health Department, informed
him that the recent attacks on Governor Trejo in the Chamber of Deputies had
been made by Deputy Bétiz, the brother of the health ofﬁcer in Baja California,
“thus making it easy to deduce that he received the data on narcotics trafficking in
Baja California that he transmitted to the Chamber from him.” The memorandum
stated that this information was being forwarded so that he “would kindly bring it
to the attention of the president of the republic, so that the attorney general may
make:

I. The appropriate decision on the events attributed to the government author-
ities in Baja California.

11. The appropriate decision on the possible revelation of details on drug
trafficking made by the health officer in Mexicali to Deputy Batiz.”“

Weeks earlier, on August 19, 1931, Deputy Bétiz had sent a report to Dr.
Demetrio Lopez, head of the Service of Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals. One of

the paragraphs of his text refers to Trejo in pointed terms:

Undoubtedly, the Governor, following Mr. Santoyo's (Secretary General of the Interior in
Baja California) indication, and more surely by the arrival of the Inspector of Chemistry
and Pharmaceuticals, S. Garcia Remus, and the notice from the military authorities, whom
Inspector Garcia Remus asked for assistance, felt obliged to pursue drug traffickers. This
was nothing more than a distraction. A few isolated arrests were made, which were wildly
exaggerated in the press, in order to make the government's work in that area seem very
worthwhile.

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 65

Batiz mentioned a note published in the Mexico City daily El Nacional on the
ninth of that month, in which Antonio Gabucio, personal secretary to Governor
Trejo, had discovered a “maﬁa” headed by Domingo Pérez Vazquez, the health in-
spector. According to Batiz’s investigations, the latter was a drug trafﬁcker,
“which the people who appointed him knew. With the help of the elements put at
his disposal, he pursued individuals who were competing with him in his busi-
ness.” In opposition to the account given that Pérez was not a government em-
ployee, Batiz stated that he was a trusted employee who had attended numerous
official ceremonies and, on one occasion, had even accompanied Antonio Gabu-
cio. Batiz said the statements “were being made merely to mislead, while the nar-
cotics traﬂicking continued ever more intensely and was shielded by officials.
Only when people fall into disfavor because of their greed does something happen
like what happened to Pérez Vazquez.” His own summary of events was as fol-
lows: “One of the drug traffickers supported by the administration decided to
work for himself, and it ended poorly. ”7

In the 1940s in California (United States), the world of organized crime in-
cluded ﬁgures such as Mickey Cohen, who began his career with Al Capone in
Chicago. Cohen’s name is linked to others such as Harold “Happy” Meltzer—who
had special contacts with Salvatore Duhart, the Mexican consul in Washington,
who made arrangements with Mexican customs to traﬂic opium—and his associ-
ate Max Cossman, also known as Max Weber, or “Step and a Half.” In his study of
the CIA’s involvement in drug trafficking, Alfred McCoy asserts that Meltzer
joined forces with Mickey Cohen. He does not mention “Bugsy” Siegel, from the
Luciano-Lansky group; however, he does say that Meltzer failed in his Mexican en-
deavor because he did not have adequate political contacts. Luciano, on the other
hand, had solid political power in Sicily and the support of criminal groups in
Marseilles and Corsica. In Marseilles, his associates enjoyed the support of the
city government and the CIA.8 According to Harry Anslinger, Siegel and Virginia
Hill negotiated with Mexican politicians in order to be able to ﬁnance the cultiva-
tion of opium poppy in the northwestern part of the country.9 In Baja California
Norte, Enrique Diarte emerged as an important opium trafﬁcker operating in
Mexicali and Tijuana. In 1944, Diarte was killed near Tijuana, a murder that Coss-
man was accused of masterminding. In the 1950s, Cossman-—under the name

Francisco Mora—made frequent trips to Culiacan, Los Mochis, and Mazatlan to

vi Contents

PA RT I 1 Crime and Governability in the U.S.—Mexican Borderlands

7.

10.

The Historical Dynamics of Smuggling in the
U.S.-Mexican Border Region, 1550-1998:

Reﬂections on Markets, Cultures, and Bureaucracies / 161
Louis R. Sadler

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability at
the U.S.-Mexico Border: Border Zone Dynamics / 177
Francisco javier Molina Ruiz V

Mexican Drug Syndicates in California / 199
Elias Castillo and Peter Unsinger

Conclusion / 217
john Bailey and Roy Godson

Notes / 225
About the Contributors / 259

Index / 263

66 Luis Astorga

purchase raw opium, which he paid for with fake jewels and counterfeit dollars.
Cossman is attributed with having funded the activities of a band of traffickers in
Sinaloa headed by Rodolfo Valdez, also known as “El Gitano,” who was a gunman
for the landholders from the south of the state and who killed the governor of
Sinaloa, Colonel Rodolfo T. Loaiza, in 1944. Cossman, also known as “the king of
opium,” was apprehended, jailed, and sentenced in Mexico City in 1949 and es-
caped from prison twice. His wife brought morphine and heroin into the Lecum-
berri prison in rubber bags underneath her clothing.”

Chihuahua and Coahuila

The smuggling of prohibited drugs in the northern border area began to be a
cause for political concern at the highest levels of the federal government, as is evi-
dent in the following historical reconstruction.

At the beginning of the 1930s, in a letter to General Eulogio Ortiz, military
commander of the state of Chihuahua, that was neither dated nor signed, the
sender referred to the general as a “friend and nephew.”” The tone and content of
that letter lead one to believe that it was sent by President Pascual Ortiz Rubio
himself. It expressed concern over “the increase in national and international nar-
cotics trafﬁcking along the rail line joining Mexico City and Ciudad Juarez.” For
that reason, he said he ordered the Department of Health to conduct a meticulous
investigation and to punish those found responsible. He reported that the depart-
ment had hired Juan Requena, a “secret agent,” and two others to handle the mat-
ter, all of whom, he adds, “are currently in Torreén.” Predicting the consequences,
he stated, “in charging those found responsible, the agents will undoubtedly run
into the difﬁculty of damaging important interests and will certainly need the as-
sistance of federal forces; I implore you to give orders providing them with all the
necessary support through the forces under your command.”

Inspector Requena sent a report, dated July 20, 1931, on his investigation to the
head of the Department of Public Health.” In that report he noted the results of
his work in Ciudad Juarez, then the capital of Chihuahua, and in Torreén over a
period of three months and ten days——since April 10, 1931. The above-mentioned
letter to General Ortiz must have been sent at some time between those two dates.

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 67

The task assigned to Requena and his agents does not appear to have been easy
or simple. In May 1931, during their stay in Ciudad Juarez, General Enrique Zer-
tuche Gonzalez ﬁrmly reminded federal health oﬂicer Dr. Alberto Jacqueminot
that he had not delivered the weapons that Requena had deposited in his office-
which apparently were conﬁscated—despite the verbal orders he had been given.
The doctor defended the actions of the federal health oﬂicers, who were “author—
ized to proceed as they did when carrying out a diﬂicult task in which they may
easily be putting their lives on the line,” and the doctor answered Zertuche
Gonzalez vigorously in writing that he received orders only from the head of the
Department of Health, which he had never been given verbally.”

On June 4, 1931, Requena received orders from the head of the Department of
Health to transfer to Torreén and was told to announce his departure from Ciu-
dad Juarez in the following terms: “The agent appointed by the federal govern-
ment to monitor the illicit trafficking in narcotics in the city has received orders
from higher up to work on a mission in the City of Los Angeles, California.” He
was asked not to divulge his destination to anyone and “that he be totally discreet
and ensure that the newspapers do not publish anything on the work you are to
carry out in that city, in order to make your actions more successful.”14

The results of the investigation by Requena and agents Piﬁa and Baca were
summarized in a conﬁdential memorandum from the Department of Public
Health (June 16, 1931).“ Torreén was listed as being the “main center for narcotics
traﬂicking in the populations linked together by the rail line from Mexico City to
Ciudad Juarez and for the international trafﬁcking carried out in this city.” It
stated that the agents had located the main traffickers and were merely waiting for
hard evidence to take legal action against them. However, the most relevant state-
ments are outlined in three points:

1. “One of the main culprits, Antonio Wong Yin, who is Chinese, is in constant
contact with the Municipal President of Torreén, Mr. Francisco Ortiz Garza.

II. He is also the ‘compadre’ of the Governor of the State of Coahuila, Mr.
Nazario Ortiz Garza.

III. General Jesﬁs Garzia [sic] Gutiérrez, the Head of State Operations, who re-
sides in Torreén, has dealings with another one of the narcotics trafﬁckers.”

68 Luis Astorga

Given the above, the agents had to suspend their investigation pending new
instructions, since they feared they did “not have sufﬁcient support from civilian
and military authorities in the state.” There were grounds for that concern.

In his report, Requena mentioned that many of the narcotics trafﬁckers in Ciu-
dad Juarez “have or had the support of civilian and federal authorities.”15 He
spoke of several Chinese men in the city of Chihuahua who supplied their fellow
countrymen in Juarez and of an American couple doing large-scale trafficking and
making trips by plane. He mentioned a person named Luis, or “El Texano,” who
was deported from the United States and was the supplier for many of the traffick-
ers in the border city. He further stated that he knew of connivance between civil-
ian authorities and railway employees in the cities of Chihuahua, Parral, Jiménez,
and Piedras Negras. As for the trafﬁckers, he stated that they all “have a complete
espionage service with elements prepared to do anything.”

Regarding Enrique Fernandez, “the ace trafﬁcker in Juarez,” Requena wrote
that on one occasion he was sent to Las Islas Marias for a “vice crime” and was
“saved” by the acting governor of Chihuahua (1929-1930), Luis Leon (Secretary of
Agriculture and Development in Calles’ cabinet and Secretary of Industry, Com-
merce, and Labor for Ortiz Rubio). He added that Fernandez, who had six police
officers in his service to protect him night and day and a “well—organized maﬁa,”
was in Mexico City and walked with a limp. He wrote that his brother Antonio
had been accused in Torreén of being a drug trafﬁcker and addict, along with
Samuel Chew, a Chinese man. Finally, he writes: “Antonio Wong Yin (the owner of
the Chinese Casino in Torreon, who was accused of vice crimes on several occa-
sions) is a close friend of the current governor of the state of Coahuila and is his
‘compadre. ’ The Governor used to be the Municipal President, a position held to-
day by one of his brothers in Torreon, and I myself witnessed Antonio Wong Yin
being close to the Municipal President and other authorities for two days.” He at-
tached a list of over eighty names of the main drug traffickers and dealers from
the capital and other parts of the country. Among those topping the list were
Simon and Antonio Fernandez, Daniel Gutiérrez (El Chiquito), José Hernandez,
and Francisco (Paco) Pérez. He further mentioned that in Topia, Durango, “there
is a large amount of land on which opium poppy is cultivated.” In addition, an
American told him that he suspected that the Chinese in the region engaged in
manufacturing opium."

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 69

More precise data on the criminal history of Enrique Fernandez Puerta, known
as the Al Capone of Juarez, were published by police reporter Salvador Martinez
Mancera between November 1937 and January 1938. Fernandez began his career
by smuggling alcohol and counterfeiting dollars. He then took up drug traﬂick-
ing. According to the journalist, Fernandez “eventually controlled city hall and
was a stepping stone for making many individuals who worked for the govern-
ment in Chihuahua wealthy, including three governors.”18 He strengthened his
power as strongman of Ciudad Juarez during the term of Deputy Governor
Roberto Fierro (1931-1932). At the end of Fierro’s term, the brothers of the official
candidate for governor, General Rodrigo Quevedo, seized city hall in Juarez and
declared war on Fernandez. General Quevedo served as governor from 1932 to
1936 and was mentioned in a letter to the Senate “left wing” and to the Perma-
nent Committee of the National Congress from Fernando Orozco, a candidate
for governor of Chihuahua, as the protector of Quevedo’s brother José, the muni-
cipal president of Ciudad Juarez, “in the illicit trafficking in opiates.”19 At the end
of 1933, Fernandez was shot and wounded. After receiving that message, he and
his men ﬂed to Mexico City, where he was later killed in Guardiola Park by gun-
men hired by the Quevedo brothers, or so it was said.“ In 1937, General and Doc-
tor José Siurob, head of the Department of Public Health, referred to Ciudad
Juarez as “possibly the most dangerous center where traffickers operate who are
corrupted by Allende el Bravo’s gangsterism and defend their trafficking with
gunﬁre.”21

The point of these vignettes is to suggest that there is evidence that a pattern of
control by politicians over criminals is more accurate than the contrary thesis that
posits the traﬂickers’ “penetration” of the clean, transparent, and virginal ﬁeld of
politics. A few years after the prohibition of marijuana (1920) and opium poppy
(1926), the reports of two ofﬁcials, Requena and Dr. Batiz, both of whom were in a
position to know what they were talking about, clearly showed that in the busi-
ness of drug trafficking there was solid ground for believing in the connivance,
protection, and support of authorities, even high-level ones. The observations by
these officials illustrate what could be deemed to be the origin of an endogenous
development within the power structure, not an exogenous, parallel, or unrelated

one, as is the more widespread perception today.

70 Luis Astorga

Sinaloa

The most signiﬁcant case of the crime-politics nexus of the 1940s took place
not in the border states in northern Mexico but rather in the northwest, in the
state of Sinaloa, where opium poppy had existed since at least the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. When the prohibitions began in the 19203, the cultivation
of opium poppy was primarily concentrated in four states: Sonora, Sinaloa, Chi-
huahua, and Durango. Trafﬁckers from Sinaloa showed greater dynamism in de-
veloping their business and were able to consolidate their positions at a time
when few people anticipated that it would boom in future decades.

In 1947, journalists for the Mexico City daily papers Excélsior, El Universal, and
Ultimas Noticias named General Pablo Macias Valenzuela—Secretary of War and
the Navy from 1940 to 1942 and governor of Sinaloa from 1945 to 195o—as con-
trolling or protecting opium trafficking in the state he led.” His defenders
claimed that this was a campaign orchestrated by his political enemies, who years
earlier had accused him having masterminded the assassination of then-governor
of Sinaloa, Colonel Rodolfo T. Loiza, in 1944. Months before these articles attack-
ing Valenzuela appeared, Harry Anslinger, the head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Narcotics and a delegate to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
had declared that Mexico was the main supplier of the opium consumed in the
United States. He also said that high-level state authorities in drug-producing ar-
eas had dealings in the drug business. The accusations against Valenzuela
emerged during the preparation of the antidrug “campaign” by the administra-
tion of Miguel Aleman, which was started by the Ofﬁce of the Attorney General in
1947-

Sinaloa was portrayed in the press as “the most brazen center for trade in opi-
ates.” Culiacén, the state capital, was described as the “opium smugglers’ base of
operations.” The municipality of Badiraguato, the main producer of opium
poppy, was dubbed “opium central” and the “hideout for hundreds of hoodlums.”
It was also published that for at least twenty years (since 1927) the governors of
Sinaloa had been “accomplices in opium production.” It was said that many peo-
ple referred to Governor Valenzuela as “one of the ringleaders of the gang of
traﬂickers.” Federal oﬂicials asked the press to “avoid insolence, exaggeration, and

lies that may hinder the success of the investigations or unduly compromise the

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 71

country's prestige.” The tension decreased after President Miguel Aleman’s trip to
Chihuahua and Sinaloa in the second half of November 1947. Two days after the
president’s visit to Mazatlan, Valenzuela issued an oﬂicial communiqué rejecting
the accusations made by the press, which he called “extremely offensive,” “slan—
derous,” and “extravagant fantasies.” Nothing was proved, but suspicions re-
mained. The governor completed his term, and in 1951 was appointed to head
Military Region I, the headquarters of which is in the Valley of Mexico, and to run
the Military Camp Number One in 1952. The main opium trafiicker of the time,
Miguel Urias Uriarte from Badiraguato, was captured and released shortly there-
after, and it was said that he was protected by the authorities.”

Sonora

The banks of the Yaqui, Mayo, Concepcion, and Moctezuma Rivers and the Al-
tar region were mentioned in press accounts as places where opium poppy was
grown. General Abelardo L. Rodriguez was the governor of Sonora at the time of
the accusations against Macias in Sinaloa. He considered Sonora to be exclusively
a traﬂicking state, although he could not deny the existence of production ﬁelds in
some of the above—mentioned locations. Days before the Macias case broke, the
rumors heard in the PGR and published in the national press said that two north-
ern governors were “involved in narcotics traﬂicking”; however, a second name
was never given. In a note sent from Hermosillo, a journalist from the Excélsior
stated that Sinaloa was the center of drug trafﬁcking.“

In Sonora, the head of the Social Prevention Police and other agents under his
command were accused of permitting the planting of opium poppy. In the munic-
ipality of Soyopa, the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) discovered and de-
stroyed a 4,ooo-square-meter irrigated plot near the ranch of Francisco Lan-
davazo, a Mexican congressman. Among those detained was a cousin of the
congressman, who was an officer in the Social Prevention Police. The land was oc-
cupied by the municipal president of Soyopa, J. Dolores Moreno, who ﬂed upon
the arrival of federal agents. According to neighbors, Landavazo was “one of the
largest drug trafﬁckers who (controlled) opium production in the region."25

72 Luis Astorga

Northern and Central Mexico

In the northern states, governors and other politicians were suspected of being
involved in drug trafﬁcking, and the situation was not very different in the capital
of the country. Carlos I. Serrano was named in a conﬁdential document sent on
September 4, 1947, by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico to the secretary of state, based
on a report by Maurice C. Holden, assistant military attaché. Holden reported on
the recent establishment of the National Security Police (DFS), a political police
force under the command of the president, with authority over all other police
forces and the authority to investigate drug-related matters. Serrano was a senator
and leader in the House and a close advisor to President Miguel Aleman and the
true head of the DFS. Also mentioned in the report were Marcelino Inurreta, the
ofﬁcial head of that organization, and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Magoral, the
third in command. All were listed as being involved in drug trafﬁcking. The re-
port stated that Magoral controlled marijuana trafficking in Mexico City. It
recorded the suspicion that these individuals requested information from the U.S.
government and used it to get rid of their competition and control the business.
Treasury Department calculations on drug trafficking in Mexico at that time
ranged between $20 million and $60 million (U.S. dollars) annually. The Ameri-
can military attaché compared the DFS to the Gestapo because of the powers it
had been given and the extremely dubious background of those persons recruited
to form it. The legal attaché of the U.S. Embassy indicated that it was too early to
determine who would dominate in the DFS—the FBI-trained officers he deemed
to be good or those well known for being bad.”

Until 1947, the Department of Health was the institution responsible for the
antidrug policy, and so the agents who destroyed prohibited crops were from the
Health Police. Given the vastness of the territory on which there were plots and
the small number of agents, it was physically impossible for them to fulﬁll their
task. However, that was not the only problem. In 1937, the head of the Depart-
ment of Health himself commented that “in the past” the agents were paid with
the drugs they seized, which, of course, they then sold. Some of the elements that
helped strengthen the inclination of individuals and groups—both in and out of
positions of power—to traﬂic illicit drugs included the increased demand for
drugs during World War II; the aforementioned shortages and practices of health

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 73

department agents; the testimony of specialized agents and health ofﬁcials; and
the constant suspicion of powerful politicians who perpetuated their inherited
ways and enjoyed the impunity stemming from belonging to the governing elite.

Starting in the 1930s there were proposals for the PGR to manage antidrug ac-
tivities. At that time, President Cardenas supported the health authorities. In the
postwar period, the U.S. government stepped in more aggressively as a leader on
the international scene for determining the speciﬁcations of the antidrug policy.
They did so because of concerns over the possibility of increased drug trafficking
and consumption resulting from the habits acquired by the soldiers and the resis-
tance by producers and traffickers to giving up such a proﬁtable business. In this
context, the ﬁrst civilian president since the Revolution, Miguel Alemzin, ap-
pointed the PGR as the institution responsible for drug issues, beginning in 1947.
Meanwhile,ithe Mexican Army was in a ﬁill “campaign” or “ﬁght against drugs” to
support the PGR, primarily by destroying growing plots. Because it had more re-
sources, and as the only institution capable of covering the entire country——but
formally and legally subordinated to the PGR——the army was in a key position for
mediation, containment, or control of the producers and traffickers and the Mexi-
can Federal Judicial Police (FJP), the DFS, and those in political power. From that
time on and for several decades, the secrecy of the military institution, the mutual
protection of political families belonging to the official party, and the law of si-
lence drew attention exclusively to accusations against the trafﬁckers, police
agents, commanders, and other low-level ofﬁcials who were accused of corruption
or of protecting or being trafﬁckers.

It should be noted that of all the northern border states, only Chihuahua was a
large drug producer after the 1940s. Another drug-producing state not along the
border, but closely linked to the American market through agricultural exports
since the beginning of the twentieth century, was Sinaloa, which became the
home base for the most powerﬁil, visible traﬂickers in the country. From then on,
the most spectacular raids to destroy illicit crops, such as Operation Condor in the
1970s, contributed to crop replacement and the exodus of experienced growers
and traffickers to other states, ready to meet the growing demand of the American
market.

An informant recruited by the DEA in 1986, who claimed to have worked in
the DFS from 1973 to 1981, stated that some of the commanders in the DFS itself

74 Luis Astorga

had advised and organized the traﬂickers in Sinaloa so they could play in the big
league, using Jalisco as a base, after Operation Condor.” This version of the story
was abandoned by U.S. authorities in order to broadly disseminate the thesis
of drug trafﬁckers’ “penetrating” power structures. Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo,
the main traﬂicker from the mid-1970s to 1989—the year he was captured in
Guadalajara-—was a pioneer of cocaine traﬂicking in Mexico and had special con-
tacts with the Colombians. He began his career as a judicial police oﬂicer in
Sinaloa and (in the 1960s) as a bodyguard to the governor of that state, Leopoldo
Sanchez Celis, who was also the best man at his wedding. Félix Gallardo, who
stood as best man for the former governor’s son, was killed when arranging to
visit his godfather in prison in Mexico City. This event is more revealing when one
notes that most of the groups of trafﬁckers currently in operation were from this
organization and were headed by Sinaloans. What has been lost over time, or
rather has been hidden, is the name or names of the political patrons of each of
the groups. The “penetration” thesis assumes that the trafﬁckers had autonomous
backgrounds, or at least assumes a reversal of the trafﬁckers’ relationship of de-
pendence on political power and their subordination to that power beginning at a

given time.

Prohibition and Violence

At different times, the violence in drug trafﬁcking has been compared to that
which broke out in the United States during Prohibition. Al Capone and Chicago
are frequently mentioned as a shorthand reference to a basic historic event, which
became a paradigm for illicit business. For example, Enrique Fernandez Puerta
was known as the “Al Capone of Juarez” in the 1930s, and Culiacén, the capital of
Sinaloa, was described in the 1950s as “Chicago with gangsters in huaraches.”
Sicily and the Cosa Nostra, or Medellin, Cali, and the Colombian trafﬁckers also
have certain preferences among the professional labelers. One characteristic of
the discourse on drugs was the mechanical use of categories of perception bor-
rowed from other ﬁelds and situations, regardless of the country and the particu-
lar characteristics of the society in question. Another was the variety of names
used to describe this phenomenon and the social agents before the stage of con-
ceptual universalization and homogenization.

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 75

Some names from the 1920s that were associated with the illegal drug trade
are: plundering criminals, despicable drug dealers, public poisoners. From the
1930s: international narcotics maﬁa, gang, underworld, international bands or
rings. From the 1940s: internationally and nationally organized bands, bands of
drug traflickers, international band of trafﬁckers, and international trust. From
the 1950s: racketeers and international narcotics bands. From the 1960s: interna-
tional organization of drug traffickers. From the 1970s: maﬁa of the gomeros (“gum
makers"). From the 1980s and 1990s: cartels, drug trafficking maﬁas, organized
crime, federation. Criminalized in the 1920s in Mexico, drug trafficking very
quickly became associated with the international market. Of course, there are
smaller groups that trafﬁc within the country; however, the largest ones operate
on the international scene. The discourse that perceives this phenomenon as be-
ing part of organized crime or that uses this category of perception as part of its
universe is to a great extent a product of the 1980s and 1990s, the beginning of the
post—Cold War era.” From the beginning, the names used implicitly considered
two aspects: crime and organization.

The ﬁreﬁghts between traffickers and police ofﬁcers and the military grew in
direct proportionto the increase in the demand for drugs, the expansion of the
market, and the arrival of a new generation of traflickers. Deaths of those on the
side of the law were of the lowest ranking officers in the respective agencies. At the
end of the 1960s, there appears to have been a shift in the implicit rules of the
game, since those killed were higher up in the hierarchy. Instead of mere agents or
common soldiers, it was no longer rare—although not very common either——for
heads of the judicial police or commanders to be killed, particularly in drug-pro-
ducing states or those where there was intense traﬂicking. For example, Major
Ramon Virrueta Cruz, the head of the judicial police of Sinaloa, was killed in Culi-
acan on June 6, 1969. Alfredo Reyes Curiel, deputy chief of the judicial police of
Sinaloa, and Major Gustavo Samano, military advisor for Operation Condor, were
killed in 1977 in that same city.” However, there is still widespread doubt about
whether they died fulﬁlling their duties or because they were playing a double
game. The gross statistics do not make these qualitative distinctions. The bands
were breaking their old codes and were openly ﬁghting among themselves in
broad daylight in urban areas where innocent civilians were killed in the crossﬁre.

The comparison with Prohibition—era Chicago went back to the front pages of

List of Tables and Illustrations

TAB LE 1.1 Mexico: Images of the Political-Criminal
Nexus / 16

TAB LE 1. 2 Borderlands: Images of the Political-
Criminal Nexus / 21

TAB LE 4.1 Expenditures of Parties in the 1994 Mexican Presi-
dential Campaign / 90

TABLE 4 . 2 PRI Campaign Expenditures in the
1994 Tabasco Governor’s Race / 95

TABLE 4. 3 Public Financing of Political Parties / 97

TAB LE 4 .4 Increases in Public Financing of Political
Parties, 1992-1997 / 99

TABLE 5.1 Reorganization of PGR, August 1996 / 112

TABLE 5. 2 Number of Judicial Police, 1988-1998 / 118

TAB LE 5 .3 Budget of the Oﬂice of the Attorney
General of the Republic / 124

TABLE 6.1 Military Regions, 1997 / 130

TAB LE 6. 2 Gross Domestic Product, Government Expendi-
tures, and Military Expenditures, 1990-1995 / 156

TABLE 6 .3 Size of the Armed Forces, 1986-1995 / 157
TABLE 6.4 Members of the Armed Forces, 1990-1995 / 158

FIG URE 6 .1 Organization of the Mexican Army, 1997 / 129

vii

76 Luis Astorga

the press in Sinaloa, since it was in that state where the problem ﬁrst manifested
itself with the greatest force. The federal and state governments felt the situation
merited military intervention. Former governor Sanchez Celis, who was no
stranger to this subject, stated that in his day there was no need to call in the
troops, implying that the situation could have been resolved politically by state
authorities. Some thought the unbridled violence of the 1970s had exceeded toler-
able limits and the local government’s ability to control it and that therefore a
spectacular raid, a larger military operation, was necessary. Others felt that it was
nothing that could not be resolved through political negotiation, in other words,
the situation in itself was not ungovernable and the traﬂickers were not more
powerful than the authorities. Rather it was due to the political ineptitude of Gov-
ernor Alfonso G. Calderon in imposing minimum rules for peaceful coexistence.
In his administration, Sanchez Celis is credited with having told trafﬁckers, whom
he knew very well: “Get out from Sinaloa; kill each other somewhere else. Do not

work here anymore.”3°

Who's in Charge?

Beginning in 1985, the year in which Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent, and Al-
fredo Zavala, a Mexican pilot, were kidnapped and killed, the U.S. government
put more political pressure on the Mexican government. More than ever before,
stories of complicity between the traffickers and police and high-level ofﬁcials
came to light. Some of those persons were apprehended, tried, and sentenced;
others were merely named, but hard evidence was never presented against them,
and they continued their political life. Yet to this day some of them still do not
dare travel to the United States. The trafﬁckers accused of these murders, Rafael
Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca, were captured almost immediately, but it
took four more years to capture the “Chief of Chiefs,” Félix Gallardo. The oligop—
oly of Sinaloan traffickers, which already had representatives in Ojinaga—such as
Amado Carrillo“ in Pablo Acosta’s group—-was apparently weakened, but not for
long since other groups broke loose from it and extended their bases of operations
to other states. In a few years, these “splinter groups” proved to be at least as pow-
erful as their predecessors.

In addition to Pablo Acosta’s group in Ojinaga, in Tamaulipas Juan Garcia

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 77

Abrego’s group was consolidated. It grew rapidly during the Salinas administra-
tion (1988——1994) but was weakened when his term ended. Since the 1920s, the
drug-producing and -traflicking areas of the country have been primarily domi-
nated by northwestern trafﬁckers, particularly those from Sinaloa. The strongest
competition ever for the oligopoly of Sinaloan traﬂickers came from a border area
with a long tradition of smuggling, but which until then had not been much of a
factor in drug traﬂicking. One of the key ﬁgures in reestablishing the power dy-
namic among the groups of traffickers in the country was the then commander of
the PJF from Tamaulipas, Guillermo Gonzalez Calderoni. He led the police raid
that killed Pablo Acosta (1987),32 arrested Jaime Herrera Nevares and Jaime Her-
rera Herrera (1987),33 captured Félix Gallardo (1989), and, according to an under-
cover FBI agent (SA 2620-OC) operating within the organization of trafﬁckers in
the Gulf, Calderoni was Garcia Abrego’s protector and partner, or at least had
been since 1986. Accused of “inexplicable” enrichment in 1993, Calderoni ﬂed to
the United States, where he is currently a member of the witness protection pro-
gram. When faced with possible extradition to Mexico, the former commander
revealed that he worked as a political spy for Raul Salinas, the brother of the for-
mer president, who, in turn, is suspected of having protected Garcia Abrego and
is currently (2000) in prison for various offenses. These include illicit enrichment
and the murder of his former brother-in—law and general secretary of the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PR1), José Francisco Ruiz Massieu. Calderoni threat-
ened to “remember” a great many things if the Mexican government insisted that
he be extradited.“

Garcia Abrego was captured in 1996 and was immediately deported to the
United States, because Mexican and American authorities had agreed that he was
born in the United States and thus was a U.S. citizen, despite other proof indicat-
ing that he was born on a ranch in Tamaulipas.35 President Zedillo justiﬁed that
decision to legislators in a private meeting (as some attendees leaked to the press)
by arguing that Abrego was a very dangerous ﬁgure and that he could carry out a
destabilizing raid in a short period of time. The spokesperson for the president de-
nied this account.” Interestingly, when the search for Garcia Abrego was on, there
were no desperate acts of violence from someone who felt persecuted and cor-
nered or who had the destabilizing power he purportedly had. Furthermore, the

most sensitive economic indicators did not move in a way that caused concern

78 Luis Astorga

during the search for him or after he was captured. Either Garcia Abrego was an
example of nationalism and civility, since there was neither capital ﬂight nor blind
violence, or the authorities or those leaking the information exaggerated the story.

The Arellano Félix brothers in Tijuana and Amado Carrillo in Ciudad Juarez
were all originally from Sinaloa. According to authorities, the former were kin-
related to Félix Gallardo, and the latter was kin-related to Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo
and became the undisputed masters of their respective territories. The Arellano
brothers were involved in the murder of Cardinal Posadas in May 1993 because of
a “mix-up,” according to the official version. They were also named as the master-
minds of a failed murder attempt on Amado Carrillo in November of that same
year, as well as successful attempts against a long list of other important police
chiefs. After Garcia Abrego was captured, American authorities named Carrillo
the most powerful drug traﬂicker in Mexico and the world. To develop and con-
solidate his position, he seems to have favored distributing money rather than
bullets, of course without rejecting the law of the “goats horn” (AK-47).

Several unsuccessﬁil military raids on the Arellano brothers were launched.
Then, in February 1997, the head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs
(INCD), General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, was jailed, accused of protecting Car-
rillo even before he reached this position.” Carrillo, the traveling, cosmopolitan
traﬂicker, was pursued and ﬂed and hid; he would be sighted either in Russia or
the Middle East, or in South America and the Caribbean. He had become invisible
in Mexico several years earlier and was able to go undetected by U.S. authorities
on his frequent trips to Las Vegas,” by Israeli authorities on his trip to Jerusalem,
and by Cuban authorities. He ofﬁcially died from side effects of a medicine ap-
plied after plastic surgery to change his appearance in a clinic in Mexico City.” It
is strange that Carrillo chose to have the surgery performed in the capital where
he was sought most, when he could have had the surgery anywhere in the world
where he traveled without any problem. Was it a suicidal act, supreme unaware-
ness, the greater challenge, or was it simply the place where he would be best pro-
tected?

With Amado Carrillo’s departure from the scene, reports about murders along
the northern border, particularly in Ciudad Juarez but also in Tamaulipas, where
Garcia Abrego’s successor appears to be operating silently and unspectacularly,

have begun to appear in the press. The new outbreak of violence is likely the result

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 79

of ﬁghts between rival trafficking groups for control of the market and hegemony
in drug trafficking in Mexico.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussions present at least ﬁve stages in the development of
drug traﬂicking in Mexico. The ﬁrst is the formation and consolidation of the
postrevolutionary state. In that stage, prominent members of the governing polit-
ical elite or people very close to them—especially in the northern states that pro-
duce prohibited commodities or that are trafficking sites—are mentioned as di-
rectly controlling drug trafficking, among other activities. In some instances there
is direct testimony from Mexican and American authorities; in others, there is
only suspicion. The problem in moving beyond mere suspicion, in the past and
today, is that those suspected were (are) both judge and jury.

The second stage began in 1947, when the PGR took over from health authori-
ties in the antidrug area. That same year the DFS was established and granted au-
thority to act in this ﬁeld. In addition, the army was more openly involved in the
task of destroying plots where marijuana and opium poppy were grown. In this
way, police forces, which were primarily but not exclusively civilian, became the
structural mediator between the hegemonic political power and the drug traffick-
ers. They were given authority but not absolute autonomy to operate in the busi-
ness to their beneﬁt. They established mechanisms that made institutional con-
trol possible and simultaneously extended the social groups that could beneﬁt
economically. This was the deﬁnition of the maxim: “I don’t want you to give it to
me, just show me where to get some.”

The third stage runs from the end of the 1960s, in particular from the second
half of the 1970s, to the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. A greater number of documented
cases of violence occurred among traffickers and between them and the police and
military. During those years there was increased demand for marijuana and co-
caine in the American market. President Nixon implemented Operation Intercept
in 1969, and in northeastern Mexico the army began to participate more visibly
and spectacularly in Operation Condor, which officially began‘ in 1977. It became
diﬂicult to effectively control the new generation of traffickers and their larger

number, within the socially tolerable limits of violence.

80 Luis Astorga

The fourth stage began in 1985, with the assassination of DEA agent Enrique
Camarena and Mexican pilot Alfredo Zavala. For the ﬁrst time, American authori-
ties publicly named politicians and high-level police and military officers as pro-
tectors of drug traﬂickers. The president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, pro-
moted the “war on drugs,” and in 1986, the year in which the annual certiﬁcation
process for producing and trafficking countries began, he declared drug trafﬁck-
ing a threat to national security. Mexico joined the neoliberal economic current
and subscribed to the Reaganite view on drug issues. At the end of the 1980s, the
PR1 began to lose important political positions when Ernesto Ruffo of the Na-
tional Action Party (PAN) became governor of Baja California. There were addi-
tional examples of the break with the old methods of controlling criminal groups,
especially in the states where the political opposition was gaining ground, such as
Chihuahua, Jalisco, and Baja California. It seemed as if the displacement of the
PR1 in some regions had accelerated the dismantling of the mechanisms for medi-
ation between those in political power and the traﬂickers. The assassination of
Cardinal Posadas, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI candidate for President, and José
Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the General Secretary of the PRI, were without a doubt
signs that the governing class had broken its own rules and that “hunting season”
had begun.

In short, and this is the ﬁfth stage, what we are witnessing in Mexico at the end
of the 1990s and into the new millennium is the accelerated breakup of the
postrevolutionary political system, of a structure based on the concentration of
power in the institutional presidency, of the existence of an official party that has
governed for almost seven decades, and the subordination of the legislative and
judicial branches to the executive. This caving-in of the old system and the emer-
gence of a new correlation of national political forces following the legislative elec-
tions of July 6, 1997, make it possible to end traditional control mechanisms. For
example, the control agents such as the police and the army served as structural
mediators between the hegemonic political power and the trafﬁckers, but they
acted under political control, as operational bodies regulating the market and the
number of traffickers necessary for the business’s scale of operations.

This accelerated breakdown of the old system has created conditions in which
the trafﬁckers can express their rebellious spirit, their desire and capacity for au-

tonomy, and their will to throw off the customary patterns of submission. They

Organized Crime and the Organization of Crime 81

do not necessarily seek to take over the political power that shielded and nurtured
them; but they do want to be considered among the major players in the new
game with its new power relationships. They seek to improve their bargaining po-
sition in the reorganization of a business that will continue, given the realities of
illegal drugs: strong criminalization and high demand. This is the case even with
the introduction of the military into the antidrug effort, as for example in the case
of Chihuahua in November 1995 and the subsequent expanded militarization of
antidrug law enforcement.“ Even so, the trafﬁckers’ economic power does not
translate automatically into political power, as “spontaneous sociology” would
have it. Put another way, the one that pays does not necessarily rule alone: the ob-
ligation may remain to pay for the “franchise” and to continue operating, more or
less as in the early years of the 1900s. And even if that actor does rule, it is not ab-
solutely or at all levels, all the time.

Recent changes in the correlation of forces in Mexico have created a context in
which democratic forces have not been able to consolidate or to impose the rule of
law over the working agreements among power groups, including both estab-
lished and new bands of trafﬁckers, that do not respect democratic civility. This
might lead to an extreme scenario, in which an understanding might be reached
among some ex-members of the DFS, the Judicial Police, and the army, along with
hard-line PRIistas (both in and out of power) and trafﬁckers to join forces and em-
ploy the drug trade to generate resources. These resources would enable such a
coalition to exercise inﬂuence in a variety of ways, possibly to complicate or even
reverse the democratic transition, since a democratic system would presumably
expel criminal—political alliances from government and subject them to stricter
controls. The power that organized crime has attained in present-day Russia
shows that alliances among those displaced from the old order are hardly ﬁcti—
tious.

Inﬂuential PRIistas of the hard line, including governors, ex—governors, high-
level former and current bureaucrats (some of whom have been identiﬁed in the
national and foreign media as connected with drug trafﬁckers) with the ambition
to assemble a coalition that might support a presidential candidacy could form al-
liances among themselves and with like-minded currents in the military. Some of
the military actors might hold commands in the antidrug campaigns. These ele-

ments would be in a strong position to ﬁnance such a project, but conceivably as

82 Luis Astorga

groups within the military seeking their own political space. Such a scenario, car-
ried to a negative extreme, would suggest an effort to resuscitate an authoritarian
system that deﬁes death. In sum, the problem of organized crime and governabil-
ity, in this case drug trafficking, is closely related to the particular forms in which
crime has been structurally and historically organized. Understanding that dialec-
tic is the ﬁrst step in imagining possible solutions.

Chapter 4

Organized Crime and Political

Campaign Finance in Mexico

Leonardo Curzio

ONE or THE MOST DEBATED topics in modern dem-
ocracies relates to ﬁnancing the activities of political parties. In
North America, Europe, and Latin America, this issue is high on
the political agenda. Furthermore, in some countries, irregular
contributions have resulted in widely publicized scandals, and,
in others, in intense legal-political controversies in order to es-
tablish legal frameworks to promote more equal electoral com-
petition. Restrictive regulations or controls on funding received
by political institutions have been modiﬁed recently. Countries
have undertaken these reforms in order to diminish the bias of il-
legal or illegitimate funding of political parties.

Recent practices of political competition have spurred the
progressive commercialization of electoral campaigns, which in
turn has required an extensive ﬂow of resources to enable the
parties to function.‘ The need for money, generated by rising
campaign costs, lies at the root of the increasing relevance of this
theme. In fact, illegal ﬁnancing of parties is only sparsely covered
in the specialized literature? Traditionally, the possibility that
more powerful economic groups could control party structures
was emphasized because it was thought that parties would be
used as an instrument of oligarchic control or as a lever to trans-
mit sectorial or foreign interests? Similar concerns about party
ﬁnancing are also reﬂected in laws that regulate campaign contri-
butions, establishing explicit prohibitions against money from

private companies or foreign interests above speciﬁc limits.

83

84 Leonardo Curzio

However, little has been said about the possibility that money coming from or-
ganized crime might make its way into the political system through ﬁnancing of
political parties. But this is a topic that requires careful attention. As stated by Pe-
ter Lupsha: “In several nations organized crime has turned into a key political ac-
tor, an interest group, a sectorial player that must be taken into consideration by
the legitimate political system.”4 V

It is not easy to conclusively establish links between organized crime and polit-
ical systems, but there are indicators occurring in certain circumstances that can
be used to establish areas where they complement each other.5

What do criminal organizations need to operate in a country? First, they need
police protection. They also need ﬁnancial mobility and protection to launder
their earnings and bring them into the legal economic system. Political protection
is harder to see, but it is also important in creating a powerful buffer against law
enforcement and judicial authorities if they decide to move against a criminal or-
ganization. These minimal necessities are what prompt criminal organizations to
inﬁltrate government and corrupt public officials to win the complicity or toler-
ance needed to continue or expand criminal activities.

It seems reasonable to suppose that if $3oo—-5oo billion, according to varying
estimates, is laundered worldwide each year, some part of that is going to disap-
pear into the political systems of the countries suffering the plague of organized
crime.6 This is made more likely by the fact that ﬁnancing political activities de-
mands enormous quantities of money. The illegal funds being shufﬂed from coun-
try to country in search of a place to be invested or otherwise protected are not all
attributable to organized crime. In general terms, the money may have three ori-
gins: tax evasion, governmental and transnational corruption,7 and organized
crime earnings.8

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the possible links between organized
crime——especially drug trafﬁcking—and political activity in Mexico. We will ﬁrst
analyze the evolution of organized crime into a national security problem. Once
we have established this, we will study the ever-controversial question of what has
come to be called “narco-politics." In Mexico the issue of narco-politics is at the
center of four recent episodes of national importance. The ﬁrst is the investigation
into Raul Salinas Gortari, brother of the former president, for money laundering

and other crimes. The second are rumors that drug money found its way into

Organized Crime and Political Campaign Finance 85

President Ernesto Zedillo’s campaign coffers. The third is the breakdown of con-
sensus between the government and the president in negotiations on electoral re-
form. The fear of organized crime inﬁltrating the political system was so great in
the early 1990s that the reform authorized a more than 1,000 percent increase, in
nominal terms, in political party ﬁnancing. The fourth episode focused on cam-
paign spending in November 1994 by Tabasco Governor Roberto Madrazo, who
according to the Mexican attorney general’s office spent more than $36 million,
some of which came from Carlos Cabal Peniche, a fugitive ex-banker with links to
drug traﬂicking. In the conclusion, I will try to establish a relationship between
organized crime and governability in contemporary Mexico.

Politics and Drug Trafficking in Mexico

In the last several years, there has been a debate over whether Mexico is a
“narco-democracy.” The term was popularized by Eduardo Valle, better known by
his nickname “The Owl.” The Owl was a leader of the Mexican left who repre-
sented the National Democratic Front, known by its Spanish acronym FDN, on
the federal electoral board in 1988. When Jorge Carpizo was appointed attorney
general in January 1993, Valle was named his special advisor for drug trafficking
issues. He later ﬂed to the United States under the protection of the FBI. In 1995,
he wrote a controversial book entitled The Second Shot: Mexican Narco-Demon
rat)/.9 Valle enjoyed some inﬂuence in the press, but this later declined. Neverthe-
less, his allegations of Mexican narco-democracy have had an impact in major
publications, as reﬂected in the widely cited article by Silvana Paternostro.1°

Beyond what Valle has written and stated, Mexico has become the base for
some of the world’s biggest criminal organizations. The existence of powerful
criminal groups can be found in a variety of academic and official documents.“
These groups are involved in a range of illicit activities but their main focus is on
drug trafficking.

Drug traﬂicking and related activities like money laundering have risen in pri-
ority on the Mexican and U.S. security agendas, and on the bilateral agendas of
both countries. In Mexico, the illegal drug trade has gone from being a problem
restricted to certain regions (like Sinaloa or Jalisco) to having a direct impact on

the country’s national security.” It quickly became a problem that reached be-